Li Yan: The old thinking dominates Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy, and "one hard and one soft" ensures that the intention is realized
Author: Li Yan, Deputy Director, Institute of American Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
Source: U.S.-China Spotlight
WeChat platform editor: Zhou Yue
Recently, the Biden administration has significantly strengthened its diplomatic efforts in the Indo-Pacific region, and Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin have visited too many countries in Asia in a short period of time to declare the "concern" of the United States on Indo-Pacific affairs and expound the strategic significance of the "partnership" with the Indo-Pacific alliance countries for the United States. After nearly seven months in office, the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy began to advance in a high-profile manner, and the strategic intentions and means shown by the relevant layout were gradually clarified.
Over the past decade, the Asia-Pacific region has been the geostrategic focus of the United States, and the relevant investment and layout have obvious continuity characteristics. Since the George W. Bush administration put forward the strategic idea of "returning to the Asia-Pacific" in the later period, the Obama administration has launched the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, and the Trump administration has promoted the "Indo-Pacific strategy". The current Indo-Pacific strategic layout of the Biden administration basically follows the general idea of previous administrations attaching importance to the Indo-Pacific region, and at the same time makes a long-term layout of great power competition more directly, pays more attention to intensive cultivation, and reflects the following new characteristics:
First, institutionalization has been significantly enhanced. This is mainly reflected in Biden's establishment of the "Indo-Pacific Affairs Coordinator" position in the NSC, which is held by Kurt Campbell, the main driver of the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy. At the same time, the NSC's team responsible for Indo-Pacific affairs reached more than 20 people, surpassing the European and Middle East affairs team for the first time in history. This institutional change is clearly of great significance. Under the coordination of Campbell, the State Council, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Commerce, the International Development Agency and other departments have promoted the Indo-Pacific layout in a more orderly manner.
Second, the strategic drivers are more diverse. Previously, the United States mainly relied on core allies such as Japan and Australia to promote strategic deployment. Biden has clearly focused on the introduction of "extraterritorial" countries to intervene in Indo-Pacific affairs, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and other European countries have recently significantly increased diplomatic and military investment in the region, NATO, the European Union has also issued the so-called Indo-Pacific strategy document. As a result, the US Indo-Pacific strategy began to show the characteristics of "multi-wheel drive".
Third, the strategic promotion focus is more diversified. Previously, regional hotspots and difficult issues were often the main starting point for the United States to promote the strategic layout of the Indo-Pacific, and the Biden administration has significantly increased the use of regional governance issues, and new issues such as vaccine supply, supply chain and industrial chain security have frequently appeared in diplomatic rhetoric. At the same time, obviously different from the Trump administration, the Biden administration has also attached more importance to "value diplomacy" and vigorously advocated the so-called "rules" and "good governance" as the benchmark for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.
Judging from the biden administration's above approach, the dominant concept behind it has not departed from the usual thinking of the United States: at this stage, the core intention is still to seek to maintain the "balance of power" in the Indo-Pacific region and ensure the realization of strategic intentions through both "deterrence" and "crisis management".
On the one hand, the "balance of power" has always been a tried-and-true strategic tool of U.S. foreign policy, and although it is not new to use it for the Indo-Pacific layout, it is also handy and costly. Since the end of the Cold War, the pattern of the Indo-Pacific region has undergone tremendous changes. At present, China's GDP is three times the size of Japan and five times that of India, and China's economic growth and huge trade have become the core drivers of regional prosperity. In the military and other fields, China's leading edge over regional countries has gradually become prominent. In the eyes of the United States, the "rapid rise of China squeezing the strategic space of the United States" that it feared more than a decade ago is accelerating into reality. In the face of changes in the situation in the Indo-Pacific region, it is imperative to restore the "balance of power" in favor of the United States. To this end, the United States must continue to declare its importance to the Indo-Pacific region and continue to increase investment in all aspects. Guiding European countries to intervene and hype new issues such as supply chain security is obviously also aimed at diluting China's dominant position in the Indo-Pacific region.
On the other hand, while continuously strengthening Indo-Pacific diplomacy and increasing military investment, the United States also attaches great importance to achieving regional balance of power through "deterrence" and "crisis management". "Deterrence" and "crisis management" as two tools in the US diplomatic toolbox, one hard and one soft, are clearly reflected in Biden's Indo-Pacific strategic practice. Among them, "deterrence" is reflected in the Biden administration's continuous reaffirmation of the "commitment" to protect the security interests of allies, such as diplomatic statements on issues such as the Diaoyu Dao and the South China Sea, and also reflected in the continuous escalation of the military layout in the Indo-Pacific region. Defense Secretary Austin has recently repeatedly promoted the concept of "integrated deterrence", emphasizing "strengthening the combination of U.S. military superiority and allied superiority" as the "key to victory" in competition with evenly matched powers. On the other hand, "crisis management" is still an important means for the Biden administration to implement the Indo-Pacific strategy. Although the United States has repeatedly instigated regional contradictions and sought opportunities to intervene, it does not want events that lead to major conflicts. This kind of thinking is particularly evident on the Taiwan issue. Although the Biden administration has constantly manipulated the "Taiwan card", when it realized that this move may provoke a strong counterattack from China, it also had to release the signal of "not supporting Taiwan independence".
Overall, the Biden administration's current Indo-Pacific strategic thinking, although aimed at great power competition, does not have much strategic innovation, and structural problems still pose a long-term constraint on it. The gap between insufficient resource investment and strategic design, the reluctance of most regional countries to "choose sides" between China and the United States, and the fact that the United States, as a "global hegemon," have to worry about the constraints of various regions of the world, are not only chronic diseases that are difficult to overcome in the INDO-Pacific strategy of the United States, but also the basis for China to maintain strategic determination and patience to start a game with the United States.
*Disclaimer: This article only represents the personal views of the author and does not represent the position of this official account
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