Mao Zedong provided guidance for the Battle of Chosin Lake, but it was up to Peng Dehuai to decide on his own

Stills from the movie Chosin Lake

Judging from the documents currently available, Peng Dehuai, then commander and political commissar of the Chinese Volunteer Army, had fewer relevant telegrams on the Battle of Chosin Lake, and there were no references to the Eastern Front in peng Dehuai's Self-Description of the Second Campaign; and Mao Zedong's relevant cables on the Battle of Chosin Lake were more numerous, most of which involved the combat tasks of the 9th Corps. According to this, some researchers believe that Mao Zedong directly commanded the 9th Corps and intervened in front-line operations. But this was not the case, and Mao Zedong's guidance of the Battle of Chosin Lake was indirect, not direct command.

The telegrams before the battle were relayed by Peng Dehuai and made a final decision

Before the battle, although as early as October 23, 1950, Mao Zedong called Chen Yi and Zhang Zhen, asking that "the Song Corps must carry out political mobilization and military training as soon as possible, and prepare to drive an army to the northeast first", this was only Mao Zedong's departure from the perspective of the overall strategic situation, taking precautions, and first making the 9th Corps ready to enter the DPRK. After that, most of the telegrams sent by Mao Zedong on the matters of the 9th Corps were relayed by Peng Dehuai, and Peng Dehuai made the final decision.

On October 27, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai that "the Ninth Corps is scheduled to be trained in the Meihekou area from November 1, and if there is a strategic urgent need on the front line, it can be called up, and if there is no such urgent need, it will not be easily called up", that is to say, the mobilization of the 9th Corps needs Peng Dehuai to judge according to the strategic situation of the Korean War situation, and the decision is in the hands of Peng Dehuai. On November 5, Mao Zedong specifically mentioned in his reply to Peng Dehuai that "all the telegrams are known and the deployment is very good." The Jiangjie and Changjin sides should determine that the Song Corps should take full responsibility, with the policy of luring the enemy to go deep into search for opportunities to annihilate the enemy. Thereafter, the corps will be under your direct command, and we will not control it remotely. One of the Ninth Corps should go straight to the river boundary and go to Chosin as soon as possible", and in this telegram, "The corps is under the direct command of you, and we will not control it remotely" has made it clear that the 9th Corps is under the command of the Volunteer Army Command. The subsequent telegram from Peng Dehuai also confirmed this.

On November 6, Peng Dehuai instructed Song Shilun and Tao Yong to "return the battlefield on the Eastern Front (east of Xiaobaishan) to the Song Corps, and to lure the enemy deep into the Old Jinli and Changjin Lines, first of all, to achieve the goal of eliminating two regiments of the US First Division of the Us Land War." On November 8, Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua, and Park Yiyu sent a telegram to Mao Zedong the next operational policy and deployment of the Volunteer Army: "In order to contain our main force, the enemy has advanced north along the Qingchuan River and cooperated with its attempt to detour the river boundary on the eastern front. In order to wait for work and facilitate the transportation of the rear, I intend to still lure the enemy to go deeper and take various annihilation policies. The western front was deployed as follows: a division of the Thirty-eighth Army fought along the east bank of the Cheongcheon River, led the enemy to the myokazan area, and resolutely held it; the main force was gathered in the mountains north of The Lower Apricot Cave, east of the stadium, and north of Tokugawa. The main force of the Forty-second Army covered the task, and after the Arrival of the Song Shi Round Corps, the 125th Division gathered in the areas northeast of Tokugawa, De da Nang, Xingchuandong, and Xueguanli; after the Song Corps began, it coordinated with the main force of the Thirty-eighth Army to attack from the northeast to the southwest, but did not relax every opportunity to destroy the puppet army. The main forces of the Thirty-ninth Army, the Forty-sixth Army, and the Sixty-sixth Army were located in the Wenjing, Unsan, Taichuan, and Guicheng areas, resting for seven days, searching for scattered troops, replenishing food and ammunition, and building roads. If the enemy does not advance, when the Song Corps mobilizes the enemy after the start of the battle, it is planned to concentrate three armies to go out of Tokugawa and its south to seek opportunities to annihilate the enemy, and push the battlefield forward so as to facilitate protracted combat. Preparations are being made to repair the road from Heecheon to Nyeongwon via Gwangcheon-dong," the cable indicates that Peng Dehuai had made clear arrangements for how the 9th Corps would be deployed.

On November 12, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua, and Park Yiyu: "The combat effectiveness of the FIRST MARINE DIVISION of the US army is said to be the strongest in the US army, and it seems that it is not enough for our army to surround and annihilate two regiments with four divisions, there should be one or two divisions as reserves, the twenty-sixth army of the Ninth Corps should be close to the front, the campaign command must be carefully organized, please continue to guide Song and Tao to complete their tasks." This telegram Mao Zedong sent directly to Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua, and Park Yiyu instead of directly to the 9th Corps Song Shilun. If Mao Zedong directly commanded the 9th Corps, then he would inevitably call Song Shilun directly, so why should he go through Peng Dehuai and others to "guide" him? Just because Mao Zedong used the word "guidance" in his telegram, it cannot be inferred that Peng Dehuai did not command and Mao Zedong directly commanded the 9th Corps.

The telegrams during the campaign were mainly guiding opinions, due to the discretion of the Song Dynasty

During the campaign, Mao Zedong repeatedly called Peng Dehuai, Song Shilun and others to give some guidance to the campaign, rather than direct command. On November 30, Mao Zedong telephoned Peng Dehuai, Song Shilun, and others: "Please do not put forward the slogan of winter rest, and only make necessary rest and rectification training between the two battles." Such a rectification may be carried out for a month or so after a major campaign, as long as circumstances permit. If the situation permits, it is extended, and if it is not permitted, it is shortened. Troop reorganization should be carried out in appropriate locations on the front line, and crippled troops can be in safer places, but it is advantageous for the military headquarters in Korea south of the Yalu River to directly control and supervise them. Whether the above is feasible or not, please consider discretion", this telegram is of a deliberative nature, only a guiding opinion, whether to adopt it or not still needs to be decided by Song Shilun and so on.

On December 1, Mao Zedong telephoned Peng Dehuai, Song Shilun, and others: "The main force of the US Seventh Division and a regiment of the pseudo-third division were attacked by Huishan, in an attempt to cut off the supply line between Houchang and Changjin, and asked Song Qin to order a division in Houchang to meet the enemy to the east so that the enemy could not advance westward."

On December 2, Mao Zedong telephoned Peng Dehuai, Song Shilun, and others: "In addition to stepping up the annihilation of the besieged enemy, our Ninth Corps should also be prepared to fight against the two Syngman Rhee Divisions and the us Third Division, which are bound to be reinforced." In fact, this telegram did not command Song Shilun to provide reinforcements, but reminded Song Shilun to always maintain a high degree of vigilance, and the enemy may have the appearance of siege-breaking troops on the outskirts of the 9th Corps.

On December 3, Mao Zedong telephoned Peng Dehuai, Song Shilun, and others: "(1) Please ask Song Qin to consider quickly transferring the Twenty-sixth Army to the south to carry out the task of fighting and reinforcing." (2) For the enemy in the Liutanli area, except for annihilating one of them, temporarily retain a large part, encircle and not annihilate, and let him call for help day and night, so that he can attract the enemy to come and help me, so that I can have help to fight. If the enemy in the Liutanli area is annihilated by us prematurely, the enemy will certainly not come to the aid of the enemy, and they will concentrate on the Xianxing area to block our southward advance and be unfavorable to our next battle.

On December 4, Mao Zedong telephoned Peng Dehuai, Song Shilun, and others: "The pseudo-first and pseudo-three-two divisions retreated on foot because of the lack of trains, and it is still difficult to determine when to arrive in Xianxing. The enemy had ordered the encircled US 57 regiments to be evacuated by plane from Xiajieyuli, and it was hoped that Song Taoqin would quickly take control of the airfield in Xiajieyuli so that the enemy would not withdraw, and annihilate the retreating troops of the 57th regiments in the south, leaving only their entrenched troops in the Liutanli area to encircle and not annihilate, so as to facilitate fishing." Mao Zedong hoped that the Song Shilun would be able to achieve the desired goal. On the same day, song shi reincarnated the volunteer army headquarters and reported to the Central Military Commission: "The Twenty-sixth Army is now taking over the Twentieth Army and undertaking the task of attacking Hagaru-ri. It is planned to start a battle tomorrow night. After the Twentieth Army gave up the task of attacking Xiajieli, the main forces of its Fifty-eighth and Sixty Divisions immediately entered the Huangcao Ridge and the area south of it, preparing to fight the enemy from the north. The main force of the Eighty-ninth Division immediately entered the Hidden Peak Lane and the Upper and Lower Passage Zone (northwest of Wulao Li). The Fifty-ninth Division is still participating tonight in the battle against the fleeing enemy in the south of Liutanli. Most of the Twenty-seventh Army is fighting with the fleeing enemy in Liutanli tonight," Mao Zedong called back on December 5: "Song Taoqin's opinion on the deployment of electricity at 22:5 on December 4 is very good, and it is hoped that it will be implemented." Judging from the telegrams during the campaign, Mao Zedong only gave certain guidance to the Song Shilun during the campaign based on the information returned by Peng Dehuai and Song Shilun, and the deployment of specific military operations was formulated and revised by Song Shilun according to the battlefield situation.

Author: Zhang Haiyan Mei Shichang

EDIT: Wei Zhong

*This article is excerpted from the Journal of Xiangtan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), No. 11, 2016