From 13 to 15 February 1951, the Volunteers and the "United Nations Army" engaged in a deadly battle in Tongpingli. However, this time, the volunteer army's unfavorable "division and encirclement" tactics unexpectedly failed, and the enemy army did not flee, becoming one of the few defeats of the volunteer army. Summarizing defeats can achieve greater victories, and this issue will share with you about the Battle of Pingli.
On February 13, 1951, the Volunteer Army had just finished a wonderful blitzkrieg and completed the Hengcheng Counter-Assault in the Jedi, killing and capturing more than 12,000 enemy soldiers in only 35 hours, and the morale of the Volunteer Army was unprecedentedly high. The "United Nations Army" on the eastern front was forced to retreat, and except for the troops stationed in Tongpingli, which remained unmoved, the rest of the troops had all withdrawn to Wonju, Ninh Viet, Pyeongchang and other places. In order to extend the results of the battle by advancing further at the end of the campaign, the volunteer central line troops decided to take advantage of the victory and attacked Topinri with the strength of eight regiments.
Only a small town surrounded by mountains, 30 kilometers west of Hengcheng, from the perspective of the entire front, it is stuck in the waist and eye of the east and west lines of the "United Nations Army", and the location is extremely critical. The success of the Hengcheng counterattack meant that the eastern flank of Tongpingli was exposed, and the attack on Pingli at this time was extremely beneficial to the volunteer army. If the Volunteer Army takes this place, it will push the Us 9th Army flank directly, affecting the war situation on the western front of the "United Nations Army", thus threatening the entire defense line of the United Nations Army, and then completely reversing the war situation.
For the "United Nations Army", Pingli was also extremely important, and like The previous Hoseong Castle, it was in a protruding place to the north of the defensive line and was at the forefront of the US front. As early as early February, Ridgway sent his second ace division, the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd Division, plus a French battalion, an artillery battalion, and a tank company, totaling more than 6,000 people, to build a systematic fortification. These defenders were not only well-equipped and well-stocked with ammunition, but also mostly experienced veterans of World War II, and were the main force for the "United Nations Army" to continue to push the front northward. However, on February 13, the South Korean defenders of Hengcheng were defeated, and the volunteer army would instantly encircle the defenders of Tongpyeong-ri, at this time the commander of the ground force of the "United Nations Army" Ridgway was making a difficult choice.
In Ridgway's view, the US Army's combat, counter-encirclement operations are extremely dangerous, unless forced to do so, must not take the initiative to fall into the enemy's encirclement, early retreat is the best choice to reduce casualties. But at the same time, Ridgway also realized that losing the key point of the battle, the volunteer army would be able to stabilize the river when advancing deeper, and that defending Pingli would avoid being threatened on the western front. At the same time, if the volunteers pursued southward, the United Nations army could launch a surprise attack from the rear of the volunteers, cut off the retreat, and regain the initiative on the battlefield. In this contradictory mentality, Ridgway ordered the defenders of Pingli to hold out at all costs, and at the same time urgently dispatched nearby "United Nations troops" to help ensure that the American army rebuilt the second line of defense in depth.
Unlike the elaborate defense of Pingli, the volunteers were ill-prepared for the attack, did not conduct sufficient pre-war reconnaissance, mistakenly believed that the defenders of Pingli had less than four battalions and about three thousand troops, and speculated that the enemy's main force was about to collapse. Although the volunteer army dispatched eight regiments to attack quickly, due to the long-term fighting since entering the DPRK, these eight regiments failed to replenish their troops in time, and originally had a full strength of more than 30,000 people, but at this time there were only more than 10,000 people, which failed to form an absolute superiority in troop strength. At the same time, although the Volunteer Army was under the unified command of Xu Guofu, commander of the 119th Division of the 40th Army, these eight regiments came from three armies and attacked from multiple directions, which was extremely difficult in both dispatch and command. Most deadly, an artillery company was attacked by air raids on its way and failed to advance to its designated position in time, and the only firepower of the Volunteers was weakened.
In the face of many difficulties, on the night of February 13, 1951, the Volunteer Army mobilized more than 10,000 people from 6 regiments and with the support of 3 artillery companies, took the lead in launching an attack to fully encircle the enemy in Pingli. However, the enemy's fire was unexpectedly fierce, and the US army fired more than 24,400 shells of various types this night alone. However, the volunteers were not afraid of the fierce enemy artillery fire, annihilated one of them in the case of weak firepower, and successfully wounded the commander of the US 23rd Regiment, successfully compressing the enemy's defensive front, unfortunately failing to cause major damage to the enemy's fundamental position.
When the night receded, the U.S. aircraft began to move, and the volunteers were forced to stop the attack due to the lack of air superiority and turned to resisting the U.S. counterattack. The 2rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment defended the Masan position, which was bombed by American aircraft and completely unable to lift its head, but the 5th Battalion fighters risked death to withstand five enemy attacks. The telephone line of the 359th Regiment was blown off, resulting in the interruption of contact with the front line, and under the strong fire of the US army, seven soldiers rushed out to connect the telephone line, watching the comrades fall one by one but no one retreated, and finally successfully connected. However, at this time, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, the British 27th Brigade, and the South Korean 6th Division on the Western Front of the United Nations Army had begun to provide eastern assistance, and the volunteer army was gradually in a passive position, and the situation was becoming more and more critical.
On the night of February 14, 1951, the Volunteer Army immediately dispatched two regiments to increase the intensity of the attack on the enemy, and in the face of the enemy's reinforcements, it was necessary to make a quick decision, and at any time it was getting dark, the Volunteer Army once again launched an active attack. However, the artillery fire of the "United Nations Army" was too strong, with 51 mortars, 21 tanks, 24 howitzers, 6 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine guns and 4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns in this narrow area. This firepower was already stronger than the defensive firepower of the U.S. ring defense circle in the Battle of Chosin Lake, and the area of the toei-ri defense circle was only a quarter of the area of Thera-ri. At this time, the Volunteer Army dispatched only 108 mountain guns, mortars, and a small number of howitzers, and at the same time carried limited ammunition, whether it was the intensity of firepower or the amount of ammunition, it was not on the same level as the "United Nations Army". Moreover, the light weapons of the US army are also not weak, and the number of bullets fired per minute in front of the main position reaches 12 rounds per square meter, blocking the way forward of the volunteer army.
According to the veteran Zhu Ke's recollection, the battle that night was extremely fierce, in order to be able to cover the breakthrough of the follow-up troops, almost every moment there were fighters rushing out to block the gun holes, lying on the barbed wire, the hillside was stained with blood donations, many soldiers even tripped over the corpses of their comrades, saying that Zhu Ke's eyes had shed tears. In this battle, no volunteer soldier chose to retreat, and they rushed forward one by one, devouring the enemy line little by little. However, in the absence of anti-tank weapons, it was too difficult to break through the tank positions of the US army, coupled with the narrow terrain of the volunteer army troops could not be used, although the night gave the US 23rd Regiment and other units a large number of casualties, successfully compressed the enemy army in an area of less than two square kilometers, but failed to completely annihilate the enemy army.
On February 15, 1951, the first reinforcement of the 1st Cavalry Division of the United States arrived at Qushuili, and the 116th and 126th Divisions of the Volunteer Army quickly dispatched troops to attack and successfully annihilated more than 100 enemy troops, but the enemy army had more than 30 tanks and more than 100 sorties of aircraft cover, and finally only stopped the infantry, allowing more than 20 tanks to meet the enemy in Tongpingli, and at this time, the South Korean 6th Division and the British 27th Brigade, which were reinforced from the direction of Yeoju, were about to approach Tongpyeong-ri. In view of this, Deng Hua, commander-in-chief of the Volunteer Army on the central front, immediately deployed tonight to adjust the attack tomorrow, and at the same time asked Commander-in-Chief Peng for instructions, our side has gradually been in a disadvantageous position, and if it is fought, it is determined to resist the enemy's reinforcements and completely annihilate them in three to four days.
At 18:00 on the 15th, in view of the fact that the enemy reinforcements had broken into Pingli and that the volunteers had already suffered heavy casualties, they took the initiative to stop the attack, withdrew from the battle at 3 o'clock on the 16th, and adopted the strategy of annihilating the enemy from the movement. At this point, the first phase of the fourth campaign ended, and the Battle of Tongpingli also became the third turning point in the offensive and defensive turning point of the Korean War, and the volunteer army changed its strategy of annihilating one or two divisions of the US army, and was determined to carry out the method of fighting a small annihilation war, with the goal of annihilating one or two battalions of the enemy army at a time, and gradually eliminating the enemy's living forces.