Today, China Aoyuan is flying! Early in the morning, major websites began to reprint, and China Aoyuan responded that the rumors circulated on the Internet that "Jinghan Real Estate Group Co., Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Aoyuan, was issued a consumption restriction order by the court and became a dishonest executor" and other rumors were seriously inconsistent with the facts.
Because the false rumor has caused public misunderstanding and adversely affected the company's image, it will reserve the right to take corresponding rights protection measures against infringement and pursue legal liability.
Ben didn't want to pay attention to this matter, but seeing that Aoyuan was so atmospheric, there was some curiosity. Query the keywords of Jinghan Real Estate on the enterprise early warning pass, it is not difficult to find that there are indeed records of the executors, and there are still two!
One of them is the equity dispute left over from the history of Jinghan Real Estate Group Co., Ltd. in 2017 mentioned by China Aoyuan itself, and Jinghan Real Estate Group Co., Ltd. has taken the initiative to reach an enforcement settlement agreement with the other party on September 30, 2021, which is currently being implemented and has no impact on the company's operation.
Another case is the property damage compensation dispute between Zhang Ruilin and Jinghan Real Estate Group Co., Ltd. The defendant, Jinghan Real Estate Group Co., Ltd., compensated the plaintiff Zhang Ruilin for property losses of RMB149,488.83 and appraisal fees of RMB46,000, totaling RMB195,488.83. It can be noted that the time of the first-instance judgment is November 19, 2020, and it is most likely that Jinghan Real Estate did not execute it, and finally it was applied for enforcement by Zhang Ruilin.
Judging from the information on the Internet, the record of being executed does exist. Even if the settlement agreement is reached, as China Aoyuan said, is it not allowed to exist on the Internet?
<h1 class="pgc-h-center-line" data-track="13" > jinghan real estate that was put on the shelves</h1>
If you know the past and present lives of Jinghan Real Estate and China Aoyuan, you may not understand why China Aoyuan has made a big fuss.
Turn the time hand back to February 2020. At that time, there was personnel turmoil in Jinghan shares, and the president, vice president and other executives left one after another. At the time of the crisis of the capital chain, it ushered in the entry of Aoyuan.
From the announcement of the acquisition of China Aoyuan in April, to the completion of the equity transfer in May, to the completion of the transaction transfer procedures in late June, to the disclosure of a new board of directors in July, to the arrival of the executive president and the announcement of the name change in October, Aoyuan's action can be described as rapid.
In the industry's view, for Tian Han, although the Jinghan founded by one hand was forced to hand over to others, Aoyuan's entry into the ownership when the Jinghan was in danger was also equivalent to saving the Jinghan.
But this "big fish swallowing small fish" did not bring too many benefits to China Aoyuan. On the contrary, in the introduction of the new regulations on "three red lines" financing, Aoyuan stepped on the red line, and it became difficult to increase financing, facing the pressure of debt reduction. To this end, after just one year of the acquisition of Jinghan, it was put on the shelves.
According to the major asset sale plan, the assets subject to the transaction include 100% equity of Jinghan Real Estate, 100% equity of Beijing Yangjia and 35% equity of Penglai Pension held by the listed company. The listed company intends to transfer the subject assets to the outside world by way of public listing and transfer at the Beijing Property Rights Exchange, and the counterparty will purchase them in cash.
The listing price of the subject of the transaction is based on the appraisal results issued by the appraisal institution with securities and futures qualifications, and the listed company intends to use 1.02 billion yuan as the reserve price for the public listing and transfer of the Beijing Equity Exchange after referring to the relevant appraisal results and deducting the corresponding dividend amount, and the final transaction price will be determined based on the public listing results.
However, the sale of the asset was subsequently questioned by the stock exchange. On August 4, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued an inquiry letter on the restructuring of Aoyuan Meigu Technology Co., Ltd., with a total of 10 questions, mainly focusing on the company's divestiture of real estate business.
The main issues of the inquiry letter revolve around the rationality of the listing and transfer price of the transaction, the specific asset information disclosure of Jinghan Real Estate, and the interest exchanges between the two.
<h1 class="pgc-h-center-line" data-track="59" > the flow of China's Aoyuan is tight and is included in the negative observation</h1>
In a decline list, the mainstream real estate dollar debt has fallen sharply, among which Fantasia, Modern Real Estate, Jianye Real Estate and Sunshine City have fallen by 68.99%, 63.39%, 44.09% and 39.52% respectively.
In fact, there is another corporate dollar bond that fell sharply in June. According to statistics, a few months ago, a number of dollar bonds in China Aoyuan experienced a sharp decline, with the face value of every 1 dollar once falling below 90 cents, of which the dollar bonds due in 2027 fell to 81.655 cents per 1 dollar on July 6, with a yield of 10.23%.
On June 9, fitch, an international credit rating agency, adjusted China Aoyuan's rating outlook from "stable" to "negative". It also confirmed China Aoyuan's senior unsecured rating and its outstanding senior dollar debt rating as "BB".
Fitch gives a simple reason:
That is, through the forecast period of 2024, China Aoyuan's proportional consolidated leverage ratio may remain above 40%, touching on Fitch's negative rating factor (from 37.9% at the end of June 2020 to 41.8% at the end of 2020). Fitch is uncertain whether the decline in its implied cash income can be reversed by the end of 2021 and whether it can reduce its guarantees to joint ventures and affiliates in 2021.
The experience of China Aoyuan seems to find a shadow from Fantasia. As early as September, institutions downgraded Fantasia ratings, in which S&P adjusted Fantasia's outlook to negative and confirmed the "B" rating. Fitch downgraded Fantasia's long-term foreign currency issuer default rating from "B+" to "B" and the outlook remains "negative".
In the face of doubts, it is also actively shrinking its dollar debt. Since the beginning of this year, Aoyuan has carried out a number of repurchases of DOLLAR bonds. Together with the repurchases on April 9 and May 21, 2021, Aoyuan has repurchased US$9 million of senior notes on the open market by June 10.
However, the liquidity of China Aoyuan is still affecting the confidence of the secondary market. In addition, according to the financial report, as of the end of June 2021, China Aoyuan's net debt ratio was 80.7%, the asset-liability ratio after excluding pre-collection was 78.5%, and the cash short-term debt ratio was 1.3 times; bank and other borrowings totaled 80.2 billion yuan, and senior notes and bonds were 31.1 billion yuan, totaling 1113.3 billion yuan. Among them, short-term borrowings in one year were 51.7 billion yuan, accounting for 46% of total borrowings.
In terms of US dollar bonds, in the first half of the year, China Aoyuan issued a total of three US dollar bonds, totaling US$738 million, which were used for refinancing. According to incomplete statistics, as of October 16, there were 10 US dollar bonds in China Aoyuan, with a total amount of 3.203 billion US dollars.
From the perspective of overall debt, whether it is borrowing or overall debt, the short-term pressure of China Aoyuan is relatively large, and the proportion of short-term debt is about 45%. In the industry, Longhu Real Estate is controlled within 10%, and Country Garden and Sunac are controlled at about 30%.
Industry insiders pointed out that the lower the proportion of short-term debt, the smaller the short-term cash flow pressure of housing enterprises, and vice versa. If the short-term debt reaches 45% or higher, it will seriously affect the company's operating activities and cash flow management.
In fact, not only China Aoyuan, a test of the liquidity of housing enterprises is coming. I hope that the real estate people can stick to it and survive this winter is spring.