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Arab World Studies, No. 6, 2021
Executive Summary
The Arab upheavals have posed serious challenges to the regimes of many Countries in West Asia and North Africa, with the exception of Moroccan social stability. Throughout Morocco's contemporary history, it is clear that the country's stability is based on its constant improvement in state governance. The Moroccan regime maintains the overall stability of society by providing security, basic services and political participation to different social groups. In creating a security environment, the Moroccan regime weakens the Islamic opposition, combats religious extremism, improves the protection of civil rights under the law and maintains collective security at the diplomatic level; When social protests occurred, the Moroccan regime resorted to political and economic reforms and repression to maintain the country's overall stability.
keyword
State governance; social stability; the Moroccan regime; Arab upheaval
About the Author
Qi Jiang, Ph.D. candidate, Class of 2018, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University;
Hong Zhang, Ph.D., is a professor at the Arab College of the University of Foreign Chinese, Beijing
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Image source: Migrademo
Morocco is an important hub for religious and commercial exchanges between West Asia and North Africa, West Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. On the political front, Morocco's stability during and after the Arab upheavals has made it an "exception" to other countries in West Asia and North Africa that are mired in civil war, the spread of terrorism and ongoing instability. On the economic front, Morocco's GDP grew steadily from 1999 to 2019, with an average annual growth rate of 4.09%. In 1999, about 16 per cent of the total population and 30 per cent of the rural population lived below the poverty line. In 2019, these figures were 4% and 19%, respectively. In terms of diplomacy, Morocco has actively developed strategic partnerships with China and Russia while consolidating its partnership with the traditional alliance regions ( i.e. Europe and the Gulf regions ) . Morocco has also strengthened its relations with sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade. Since the Visit of the King of Morocco to China in 2016, China-Morocco relations have been accelerating their development. During the COVID-19 epidemic, the cooperation between China and Morocco in the fight against the epidemic can be called a model of South-South anti-epidemic cooperation. Morocco's stability is crucial for China to advance the Belt and Road Initiative in West Asia and North Africa. Through the history of Morocco (since independence in 1956) shows that Morocco's stability is not an accidental phenomenon. Starting from the governance of the Moroccan regime in the three areas of security, basic services and political participation, this article analyzes the reasons for the effective maintenance of the overall stable development of society by the contemporary Moroccan regime through state governance. Morocco is an important country on the "Belt and Road", and understanding the characteristics of its national governance is of great significance for promoting future cooperation between China and Morocco.
There are many analyses of the reasons for moroccan social stability by scholars at home and abroad, and these explanations can be divided into the following four perspectives: First, the perspective of religious governance, that is, the institutionalization of religious factors and religious institutions in Morocco has built and consolidated the legitimacy of the regime, resisted and combated extremist ideologies and terrorism, and thus maintained a balanced and stable political order. The second is the perspective of political pluralism, that is, the Moroccan regime's governance of political parties, the setting of political issues, and the consolidation of political alliances have enhanced the flexibility of the regime. The third is the perspective of economic reform, that is, the structural adjustment of the Economy by the Moroccan regime has enhanced the country's ability to withstand various internal and external shocks, consolidated the ruling foundation of the regime, and ensured the basic stability of the political situation. The fourth is the perspective of external factors, that is, the European countries led by France, the United States and Saudi Arabia have jointly formed an important external force to maintain the security of the Moroccan regime, and the assistance and support of these forces have maintained the stability of Morocco's political situation.
Looking at the analytical dimensions of scholars, while religious factors have maintained the legitimacy of the Moroccan regime, the two military coups d'état that took place during hassan II and the challenge posed by the Islamic opposition under Mohammed VI show that the power of religion does not seem to apply to all groups. The strategy of political pluralism has allowed the regime to ease the pressure for reform at home and abroad, but the political landscape brought about by party pluralism has gradually made asylumism a tool for political parties to profit, and the resulting corruption problems and administrative inefficiency have triggered many social protests. Economic reforms helped Morocco resolve the debt crisis and gave the regime access to abundant economic resources to maintain the foundations of governance, but the gap between rich and poor brought about by neoliberal reforms was the trigger for several social protests in Morocco. In contrast to its North African neighbors, the Moroccan regime's immunity from the Arab upheavals has benefited from the "non-interference" of the West, which is the result of years of balanced diplomacy by the Moroccan regime. At the same time, by comparing the slogans of the masses in social protests, it can be seen that the Moroccan people did not question the status of the king, they were more protesting against socio-economic problems, so the "support" of external forces was at best a contributing factor rather than a determining factor. Thus, political, economic, cultural and diplomatic factors alone cannot explain the long-term stability of Moroccan society. This paper attempts to explore how the contemporary Moroccan regime has consolidated its legitimacy through a more macroscopic perspective, that is, a comprehensive perspective of national governance, so that it can gain the support of the public at the macro level and achieve long-term stable development of the country. State governance is the activity and process of the state using public power to manage public affairs, and governance can be defined as the exercise of political power and the use of institutional resources to manage problems and social affairs. This article will analyze how Morocco has maintained social stability through different national governance practices, starting from the three dimensions of security, basic services and political participation.
1. The Moroccan regime's maintenance of security
Morocco's greatest challenges in the area of security come from religious extremism and Islamist forces represented by the Organization of Justice and Spirituality. The terrorist attacks perpetrated by the former threatened the physical integrity of the Moroccan population, while the latter threatened the security of the Moroccan regime during the reign of Hassan II. In response to religious extremism, the Moroccan regime has largely eliminated terrorist attacks on Morocco's soil by adopting a combination of domestic governance and diplomatic cooperation. In response to Islamist forces represented by the "Organization of Justice and Spirituality", the Moroccan regime has weakened the potential threat posed by religious, political and forced repression. In addition, the Moroccan regime had gradually improved the human rights situation in the country through a series of legal reforms.
(1) Governance of domestic security
The Moroccan regime's governance of internal security is mainly reflected in the weakening of Islamist forces represented by the "Just and Spiritual Organization" and the fight against religious extremism. During the reign of Hassan II, the Moroccan regime established a balance between secularism and religion in the country, forming a "religious-nationalist synthesis". This particular cultural complex has created a broad appeal among different groups in Morocco's pluralistic society, weakening the strength of Islamic opposition groups. In addition, the Moroccan regime strengthened its alliance with Sufi forces and its monopoly on religious institutions. For a long time, Sufi forces have established a relatively strong alliance with the Moroccan royal family, and the spiritual symbol of Sufism is part of the royal power ceremony. The official Islamic forces were a physical manifestation of the king's "Commander of the Faithful" and Sharif's identities, and the Moroccan regime bureaucratized the official Islamic forces through a series of religious institutions. At the same time, the Moroccan regime has also defused the potential threat posed by Islamist opposition groups, mainly "justice and spiritual organizations", by integrating Islamists (in this case, the Justice and Development Party, hereinafter referred to as the "AKP") into the political system and strengthening security institutions.
After the succession of Mohammed VI, the Moroccan regime purified the country's religious environment by initiating reforms in the religious sphere. Reform in the field of religion is a key component of Morocco's strategic framework to combat extremism and radicalism, aimed at safeguarding Morocco's "mental security" and national security. Morocco's reforms in the field of religion mainly included the following measures: First, the reorganization of the main religious institutions, including the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, the Supreme Council of Ulema and the Muhammad Ulayma Federation. The restructuring involved many aspects, including mechanisms, legislation and society, and the purpose of the reform was to expand the functions and responsibilities of each institution, thereby covering all aspects of religious life in Morocco. Secondly, a training and education programme for imams and trainers aimed at modernizing religious education in Morocco and assisting in the implementation of the de-radicalization policy. In terms of curriculum, the training imam's curriculum is diversified, including psychology, philosophy, comparative religion and foreign languages, to promote open and moderate thought. In terms of teaching groups, there is a gradual focus on the power of women. Launched in 2006, the Women's "Mourchidat Program" sought to harness women's religious soft power and defuse violence before it happened. Third, fatwa (Islamic decree) issued by fatwa (Fatwa) is issued to avoid contradictory and conflicting fatwa and prevent domestic and external forces from harming national interests. In 2004, the Supreme Ulema Council established the country's only Fatwa issuing unit, the Ifta Committee. Fourth, the moderate Maliki school ideas were disseminated through the media. Morocco has launched the Assadissa TV channel and website, which disseminate official Islamic ideas to the general public of Morocco through images and concise language. Through these reforms, the Moroccan regime has cleverly resisted religious radicalism and terrorism in the country.
(2) The establishment of a legal system in safeguarding citizens' rights
Through a series of legal reforms, the Moroccan regime gradually improved the protection of citizens' rights. Morocco's first post-independence constitution, the 1962 Constitution, provided for a wide range of rights for citizens, such as the right to equality, liberty, property and rights in the political, economic and social fields. Subsequent laws further improved the protection of citizens' rights. In the area of promoting gender equality, the reform of the Family Code in 1993 and 2004 had gradually improved the status of women and expanded their rights in the areas of guardianship, marriage and divorce. The Electoral Laws of 2002 and 2011 increased the quota of women in Parliament from 30 to 60. In 2019, the proportion of women in Morocco's parliamentary seats was 17%, a significant increase from 1% in 2004. In addition, gender equality is at the heart of many legal provisions, such as the Labour Code of 2003 and the Nationality Act of 2008. In the area of improving human rights, Morocco adopted the National Human Rights Charter in 1990 and established the National Consultative Council on Human Rights, releasing hundreds of political prisoners from 1991 to 1993. After Mohammed VI came to power, discussions began about past abuses of power, and the establishment of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission was an important step in the country's judicial transition process. In August 2007, the Consultative Committee on Human Rights announced that 23,676 people had been compensated for human rights abuses committed during the reign of Hassan II. In terms of improving the governance of security institutions, the 2011 Constitution not only submits security policies and practices to Parliamentary oversight, but also stipulates that personnel in the security sector respect human rights in order to fulfil Morocco's international obligations in this area. The National Plan of Action on Democracy and Human Rights (2018-2021), recently adopted by the Government of Morocco, reaffirms its policy of establishing permanent mechanisms to democratize the security sector with a view to improving security services through the maintenance of public order and the protection of human rights.
(3) Safeguarding national security at the diplomatic level
At the diplomatic level, in order to safeguard national security, the Moroccan regime has strengthened the diversification of strategic partnerships and diplomatic cooperation in the field of security. In terms of the diversification of strategic partnerships, during the reign of Hassan II, Morocco continued to develop relations with the United States, the European Union, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies. Since the reign of Mohammed VI, the diversification of strategic partnerships and the strengthening of multidimensional South-South cooperation have constituted the main features of Morocco's foreign policy. During the 2016 GCC summit, Mohammed VI proposed Morocco's commitment to maintaining strategic relationships with traditional partners while seeking to develop comprehensive strategic partnerships with emerging economies such as China, Russia, Brazil and India. In March 2016, Mohammed VI visited Russia, and the two heads of state announced the deepening of the strategic partnership between the two countries. In May of the same year, the relationship between China and Morocco was upgraded to a strategic partnership. In 2017, Morocco became the first country in the Maghreb region to sign a memorandum of understanding with China on the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2018, Morocco became a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In addition, Morocco had strengthened its partnership with African countries. In 2017, Morocco returned to the AU and applied to join the Economic Community of West African States. By implementing the pluralism of strategic partnerships, the Moroccan regime has increased the autonomy of national diplomacy, thereby increasing the negotiating weight with traditional allies such as France in terms of national security.
In terms of cooperation in the field of security, after 9/11, Morocco strengthened cooperation with the United States in counterterrorism. Following the terrorist attacks in Morocco in 2003 and 2007, the United States increased its military assistance to Morocco. As terrorism and extremism spread in the Maghreb region, Morocco was paying increasing attention to cooperation with African countries in the field of security. Since early 2012, Morocco has been leading efforts to revive and restructure the Community of Sahel-Saharan States to address the unstable security situation in the region. Morocco also meets the needs of African countries by training local religious scholars, with the aim of preventing religious extremism by countering the influence of Wahhabism. In response to the growing demand for training religious workers, Morocco established the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Mourchidin and Mourchidat and the Mohammed VI Foundation of African Ulemas in 2015. In addition, Morocco has joined the Saudi Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism to combat various Islamist extremist groups. Since 2003, terrorism and extremism have challenged Morocco's national security from time to time, with serious negative social and economic impacts on the country. By cooperating with regional countries and major countries outside the region in the field of security, Morocco has created a favourable internal and external environment for the overall stability of society.
Basic services provided by the Moroccan regime
The basic services provided by the State generally refer to resources (land, water, etc.), infrastructure (public utilities, transportation, communications, etc.), social services (education, health, social security, etc.) and economic opportunities (work, good business environment, government procurement, etc.). After independence, the Moroccan regime's provision of basic services went through three distinct phases as the economic development model changed: state-led development in the 1950s and 1970s, which enabled the regime to provide rich resources for different social groups in the economic and social spheres; in the 1980s and 1990s, during the neoliberal reform period, the regime allocated more economic and social resources to the elite groups that were essential to its rule; and after the 1990s, The privatization process of the state led to the monopoly of economic and social resources by the bourgeoisie, exacerbated social inequality and popular discontent, and eventually led to the "2.20" movement in Morocco. In the post-Arab upheaval, the Moroccan regime implemented a series of economic measures and social programs aimed at easing tensions between the state and society. Inequalities in the economic and social spheres persist, triggering large-scale social protests in rural areas in recent years. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Moroccan regime has increased its investment in basic services, eased state-society relations, and maintained overall stability in the country.
(i) The results of the basic services provided by the Moroccan regime
1. Provision of economic resources
In terms of economic resources, the elite have a clear advantage in access to land, corporate resources and bank loans. In terms of the provision of land resources, in the early years of independence, in order to gain the support of the rural elite and maintain the stability of rural society, the Moroccan regime distributed the recovered colonial land to rural celebrities, officials and landlords who did not have to pay taxes, so that they retained control over two-thirds of the irrigated land, reflecting the support for the rural elite. In terms of providing corporate resources, in the 1960s and 1970s, in order to further consolidate the base of elite support in various areas of the political economy, the Moroccan regime promoted the expansion of local private enterprises through a protectionist system. Among them, "Moroccanization" was the most important policy adopted during this period. The policy stipulates that for any designated commercial, financial and industrial company, locals must hold at least 50% of the capital and management positions. In the 1990s, the Moroccan bourgeoisie was fully developed as the state sold its economic assets at low prices and adopted neoliberal policies during the privatization process. In providing bank loans, the Moroccan regime provides credit support to the elite through the commercial banking system. In 1982, King Hassan II took over from French owners the country's largest private conglomerate, Omnium Nord Africain, which bought a major stake in Morocco's major commercial banks. In 2010, the North African Securities Group merged with the National Investment Company, further expanding the royal family's control over the economy. Members of Morocco's main family hold important positions in the banking system, and they monopolize the distribution of credit to the private sector.
For the middle class and below, their access to economic resources is reflected in employment and government support for businesses. In terms of providing employment, in the 1950s and 1970s, the economic rents obtained by the state were invested in the expansion of the public sector. During this period, the Moroccan regime included the emerging urban lower middle class and a growing number of educated young people in the social contract. In the post-Arab upheaval, the Moroccan regime committed itself to providing more jobs in the private sector by implementing economic reform programs at different stages. The Economic, Social and Environmental Council was established to help Moroccan youth integrate into the workforce and provide the necessary skills training to increase their access to work. Thanks to the government's efforts, Morocco's overall unemployment rate fell from 13.94% in 1999 to 9.02% in 2019. The liberalization of markets has enabled more young people to become entrepreneurs in terms of supporting businesses, but the concentration of wealth and the intertwining of political and business elites limit the ability of SMEs to gain greater influence within the private sector as a whole. In the post-Arab upheaval, the Moroccan government implemented a number of reform policies to support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. By creating an "industrial ecosystem", the Government of Morocco encourages SMEs to forge mutually beneficial partnerships, identify gaps in supply chains and find ways to bridge them. In order to break down the barriers of small and medium-sized enterprises, the Moroccan government reactivated the Competition Council in 2018, aiming to promote the development of smes in the private sector.
2. Create a good business environment
In recent years, Morocco has improved the relevant construction of legal and economic sector structures, laying the foundation for a good business environment. At the legal level, legal construction aimed at improving the conditions for investment provided better protection for operators of private enterprises, allowing Morocco to successfully attract sustained foreign capital inflows. In addition, free trade agreements with major economies, including the United States and the European Union, have been complemented by a series of BITs in recent years. The new Public-Private Partnership Law enacted in 2014 has provided impetus for investment in the transport sector, and upgrades to major road, rail, airport and port infrastructure will continue to advance in line with the goals set out in the Moroccan government's long-term infrastructure strategy. In upgrading the structure of the economic sector, the National Industrial Rise Convention and the Industrial Acceleration Plan aim to strengthen the local industrial base and increase the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP, exports and investment. Morocco ultimately wants to further integrate into the global market and position itself as a business hub in the African region that promises to boost growth and a strong link between Africa and Europe. In 2020, Morocco ranked 53rd in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business and third in the West Asia and North Africa region, behind the UAE and Bahrain. In contrast, Morocco ranked 128th in the world for this indicator in 2010. During the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to support affected businesses, the Moroccan government activated additional lines of credit from banks and the Central Guarantee Fund, providing a special guarantee mechanism of $50 million. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of Morocco has launched an initiative to support small and medium-sized enterprises in investing in the production of anti-epidemic products to produce products and equipment to fight the epidemic. In addition, the revised fiscal bill supports the gradual resumption of economic activities, guarantees employment in the private sector, and accelerates administrative reforms, providing a guarantee ratio of up to 95% for small and micro enterprises, and increasing the total national investment budget to AED 86 billion to stimulate economic recovery and strengthen financial inclusion to improve the business environment.
(b) The basic services provided by the Moroccan regime in the social sphere
1. Education for all
Since 1999, Morocco has implemented a number of educational reforms to achieve universal access to education, improve the quality of education, strengthen educational equity and promote the interface between education and employment, and the government has promulgated the National Education and Training Charter (2000-2009) and the National Education Emergency Support Program, 2009-2012), Education Action Plan (2013-2016) and The Strategic Vision for the Moroccan School Reform (2015-2030). After 20 years of educational reform, Morocco had made remarkable progress in reducing illiteracy rates, achieving universal education and improving educational equity. In terms of reducing illiteracy rates, the literacy rate of the population aged 15 years and over in Morocco rose from 55.15 per cent in 2008 to 73.8 per cent in 2018. In the area of education for all, enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education increased steadily between 2010 and 2019. In 2019, gross enrolment in primary education reached 100 per cent, while gross enrolment in secondary and tertiary education was 81.2 per cent and 38.5 per cent, respectively. In narrowing the gap between urban and rural education, most of the primary schools built in Morocco between 2008 and 2014 were in rural areas, demonstrating Morocco's willingness to achieve universal primary education. In terms of gender equality, the gender equality index in primary education increased from 0.82 in 1999 to 0.96 in 2018, and the gender equality index in the literacy group of young people aged 15-24 increased from 0.8 in 2011 to 1 in 2018. From the above perspectives, Morocco's achievements in education reform are remarkable, but more efforts are needed to achieve the goals of education reform in all aspects.
2. Strengthen infrastructure construction
In the construction of transport and logistics infrastructure, Morocco has spent an average of about 40 billion dirhams per year over the past two decades, accounting for 10% of the country's total investment and 20% to 25% of the investment budget. The country's road, rail, air and water transport infrastructure is among the best in African countries. In the construction of electricity infrastructure, 100 per cent of rural communities have achieved electrification, compared with only 18 per cent in 1999. Following the promotion of large-scale electrification, Morocco embarked on renewable energy development projects, completing phases II and III of the Nuo project, the world's largest solar thermal power station. In the field of communication infrastructure, Morocco has a good wired and wireless communication system. In 2019, the country had 22.57 million Internet users, or 62 percent of the country's population, and the country's Internet penetration rate was 55 percent, above the global and African averages. In the area of health infrastructure, Morocco has made significant progress in developing the capacity of its health system. In urban areas, 100 per cent of the population lives within 5 km of a health facility, while in rural areas this figure is 30 per cent. In recent years, demands for improved health conditions in rural areas have become one of the main slogans of social protests. To address infrastructure shortages outside major cities, in July 2019 Moroccan Prime Minister Saadeddine Othmani announced that by 2021, the Moroccan government would invest $1 billion in regional infrastructure projects, focusing on specific infrastructure areas that most needed improvements to achieve more equitable development.
3. Improve social security
Morocco's social security system consists of some 140 insurance or social assistance schemes, covering employees in both the public and private sectors, providing family, health, maternity, retirement, disability and death benefits. Among practitioners, according to a report released by Morocco's High Planning Commission in 2019, 45.3% of employees nationwide benefit from health insurance provided by their employers, compared with 52.4% in urban areas and 24.5% in rural areas. 42.4 per cent of employees were included in the pension system, compared with 50 per cent in urban areas and 19.2 per cent in rural areas. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for the formal sector, workers registered with the National Social Security Fund for temporary work stoppages receive a monthly subsidy of AED 2,000, benefiting about 900,000 people. In addition, they will not have to repay loans and consumer credit until June 30, 2020. For the informal sector, families funded by the National Medical Assistance Scheme receive a monthly subsidy of 800 to 1,200 dirhams, benefiting about 2.3 million families, depending on the size of the family. For those who apply for assistance online and are not covered by the National Medical Assistance Program, they can benefit from the policy by filling out the requirements on the electronic platform. Since one-third of Moroccan citizens currently do not benefit from the social security system, the Moroccan government plans to start making social security universal on 1 January 2021 to cover all Moroccans.
Development of political parties and civil society in Morocco
Looking at the political development of contemporary Morocco, whenever the process of political participation of social groups is blocked, the relevant groups will vent their dissatisfaction in the form of protests and demonstrations. During the reign of Mohammed V, the Independence Party's exclusion and alienation from other political parties and rural populations led to unrest in many parts of Morocco. With the division within the Independence Party and the pluralism of political parties, the king gradually stabilized the political situation. During Hassan II's reign, when political parties were suppressed and popular discontent spread to the streets in the form of riots, one of the main ways in which the regime quelled social unrest was through military repression. After the military coup, the regime gradually reduced its reliance on forced repression by increasing the participation of party politics. During the reign of Mohammed VI, political liberalization in Morocco was further developed. But as political parties become more and more detached from society and public discontent is not effectively resolved, social protests have once again become a way for social groups to express their political demands. Through a series of reforms, the Moroccan regime has strengthened the political participation of civil society and maintained the overall stability of Morocco.
(i) Political participation of Moroccan political parties
In the process of political participation of political parties, the interaction between the Moroccan regime and political parties has enabled both sides to fulfil their respective responsibilities and obligations to varying degrees. By bringing more political parties into Morocco's political system, the Moroccan regime, while establishing its dominance, eased political pressure at home and promoted political liberalization. With the establishment of the politics of consensus among political parties, the policy recommendations provided by political parties are basically in line with the king's political agenda.
1. Political party pluralism under the control of the regime
In the early years of independence, the King's political struggle with the Independence Party promoted the pluralism of Moroccan political parties. Morocco's national liberation movement was jointly led by the King and the nationalist Independence Party, and in the early years of independence the partnership between the two gradually transformed into a competitive one. During the reign of Mohammed V, the Independence Party dominated the official political apparatus at the state level. As a result of the party's exclusion and alienation from other political parties, the rural elite and the rural population, there was a period of unrest in some parts of Morocco as a result of dissatisfaction with the party. The government was unable to quell the unrest by political means, and Hassan II, then the General Staff Officer of the Royal Armed Forces, used military force to quell the armed rebellion and strengthen the prestige of the royal family. To counter the INDEPENDENCE's involvement in local affairs, the Popular Movement, a party founded by leaders in rural areas, together with the Democratic Independence Party and other organizations ostracized by the INDEPENDENCE Party, became the main force against the INDEPENDENCE Party. These parties became important allies of the king in the struggle against the Independence Party. The Independence Party is a large and uncontrollable bloc of various interests, and the confrontation between radical and conservative forces within the party is gradually intensifying. In 1958, the King appointed prime ministers from both factions, thus exacerbating the contradictions within the INDEPENDENCE Party. After 1958, the split of the Independence Party and the rise of other parties, and after the 1962 Constitution allowed for the existence of multiple parties, the King held almost all political power. The multi-party system provided for in the 1962 Constitution is also seen as a contract between the regime and political parties, which promised to formally introduce political competition in the form of parliamentary elections.
The pluralism of political parties, the king's "divide and rule" and the strategy of envelopment and balance have weakened the power of political parties while putting the parties in a state of mutual checks and balances, ensuring the stability of the political situation. In terms of weakening political parties, opposition parties, under a "divide and rule" strategy, the main parties, the National Union of Popular Forces, the Organization of Democratic and Popular Action, and the Party of Progress and Socialism) has not escaped division. Similarly, rifts emerged within the royalists and new political groups emerged. The National Popular Movement broke away from the People's Movement in 1991, after which the Democratic and Social Movement split from the NDP in 1996. In terms of checks and balances, during the reign of Mohammed VI, in order to curb the development of the AKP, the king promoted the formation of a new party, the Authenticity and Modernity Party. In addition, military repression has played an important role in consolidating political stability in different historical periods. During the state of emergency from 1965 to 1970, Hassan II used military repression to maintain and consolidate political power.
2. Political liberalization
During The reign of Hassan II, political parties promoted political liberalization in their interactions with the regime by proposing alternative political ideas. From 1962 to 1972, the King took repressive measures against opposition parties. Many Moroccans no longer see parliament as a useful tool for expressing their opposition, and discontent has spread to the streets in the form of unrest. As the situation spiraled out of control, the king declared a state of emergency for the country. In the meantime, the king exercised strict control, and his control of the domestic situation was based on the support of the military. In 1970, dissatisfied with the Constitution's provisions on the electoral system, the structure of parliament and the power of the king, opposition parties called on citizens to boycott the constitutional referendum and formed the National Action Bloc to counter the king. In 1972, the National Action Committee again boycotted hassan II's constitutional referendum, which left the king feeling politically isolated. After the military coup of the same year, the king seemed to realize that to maintain his position as a state authority, he had to share political power with the political parties. From 1972 to 1990, the king tried to reintegrate opposition parties into the political system and promote further opening up of the political system. In the early 1990s, a series of events, including the growing strength of the traditional opposition, popular demonstrations during the Gulf War, and the development of Islamist movements, led Hassan II to introduce "limited" political liberalization measures to win popular support and restore some of the legitimacy of the Moroccan regime. These include constitutional reforms in 1992 and 1996, dialogue and negotiations with the opposition, the integration of the opposition's Independence Party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces and the Progressive and Socialist Party into the Government, and the appointment of Abderrah Youssoufi, the leader of the Socialist Union of Popular Power, as Prime Minister. Through the "limited" process of political liberalization, political pressure in Morocco has been effectively alleviated. During the reign of Mohammed VI, the Moroccan regime continued to promote the process of political liberalization, implementing top-down and controlled political openness, and the regime's interference in elections and political parties was significantly reduced.
3. Consensus on policy recommendations
In terms of providing policy advice, a politics of consensus was gradually formed among the political parties, and the policy advice provided by the political parties was basically in line with the king's political agenda. With the gradual incorporation of the opposition into the Government and the weakening of the strength of the opposition parties, a consensus politics gradually developed among the main political parties in Morocco. They no longer debated the king's status and power, and the policy advice they provided was largely in line with the king's political agenda. During the reign of Mohammed VI, some political parties and members of parliament focused their attention on the material interests of participation in the official political process, rather than on political interests. The success of the Moroccan general elections was closely linked to the efforts of political parties to mobilize local asylum networks, not their policy platforms and their ability to mobilize all segments of society. Some opposition parties are largely able to avoid patronism and articulate a rational program, but the pressure exerted on them by regimes often inhibits their ability to propose a broad and coherent set of policies. Other political parties have changed their positions in accordance with the regime's attitude, as is the case with the AKP. Fearing that the regime might use the terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists in 2003 as a pretext to outlaw the party, the AKP reduced the aspects that were more distinctive in the 2007 election agenda. The separation of political parties from society has alienated more and more of the public from political parties and elections. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, turnout was only 37 per cent. In the post-Arab upheaval, although the 2011 Constitution gave the Prime Minister and Parliament greater powers, and the two played a greater role in the process of governance and legislation, the distribution of power in Morocco did not change substantially. The King remained at the center of Morocco's political system, continuing to preside over cabinet meetings and retaining leadership over the army, foreign affairs, and the new National Security Council. All parties were aware of the need to get closer to Mehzan in order to survive, and the king's speech had become a major reference for all parties and was often used as a guideline for governments and parties, as a driving force for every political change and at the center of consensus political construction.
(ii) Political participation of Moroccan civil society
In the political sphere, civil society is a buffer zone between state power and the private sphere. Antonio Gramsci described civil society as a "mighty fortress and defense system" located at the rear of the state, giving the state stability and power. Morocco's civil society played an important role in participating in the building of the public sphere and in supervising the government.
1. Participate in the construction of the public domain
In the three decades following Morocco's independence, civil society organizations were indirectly involved in the construction of the public sphere, although their lack of autonomy hindered the expression of civil society interests. Between 1956 and the 1980s, vertical power relations between political parties and civil society organizations inhibited the free expression of the latter's interests. Civil society organizations such as trade unions, human rights organizations, youth organizations, women's rights associations and Islamic organizations are used by opposition parties as tools in their confrontation with the central government and the crown. Among them, the Moroccan Association of Human Rights has opposed the government's human rights violations and refused to recognize the traditional legitimacy of the king and the power in his hands, directly challenging the legitimacy of the regime. In order to defuse the challenge of opposition parties, the Moroccan regime created its own associations to expand its influence in society. Among them, the most notable tactics are the establishment of "comprehensive councils", such as the Advisory Council for Human Rights, to encourage individuals and groups to participate in the construction of the public sphere and to expand the discourse of the regime in the field of human rights and women's rights. During Morocco's economic restructuring in the 1980s, official civil society organizations were set up not only to provide mechanisms for control and stability, but also to form new elite groups. The central role of these organizations is to absorb and integrate, especially to bring new elites into the political parties and administrations.
Since the 1990s, Moroccan civil society organizations have played an important role in building the public sphere, driving political reform in Morocco. Civil society organizations were further developed during the early years of Mohammed VI's reign, and the development of the Berber cultural movement was seen as one of the main cases in which the regime absorbed the suggestions of civil society organizations. At the beginning of the 21st century, members of the Berber movement drafted the Berber Declaration. The declaration called for the establishment of Berber as the official language and the introduction of the administrative and educational systems, with Berbers enjoying a higher status than before in official historical and economic development plans. In response to these demands, the King ordered the establishment of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in 2001. In 2011, Berberists played a prominent role in Morocco's "2.20" movement, demanding that Berber be made the official language in the constitution. In addition, the demonstration was supported by civil society organizations such as Islamist organizations, student organizations, and trade unions. The movement also demanded many political aspects, namely, the achievement of profound and thorough constitutional and political changes, the building of a State based on a legal system based on the rule of law, freedom and independence, and the political system of a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. After the protests in major cities ended, Mohammed VI translated popular discontent into formal institutional procedures. He added provisions recognizing Berber as the official language to the new constitution and carried out a series of political reforms in response to civil society's demands for reform.
2. Supervise the government
In the post-Arab upheaval, the status of Moroccan civil society was guaranteed by law and the Government was strongly monitored. Morocco's 2011 Constitution strengthens the status of civil society: the Constitution stipulates that non-governmental organizations should be involved in the drafting, implementation and evaluation of state institutions (article 12); The new constitution provides a lot of room for civil society to expand its political participation, and the Moroccan regime has adopted a more tolerant approach to civil society activities without crossing political red lines. In 2016, the Hirak Movement erupted in the Rif region of northern Morocco aimed at eliminating political corruption and changing the marginalization of the Rif region. Subsequently, new protests broke out in and around Jerada and Zagora. The uprisings in the Rif region and other parts of the country are a reflection of civil society's neglect of regional inequalities, popular discontent, and inadequate local governance. Despite sometimes harsh repression, the public mobilization in support of some local and national movements demonstrated a great interest in public affairs and concern for government policies.
In late May 2017, unrest intensified and many people took to the streets demanding improved road traffic and hospital conditions, arguing that the government was corrupt and incompetent. In his speech on 29 July 2017, the King responded to the uprising in the Rif region and widespread criticism of regional disparities and poor public services, acknowledging many structural problems, denouncing elected politicians for failing to improve regional development and implementing the reforms mandated by the 2011 Constitution, and promising changes such as better transparency in public institutions, improved accountability, and more participatory decision-making. In October 2017, more than 400 protesters linked to the Chirac movement were arrested. In the wake of the campaign, many civil society activists called for the need to address the problem by developing overall socio-economic alternatives rather than repressive measures against protesters. In 2018, a coalition of 21 civil society organizations called for the release of detainees in the Chirac movement. Such criticisms and appeals suggest that civil society organizations are monitoring the government's response to social protests. In August of the same year, the King ordered the release of 188 detainees linked to the movement. In July 2019, the King appointed the Special Commission for the New Development Model to study and propose substantive and transformative solutions to the country's social and economic problems.
IV. Conclusion
Since independence, Moroccan society has been able to maintain stable development when the Moroccan regime has been able to provide results that benefit different social groups in terms of security, basic services and political participation. In turn, there will be social unrest in Morocco. In the area of security, the Moroccan regime has adopted a combination of internal and external governance methods, which have created a good external development space while weakening the power of Islamic opposition groups, combating religious extremism, and safeguarding civil rights. In the economic field of providing basic services, the Moroccan regime has provided different economic resources such as land, employment and enterprise support to different social groups, and has maintained competition and balance among various groups. In the social sphere of providing basic services, the Moroccan regime has gradually diversified the way in which it provides social benefits and has gradually narrowed the gap between social groups in access to basic services such as education, infrastructure and social security. Before the outbreak of COVID-19, problems in the economic and social fields triggered many mass protests. During the pandemic, the Moroccan regime eased tensions between the state and society by providing abundant socio-economic resources. In terms of political participation, Moroccan political parties have achieved pluralism and political liberalization in their interaction with the regime. As the strength of opposition parties weakened, consensus politics gradually formed among the parties. This gradually separated the party from the people, strengthened popular discontent, and eventually triggered large-scale social protests. At the same time, the independence and political overtones of civil society were gradually strengthened, and in the post-Arab upheaval period, they played a role as a supervisor of government, easing tensions between the state and society. In addition, the regime's political governance and timely feedback on political demands also play an important role in Morocco's overall stability.
Although the state has basically maintained the overall stability of society, such as Tunisia and Egypt, sustainable and stable development is inseparable from the positive interaction between the state and society, rather than relying solely on military repression and simply copying the Western model of democracy; for countries that rely on the oil dividend to provide generous social welfare to society, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the fluctuation of international oil prices and the development of green energy in the future are real problems that these countries have to face. How to optimize the industrial structure and improve the delivery of basic services by the regime is the focus of the current economic reform of these countries. Although external forces are to a certain extent uncontrollable factors, such as the coercive interference of Western countries in the internal affairs of countries in the region, how to exert their own initiative, improve the relationship between the state and society at home, and seek a balanced environment for diplomacy abroad is something that many countries in the region need to further practice. In this regard, the governance experience of the Moroccan regime can be learned.
(The views in this article are only the personal views of the author and do not represent the position of the Shanghai Foreign Middle East Research Institute and this WeChat subscription account.) ）
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