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In the vast desert battlefields of North Africa, artillery is a winning weapon as important as tanks. For the German and Italian armies and the British army, all kinds of artillery are not only an indispensable support force in the offensive, but also a firepower barrier that is extremely dependent on defense, and for the North African Italian army with weak armored forces and insufficient mobility of infantry units, the status of various artillery units is particularly important, which can be called the absolute backbone of firepower and the source of combat strength. North African Italian artillery is mainly divided into anti-tank artillery units, field artillery units and anti-aircraft artillery units, due to the poor performance of the Italian anti-tank guns, the number is small, field guns and anti-aircraft guns also have to undertake a large number of anti-armor tasks outside their own roles, and even directly face the impact of british armored units to prevent opponents from breaking through the infantry defense line.
Gunners of the Italian Artillery Unit in North Africa operate a 100/17 type 100 mm field gun on a truck chassis.
North Africa is barren and barren, with scarce modern resources and backward infrastructure, and other materials needed by the German and Italian armies for combat must be transported by sea from the European continent, and only hundreds of kilometers or even thousands of kilometers can be transported by car on desert roads without shelter and with extremely poor road conditions to reach the front. Adequate logistical and transportation support is indispensable to ensure that the German-Italian Afro-Army maintains combat capability for a long time. In addition to some front-line troops fighting with the German army, the North African Italian Army invested most of its manpower and material resources in logistics and transportation operations, and struggled to maintain the operation of long supply lines, so the logistics and transportation units played an extremely important role in the combat system of the North African Italian Army.
Anti-tank artillery
As we all know, the Desert of North Africa is a paradise for tank warfare, and the German-Italian African Army must also guard against British tanks while using armored forces to launch a fierce offensive. Before the German reinforcement of North Africa, the anti-tank tactics of the Italian army in North Africa were quite backward, and most of the tank groups engaged in head-on confrontation with the British tank groups with superior equipment and tactics in the absence of infantry and artillery cooperation, and finally it was inevitable to lose.
In the defense of the position, the most important anti-tank weapon of the Italian army was the M35 47 mm anti-tank gun, also known as the Type 47/32 anti-tank gun (that is, the caliber is 32 times the diameter). The gun was designed by the Austrian company Burrough and built domestically in italy in the 1930s with a production license to equip the Italian Army as a standard anti-tank gun. The Type 47/32 anti-tank gun can fire armor-piercing shells and high-explosive shells, according to Italian tests, 47 mm armor-piercing shells can penetrate 43 mm homogeneous vertical armor at a distance of 500 meters, and can penetrate 58 mm homogeneous vertical armor at a distance of 100 meters, which is enough to deal with most of the active tanks of various countries at that time, compared with the Pak 35/36 type 37 mm anti-tank gun equipped by the German army in the same period and the 2-pound (40 mm) anti-tank gun equipped by the British army, the performance is not inferior, or even slightly superior.
■ The Italian Army's standard anti-tank gun 47/32 type 47 mm anti-tank gun during World War II.
However, the superiority of the Type 47/32 anti-tank gun lasted only a short time, and when Italy entered the war in 1940, its armor-piercing performance was rapidly eclipsed by the thickening armor of tanks in various countries. The Italian military was slow to respond, devoting sufficient resources to the development of a more powerful anti-tank gun or increasing the production of the Type 47/32 anti-tank gun to meet the needs of the front. According to the 1940 establishment, an Italian infantry division was organized into only 1 to 2 anti-tank companies, each equipped with 8 Type 47/32 anti-tank guns, while the number of anti-tank guns in the German infantry division in the same period was 72, while the British infantry division was 48, far more than the Italian infantry division. Not only that, the newly installed Pak 38 50 mm anti-tank gun of the German army also surpassed the Type 47/32 anti-tank gun in terms of performance.
■ The Italian 47 mm anti-tank gun on the North African battlefield, this weapon was already outdated in the early days of the North African campaign.
With the improvement of the level of British tank protection, the Italian army also tried to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the front-line troops, but the weak Italian military industry system could not provide a new anti-tank gun to replace the 47/32 type anti-tank gun, and the Italian army had no choice but to rely on increasing the number of artillery to enhance the front-line anti-tank firepower. The Italians increased the number of anti-tank artillery companies in some infantry divisions to 3, and individual divisions also organized anti-tank battalions, drawing anti-tank companies from the rear to strengthen the front-line troops, such as the 5th, 71st, and 227th anti-tank companies under the 17th "Pavia" Infantry Division in early 1941, and the 102nd Anti-Tank Company transferred from the 102nd "Trento" Motorized Division, barely making up 32 47/32 anti-tank guns. Ensure that the division took part in Rommel's initial offensive in North Africa and in offensive and defensive operations around Tobruk.
■ 47 mm anti-tank gun equipped by Italian sharpshooter infantry in the North African battlefield.
However, this practice of demolishing the eastern wall to supplement the western wall was of no benefit to improving the overall anti-tank capability of the Italian army, and the shortage of equipment meant that the rear troops were weakened, which was not conducive to protracted combat. In view of this situation, the Italian army adjusted the program, most of the limited number of Type 47/32 anti-tank guns into independent anti-tank units, and reinforced to the most dangerous areas according to changes in the battle situation, so that the limited equipment could be used to maximize the effectiveness. At the same time, according to the AS42 formation, the North African Italian Infantry Division should have 72 anti-tank guns, the Motorized Division should have 36 guns, and the Armored Division should have 42 guns, but because the Italian army suffered too many losses in the "Crusader" operation at the end of 1941, it had not recovered until May 1942, and the actual number of anti-tank guns in each division was only about 50% of the requirements. When Rommel won the Battle of Ghazala and advanced toward Egypt, the Italian anti-tank guns were even more difficult to replenish, and many anti-tank companies in infantry divisions had become useless and had to be abolished. However, the Exception was the Sharpshooter Infantry Regiment within the Formation of the Italian Panzer Division and the Motorized Division, each regiment maintaining 12 Type 47/32 anti-tank guns and armed with a variable number of anti-tank guns, mainly the Soloton S/18-1000 20 mm anti-tank gun.
■ The Soloton S/18-1000 type 20 mm anti-tank gun equipped by the Italian sharpshooter infantry.
Field artillery and anti-aircraft artillery
Due to the serious shortage of anti-tank guns in power and number, the Infantry Divisions of the North African Italian Army could only allow the field guns of the divisional artillery regiments and the anti-aircraft guns of the anti-aircraft units to take into account the anti-tank tasks. The Italian Infantry Division and the Motorized Division each have 1 artillery regiment under their command, with 3 artillery battalions, each battalion is equipped with 12 guns, a total of 36 guns in the whole division, and the artillery models equipped are more varied, including 75 mm, 100 mm or 105 mm calibers, including both old antiques manufactured before World War I and new artillery guns designed in the 1930s. The Armored Artillery Regiment under the Italian Panzer Division initially consisted of only 2 battalions, armed with 24 75/27 Type 75 mm field guns. The North African Italian Army also provided the 10th And 21st Corps, each operating on the front line, with a number of heavy artillery battalions each equipped with 105 mm, 149 mm or 152 mm guns. At the Army Group level, the German 1st and 2nd (motorized) African Artillery Regiments served as fire support, and no Italian artillery units joined.
Italian artillery operating in North Africa maneuvered a Type 100/22 100 mm field gun to fire at the target.
■ The 149/40 Type 149 mm cannon equipped by the Italian troops in North Africa, one of the heaviest field artillery of the Italian Army.
In the early days of the war, the Italian Army, like other national armies, did not pay much attention to combat air defense, and a division usually had only one anti-aircraft company equipped with the Breda M35 20 mm anti-aircraft gun, also known as the 20/65 anti-aircraft gun, in addition to the larger anti-aircraft units in the high command above the military level, equipped with larger caliber anti-aircraft guns, such as the newer 75/46 type 75 mm anti-aircraft gun or the 90/53 type 90 mm anti-aircraft gun, which played the same role as the famous German 88 mm anti-aircraft gun It is mainly responsible for air defense tasks, rarely appears on the front of the battlefield, and has fewer opportunities to undertake anti-tank tasks. It is worth mentioning that the Type 90/53 anti-aircraft gun has many similarities in design to the German 88 mm anti-aircraft gun, which can also be easily used for direct fire or indirect fire support for troops, and is equipped with special armor-piercing shells against armored targets and strong fortifications, which are comparable in power to German 88 mm shells. However, the Type 90/53 anti-aircraft gun was only officially commissioned in 1940, mainly deployed near important cities and bases in mainland Italy, and the number of them put into the North African battlefield was very small. To compensate for the urgent need for large-caliber anti-aircraft guns from front-line troops, Italy ordered a considerable number of German-made 88 mm anti-aircraft guns and equipped them with The Italian Army in North Africa. The German-made FlaK 37 88 mm anti-aircraft gun is equipped with the designation Type 88/55 anti-aircraft gun in the Italian army.
■ Italian anti-aircraft artillery on the North African battlefield, who operated a Type 20/65 20 mm anti-aircraft gun.
■ The Italian 90/53 type 90 mm anti-aircraft gun on display in the museum today has the same performance as the German 88 gun.
In the reorganization of 1942, the Divisions of the North African Italian Army reorganized their artillery units according to the AS42 chart, and all divisional artillery regiments had to be motorized to provide timely artillery support for infantry and tanks in motion. The artillery regiment of the North African Infantry Division consisted of 4 artillery battalions and 1 anti-aircraft battalion, equipped with 24 Type 75/27 field guns, 24 Type 100/17 field guns, 24 Type 20/65 anti-aircraft guns and eight Type 88/55 anti-aircraft guns. The artillery regiment of the Motorized Division was similar in size to that of the Infantry Division Artillery Regiment, but the anti-aircraft battalion had one less anti-aircraft artillery company and 8 fewer Anti-Aircraft Guns of the 20/65 type. The Panzer Artillery Regiment of the Panzer Division has 3 artillery battalions, 1 anti-aircraft battalion and 2 self-propelled artillery battalions. In addition to the self-propelled artillery battalion, the other battalions were equipped with 24 Type 75/27 field guns, 12 Type 105/28 field guns, eight Type 90/53 anti-aircraft guns and 16 Type 20/65 anti-aircraft guns. Although the number of artillery units of the Italian artillery unit in North Africa was limited by poor supply conditions and was rarely full, these "Italian guns" still played an unquestionable pillar role in the North African battlefield.
■ The 75/27 Type 75 mm field gun of the North African Italian Artillery Unit is firing.
■ The Italian artillery was reloading the 102/35 type 102 mm gun, which was an old naval gun that was converted to land warfare during World War II.
Truck chassis self-propelled gun
As mentioned earlier, the North African Italian artillery unit needed to undertake anti-armor tasks and mobile fire support tasks, and in highly motorized desert operations, slow-moving towed artillery was difficult to perform both tasks. To this end, while imitating the German army in developing tracked chassis self-propelled guns, the Italian army also placed various types of new and old guns on the chassis of various wheeled trucks and converted them into wheeled self-propelled guns to meet combat needs. These characteristic emergency "truck guns" were prominent in battle, repeatedly inflicting heavy losses on British armored units with ingenious tactics.
■A Type 75/27 gun mounted on the chassis of a TL37 light vehicle.
The Fiat 634N truck equipped with the Type 102/35 gun is an example of a successful "truck gun". Originally a naval gun, used as a naval or shore gun, the gun was designed in 1914 and was older than many Italian soldiers, and the North African Italian army mounted this old gun on the chassis of a truck, making it a powerful mobile anti-tank weapon. During the Battle of Gubijing in November 1941, the Italians put in a company of truck artillery, seven Type 102/35 truck guns, obscured by canvas guns, making them look like ordinary trucks, and lined up in columns exposed to the open desert. A group of British "Crusader" tanks thought that they had encountered an Italian transport convoy and boldly approached, but the Italian artillery suddenly opened the canvas, manipulated the artillery to shoot fiercely, and the rows of shells exploded in the British tank group, 15 tanks were destroyed on the spot, and the remaining British tanks retreated in a hurry.
■ The marching convoy of The Italian troops, at the forefront was a Type 102/35 self-propelled gun.
■ Side view of the Type 102/35 self-propelled gun mounted on the chassis of the Fiat 634N truck.
In the AS42 formation, the Type 90/53 anti-aircraft guns equipped by the anti-aircraft battalion of the Armored Division were also modified from truck guns and transformed into a terrible "tank killer". The Italians mounted the bulky Type 90/53 anti-aircraft gun on a Lancia 3Ro heavy truck, supplemented by other accessories, and transformed it into a high-level dual-purpose self-propelled gun. The 501st Anti-Aircraft Battalion of the 132nd "Ariet" Panzer Division was equipped with eight Type 90/53 self-propelled guns, which inflicted considerable losses on the British army during the operation.
■Type 90/53 anti-aircraft gun mounted on the chassis of Lancia 3Ro heavy trucks.
■ Side view of the Type 90/53 self-propelled gun of the Lancia 3Ro truck chassis.
In addition to using their own truck chassis, the Italians also used the British Morris CS8 light truck captured in 1941 carrying type 65/17 guns to form 7 mobile artillery companies to deal with british long-range reconnaissance teams that were haunted in the desert, and to provide timely artillery support to infantry when necessary. In 1942, the Italian Army reorganized the mobile artillery companies into the 14th and 15th self-propelled artillery battalions, which were combined with the 16th and 17th self-propelled artillery battalions and the 88th anti-aircraft company (equipped with 20/65 anti-aircraft guns) to form the 136th Armored Artillery Regiment. The 16th Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion was equipped with 12 Type 75/17 self-propelled guns with a Fiat SPA L37 truck chassis, and the 17th Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion was equipped with 12 Blue Ciya 3Ro truck chassis Type 100/17 self-propelled guns, a special artillery unit that carried out vigilance duties mainly in the rear.
■ This painting depicts the Type 65/17 self-propelled gun converted by the Italian army using captured British Morris CS8 light trucks.
On the eve of the Second Battle of El Alamein in October 1942, the African Panzer Army was equipped with a total of 496 anti-tank guns, including 88 mm anti-aircraft guns deployed on the front line. Although the Italian army had about 46,000 troops in three armies, it only had 127 47 mm anti-tank guns, 8 truck chassis type 90/53 anti-aircraft guns and 28 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, which were almost unable to withstand the impact of the large British armored forces. Most Italian infantry divisions had lost all anti-tank guns and could only use 20 mm anti-aircraft guns against British tank groups. The German-Italian army had a total of 552 support guns, but due to a severe shortage of shells, it was unable to exert its due power. In order to prevent the front-line Italian infantry division from being overwhelmed by British tanks, Rommel could only break up the German troops with strong anti-tank capabilities and cross-deploy with the Italian troops, this hanger tactic was often interpreted as Rommel's lack of trust in the Italian army and deliberately installed German overseers, in fact, the biggest reason why Rommel took this approach was that the anti-tank firepower of the Italian army was too weak.
■ In the autumn of 1942, the Italian 20 mm anti-aircraft gun group was on alert at the front, the artillery was in a flat-firing state, and an AB41 armored vehicle could be seen in the background.
When Montgomery launched the offensive, the starving and material-poor German-Italian army inflicted heavy losses on the British army with various anti-tank weapons in hand, and the 185th "Lightning" paratrooper division performed best in anti-tank combat among Italian divisions, which was equipped with 44 47 mm anti-tank guns, prepared a large number of anti-tank grenades and Molotov cocktails, and was strongly supported by the 31st Combat Engineer Battalion and 4 Italian Artillery Battalions. Under the stubborn resistance of the Italian paratroopers, the British lost 30 tanks in an attack on the night of October 24, and finally were blocked by the Italian artillery cover and minefields, and were forced to retreat, and the British troops, including the British 7th Panzer Division, had to abandon the attack and choose another breakthrough area.
■ This painting depicts paratroopers of the 185th "Lightning" Parachute Division using 47 mm anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns to resist the attack of British armored units.
Motorcycles and armored vehicles
In desert environments, light and agile motorcycles are a very useful means of transportation, and the Motorized Troops of the Italian Army in North Africa are equipped with motorcycles in large quantities, and infantry divisions also have a certain number of motorcycles for battlefield communications or other tasks. Like the German Afrika Korps, the North African Italian Army mainly assigned motorcycles to command structures or carried heavy weapons such as machine guns. Combat units capable of forming motorcycles include the Italian African Police Force, the Libyan Mobile Company (both of which are used to maintain rear security) and the Sharpshooter Infantry Regiment of the Front Line Force. In 1941, the North African Italian Sharpshooter Infantry Regiment consisted of a motorcycle battalion, which was later reorganized into a heavy weapons battalion in 1942 and a motorcycle company for reconnaissance, equipped with 61 two-wheeled or side-scroll motorcycles. According to the AS42 formation, the armored division was equipped with 504 motorcycles, the motorized division was 244 and the infantry division was 147.
Motorcyclists of the Italian Sharpshooter Infantry Unit operating in the deserts of North Africa, usually on order liaison missions.
Due to the Italian Army's lack of attention to battlefield reconnaissance and the low military industrial capacity, the Italian Army in North Africa was equipped with far fewer armored vehicles than the German Army, and lacked vehicles similar to the German Sd.Kfz.250/251 series of semi-track armored vehicles. At the beginning of World War II, there were basically no reconnaissance units in the Formation of the Italian Combat Division, and it was not until 1941, after the German Army joined the North African War, that the Italian Army gradually realized the importance of forming armored reconnaissance units, and in the autumn and winter of the same year, an armored reconnaissance group directly under the Italian Mobile Army was established, of which the "Romolo Gessi" African police battalion and the 3rd Light Tank Battalion of the 32nd Tank Regiment were partially equipped with AB41 armored vehicles, in addition to motorcycles, tanks, and motorized infantry and artillery units. Ab41 is the main armored vehicle of the Italian Army in World War II, equipped with a 20 mm machine gun and 2 mm machine guns, armor thickness of 6 to 18 mm, road speed of up to 70 km / h, travel 400 km, enough to be competent for battlefield reconnaissance tasks, but the engine horsepower is slightly insufficient, climbing more difficult.
■ Italian AB 41 armored vehicles firing at British targets on the North African battlefield.
In the 1942 reorganization, both the Italian Panzer Division and the Motorized Division in North Africa had an armored reconnaissance battalion. The 132nd Panzer Division was organized into the 3rd Brigade of the "Nice Cavalry" Regiment, equipped with 54 AB41 armored vehicles; the 133rd Panzer Division was the 3rd Brigade of the "Novara Lancers" regiment, equipped with 52 L6/40 light tanks; the 101st Motorized Division was the 8th Sharpshooter Infantry Armored Battalion, equipped with 40 AB41 armored vehicles. In addition to the front-line troops, the rear-end, unorganized 136th "Young Fascist" Panzer Division was also equipped with the 3rd Brigade of the "Monferrato Hussar Regiment" armoured with 50 AB41 armored vehicles. After being put into the North African battlefield, the armored reconnaissance units of the Italian army increased the number of artillery and air defense units in combination with the actual combat needs, and they all suffered heavy losses in the operation.
Logistics force
In the harsh natural environment of the North African battlefield, the combat capability of the German and Italian armies did not depend on the number of tanks, infantry, and artillery, but on the effective logistical support. If there are no ships and aircraft to transport a steady stream of soldiers and supplies to Africa, or if there is not a sufficient number of transport vehicles to transport them to the front line, the combat effectiveness of the officers and men of the African Army will be futile.
The logistics of the German-Italian Afrika Korps were mainly the responsibility of the Italian Army, its supply line started in Tripoli, the coastal road extended eastward to the front line, its north was the sparkling Mediterranean Sea, its south was the dusty Sahara Desert, the coastal road was almost the only lifeline of the German-Italian army, and in order to maintain the smoothness of the supply line, the Italian army deployed a large number of troops in the strongholds along the line and the desert oasis, which was much larger than the front line troops. Between 1941 and 1942, the total strength of the Italian army in North Africa was between 110,000 and 130,000, of which the front-line troops affiliated with the Afrika Korps accounted for only 30% to 40% of the total.
■ On the map of North Africa from 1941 to 1942, the solid red line along the coastline is the coastal road, the logistical artery of the German-Italian army.
In November 1941, the proportion of the Italian front-line troops in North Africa reached the highest 50%, while the total strength of the Italian army in North Africa was 132,410, and there were another 16,000 Libyan colonial troops, of which about 27,000 were directly under the Italian General Command in North Africa, accounting for 20.5% of the total strength, the Tripoli garrison was 31,000, accounting for 31.5%, the Sahara garrison was 1,100 people, accounting for 1%, and the Cyrenega garrison was 7,300 people, accounting for 7%. In addition to maintaining the operation of the supply line, a large number of Italian rear troops had to guard against the infiltration of British special forces and the Free French army from Chad. By the eve of the Battle of El Alamein, the total strength of the Italian army in North Africa was 128,000, of which 29,000 were stationed in Libya, 53,000 were in the rear, and only 46,000 were on the front line, accounting for 36%. In addition to a large number of logistical and garrison units, a number of newly arrived combat troops were also stranded in the rear, such as the 16th "Pistoia" motorized division on the Libyan-Egyptian border and the 80th "La Spezia" airborne infantry division on the Tripoli-Cyrena-Cyrena border.
■ Italian troops took trucks along the coastal highway and pulled forward.
Rommel was very unhappy with so many Italian troops deployed in the rear, and demanded that priority be given to the supply and vehicles of the front-line troops. However, the transport capacity of the German-Italian supply line was constrained by many factors, in addition to the limited throughput of north African ports, the lack of transport vehicles was the most headache for the German-Italian logistics units in North Africa, and many materials could only be piled up in ports and airports due to lack of truck transportation, and it was difficult to reach the front-line troops thousands of miles away.
■ The Italian convoy marching on the desert road, trailers towed by Lancia 3Ro trucks, loaded with M14/41 tanks sent to the front.
The number of trucks owned by the Italian army in North Africa usually fluctuates between 6,000 and 8,000, and at its peak it was close to 9,000, but a considerable part of them belonged to armored divisions and motorized divisions, and a considerable number of trucks were unusable at any time, and the high temperature and dust environment in the desert area made the loss rate of vehicles high, further worsening the use of vehicles. For example, in November 1941 the 132nd Panzer Division had 633 available vehicles (including carrying trucks and passenger cars) and 317 unusable vehicles; the newly arrived 101st Motorized Division had 1,141 available vehicles and 50 unusable vehicles; and the 102nd Motorized Division had only 394 of its 1284 various types of vehicles available.
■ The main transport model of the Italian army in North Africa: Fiat 626 truck, with a load capacity of 3 tons, a maximum road speed of 65 km / h, and a range of 340 km.
In January 1942, the three armies of the Italian Army in North Africa on the front line had a total of only 836 vehicles available, compared with 455 unavailable vehicles. According to the AS42 establishment, the armored division should have 1123 motor vehicles, the motorized division 828 and the infantry division 359, but the number of motor vehicles of the North African Italian army never met the establishment requirements, and there was an extreme shortage of trucks and other vehicles. The Italian army in North Africa should have obtained 11,000 vehicles between January and April 1942, but only 6,000 in fact, and the number of supplementary vehicles in May and October dropped to 3,903, far from being able to fill the attrition of vehicles, so the Italian army and the German Allies used captured British vehicles to make up for the shortage.
■ Italian transport convoys that replenished fuel midway on desert roads, and the German and Italian troops were always short of transport vehicles during the North African Campaign.
During the Battle of El Alamein, Rommel repeatedly asked the Italian General Headquarters in North Africa, Rome and even Berlin for reinforcements of trucks and fuel, claiming that "as long as I am given 1500 trucks and enough fuel for 100 kilometers, I can block the breakthrough of the British army in the south-central part of the front", but the German-Italian army could not raise the above number of vehicles and fuel in the short term, and the helpless Rommel was unable to block the breakthrough of the British army, and could only use the remaining vehicles for retreat. Most of the Italian infantry divisions, which lacked motor vehicles, were abandoned.
■ In the Italian film "Blood Battle of El Alamein", a large number of Italian troops had no vehicles and could only retreat through the desert on foot, and eventually became British prisoners of war.
epilogue
Looking at the situation in North Africa from June 1940 to November 1942, Italy can be said to have experienced the process of going from a crappy protagonist to a supporting role in the dragon suit on the war stage built by its own hands, but the German African Army as a reinforcement was the main anti-guest and became the absolute protagonist of the North African campaign. However, the supporting role of the Italian army is quite heavy, not a "pig teammate" repeatedly ridiculed by the internet writer, in fact, behind the brilliance of Rommel's crossing the north African desert, it is the blood and tears of the Italians. The Italian Army in North Africa undertook most of the AFF's logistical and rear security tasks, providing Rommel with most of its infantry strength and a considerable number of armored and artillery units. It is undeniable that there is a significant gap between the Italian army in North Africa and the German army and even the British army in terms of equipment level, training level, tactical thinking, combat quality, will to fight, etc., but in the process of the North African campaign, the Italians also worked hard to make improvements, and it was an important factor that Rommel could not ignore when formulating the battle plan. If the existence of the Italian army in North Africa is completely withdrawn, then even if the "Desert Fox" has great ability, it will be difficult to move! In fact, based on Mussolini's strategic short-sightedness, relatively backward military-industrial base, far from adequate war preparations and the special battlefield environment in North Africa, the Italian army has done its best to carry out a war that cannot achieve final victory. (Continued)
■ A group of Italian sharpshooter infantry taking photos of abandoned British tanks. The Italians were not always losers on the North African battlefield, and they fought as hard as they could.