Rethinking Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of Great Powers"

In 1987, Paul Kennedy, a professor of history at Yale University, published his famous book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. With its global vision, fascinating insights, and rich and informative historical analysis, the book has caused a sensation in international academic and political circles once it was published, and has been translated into 23 languages so far. Kennedy has publicly stated that in 2022, he will revise and add new chapters to The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. At the same time, today, when the international system is facing extensive and profound adjustments, international political scholars still talk about the rise and fall of great power and the change of international power involved in this book. So, what kind of academic judgment is based on Kennedy's prophecy of the direction of great powers? How should we rethink the contemporary significance of The Rise and Fall of Great Powers? What are the determinants of a country's rise and fall? In order to explore the above questions, the reporter sorted out the views of relevant academic circles and interviewed foreign scholars.

　　Predicting that the United States will go into "relative decline"

　　In his book, Kennedy examines the evolution of great power and the changing world pattern between 1500 and 2000. In the final chapter, he predicts that the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Western Europe will become the five centers of power in the 21st century. Among them, the prediction that the United States will go to "relative decline" was highly valued by the US Congress at that time, and Kennedy was also controversial. In an interview with the media, Kennedy responded that the rise and fall of a country should be judged based on a general trend in 50, 100 or even 150 years. The United States will not immediately decline or collapse, but if the series of problems caused by overextending persist, the United States will become relatively depressed.

　　Kennedy still says the book's main point that "the economic base of a great power determines and influences its relative status" does not need to be changed. Kennedy believed that only by investing enough resources to maintain economic growth could it maintain its position as a great power. As he writes in the book, "The shift in economic power heralds the rise of new powers." ”

　　Another of Kennedy's core arguments was that economic potential determines military power and that there is an interaction between the two. "Wealth is usually the basis for supporting military power, and military power is always needed to acquire and defend it," he said. When great powers realize that they are in decline during periods of relative decline, they become more aware of the "insecurity" of the international environment and instinctively spend more money on defense and security, and thus the resources for economic investment or productive wealth creation decline. When the balance of the day is tilted too much toward unproductive military power, the domestic economy will inevitably be dragged down, and eventually weaken the overall strength of the country. Thus, Kennedy concluded, the ever-expanding foreign strategy led to a rise in military spending, which ultimately overwhelmed the country's economic base and was the beginning of a long-term decline of a great power. It was on this basis that Kennedy made a prediction that the United States would go into relative decline.

　　The warning of "national overextensibility" still makes sense

　　In the book, Kennedy questions the large-scale military intervention of some countries in other countries: What is the cost of these military operations? What can this country afford? Will costly military operations create large deficits and ultimately weaken rather than strengthen national security? Kennedy explained that the potential benefits of outward expansion are likely to be offset by the enormous costs paid for it. If the country is in a period of relative economic recession, this dilemma will become even more serious. For Kennedy's warning, many scholars agree.

　　Robert Toplin, emeritus professor emeritus of the History Department at the University of North Carolina, wrote that "the danger of national overextension is still of great practical significance" is the main argument made by Paul Kennedy in his book The Rise and Fall of Great Powers.

　　It was in this domestic context that Kennedy's book came out in the 1980s when the American public was concerned about the ballooning defense budget under President Reagan, Toplin wrote. The book's arguments have aroused great interest among American readers, especially the explanation of the correlation between the economy and the military has resonated with a large number of Americans. But shortly after the publication of The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, public interest in the book waned dramatically. The reason is that the Germans overthrew the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The strong development of the US economy made Kennedy's prediction of "American decline" look less convincing, and many people called him a "bad prophet". In the late '90s, the U.S. government had a budget surplus —and the American people were expecting more hope than for the country to progress, not decline.

　　However, in the 21st century, the American people are once again plunged into an unquenchable pessimism. Toplin writes that it is well known that the U.S. economy has lost its traction and that the deficit is spiraling upwards. Kennedy's remarks as early as 1987 were quite insightful at this time. Topplin mentioned that the United States accounts for nearly half of the world's military spending, and U.S. troops are currently stationed in more than 150 countries. In a book co-authored by Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard political science professor Linda Bilms argue that U.S. military investment in Iraq and Afghanistan was nearly 10 times greater than in the first Gulf War, 1/3 more than in the Vietnam War, and twice as much as when the United States fought in World War I. The New York Times commented that the war harmed the interests of Americans and seriously affected the US economy.

　　Alfred M. Thompson, an expert on the history of world empires, said that he would not be able to do so. Alfred W. McCoy has analyzed a series of "shadow wars" launched by the United States after the Cold War to maintain its expansionary hegemony. He believes that in addition to hundreds of military bases surrounding the world, fearsome nuclear weapons reserves, large-scale air and sea power and overseas troops, the United States has built a powerful secret weapon of war through the National Security Agency's surveillance of the world, the CIA's covert operations on other continents, cyber warfare, election manipulation, and so on.

　　In his book, Kennedy warns that "policymakers in Washington must face the embarrassing and enduring fact that the sum of America's interests and obligations around the globe is far greater than America's ability to defend them simultaneously." In addition to the United States, Kennedy also used considerable ink to describe the process of Germany and Japan's rise to the ranks of world powers through military expansion in the 1930s and 1940s, and called both militaristic "revisionist" countries. Some scholars believe that Germany and Japan started with the war and fell into decline because of the war. Therefore, it is not advisable to use military expansion to address domestic resource shortages. This view doesvetail with Kennedy's "danger of national overextension."

　　As Kennedy emphasized, the leaders of any country should be aware of the interplay between military strategy and economic development. "If a country's policymaking is beyond the capacity of its material resources, the country will be less secure in the long run." This conclusion still seems to be of great cautionary significance today.

　　Some of Kennedy's views need to be revisited

　　While affirming the strategic ideas and academic value of The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, many scholars believe that Kennedy's thought cannot get rid of the traditional historical framework after all. As a historian, Kennedy's judgment of international relations is based on a world historical perspective rather than the international system itself. Kennedy's reflection on the rise and fall of the world's great powers, the successes and failures of the lessons learned, is more of a "law summed up from historical events."

　　Kennedy wrote in his book: "A troublesome protracted war is a touchstone for testing the strength of both sides... It goes without saying that in a protracted war between great powers (usually between alliances), victory often belongs to the side with a solid economic foundation or to the side that still has financial resources in the end. Many of the facts presented in this book will prove that this important point, while ironic, is correct. In this regard, Henry M. Thompson, Professor Emeritus of george Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, said: Henry R. Nau's article "Why There Are Loopholes in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers in Paul Kennedy's Writings" said that although Kennedy emphasized the importance of "financial resources" in the rise and fall of nations, he did not propose a universal theory of the economic cycle; although he emphasized that "the victory of the state in war" is an important factor in considering the rise of great powers, he did not explain what social system or governmental organization was most effective in helping a country win in war. As a historian, Kennedy exalted theories in favor of facts, and simply summarized some "generally valid conclusions" by examining historical records, and he acknowledged that such conclusions could not be applied to all situations, and did not rule out that one case occurred. As Kennedy pointed out, "While we can attribute the occurrence of certain wars (such as World War II) to policymakers' fear of a change in the balance of power in the world, this conclusion does not help explain the American Revolutionary War of 1775, the French Revolutionary War of 1792, and the Crimean War of 1853."

　　In addition, Kennedy stressed that the rise and fall of great powers is relative and depends on how the international environment compares to the rise and fall of power in other countries. In his book, he quotes Philipp Wilhelm von Hornick, a proponent of European mercantilism, as saying: "The current wealth of a country depends not on the power and wealth it possesses, but mainly on the strength and wealth of its neighbors." Kennedy further noted that the Netherlands in the mid-18th century was certainly richer than it was 100 years ago, but it was no longer a great power because neighboring France and Britain had more power and wealth than it did. France in 1914 was undoubtedly stronger than France in 1850, but it was slightly inferior to powerful Germany. Compared to its heyday (the middle of the Victorian era), Britain now has far more wealth and its armies are far more powerful in their weapons. But this is meaningless, as its product production has fallen from 25% of the world's total production to about 3%. If a country is stronger than its neighbors, it will live better; if it is weaker than its neighbors, it will run into trouble.

　　For Kennedy's argument, some scholars believe that Kennedy is too partial to the horizontal comparison of major national strengths, and weakens the "natural decline" factor caused by the decline in the national strength of the great powers themselves. The cycle of life and death, prosperity and decline of a country will also follow a certain natural law, which depends not only on the external pressure exerted by other countries, but also on the maintenance of its own strength. If a country can store its national strength for a long time, it can be evergreen in all seasons; but if it is allowed to be governed by decadence, it will inevitably embark on the road of decline. In The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Kennedy predicted that the Soviet Union might face a recession, but he did not expect the Soviet Union to collapse in just a few years. He believed that even if the Soviet Union declined, it would end in the form of an arms race or a major power war. But in fact, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the collapse of the Great Powers under peaceful conditions. Whether it is the institutional rigidity caused by the highly closed planned economy, the economic crisis caused by the excessive development of arms and heavy industry, or the social unrest caused by the erroneous political trend, it is fully demonstrated that the fundamental factor that pushed this former prosperous country onto the road of despair lies in natural decline, and the "decline in competition" brought about by the confrontation of cold war forces is only a contributing factor. As Huang Renwei, a Chinese scholar of international strategic studies, put it, "The Soviet Union, as a vast and resource-rich power, itself had the potential advantage of rising as a world power." And there is no threat of great powers around it... The defeat of the Soviet Union was mainly due to internal factors, it was not defeated by the world war, but it was dragged down in institutional competition."

　　Speaking of this, Henry R. No. Nuo told reporters that Kennedy ignored the internal institutional factors of the country, which in addition to the advanced nature of the system itself, also include domestic political identity, common values, social cohesion and so on. Kennedy was a realist who looked primarily at the world's power change from a struggle perspective. In fact, on one side of the "power coin" is the state's ability to possess weapons and wealth, and on the other side is the state's ability to inspire citizens' confidence and encourage them to use state power. Without the second point, the first point cannot be established. However, Kennedy's judgment of the dimension of international life ignores the other side of the coin. Henry R. No. explains that after 1970, the relative military power of the Soviet Union and the United States changed little, but the difference was that the political acceptance and citizen support for government power in both countries changed. After a "troubled period" of the late 1960s and 1970s, U.S. citizens regained confidence in domestic politics and market institutions in the early 1990s. Soviet citizens, however, were disillusioned with their internal institutions and eventually rejected the right of the Soviet government to use force in self-defense. In this sense, the collapse of political identity in the Soviet Union was an important factor.

　　Michael Braddick, a fellow of the National Academy of Sciences and a professor of history at the University of Sheffield, told reporters that the political system needs to rely on "legitimacy" rather than "coercion" to raise government funds and mobilize domestic political will. A regime that operates solely on coercive means is fragile, easily hollowed out, and prone to sudden collapse. "Legitimacy" requires mobilizing broad popular support and participation in politics. Historically, the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the collapse of the Soviet Union were largely due to this failure.

　　Braddyk added that Kennedy's work has some very revealing points, and that macro-historical evidence in the course of the world's development can also justify some of his statements. However, some of the book's points need to be revisited. Economics and the military play a very important role in determining the dominance of state power, but they are not the only factors that define the power of a great power. The dominance of the United States in the 20th century and today derives not only from its economic and military power, but also from the relationship between seigniorage and the dollar, core technologies (which are becoming more important), national strategic capabilities, cultural influence, and the global popularity of the language. In addition, soft factors such as national credibility should also be included. For example, the United States faces questions of hypocrisy and unreliability in today's international system, which is also a negative impact on the national power of the United States. Therefore, Kennedy's views need to be reinterpreted from a broad perspective.

　Source: China Social Science Network - China Social Science Daily Author: Bai Le