On June 2, 1938, Wuhan, known as the "three furnaces", became more and more intense. After the fall of Xuzhou, this modernized city in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River became extremely important, and although the Nationalist government had already announced the relocation of the capital to Chongqing, Chiang Kai-shek himself and all important military and political institutions were still in Wuhan. On this day, Chiang Kai-shek received more than twenty Soviet military advisers who had come from afar, and according to Kalyakin, who was present at the time, Chiang Kai-shek was very frank, "talking about the difficulties of his own army, about the lack of equipment, about the backward methods of army command, and about the lax discipline of some generals." And "thanked the Soviet government for its assistance to China, believing that friendship with the Soviet Union would help China achieve victory."
Chiang Kai-shek during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression
In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek launched the "Qing Party" in Shanghai, and the bloody killing spread rapidly, completely ending the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. On December 10, the Nanjing government unilaterally announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and the next day, the CCP launched the Guangzhou Uprising with the help of Stalin's funds, and the Soviet Deputy Consul in Guangzhou, Hases, was killed for publicly supporting him. In July 1929, the Soviet Union officially announced the severance of diplomatic relations with China.
After the September 18 Incident, although China and the Soviet Union were still full of contradictions in the face of ideology and practical interests, japan invaded northeast China, and both sides clearly felt a common crisis. There is no doubt that Stalin could not let go of the Anti-Communism of the Kuomintang, but he was more concerned about Chiang Kai-shek's attitude toward Japan.
On the one hand, the Soviet Union repeatedly expressed to the Nationalist government its desire to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries, and on the other hand, it sold the Middle East railway and established consular relations with the puppet state of Manchukuo in exchange for peace with Japan. Geopolitics are always complex, and in the face of increasing Japanese military pressure, Nanjing has few options. On December 12, 1932, China and the Soviet Union officially announced that diplomatic relations would resume normal from today.
Stalin
Trikov served as military attaché and general military adviser in China from January 1941 to February 1942, and he later performed well in the Great Patriotic War, serving as deputy minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the army in the 1960s. Cuikov considered Chen Cheng "one of the best generals of the Kuomintang." In the spring of 1941, he and his assistants worked with Chen Cheng's Sixth Theater of Operations to formulate a plan for a counter-offensive against Yichang.
Yichang was an important city in the middle and upper reaches of the Yangtze River, and after the fall in June 1940, Trikov's predecessor Khachanov relentlessly criticized Chongqing for "lacking strong and consistent leadership over troop combat, lacking strict requirements for supervision and implementation of purposes." Theater commanders, commanders-in-chief and commanders of group armies lack courage and initiative, and lack the perseverance and determination to carry out their tasks."
Trikov, military attaché and general military adviser in China
Chiang Kai-shek approved the Implementation of the Yichang Offensive, but rejected the idea of more than two hundred artillery of medium caliber or more, and in fact it was difficult to assemble artillery of such a large scale. On September 30, the Sixth Theater of Operations began to attack, and about a week later, some strongholds on the eastern outskirts of Yichang changed hands. The Japanese who defended the city felt that it was difficult to support themselves, and hurriedly burned the flag and secret documents, and the officers even prepared the site and equipment for suicide.
However, Chen Cheng, who was bent on retaking Yichang, did not succeed in the end, and the strength of the Nationalist army did not seem to be enough to take on the heavy responsibility of counter-offensive. Trikov could not help but complain: "Although it is entirely possible that the Japanese army will firmly control the Han River Valley and capture Yichang before the Japanese army arrives from the Changsha area, the attack has stopped." Chen Cheng felt sorry, but he said: "Our counter-offensive this time is indeed a battle to find the enemy to fight and fight with the enemy, and it is better to win back a little face for the Chinese army than to see the enemy and self-destruct in the name of not fighting the dot line." ”
Chen Cheng, commander of the Sixth Theater
Overall, Chongqing's evaluation of Soviet military advisers was more positive, believing that they were "serious in teaching" in teaching and training courses; "kind in temperament" and "serious in work" in terms of service attitude. However, many complex factors also constrained the implementation of the plans and recommendations put forward by Soviet advisers, and Zhang Shouling, senior staff officer of the Fifth Theater, had a typical view:
"Before the successive battles with the Japanese Kou, when formulating the battle plan, the war zone and the chief adviser, Colonel Bagdanov, studied it in advance. However, because they do not understand the quality of our generals and troops, most of their suggestions do not correspond to the needs of the actual situation, and are only for reference. ”
Soviet bombers aiding the Nationalist Air Force against Japan
One day in the summer of 1939, the Xi'an xingying sent two Soviet advisers to inspect the Tongguan national defense fortifications, and Hu Zongnan, the 34th Group Army sitting in Guanzhong, had a negative attitude and called the garrison: "Let them see the general fortifications, and the permanent fortifications do not need to be introduced." According to Peng Zhulin, who was the commander of the 109th Division's supplementary regiment at the time, soviet advisers were very careful, even if a gun hole was impractical, and patiently analyzed the stakes. From noon to 3 p.m., he refused to accept hospitality and returned to Xi'an overnight.
Statue of Trikov
Of course, not all Soviet advisers were so dedicated, Cai Renqing was transferred to the senior staff of the military headquarters in 1942, and passed by the advisers' office in the morning and evening, often gathering them to play poker, and the rubles on the desk showed a considerable number of wins and losses.
In addition, not knowing Chinese, not understanding China's national conditions, and not being familiar with Chinese traditions and customs also restricted Soviet advisers from exerting their fists and feet. Trikov acknowledged that "this is a pity," and on the other hand, he inevitably needed to express his opinion on the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. In January 1941, the New Fourth Army was attacked by Kuomintang troops on its way to the north and south of Anhui Province, suffering heavy losses. As a Soviet military attaché in China, Trikov repeatedly demanded that the truth of the incident be revealed, and Chiang Kai-shek pretended not to know the details, saying that he would definitely elaborate on the investigation after the investigation was completed.
Trikov's Memoirs "Mission in China"
Trikov was very angry and asked He Yingqin whether he had used Soviet-supplied weapons in the conflict with the New Fourth Army, which He Yingqin denied, but stressed that "the New Fourth Army did not carry out orders and was therefore punished by the Supreme Commander." Trikov said: "Never go to war against your own army, in order to win the national war, the people should unite." ”
In May, the Kuomintang again disputed over the dispatch of troops to the Eighth Route Army at the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain, and CuiKov intervened, causing yan'an to be unhappy, and Mao Zedong instructed Zhou Enlai: "In the past two and a half years, the Kuomintang has fought very little against Japan, and there has been no battle since the winter offensive of the previous year. Tell the general counsel not to talk nonsense. ”
Trikov in the Soviet-German War
In February 1942, in the desperate need of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union decided to recall a large number of advisers in China. Trikov pointed out bluntly: "It is inappropriate and even harmful to play with General Stilwell when making suggestions. I do not want to take responsibility in front of the Chinese public for the failure of China's elite forces in Burma for carrying out the orders of the Americans and The British."
It is undeniable that soviet military advisers, like munitions and materials to China, made indelible contributions to China's early War of Resistance. At the same time, we cannot avoid the fact that Stalin's ideas and practices of getting involved in Xinjiang have brought great confusion to the Chinese people who pursue national reunification and national unity.
bibliography:
1. Cuikov, Mission in China: Notes from a Military Adviser, Xinhua Publishing House, 2012.
2. Edited by the Cultural and Historical Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: Selected Manuscripts of Literature and History Materials: The War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, China Literature and History Publishing House, 2002.
3. Lü Fangshang, editor-in-chief: "Long Compilation of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's Chronology", Taipei "National History Museum", 2015 edition.
4. "Memoirs of Mr. Chen Cheng: The War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression", National History Museum, Taipei, 2005.