Since the conflict broke out, nearly 450 buildings in the Gaza Strip have been destroyed or severely damaged, including six hospitals and nine primary health care centres, according to U.N. humanitarian agencies. The conflict displaced 52,000 people, some 48,000 of whom were housed in UN-run schools.
Israel, as an angry nation-state, has once again brought the social Darwinian law of the jungle to the eyes of the international community, while Palestinians, as a protester, have also shown the world the despair and sorrow attached to the great power game and ethnic conflict. The cause of all this stems from the forcible expansion of Jewish communities and the expulsion of Palestinian residents in East Palestine since May 7. As for the Palestinian-Israeli territorial dispute, we can resort to the hasty figure of the empire when it disintegrated, or we can trace it back to the vague language of 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, which has not changed the long-standing antagonism between Israel and the Arab world. The other form of ethnic conflict and geopolitical competition reminds us that we have not bid farewell to the political logic of the jungle and the difficulties of ethnic reconciliation.
However, when we look back at history, we find that the reconciliation between Palestine and Israel is not entirely out of the blue. The peace agreement reached on August 20, 1993, following a secret meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization President Arafat in the Norwegian capital Oslo, gave many people an opportunity to make peace and heal the wounds of history. Critic Edward Said, however, pointed to the natural flaws of the Oslo Accords, "Did Israel recognize the Palestinian people as a people when it signed the Oslo Accords?" Did the Oslo accords radically change the Zionist ideology toward "non-Jewish Palestinians"? Do these agreements guarantee the restoration of a lasting and comprehensive peace? Does the current leadership of the PLO represent the political and national aspirations of the Palestinian people? History, as Said had foreseen, disintegrated in an expected way. Also after the collapse of the Oslo agreement, both sides rushed in the direction of the conflict with a similar impulse. Everything we see in international journalism today seems to find its counterpart to today in the brief period after the rupture of peace.
Enemies and Neighbors, by Ian Black, translated by Lixin Wang, Edition: Synopsys Culture| CITIC Publishing Group, September 2019
The original author | Ian Black
Excerpt from | Yingma
Peace Assassin
On the evening of November 9, 1995, three Palestinian dignitaries drove to the northern Gaza Strip, boarded an Israeli military helicopter, and flew from the sea to Sdeh Dov Airport in Tel Aviv. They were escorted to the home of nearby Yitzhak Rabin, under layers of security, to express their condolences to his widow, Lia. Yasser Arafat wears an olive-green combat suit, but does not wear the iconic Kafier, and his head appears extremely bare and wide under the light of the camera. He sat next to the sad woman, drinking tea in front of the bouquet of flowers. Something as bizarre as an illusion happened, and Arafat demonstrated his very limited knowledge of the Hebrew language. During the brief flight, the PLO leader refused to look down at the flickering lights of Israel, and did not even look at the famous minaret of the HassanBek Mosque in Jaffa, but instead "kept his head down, not looking left or right... This was true throughout the strange journey, although it was a rare opportunity of our life to be able to see our beloved country." Ahmed Qurey, who was involved in the oslo accords, never asked Arafat why he didn't want to see a panoramic view of "historic Palestine," but Qurei speculated that "maybe he remembers what it used to be and doesn't want to see what it has become." Dressed in a black coat and hat, Arafat was not recognized by the crowd waiting outside Rav Ashi Street's apartment in Rav Ashi Street. It was his first time on Israeli soil since his covert mission to resist occupation after the 1967 war.
Arafat with his wife Suha Arafat
Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish right-wing extremist five days ago, which dealt a heavy blow to the Oslo Accords and the "brave peace" that Arafat praised to Leah, her family, and the Israelis gathered here. The crumbling temporary building, already under constant lashing fire from rivals on both sides, has just lost one of two leaders who had the courage to build it. When Nabil Shas reported rabin's murder, Arafat replied: "The peace process is over today. ”
Arafat asked to attend the funeral through the U.S. consul in Jerusalem, but Shimon Peres, who took over as Israeli prime minister interim, refused on security grounds. But Kurei represented the PLO in the solemn ceremony of Rabin's burial at Mount Herzl, which included Bill Clinton, King Hussein and Hosni Mubarak among the 5,000 mourners. Qurei later recalled the attentive concerns of the IDF helicopter crew, who had sent Arafat, Fatah veteran Soldier Hamood Abbas and himself to Tel Aviv; such aircraft had been commonly used in the past to hunt down Palestinian fighters. Times seem to have really changed.
The murderer of Rabin, Igar Amir
Yigal Amir, a Jewish right-wing extremist, shot Rabin at a pro-peace rally in Tel Aviv's Kikar Malchei Yisrael, which he saw as his mission. The law student from Heerzliya had been planning murder for two years, and on one occasion he had pulled out his Beretta pistol and wanted to assassinate the prime minister, but gave up at the last minute. A year ago, he also attended the funeral of Baruch Goldstein, the perpetrator of the Hebron Massacre. The political climate in Israel is already crisis-ridden and divisive. Rabin is portrayed wearing Kafiyer and an SS uniform, as was depicted during an anti-Oslo accord demonstration in Jerusalem with Benjamin Netanyahu as the main speaker. "People chanted 'Rabin was a bitch' and insulted him for 'taking the country to the gates of Auschwitz' and 'reaching an agreement with the devil Arafat'." 6 Amir was a reclusive man, but he gained friends, supporters, and broader support. The extremist rabbis have developed the idea that the chancellor's policies constitute betrayal and that it is understandable to kill him for the benefit of the Jewish people. Immediately after the November 4 shooting, amir, 25, was detained. His composure surprised investigators, and he even asked for a glass of wine—"a glass of gin"—to celebrate "Rabin's death." "I acted alone at God's command, and I don't regret it." He told them.
Rabin was not "soft-hearted" about terrorism and did not condone Arafat. Six months before the murder, Hamas suicide bombers killed 7 Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip, and the prime minister imposed severe sanctions on them. Arafat remained theoretically committed to fighting Islamists, arresting hundreds of people and repeatedly warning Hamas and Islamic Jihad to respect the Oslo accords. Yet whether he refuses or fails – perhaps both – to strike hard enough, each Palestinian attack seems to follow a clear strategy that justifies Israeli hardliners: The bus bomb that killed five elderly Israelis in Ramat Gan in July appears to have been deliberately chosen to meet the deadline for the next phase of the Oslo negotiations, sparking a crisis between Israel and the PLO in the negotiations. A poll after the bombing showed that 52 percent of Israelis believe talks should be interrupted, and only 37 percent say they should continue. Fatah accused the unknown "traitors hiding behind news headlines and slogans" plotting to obstruct Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian prisoners.
Fighters of the Fatah organization
Each bomb attack enlivens Israel's punitive countermeasures — mass arrests, curfews and, most importantly, prolonged closures of transit crossings — which create enormous hardship in the lives of ordinary Palestinians and weaken the sense that people have benefited from the changes that have taken place.
But they're still struggling. In September 1995, the Oslo II agreement was finalized in talks in Taba, on the Ethiopian-Israeli border near Eilat. It provides for the bilateral relations between Palestine and Israel during the transitional period of negotiations on a permanent status agreement. The more than 300-page agreement contains numerous annexes covering the entire West Bank except East Jerusalem and a gradual Israeli withdrawal plan. The expanded Palestinian security forces – which already had 30,000 police officers and 6 separate branches – were responsible for "fighting terrorism, stopping violence and preventing incitement to atrocities." District Co-ordination Offices were also established. The border crossings at the Allenby Bridge and the Rafah crossing were arranged by each side, and formal control by the Palestinian side was reflected by uniformed police and the flag, although the situation on the Israeli side was blocked behind a one-sided mirror. The most eye-catching aspect of the agreement was the establishment of a "Provisional Palestinian Self-Government" and parts of the Palestinian Parliament, which allowed for the first time to envisage the prospects for elections.
The more important part, however, is its territorial arrangements. The occupied territories are divided into three zones: Area A, which consists of Palestinian towns and urban areas, represents 2.8 per cent of the territory, where the Palestinian Authority is solely responsible for law and order; Zone B, which includes villages and sparsely populated areas, represents 22.9 per cent of the West Bank, where the Palestinian Self-Government maintains public order while the Israelis retain full control over security; and the largest part is Area C, which occupies 74.3 per cent of the territory and contains important agricultural areas and water sources. Israelis maintain full responsibility for security and public order in these areas. This means that the Palestinian Self-Government is responsible for administering all Palestinian residents, but has full control of only 2.8% of the land. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are considered a regional unit, with the exception of a crucial overarching reservation — "with the exception of issues to be discussed in the 'permanent status' consultations". Palestinian support for the peace process peaked at this time: 71 percent. Even among students, who are generally the hardest palestinians, support for negotiations increased from 44 percent in January 1994 to 62 percent in August-September 1995, with opposition falling from 47 percent to 24 percent over the same period. In October 1995, Oslo II received 72 percent support, the highest point ever in the peace process. In Israel, however, the parliamentary vote on oslo II reflected a gradually hardened mood: it passed by a narrow margin of 61 to 59 in early October. The Likud group claimed that the Rabin government had decided to sign the agreement at all costs, and the right wing complained about it. Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, a senior member of the Likud, called it "a dark day in Israel's history." Soon after, Netanyahu took part in a ceremony reaffirming his "loyalty to the 'Land of Israel'" and visited the settlers of Hebron, and it was naturally clear which side he was sympathetic to. Exactly a month later, Rabin died.
Settle grudges
Since 1967, and especially since the likud group came to power in 1977, settlement has been a highly sensitive issue. After the signing of the Oslo Accords, the importance of settlement was greatly increased by Israel's desire to establish more established facts before the final peace plan arrived. In January 1995, a week after Rabin, Arafat, and Shimon Peres were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Rabin promised that Israel would not build new settlements and would not confiscate land, except for land used to open bypass roads in the West Bank to divert Arabs and Jews and reduce friction. However, within days — after the beitleid explosion killed 19 soldiers — the Cabinet approved the construction of more than 2,200 homes in the West Bank. Construction of East Jerusalem was in full swing and was always excluded by the Israelis with concessions or changes. These announcements appear to have been issued deliberately at such a time. Plans to build 6 500 residential units in the Jebel Abu Ghneim area south of Jerusalem — known as Har Homa in Hebrew — have also been announced.
Simon Peres Arafat and Rabin were awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize
Located within the city's unilaterally expanded (not internationally recognized) boundaries since 1967, this forested area is a popular picnic spot for Palestinian families in Bethlehem and surrounding villages. Palestinian and Israeli critics see it as forming a natural hinterland in Beit Sahorn, adjacent to Bethlehem, and therefore the move taken weeks before the planned withdrawal of IDF from the city was provocative. The Peace Now movement protested: "Only those who are completely divorced from reality will believe that it is possible to build such a mega-project without causing fatal damage to the peace process." "Throughout the summer of 1995, as the second phase of the Oslo Accords approached, settlers began to speak out more emboldenedly, warning that they would fire on the security forces of the Palestinian Interim Government and fight all attempts to drive Israelis out of their homes. Activists occupied new hilltop vantage points and set up makeshift camps around Jerusalem and Ramallah to transport supporters inside the Green Line. In July, a group of right-wing rabbis, including a former chief rabbi, announced a Haraka teaching, quoting the 12th-century scholar Maimonides that the king's orders could be ignored if they disobeyed the Torah: In the case of the situation, it meant that troops should disobey all orders to evacuate the settlements. The decree was condemned by both religious and secular left and right, but was well received by settler leaders. Igor Amir noticed it. The Oslo II agreement did not make an explicit commitment to the settlement issue, except that "no party shall take an initiative or take any measure to change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip until the permanent status negotiations have reached a conclusion". But the above moves undoubtedly go against the spirit of the agreement.
Rabin shakes hands with Arafat's century
In late October, Salfit became the first urban area to be handed over to the Palestinian Self-Government as part of District A. The site is located west of Nablus, where the red roofs of Ariel, one of the largest Jewish settlements in Samaria, can be seen. Salfait's Israeli command was dismantled, cranes removed concrete barriers, kiosks and steel gates defended against car bombs, and cement foundations were uprooted. Ahmed Faris, director general of the Palestinian Self-Government's Ministry of Civil Affairs, took over the building from Colonel David Barel, the second-in-command of the junta. Jenin, Gelqiliyeh and Tulkarem followed. In December, Israelis left Nablus and Bethlehem three days before Christmas, and finally left Ramallah, a city that is becoming the temporary capital of the emerging Palestinian entity, whatever its nature. Israel's withdrawal gives the impression that, despite its flaws, major changes are taking place in the Oslo Accords. Mourid Barghouti, who visited Ramallah's new ministry of civil affairs, said Palestinians would now be warmly received in places where They have been repeatedly humiliated by Israelis for years. Nabil Qassis, a scientist at a college and a member of the Washington talks panel, said it was "unbelievable" when people walked around and looked at the empty cells where Israelis in Muqata district had held and tortured detainees.
Palestinian self-government with Israeli power
In accordance with the Oslo Accords, the role of the Palestinian Self-Government is limited to civil affairs and internal security. As its whole took shape, power shifted from Intifada activists to PLO officials returning from Tunisia, who were usually members of the Fatah Central Committee and the Revolutionary Committee. Self-government ministers are often outsiders, and their deputies are West Bankers or Gazans who have worked on Nusebe's technical committees. Fatah has established "a quasi-state institution based on a covenant between the autocratic Arafat-led bureaucracy and the local elite", and as one expert has pointed out, "these elites enjoy what they cannot get from Israel – government incentives and political asylum in return for their support for the authorities". Israelis are well aware of the tensions between Tunisian returnees and the local population in the West Bank and Gaza.
Among arafat's appointed district administrators and mayors were pro-Jordanian figures who were sworn enemies of the vast majority of the insurgents. In Gaza, when a local "celebrity" was appointed to lead Fatah, people were outraged. "The leadership has pushed aside those who fought and sacrificed for this cause," one activist indignantly said, "and we refuse to allow those who live in five-star hotels and eat fish and chocolate while our people are starving to become leaders." The real leaders are those on the ground, not in the hotel, those who are educated in prison. The heads of trade unions and NGOs were replaced by loyal supporters of Fatah who "judged everything by the impact that things might have on Arafat's political standing".
The PLO leader replicated the way he governed in Kuwait, Beirut and Tunisia, receiving petitioners and begs like the sheikh of the tribe. One observer commented: "Everyone is welcome — everyone, in other words, except for thoughtful, organized, and systematic people." Arafat listened to the grievances expressed by two hundred dignitaries about the collapse of Gaza's highway system, drainage and electricity and telephone problems, but at the end of the meeting, they all lined up and shook hands with the chairman one by one, and he was "like a Hollywood star." His habits of control are most evident in financial matters. No one else can sign a check. One consultant recalled: "Arafat understood from the outset that security, information and money are the cornerstones of leadership. Arafat's methods, dubbed the "Fahani Rules" by PLO insiders, were honed from 1971 to 1982 at Fahani headquarters on the outskirts of Beirut. He was particularly concerned about the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), which was established by the World Bank after the Oslo Accords to provide assistance to palestinian self-government. When Arafat appointed himself chairman, Yusuf Sayyig, a prominent economist who served on the committee, resigned. Sali Nussebe said: "If there is money flowing into his vault, he loses the ability to buy off potential challengers. ”
The Palestine Liberation Army forces, whose names had been censored by the Israelis, held security, absorbed groups such as Fatah Hawks and Black Panthers, and created jobs and gave them status for intifada's loyal infantry, albeit at meager salaries. Many people (and their families) who were forced to leave Lebanon and travel to Tunisia and elsewhere have thus returned to Palestine. Fatima Barnawi, who was imprisoned for 10 years for dropping a bomb in a cinema in West Jerusalem in late 1967, came to Gaza to command a women's unit of Palestinian police. In the De Haish refugee camp, dozens of former prisoners were recruited by the security forces, while others went into various ministries and agencies to serve as clerks, managers and directors, many of whom were formerly unemployed vagrants. The Palestinian Self-Government, which operates like most Arab countries, buys hearts and minds by offering an iron rice bowl to a group of grateful people. "The impact on Palestinian society is disastrous," lamented Mustafa Barguti, who opposed the Oslo Accords from beginning to end, "people began to compete with each other for work and money, worrying about who would become a director, a deputy director, a deputy manager, and how much they would make — because it was about a lot of money, partly from outside funding, partly from fiscal revenue." "The responsibilities of the newly created organ ministries overlapped and contradicted each other, so Arafat was able to intervene personally and exert control." We have leaders," one minister said, "but we don't have leadership. ”
The january 1996 elections for the 88 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the presidency were the first test of the limited legitimacy and popularity of the Palestinian self-government. "There has never been a campaign in this land, and its de facto ruler is a long-time notorious man for his reluctance to decentralize power, so it is not surprising that a certain degree of chaos has occurred," one reporter reported, "but as the campaign progressed, something even more unpleasant happened in the general election." "The leadership chose to divide the country into 16 constituencies and elect delegates by the person with the most votes, rather than a single-constituency list election system that produces representatives proportionally and encourages voters to think in the national light. Opponents point out in vain that this in a society where families are still more important than ideas will promote clan monopolies and hinder pluralism and coalition governance. Political scientist Khalil Shikaki commented: "The majority election system may be suitable for stable democracies, but it may not be suitable for societies where there are deep political divisions and the basic issues of national identity and territorial boundaries remain unresolved."
The only candidate to challenge Arafat is Samiha Khalil, and that's just a gesture, a respected feminist activist who has bluntly criticized the Oslo Accords. The parliamentary campaign was biased towards Fatah. The opposition, including Hamas, launched a campaign to boycott the vote. The independent candidates included dozens of disgruntled Fatah members who either failed to secure a place in the party or were expelled by Arafat. Senior PLO officials from Tunisia, such as Nabil Shas, Ahmed Quray and Abu Jihad's widow, Intissar al-Wazir, received more votes in many constituencies than locals. The foreign observer army consists of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and teams from the European Union, Japan, Norway, Canada, and others. The attention of the international community has greatly enhanced the sense of legitimacy of the leadership of the PLO, which is crucial for them. A high-profile figure like Hanan Ashrawi was elected with his help. "Arafat told me there would be about 15 women on the committee, adding 'Ha Nan a top ten,'" Carter recorded, "and everyone laughed." Ultimately, the vote was more about consolidating power, strengthening recognition, and legitimizing peaceful Coexistence between Palestine and Israel than building a truly democratic State. Polls on a given day of the election showed 50 percent support for oslo's principles, with only 16 percent opposing it. Fatah received 57% approval.
Security remains the most nerve-wracking part of all issues and, as in the past, a top priority for Israel. A few days before the election, the Israelis finally managed to capture Yahya Ayash, the "engineer" known for his Hamas bomb attacks. The most wanted man in Palestine died in Beit Lahiya, Gaza Strip, after a Palestinian working for Israelis gave him a mobile phone with an explosive device in it. In the words of Carmi Gillon, the leader of the "Simbett" who oversaw the assassination, Ayash has become a legend who has "an incredible ability to survive... Part of the reason is that he has never been in a place for more than an hour." Rabin had personally told Arafat that Ayash was already in Gaza, but the PLO chief insisted that the man was actually in Sudan. The prime minister warned him: "I know he's here, and if you don't find him and hand him over to us, I'll tear up the whole agreement and surround Gaza." 38 Hundreds of thousands of people attended Ayash's funeral in Gaza, shouting, "We want buses, we want cars." The hunt was carried out during Rabin's tenure, but permission to do so was approved by Shimon Perez. It follows the Israeli tradition of destroying the most dangerous enemies and recklessly. The previous summer, Islamic Jihad leader Fathi Shqács was also shot dead while visiting Malta on his way back from Libya to bases in Damascus, killed by an unknown gunman rumored to be a Mossad agent.
Netanyahu at Simon Perez's funeral with then-U.S. President Barack Obama
Hamas is making a comeback
On February 25, 1996, Hamas launched a campaign of revenge. In Jerusalem, a powerful bomb filled with nails and ball bearings exploded on a crowded 18 bus next to Jaffa Road Central Station, killing 24 people. Another civilian was killed in an attack at a bus stop near Ashkelon. Islamist groups called it retaliation for killing Ayash. Coincidentally, it coincided with the second anniversary of the Hebron massacre of Baruch Goldstein at the Ibrahim Mosque, an early test of the ability of the Oslo Accords to withstand. Panic ensued: a week later, another Hamas bomber boarded an 18-line bus near Jerusalem's Zion Square and detonated the bomb vest, killing 16 civilians and 3 soldiers. The next day, a bomber killed 12 people in Tel Aviv: corpses were strewn across the busiest part of Israel's busiest city, at the junction of Dietzyzygov Avenue and King George Streets. Fragments of ruined shops fell on the wreckage of cars, and dazed and frightened shoppers rushed out of the scene in confusion. Within minutes, the intersection was packed with police and crying ambulances. Order has not yet been restored, and Israeli television is following up on the live broadcast. The cameras captured the details of the bodies, some of which had been blown away, and all of which were charred. There are also heart-wrenching scenes of children crying, some of whom are wearing beautiful clothes for Purim.
The unprecedented street massacre – 60 people died in eight days – has placed a huge question mark on Israeli politics and the future of the Oslo Accords. Perez is eager to step out of Rabin's shadow and win power by his own efforts. In early February, he publicly called for an early general election, giving Israelis the first direct vote for the prime minister and the party of their choice. The winner of the prime ministerial election will be the backbone of a coalition to form a governing coalition. In mid-February, Peres touted his government's achievements, describing peace with the Palestinians as "thriving, unlike Ireland and Bosnia." Two weeks later, Hamas bombers were also campaigning, so that statement seemed unconvincing. The idea of a "new Middle East" — which provoked ridicule at the "so ambitious" Perez — never seemed so empty. The Labour leader, who has only 20% of the polls, is out.
Israeli forces have blockaded the West Bank and Gaza, imposed travel and trade barriers with curfews and checkpoints, cut off roads between territories under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Self-Government and launched a manhunt for Hamas suspects. Hundreds of villages and towns have been paralysed by strategically placed ditches, sand or stone barricades. For the first time since 1967, tanks were deployed along the entire "Green Line". Dozens of people have been arrested in areas where Hamas has gained support, Palestinian security forces have similarly carried out indiscriminate sweeps, and there have been allegations of atrocities against those detained. 40 The houses of known suicide bombers were banned and subsequently demolished.
Palestinian residents attacked by Israeli "grapes of wrath" fire
Thousands of Palestinians have once again been forced to interrupt their work in Israel, and the economic losses of the autonomous communities have been heavy (estimated to be roughly equivalent to the amount given or promised by international funders in support of the Palestinian Self-Government). Hamas institutions were shut down. Israeli paratroopers stormed Birzet University and surrounding villages, stormed dormitories and apartments, rounded up students, and drove them all to the soccer field for interrogation, after which the autonomous government police were thrown stones by crowds at the university. Hundreds of people were arrested. "We don't know who is more directed at us, our government, or the Israelis." A 20-year-old Gaza student "Ibrahim," who escaped the siege, complained. Shortly thereafter, Arafat was subjected to more verbal abuse during his visit to Ramallah. In the student council election, Hamas-Islamic Jihad ran jointly, winning 23 of the 52 seats, compared to 17 seats in Fatah. In Ramallah prison, a Palestinian Self-Government security official told a detainee: "You are here because you are divided into these three categories: the first is the people that the Israelis want to arrest, the second is the people that the government wants to arrest, and the third is the people arrested to appease Israel. The Israelis were satisfied with the accidental arrest of Hassan Salamai, the second in command of the "Qassam Brigade" who planned the recent bus bombing, in Hebron. This is a hand-holding boost for Perez. Perez also accused Iran of being a distant but recalcitrant enemy who instigated "Islamic Jihad and other subversive groups" to attack Israel ahead of polling day. Behind the scenes, the push for security cooperation has intensified, albeit at its best, with a thorny relationship to be dealt with — the condescending and condescending posture of Israelis in the face of Crony Palestinian cronyism, corruption and incompetence of self-government. Palestinians blame Israel's crackdown on Hamas's growth, but Peres and Arafat are still meeting to discuss the status quo. Perez understands that cooperation is limited. He explains:
(Arafat) cannot exist as an agent. You can't command him. You also have to reward him. A lot of people ask me if Arafat is trustworthy... He did not become a Zionist, nor would he be a Zionist... He is the leader of the Palestinians and will always be. We can have peace talks as partners, but we can't use him as a tool to achieve our policies.
Labour leaders were soon embroiled in a new crisis, this time in southern Lebanon, where Israel continued to shell Allah party strongholds during a five-week long cross-border exchange of fire against targets as far north as Beirut. But during the 18-day Operation Grapes of Wrath, Israeli shells hit a U.N. base in Qana, killing 108 civilians who had panicked in a shipping container, a routine military response with far-reaching consequences. The U.N. report rejected Israel's claim that the massacre was the result of a technical error, and the angry response from Lebanon and the Arab world as a whole became justified. Palestinians naturally share the feelings of the Lebanese victims. However, Israeli critics point out that the IDF has given an explanation: it is attacking Shiite villages in the south, causing an influx of civilians north into Beirut, prompting the Syrian and Lebanese governments to contain the Allah Party. In May, polls showed Perez leading by 4 to 6 percent, but only 2 percent ahead of the May 29 election. Israel's Arab voters – 14% of the total number of voters – responded to calls for a boycott by community leaders, who denounced the Labour leader as a "child killer" and a "war criminal". It was later found that 72 percent of Arab voters cast blank or void votes. Even so, right-wingers have emphasized Arab support for Peres as a major reason to oppose him. Perez lost by just 29,000 votes. His articulate Rivals of the Likud group campaigned under the slogan "Netanyahu, for the benefit of the Jews" and won the power to form a new government.
This article is excerpted from the source Enemies and Neighbors.
The translator | Wang Lixin
Editor| Zhang Ting
Introduction Proofreading | Dangerous
Source: Beijing News