A composite brigade of the People's Liberation Army has been stationed on the plateau for four consecutive years, and officers and men have a deeper understanding of systematic operations

The border pass is not over, and the snow training is busy.

Just after the Spring Festival a while ago, Zhang Tong, a training staff officer of a composite brigade of the 77th Group Army, had been working overtime for several consecutive nights to make full preparations for the 5th plateau training of the troops.

The information in my hand was turned back and forth. Although there is a lot of data and thick materials, Zhang Tong has repeatedly "chewed" for a long time, afraid of missing a key word and a data value. Because these materials are the results of the officers and men of the whole brigade on the snow line of the drill for 4 consecutive years, they have accumulated one shot and one bullet, and each item is not easy to come by.

"The target was not destroyed, the operation was exposed..." Zhang Tong still remembers that scene - in the summer of 2017, when he first went to the plateau, he did not expect that the firepower strike operation that was familiar with the plain area ended in failure in the alpine mountains.

At that time, after receiving the coordinate data of the "enemy's" important military facilities transmitted by the reconnaissance detachment, the artillery detachment quickly installed a ruler and covered the target area with firepower. Unexpectedly, shells frequently landed outside the target area.

Why is it different from the plains? After repeated demonstrations by live ammunition, the positioning information is correct, and the problem lies in the "Iron Guy". Everyone found that the temperature of the plateau, air pressure and other factors will have an impact on the performance of weapons and equipment, and the original shooting meter does not work...

Eat a trench, grow a wisdom. Walking down the exercise ground, the brigade bound the performance data of various weapons and equipment after the plateau test into a book for reference in the coming year.

Who would have thought that after another highland exercise a year later, the officers and men encountered a new problem: During the confrontation, the reconnaissance detachment that updated its playing style according to the plateau environment had lost its fighter plane long ago because it did not match the tactics of the firepower detachment enough, coordinated many times, took a long time, and had long since lost its fighter.

"If we don't face up to the battlefield environment and combat conditions on the plateau, the system will not be able to talk about it, and the balance of victory will not tilt toward us." Successive years of stationed training on the plateau have enabled Zhang Tong and his comrades-in-arms to have an increasingly profound understanding and understanding of the system of combat above the snow line.

Only when every element and unit is integrated into the system can we win the war above the snow line.

Today, in the face of the upcoming 5th plateau training, Zhang Tong's training department is brightly lit, and everyone is racing against the clock to deeply process stacks of data and carry out the demonstration of tactics and training methods, laying a solid foundation for tempering the combat skills of alpine mountains.

As more and more officers and men began to "cross the snow line" in their minds, everyone gained a deeper understanding of "systematic combat."

The military plateau, the same battle, different tactics, the result is the same -

In a coordinated training, the pilots of the army aviation unit flew helicopters carrying more than 10 special combatants "deep behind the enemy lines." The pilots chose the landing site, and after the special combatants left the plane, they found that the surrounding terrain was flat and open, and it was impossible to effectively conceal them. In the end, the operation failed due to premature exposure of whereabouts.

The next day, in coordination again, the pilots considered the concealment of the terrain of the airborne landing, and chose a valley in the snowy mountains for airborne landing, but due to the disturbance of the valley air flow, they almost caused safety problems, resulting in the failure of the operation.

At the review meeting, the special combatants blamed air power, and the air force complained about the special combatants, and the two sides insisted: "Choosing to land in a relatively flat and open field area is out of consideration for the safety of airborne landings..." "Choosing complex terrain is for the concealment of special operations operations..."

In the eyes of each side, there are considerations of the odds of victory in the profession of the same army. However, because both sides took the "extreme value" and did not take the common divisor, both led to the failure of the operation.

"This common divisor is actually systematic operational thinking." During this review, the officers and men of the two units understood the same truth: In training troops on the snow line, systematic thinking must be indispensable.

Officers and men of a certain special combat brigade said: There is no ready-made training experience reference for embarking on the plateau, so we have to carry out it step by step according to the altitude from low to high, and move the mature training mode in the plain area to the plateau. This practice has contributed to the generation of combat effectiveness. That year, the special combat brigade parachuted to the top of Kunlun, without any casualties, no damage to equipment, whether it was the number of skydiving or the content of training courses, it set a historical record.

But after training for a long time, they found that above the snow line, the combat effectiveness of each element would be reduced due to the altitude factor - the penetration speed would be limited, the angle of fire of the artillery would be reduced, and the flight conditions would be more complicated... Wang Fuqiang, a brigade parachute training instructor and a first-class sergeant major, said: "The cold environment of the plateau has suppressed the ability to fight alone, and if you cannot establish systematic thinking, open up various nodes, and start a war, you will have to suffer hardships." ”

"Training experience is like the area of a circle, the more experience the larger the area, the larger the circumference of the circle, and the greater the unknown territory touched." Shang Baoyu, commander of the special operations brigade, said: "With the deepening of training, the bottleneck of the original combat system has gradually become prominent. ”

"Above the snow line, the coordination between various combat elements has been repeatedly 'stumbled'. The first thing we should feel when we find these problems is joy. The leader of the group army introduced. They have deepened military training on the plateau for four consecutive years, and the chief organs have led commanders at all levels to repeatedly discuss and sum up, sort out a series of deep-seated problems, and urge all branches and professions to abandon old concepts and integrate into a new system.

As more and more officers and men began to "cross the snow line" in their minds, everyone had a deeper understanding of "system operations": In the past, when talking about systems, most of them were the sum of the peaks of strength, and being able to achieve "1+1>2" was success, but now we see another possibility, that is, the formation of the effect of "1+1>n".

Zhang Shangnian, a first-class pilot of a certain land aviation brigade, led his crew to study the system of tactics under plateau conditions: one by one, he carried out coordination and integration training under extreme conditions with the elements of accusation control, reconnaissance intelligence, firepower strike, and comprehensive support, eliminated the blind spots of the system, and opened up the "combination" between elements and elements.

"Each link is no longer a single independent individual, there is no distinction between high and low, big and small, it is part of the combat force of the system." Walking off the training ground, Zhang Shangnian told reporters that although the training is difficult and demanding, this training method is more suitable for the future requirements of war.

Above the snow line, the change of the system occurs bit by bit, and its purpose is to cause qualitative change from quantitative change. In August last year, the group army's "five types of firepower" of synthesis, artillery, air defense, special operations, and land aviation met with the plateau to conduct a coordinated exercise, and gained a skin-to-skin and deeper understanding of system operations.

The examination room above the snow line forces the commanders to further realize the "cross-border" of their minds and fight around the system

For Jian Chun, commander of a certain composite brigade, commanding the coordination of infantry and tank artillery is his best trick -- tanks destroying the enemy's forward fortifications with firepower, artillery suppressing enemy fire to clear obstacles, and infantry bursting forward to eliminate living forces.

However, the first time he crossed the snow line to participate in the real-force confrontation of the composite troops, Jian Chun was shocked into a cold sweat - the physical strength of the infantry detachment decreased, slowing down the pace of attack; the artillery detachment lost its shooting table due to the special environment of the plateau and lost its accuracy. If it were not for Jian Chunlin's aircraft commanding the tanks to break into the front of the "enemy" and regain firing time for the artillery detachment, this battle would only be afraid of more evil than ji.

"The tried-and-tested system of tactics in the plain area has been moved to the plateau but the water and soil are 'unsatisfied with the water and soil'..." At the review meeting, the commanders sighed a lot: The anti-aircraft firepower group is inconvenient to camouflage in the barren plateau environment on the surface, and the laying of positions according to the requirements of the plain area is bound to become an obvious "living target"; the power of various types of vehicles and equipment has decreased, the failure rate has increased, and the lack of maneuvering often delays the fighter planes.

The elements of the units that have been seamlessly linked for a long time in the plain area have exposed new system "gaps" in the plateau. The examination room above the snow line forces the commanders to further realize the "cross-border" of their minds and fight around the system.

Wang Qingbo, commander of a certain heavy composite unit, recalled a synthesis exercise and was overjoyed: That time, Wang Qingbo led a deep attack group to break through, and after encountering the "enemy's" firepower, he directly called on his own land aviation forces to provide air fire suppression, and at the same time dispatched a special combat detachment to infiltrate the enemy's rear to guide the accurate attack on the "enemy" fire unit.

"If you don't know the changes in the system above the snow line, the already clenched fist will slowly loosen." Wang Qingbo said: The leaders of the group army have led commanders at all levels to go deep into the plateau to study and train in combat, and have continuously reduced the level of command for operations on the plateau in accordance with the requirements of the battlefield. Nowadays, front-line commanders can directly report the battlefield situation to the "Chinese army account" of the group army, and coordinate immediately and assign operational elements according to needs.

Go up the mountain to "find stubble", go down the mountain to make up for the short. In recent years, the group army has organized more than a dozen trainings on plateau command ability, covering the key points of plateau mobile command and the characteristics of plateau operations in various arms, and resolutely eliminating the "five noes" problem in the plateau version.

The improvement of the personal ability and quality of commanders has become a key point in the construction of combat systematization. After the readjustment and reform, the group army organization and structure were reorganized, forming an operational system in which the composite unit is the main combat force and the arms unit is the functional combat unit. It is necessary to form a fist between the elements of various arms, and it is urgent for commanders to deeply study the essentials of the plateau system of combat.

"The mountain is a man-made peak. When training troops on the plateau, the higher the commander stands, the farther he must see. Jia Junhui, commander of a brigade's firepower unit, gave an example: In a plateau operation, the firepower detachment needs to allocate a small unit to the special operations detachment to provide fire support. In a larger combat system, special operations detachments will be assigned to the composite corps to fight, performing tasks such as reconnaissance guidance, infiltration and infiltration, and sabotage and harassment. "The new combat system and the new combat terrain not only require commanders to be proficient in their professional positions, but also need to flexibly respond to the system combat requirements of different environments and conditions."

Fight in the plateau, and the ability is practiced in the plateau. In 2017, for the first time, the army group set up a campaign command post above 4,000 meters above sea level. After 2018, the training and guidance group of the group army was permanently stationed in high-altitude areas, driving the brigade chiefs and organs to go to the plateau in an integrated system. The leaders of the group army said that the change in the altitude at which the campaign command organs were stationed has accelerated the enhancement of the concept of actual combat, the renewal of the concept of operation, and the emergence of a sense of coordination. Last year, they organized a comprehensive exercise on the plateau, in which the combined forces and the special operations forces coordinated with each other, the air defense forces and the land aviation forces confronted each other on the same terms, and commanders at all levels led the troops to independently reconnoiter, strike independently, and coordinate independently.

In extreme circumstances, the victory or defeat of the war depends more on the "dispute between inches and land" at the end, and the squad leader, the "head of the soldier and the tail", has become the top priority

"No matter how grand the blueprint is, there is no brick or tile pile, it is just a castle in the air." Similarly, no matter how powerful the combat system is, it is only a figment of the word. In the army group, many officers and men have mentioned such a point.

During a drill, when Bao Shoufu, the commander of a certain brigade's fire support company, led the squad to operate with a special operations squad, the operation was deadlocked because the gunners were "reduced" and could not provide fire support in time. The delay in the operation of the special operations squad triggered a chain reaction of the combat system, resulting in the disruption of the follow-up battle plan...

Above the snow line of the exercise, the leader of the group army keenly found that in the extreme environment of high cold and lack of oxygen, the victory or defeat of the war depended more on the "dispute between inches and inches" at the end, and the squad leader, the "head of the soldier and the tail", became the top priority.

To this end, they set up a research group for this "head and tail" to guide the squad leaders to learn "cross-border" knowledge and extend the system combat thinking, rather than just creating a "module" that simply obeys orders.

Prior to this, the squad leaders were somewhat unfamiliar with the "tactics" and "tactics": "It is good to resolutely carry out the order, and there is not much room for independent play." ”

In this regard, the group army distinguished between tactical levels, docked and improved the action plan, formed a number of achievements in tactics, and built a five-level tactical system of "army-brigade-battalion-company-squad" to release the maximum effectiveness of tactical innovation.

That year, in order to overcome the difficulties in training such as snow marching, shooting, and camouflage, Xiao Pan, the 39th squad leader of the "Yangting'an class" of a certain brigade, led the whole class to study the key points of tactical action in the snow environment, filling the gap in the offensive tactics of the plateau rain and snow weather class.

The wind rises at the end of Qingping. A certain brigade launched a combat operation on the snow line at an altitude of more than 4,000 meters, and the terminal commander received instructions on the spot, searched for targets on the spot, judged the nature of the plane, and selected the strike method on the spot, and completed the comprehensive attack and precision strike of multiple bombs on the plateau for the first time. In the first battle above the snow line last year, the "Yangting Anban" assumed the role of a sharp knife in the system confrontation, not only quickly tearing apart the "enemy" defense line, but also waiting for the opportunity to complete the task of target positioning and guiding firepower strikes, laying the foundation for the final victory.

The plateau has raised the standard of support, the snow line has lengthened the support line, and we must explore a support pattern that can support each other independently and support each other

Over snow-capped mountains, glaciers, and river valleys, assault detachments weaved through the complex terrain.

Not long after the drill began, Chen Wenli, commander of a certain brigade engineer company who was in charge of accompanying support, felt a little overwhelmed. He said frankly: "Along with the guarantee, not only must we have eighteen martial arts, but we must also keep up with the rhythm of plateau combat." ”

The temperature plummeted and the river rushed. In the face of the "enemy situation" that followed, Chen Wenli led the officers and men to operate the equipment and quickly erected a pontoon bridge to help the assault detachment to occupy the position first.

"The armor is strong and the soldiers are profitable, the cars are solid and the horses are good, the livestock is sufficient, and the soldiers are Yin, and the great assets of this army are also." The leader of the group army said that the plateau has raised the standard of support, the snow line has lengthened the support line, and we must explore a support pattern that can support each other independently and support each other.

In recent years, in order to solve the problem of food support in the cold areas of the plateau, the group army has developed and distributed folding "camping stoves", multi-functional non-staple food platforms, field fast food generation systems and other support equipment. They also rely on local catering enterprises to rough process the ingredients, through the classification, rationing, assembly and other processes after the transport to the distribution point, the cooking team uses the field cooking unit for follow-up cooking.

The rapid treatment of plateau war wounds has high time requirements, and they closely follow the forward positions to optimize support, equipped with light ambulances, equipment, drugs, etc., and can independently carry out combat rescue tasks without supplementation; they can also rely on helicopters to deliver the guard force to the battlefield where they are urgently needed to complete relevant first-aid tasks. At present, they have conducted many docking exercises with various branches of the armed forces.

Last year, a certain brigade participated in a drill in the plateau and used software distributed by the superior to collect and screen a large amount of first-hand data, which provided a reliable reference for scientifically formulating a support plan plan. The staff officers of the support department of the group army told this reporter that the terrain and environment of the plateau are complex, and each place is quite different, and the on-the-spot collection is time-consuming and laborious. "We complete a data expansion every time we fight a battle and everywhere we go, and the enrichment of the data makes the support path of the group army units more accurate, and the time for the support forces to be put into operation is also correspondingly compressed."

The optimization of the support system has provided strong support for the release of the combat system. In a plateau emergency rescue operation, a certain brigade successfully completed the rescue mission by maneuvering over a large distance, each echelon was equipped with full elements and accompanied by support, and it maneuvered continuously for nearly two days and nights, crossing 5 snowy mountain passes above 4,000 meters above sea level.

Source: People's Liberation Army Daily