Several months after the Russian-Ukrainian border region has entered a "critical state of war", Putin took the initiative to demand that the United States and NATO stop eastward expansion and that Ukraine cannot join NATO. However, in fact, it has been rejected by NATO, although it is not explicitly stated.
In fact, the U.S. military has five major weaknesses. Since the U.S. military began reforms in 2003-2009, the U.S. military has drastically reduced its heavy armored brigades and increased infantry brigade-level battle groups that can maneuver around the world. All equipment is required to be crammed into the C-130 transport aircraft for airlift.
It was therefore required that all armored vehicles must be able to fit into the narrow cabin of the C-130 transport aircraft. The goal of the U.S. military is to be able to maneuver globally, arrive quickly, and rely on the air force's precision fire support for ground warfare. Although there are no heavy weapons such as tanks, it can rely on vehicle-mounted anti-tank missiles against armored forces.
During Rumsfeld's time, most of the U.S. armored divisions that had fought the Soviet Tank Corps in Europe were eliminated, and the Army began to reduce its number across the board, creating newer brigade-sized units that used wheeled armored vehicles more quickly. Before the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army had 18 divisions, but by the end of the Cold War, the number of divisions had shrunk to 10.
Therefore, the U.S. Army is now mainly more than 30 light combat brigades, which are actually useless in the Ukrainian battlefield. The more than 4,000 U.S. troops in Ukraine and more than 6,000 NATO coalitions do not have the capability to counter Russian forces.
The combat group of this infantry brigade of the US army has five major weaknesses, first, the lack of self-propelled artillery, and the lack of mobile heavy firepower worth mentioning. It relies on 18 towed howitzers. The towed howitzer has almost no survivability on high-intensity battlefields, has low mobility, and has no protection capabilities.
The second is that there are no tanks, almost no heavy armor breakthroughs and defense capabilities. There are only more than 100 vehicle-mounted anti-tank missiles in a brigade, and once they encounter the enemy's attack, even the old tank troops are attacked.
The third is the great lack of direct and curved firepower. The Russian army's 1 battalion-level battle group consisted of 1 152 mm self-propelled howitzer company and 1 modular 220 mm rocket artillery company. One infantry brigade battle group of the U.S. Army consisted of only 18 105 mm wheeled assault guns and 18 towed howitzers.
If strong fortifications were encountered, the U.S. military would have little to do. In addition to the difficulty of maneuvering on the battlefield, the towed howitzer that could not accompany the advance of armored vehicles. Below the U.S. infantry battalion, there were only mortars, and there was basically no ability to attack the stronghold.
Fourth, the U.S. military's requirement that all wheeled armored vehicles can be crammed into C-130 transport aircraft has also caused these wheeled armored vehicles to have low protection. They did not dare to approach the position, and could only release the infantry to engage in ground warfare at a certain distance from the position. Fire support was provided by 30 mm machine guns and large-caliber machine guns on wheeled armored vehicles.
Fifth, there is a lack of long-range strike capabilities. In the Ukrainian battlefield, once positioned by drones of Russian military battalion-level battle groups and intelligence companies. Russian self-propelled howitzers and rockets can strike the U.S. army from 40-50 kilometers away with anti-armor submunitions, anti-personnel submunitions, directional mines, terminal bombs and thermobaric bombs.
If the air force is blocked by Russian anti-aircraft missiles and air force, it will not be able to reach the battlefield. The U.S. infantry brigade-level battle group relies on these equipment and will be sifted by the Russian tank group army.