Above, we have talked about why we should raise the strategic question of guerrilla warfare and the basic principles of war, and then we will read the third chapter together, the six specific strategic issues of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. These six questions are summed up in order to answer how to achieve victory in guerrilla warfare, and are the most valuable content in this article, and it can even be said that this is the "dragon slaying technique" left to us by the instructor. Che Guevara, the famous leader of the Cuban revolution, has publicly stated that he has benefited greatly from the "Mao Xuan" in the protracted military struggle, and when he visited our country, he was even more excited like a schoolboy in front of Chairman Mao.
Che Guevara
Che Guevara and Chairman Mao
So what six aspects need to be grasped in the victory of guerrilla warfare? The original text is as follows: (i) actively, flexibly, and systematically carry out offensive warfare in defensive warfare, quick decisive battles in protracted warfare and external operations in internal warfare; (ii) coordination with regular warfare; (iii) establishment of base areas; (iv) strategic defense and strategic offensive; (v) development toward mobile warfare; and (vi) correct command relations. These six items are the strategic program of the entire anti-Japanese guerrilla war and the necessary way to preserve and develop oneself, to destroy and expel the enemy, to cooperate with regular wars, and to win final victory.
The strategic problem of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war
How should it be carried out in a specific campaign? Chapter IV immediately answers the question: actively and flexibly and systematically carrying out offensive warfare in defensive warfare, quick decisive battles in protracted warfare, and external operations in internal warfare. Isn't it still a bit confusing? The patient instructors subdivided it in turn: (i) defensive and offensive, durable and quick-fix, the relationship between the inner and outer lines; (ii) the initiative in all operations; (iii) the flexible use of force; and (iv) the planning of all operations. Don't you understand? So let's take a small example of practical use to explain.
guerrilla warfare
For example, how to organize a beautiful guerrilla war? I'll follow the rough description of the instructor's article: First, rigorous planning. The understanding of the surrounding enemy situation and social conditions, the determination of tasks, the deployment of troops, the military and political education of soldiers, the preparation of supplies and ammunition, the cooperation of the people, the determination of offensive plans, the withdrawal route, the anti-espionage work and intelligence gathering, and so on. Second, strive for the initiative and concentrate our forces on annihilating the enemy. Bullying the enemy is strong and weak, such as dispersing troops, acting barbarically and cruelly, and commanding clumsily, concentrating as many troops as possible, taking secret and rapid action, ending the battle extremely quickly, taking annihilation of the enemy and destroying the enemy's fortifications as the main purpose, taking advantage of familiar terrain to block and defend against the enemy's pursuit or reinforcement in passes, dangerous places, rivers, villages, etc. Finally, flexibility in the aftermath. Once a blow is inflicted on the enemy, it is bound to usher in a counterattack, and at this time it is necessary to grasp the principle that the guerrilla forces need to be able to quickly disperse, concentrate, and change, break into pieces, quickly and secretly transfer, properly resettle the masses of the surrounding compatriots, and do a good job in the work of compensating and rewarding comrades who have been injured or injured.
Guerrilla fighters
Chapter Five, in conjunction with regular warfare. Strategically, the entire guerrilla war plays the role of weakening, clamping down, and hindering the enemy in the enemy's rear, and is of great help to the frontal combat of the regular army throughout the country. In the campaign, comrades engaged in guerrilla warfare took active action in the weakest and most sensitive parts of the enemy, facilitating the offensive and defensive of the regular army. In battle, the special nature of the guerrillas, such as locals who are familiar with the situation, can act as guides, reconnoiter the enemy, etc., and also play a positive role in the victory of the battle.
guerilla
Chapter VI, Establishment of Base Areas. The purpose of guerrilla warfare, in addition to annihilating the enemy's living forces, is to establish our base areas in a small or larger area when conditions are ripe and strength is attained. The first is to realize counter-occupation in the enemy's occupied areas and to make material preparations for future strategic counteroffensives; after all, there is no grain to grow in the deep mountains and old forests, and it is difficult to find cotton, gunpowder, and other materials; second, it is possible to make the enemy suffer from the enemy's belly and back, and he has to fall into a situation of two-front combat, front-and-back attacks, and even embattled, so that a nationwide victory is not far away.
Jin-Cha-Ji base area
The instructors even pointed out in detail how and where to establish a base area. There are no more than three types: mountainous land, flat land and river and lake port area. It is not difficult to understand that the mountains and rivers, lakes, and ports are all complex terrains, easy to defend and difficult to attack, such as the well-known Jinggangshan base area, Baiyangdian base area, etc. How can the endless great plains establish a base area? It turned out that it was possible, because the brutal Japanese Kou were too inhuman, and even at great risk, the people still had a strong sense of resistance, but the guerrillas had to exist and operate in small groups, and they had to be able to move to the mountains in a timely manner, or to carry out special battles such as "tunnel warfare".
Baiyangdian base area
The basis for the establishment of the base areas is a relatively stable guerrilla zone, in which the enemy is weak and we are strong to a certain extent; the other condition is a tenacious anti-Japanese armed force capable of defeating the enemy; the most important thing is to mobilize the local masses extensively, organize them, and rely on the strength of the broadest masses of the people to carry out the work of eliminating traitors, logistical and material support, and replenishing combatants. Attention should also be paid to economic problems, the reasonable burden and protection of commerce, the implementation of strict discipline, and the confiscation of the property of a person or a shop without accurate evidence of collaboration with the enemy.
The anti-Japanese base area in northern Jiangsu
Chapter VII, Strategic Defense and Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla Warfare. After the Japanese aggressors stop their nationwide offensive, they will inevitably concentrate their forces on attacking the base areas we have established, and the encirclement and suppression of the base areas is often of an enveloping nature, and they can be broken down by attacking them one point or all the way. In the course of counter-siege, we must pay attention to "erecting walls (practicing martial law so that the enemy elements cannot get information) and clearing the field (harvesting mature grain as soon as possible so that the enemy has no supplies)," flexibly adopting the tactics of strategic transfer, encircling Wei and rescuing Zhao (concentrating the main forces to encircle the enemy and make the enemy's main forces abandon the siege of our base areas and turn to rescue), and so on. After smashing the enemy's encirclement and suppression, we can prepare for our strategic offensive, fully rest and train, solve the problem of supplying guns, bullets and medicines, unite and mobilize the masses, and take advantage of the victory to strike at the enemy.
Strategic offensive
Chapter VIII, Towards Movement Warfare. In layman's terms, mobile warfare refers to guerrilla warfare waged by regular troops; therefore, in the course of building guerrilla units and base areas, we must pay attention to abandoning hilltopism and localism, and we must resolutely draw a clear line with Chiang Kai-shek's warlord factional habits. The formation of a large-scale guerrilla force must develop in the direction of the regular army, not into a private armed force or a local separatist force, and all regular armies have the responsibility to help the guerrillas develop into the regular army.
Anti-Japanese guerrillas in South China
Chapter VIII, Command Relations. Guerrillas are low-level armed organizations, and are often decentralized, so that a high degree of centralism is not tolerated in command, and considerable independence and autonomy must be given to their commanders, otherwise the high liveliness of guerrilla warfare will be dealt with. The lesson of President Chiang Kai-shek is the most profound; a commander-in-chief who commands the armed forces of the whole country even has to give orders to battalion and company-level units in a certain battle; the fighter planes are fleeting, and the situation ahead is absolutely not as clear as that of the front-line commanders. But at the same time, we must also pay attention to overcoming absolute decentralism in the guerrilla command system, otherwise their auxiliary role in regular operations will be greatly reduced.
Comrades, that is all that is for this article. Have you learned how to establish base areas behind enemy lines, maneuver with strong enemies, take advantage of all kinds of favorable conditions, seize opportunities to create initiatives, clear up all kinds of contradictions, oppose encirclement and suppression and annihilate the enemy, and so on, until the final victory?
Looking forward to my Yang yang Huaxia, the flag dyed red by millions of martyrs will never fall, and the art of slaying dragons is no longer useful.