After the Qing army entered the customs, the Zheng clique has always been a thorn in the eyes and a thorn in the flesh of the Qing Dynasty, and it is a routine operation to take advantage of your illness to kill you. The reason why the Qing army did not launch an offensive when Zheng successfully recaptured Taiwan was that it did not have this strength for the time being.
In the Battle of Gengzi in Xiamen, he was violently beaten by the water army and land division of Zheng Chenggong's group, resulting in the serious injury of the Qing army's water division
This large-scale naval battle took place in May of the seventeenth year of Shunzhi (1660), nine months before Zheng successfully set about recovering Taiwan. Because this battle was estimated to have been beaten miserably, the historical materials of the Qing Dynasty tried their best to cover up the truth, and few people knew about it. The most typical is that there is no mention of anything in the "Records of the Ancestors of the Qing Dynasty", and the situation of the battle is not mentioned in the biography of Dasu, the commander-in-chief of the Qing Campaign. Only in the biography of another commander, Munemura Laita, it is mentioned that the battle ended in defeat because the Qing army was not good at water warfare. The "Biography of the Qing Dynasty, Volume V, Dasu" records: "Dasusu asked for the successful suppression in Xiamen, and yu yun was allowed to do so, so he led his troops from Jiangsu and Zhejiang to Fujian. The "Biography of the Qing Dynasty, Volume VII, Laita" said: "Next year, Laita and the capital of the same capital, Suohun suppressed the thief Xiamen, and the officers and troops did not practice water warfare and lost. ”
The reason why the Qing army launched this naval battle was to take advantage of the favorable opportunity of Zheng Chenggong's setback in Nanjing in the sixteenth year of Shunzhi (1659) to eliminate the Zheng clique in one fell swoop, and the Qing court attached great importance to this naval battle, taking the two main commanders of this campaign as an example, the commander-in-chief Dasu was a man with a yellow flag, and the commander of the escort army, Lai Ta, was born in the Zhengbai Banner, which belonged to the same three banners. The number of warships is more than 400. The "Records of the Expedition" said: "More than 300 ships in Zhanggang harbor are limited to the first day of May to worship the river out of the master's meeting." The head stack is really full of drapes, and the boat furniture is painted red; the second stack is full of Han, and the boat furniture is painted black. ”
Zheng Chenggong
In this campaign, the Qing army divided into two routes, one to attack Xiamen from Zhangzhou, and the other to cross the sea with An and attack Gaoqi. Zheng Chenggong made a corresponding deployment: he ordered the right tiger guard Chen Peng to defend Gaoqi and block the Qing army in the direction of Tong'an, while he personally led the main force to garrison Haimen to attack the Qing army in the direction of Zhangzhou, and after fierce fighting, the qing forces on both sides were all repelled and suffered heavy losses.
The biggest problem in this campaign was that the Qing Dynasty, without adequate preparation, forcibly launched a great decisive battle on the sea, attacked people with its own short strengths, and wanted to force a will victory without being familiar with naval warfare, and suffered a big loss. When Zheng Chenggong learned in March of that year that the Qing army was organizing the water division to attack himself, he expected that the Qing army would send people thousands of miles away and would undoubtedly lose. The Records of the Conscription says: "The emperor wants to give up his bow and horse skills, in order to compete with me between the waves of the boat, and to drive away the remnants of the rebels with a few ships." The shape of the host and the guest is not similar, and the power of the land and water is very suspenseful, and its victory or defeat is already understood. ”
In the course of specific operations, the Qing army's ignorance of naval warfare was infinitely expanded, especially the Manchu officers and soldiers who participated in this battle also lost their previous prestige in land warfare.
For example, when the Qing army attacking Xiamen from Zhangzhou initially occupied the upper echelons, the Zheng army was in a disadvantageous position, so Zheng Chenggong ordered that the tide turned to his side in favor of his own side to attack the Qing army, "Hou Chaoping had an order, Fang Zhun drove to kill", the Qing army should have seized the favorable opportunity to rush to kill, but the Qing army, in addition to fighting with the two Zheng army ships that were too late to withdraw, only dared to hit the Zheng army ships anchored in the distance with artillery arrows, until the tide turned to favor the Zheng army, the situation could no longer be cleaned up. The scene turned into a one-sided massacre.
This is only a tactical mistake, the naval warfare training level of the two water armies is also too different, the Zheng Army Marine Division has long adapted to the sea tide climate because of its rich navigation experience, once the battle, "all the sea moves, stepping on the waves like flying", and the Qing army participating in this battle, whether it is full of soldiers or the Han army, most of them are northerners, extremely uncomfortable with naval warfare, have a violent physiological reaction, and have an extremely serious impact on combat effectiveness. The "Small Shy Chronicle Supplementary Examination" records: "The northerners do not understand the nature of water, and they are dizzy and rebellious, so they are defeated, and the zombies are full of sea." ”
In the landing battle of Chishanping, which attacked Takasaki, the tactics of the previous Manchu Eight Banners wearing heavy armor and fighting straight forward were also unsatisfied, declaring bankruptcy, and as soon as the heavily armored infantry of the Manchu Eight Banners landed on the island, they fell into the mud and could not get out, and were almost completely annihilated by the Zheng army. The Records of the Expedition says: "Most of the captives who landed first were in cement, killed by our division and drowned. The "Little Shy Chronicle Supplementary Examination" also said: "My soldiers were heavily armored, retreated to The Void, and died six or seven times out of ten." ”
Moreover, the quality of the Qing army's ships this time is also inferior to that of the Zheng army, and Zheng Chenggong already knew the situation of "no big ship" before the battle, indicating that the Qing army is also inferior in the performance of the sea vessel.
In the Battle of Gengzi in Xiamen, the Qing army was ruthlessly crushed in all aspects, and the losses of the Qing army were not recorded and could not be estimated. According to the "XiaoYi Chronicle Supplementary Examination", "Wang Shi died 1600 people, and the leader Hala Saturn was captured", after this battle, the Qing Dynasty "actually succeeded in the world, and no one dared to say anything about the island". It can be seen that the reason why the Qing Dynasty did not strike behind Zheng's successful recovery of Taiwan Island was that this battle played a major role, and the material and psychological blows given to the Qing Dynasty made the Qing army dare not act rashly.
The situation of the Qing Dynasty on the mainland was unstable, and most of its human and material resources were busy eliminating the Yongli court
As we all know, to build a strong naval force or navy, it is inseparable from the investment of a large amount of funds, and its consumption is not comparable to that of the army. During the Shunzhi period, the Qing court's finances can be described as overstretched in the whole period, and there was no time for abundance, such as the twelfth year of Shunzhi (1655), wang Mingyue, who was in charge of the engineering department, pointed out that the annual revenue of the national treasury was only more than 18.41 million taels, and the annual expenditure was 22.61 million yuan, and the deficit reached 4.47 million taels. After the thirteenth year of Shunzhi (1656), after deducting the basic government operating expenses, all of them were used to apportion military expenses, and the deficit was more than 4 million taels perennial.
Love Shin Kyora Fu Lin
The seventeenth year of Shunzhi (1660) and the eighteenth year of Shunzhi (1661) were the key two years for the suppression of the Yongli regime, and according to Wei Yuan's "Sacred Martial Record", because the Manchu and Han armies gathered in the Yun and Gui regions, the total cost paid by the Qing court to San Fan was about 20 million taels. "By the seventeenth year of Shunzhi, the ministers of Yunnan Province had been paid more than nine million yuan, and the two domains of Fujian and Guangdong needed more than 20 million years old."
So what was the income of the Qing Dynasty in the seventeenth year of Shunzhi (1660)? According to the "Records of the Ancestors of the Qing Dynasty", it is 25.66 million taels, and there is not much left by the reduction of military expenditure, and there is not much left, where there is money to build a strong fleet to attack Zheng Chenggong, in fact, in the case of political instability and the country is not rich, it is tantamount to a fool's dream. Therefore, the reason why the Kangxi Emperor was able to recover Taiwan in the twenty-second year after he ascended the throne was because the Qing court eliminated San Francisco, the economic situation improved, and a large amount of money could be allocated to support the construction of the Fujian Water Division, which gained an overwhelming advantage over the Zheng clan, plus led by Shi Lang, a water division who was familiar with naval warfare, the elimination of the Zheng clique would not be a drain!
Therefore, why the Qing army did not backstabbing Zheng Chenggong, first, the Qing army's water division was seriously injured by the First World War and could not recover in a short time. Second, at that time, the Qing army took the complete destruction of the Yongli regime as its primary task, and most of the manpower and material resources were invested in the southwest battlefield, and naturally there was no spare energy to carry out sneak attacks behind the scenes.