The current trend of war in East China
(November 1, 1946)
central:
Asked about the trend of the war, I would like to report the following in terms of what we have seen:
I. Enemy Situation: (1) Li Yannian counted six armies in Huaibei's 74th, 28th, 58th, 69th, 59th, and 7th Armies, and the 7th and 74th Armies were the main attacking forces, all of which were seriously damaged. The 69th Division also only has the 6O Brigade and the 41st Brigade, and its combat strength is not strong. The 28th Division was also an attacking force, with one brigade suffering losses and two brigades not yet participating in the great battle. (2) There are five divisions of the 26th, 77th, 59th, 51st, and 97th Divisions in Lunan, with the 26th Division as the main attack, the 77th and 59th Divisions cooperating, and the 51st and 97th Divisions as garrisons. The enemy on this line was weak in combat, but it did not suffer a major blow, and there was still a force to advance, and it was attacking Linyi East. (3) On the central Soviet side, the enemy occupied the canal line with the 25th Division, and the division from Yangzhou to Huai'an was responsible for the division, and each county had less than one regiment of troops. The enemy attacked Dongtai with the 65th And 83rd Division, and garrisoned the remnants of the 100th Army, the 49th Army, and the 21st Army. (4) Jiaoji Line:'Counting the Eighth, Seventh, Fifth, Fourth, Ninety-Sixth, and Twelfth Armies (of which the Fifth Fourth and Ninety-Sixth Armies were the hardest hit by us) and the addition of six corps of the Fourth and Sixth Divisions, the other three security divisions of about one hundred regiments, the five general units of the traffic police, and the five garrison brigades of the puppet army, the enemy on this line often attacked with four armies, and the rest were garrisoned in an attempt to invade Yanwei and may cooperate in the attack on Linyi. (5) The Jinpu Line Wuhua Cultural Department and the stubborn armies in Huxi counties have been united, but if the Fifth Army is contained by Liu Deng, the Yanji pseudo-Wu offensive force is not strong, but because I only have local armed forces there, it is difficult for Wu to suppress qufu and Zou counties in order to advance.
II. My Feelings: (1) In jiaoji, our army counted the mobile units of one division and three local regiments in Bohai, two divisions in Luzhong and two divisions in Jiaodong, a total of five divisions and three local regiments, and another brigade garrisoned Yanwei and several local regiments and local armed forces. Compared with the enemy Wang Yaowu, he only accounted for a quarter of his number, and he was facing the enemy in separate ways, so it was difficult to completely annihilate the enemy. (2) Lunan, the 1st Column, the 8th Police Brigade (now changed to 10th Division, 3 regiments), the 8th Division newly returned to a total of 15 regiments, and two local new regiments. (3) In northern Huaibei and Lianghuai, huaye's main forces counted Wang Tao's two divisions, the leather brigade, the fifth brigade, the ninth column, and the tenth column, and the other five local regiments, plus the second column and the seventh division in the mountains and fields, and the troops were very concentrated, but the canal and the old Yellow River were separated, forming a confrontation across the river, and the enemy did not dare to come, and it was difficult for me to take the initiative to wedge people. (4) In central Jiangsu, Dongtai, and Yancheng, I have seven columns to clamp down, Xinghua to keep a regiment of ten columns to garrison, and new local armed forces to be established in the counties, districts, and townships of central Jiangsu. (5) In Huaibei, four local regiments of the Seven Sub-districts insisted on persisting in the area, the area was reduced, the enemy swept frequently, and it was planned to withdraw. More than 7,000 troops of the Eighth Division still insist on the area, and it is difficult to move to the south of the Vortex River.
Iii. (1) The central China side has reached an unprecedented level of recruits and mobilized civilians, and it is also very difficult to expand new recruits, and at present it can only be prepared to stick to the spot in the form of expanding the local force, so that the troops can turn to the initiative. In March combat experience, every 10,000 troops used at least 1,000 civilians, mainly to transport grain, shells, wounded, etc. Therefore, the winter wheat in various places has not been planted, the beans and potatoes have not been harvested, and the impact is very great, the people are crying in the service of the troops, some local cadres have fled, and the people have hidden and expanded their troops. As long as the area of central China is no longer shrinking, it can be supported until next spring. Although Huaye's troops were victorious and suffered more than 10,000 casualties, some of the battles felt the fear of death, and the war lasted endlessly. (2) The Shandong side has recently expanded to 60,000, and the prefectural forces have suppressed dozens of armed agents and expanded 20,000 new recruits. From this winter to next spring, if Linyi is not lost, it can still expand 60,000 people to the main force. In order to support the front, the northeast supplies were transported to central China and Jiluyu, and the use of civilian strength was also large, and wheat had not yet been planted in most areas. There is still a lot of food. If Linyi and Zhucheng are lost, the two major grain areas and densely populated areas will be lost, and the impact will be great, and it will be difficult for public grain to last next spring. Jiaodong suffered 8,000 casualties, 2,000 in Luzhong, more than 1,000 in the Bohai Sea, and more than 3,000 in the mountains.
Fourth, the characteristics of the second phase of the operation, the enemy occupied more than forty counties in eastern China, the garrison was extended, and the offensive strength could only draw out ten corps (three armies in Lunan, three in Huaibei, and four in Jiaoji), accounting for one-half of the total strength of the enemy's twenty-third army. For example, if the scope of the occupation of our region is large and the lines of communication are extended, the offensive and garrison forces are exhausted, such as the recent discussion of Sun Liangcheng, "The puppet army defending Xuzhou is an example. Additional troops are no longer possible. Therefore, in the second phase of the enemy's deep-going operations in our region, his tactics have changed somewhat, that is, he has abandoned the principle of finding our main force for a decisive battle, boldly advancing, avoiding the real and attacking the false, and trying to avoid the loss of living forces, seeking more areas, so that our troops have less food sources, causing difficulties in the operation of our large corps, and at present it is also bluffing politically. This is the exact opposite of mine, namely, that our side will not hesitate to withdraw from certain areas in order to annihilate its living forces and expand our living forces. Therefore, the gains and losses in the region and the growth and growth of living forces have become the core of the struggle between the enemy and ourselves.
V. Our War Trend: (1) The enemy's method of avoiding the real and attacking the false has achieved great results, causing our main force to be exhausted and exhausted, the enemy attacks a certain place, and the arrival of the main force becomes a war of attrition. For example, the Battle of Lianshui, if the main force does not reinforce, the area will fall immediately. For example, in Dongtai, Gao, Bao, and other places, the Eighth Division will open to the north, and if it cannot annihilate the enemy, it will still cause the disadvantage of losing the area and not being able to annihilate the enemy's living forces. Moreover, our main force concentrated more than 60,000 people in one area for more than two months, and the local people and grain could not support it. The main forces of Shanye and Huaye gathered in Huaihai for more than a month, that is, they were caught in a passive situation in which it was difficult to attack, waiting for the enemy to arrive, and the enemy attacked the south to aid the south and the north to aid the north. Due to too many escalations of local forces, too many militia expansions, weak local insistence, and lack of strength on each side, the main force cannot be expeditioned. The canal line lost several counties in a few days, but the Jiaoji line was entangled well in March because it did not transfer the main force and the local forces and militia. Huaye left Shuyang and Lianshui to fight one or two battles on the inside, but there are many wars of attrition, and sports wars will be difficult. However, the yamano (including the 2nd Column and the 7th Division to the North) and Lunan may annihilate Feng Bu and one of the 26th Division, but it is difficult to completely solve the battlefield. The Jiaoji line was entangled with the enemy on the long eight-hundred-mile front, and the chance of annihilating one battalion was less than the chance of a regiment. At present, the enemy, except for one part of the Jiaoji Line, still has a large-scale attack on the important county town of Jiaodong in order to cut off our Haikou, to reinforce each other with the Jiaodong and Jiaodong Haihai transport lines, and often gathers eleven regiments of troops to extend to the north or south to our interior (such as advancing to Qingcheng in bohai sea to loot and destroy for ten days). The enemy of Lunan District may take advantage of the false advance to occupy the line from Zou Teng" to Tai'an, and then enter Linyi from the "Lin" highway gap of Zi (Yanzhou). Therefore, the enemy in Lunan is not rapid, and there is this crisis in the Lunan Mountains. If only the mountains and wilderness return to Lulu, Linyi will not be able to ensure it for a long time. Huaye stayed in Huaihai, then Yancheng, Xinghua and other places were difficult to maintain within two months.
VI. Opinions on Future Operations: Chen Chu returned from the Central China Sub-Bureau and discussed with Zhang Dengsu Tan zeng on many occasions, holding that if the four fronts in Eastern China, Jiaoji, Lunan, Huaibei, and Central Jiangsu, could solve one aspect, the situation would change, and if one or two more fronts could be resolved, the overall situation would be victorious. At present, it is not enough to subdue the enemy to avoid the real attack and cunning (because the enemy's movement is in the daytime, there are cars, roads, and rubber boats to take advantage of it, I am very cumbersome to use civilian transportation at night, in addition to the prisoners deserting, the secret agents and landlords in the liberated areas report letters, the enemy is easy to find out our deployment, etc.), so at present we should be determined to leave the troops to adhere to the situation in central China, resolutely concentrate Wang Tao's [two] divisions, Wei divisions, and about 100,000 troops of the Eighth Division, the First Column, and Lunan, and completely smash the enemy in Lunan in one month, and eliminate his three or four armies, then the overall situation can be changed. For example, [and] I went south to restore the situation in Huaibei completely different. The reason for not fighting Huaibei but fighting Lunan is that the Huaibei battlefield is not good (difficulty in crossing the river, difficulty in the supply of people and grain). The enemy suffered losses in the Lianshui River crossing operation with air force and artillery cover, and it was more difficult for us to cross the canal. However, if the enemy of Lunan is fought, by the end of the year, the upper flow of the canal can be waded in vain, and it is relatively stable to insert into Huaibei and have a rear to rely on. If Lunan breaks, then Wang Taoweiye's four divisions will leave Huaibei, and Lunan's troops will be able to turn into the Jiaoji line to form the fists of nearly twenty regiments, which can change the situation in Jiaoji. At the end of September and the beginning of October, it was more difficult to implement, because huaye cotton clothes had not been solved, and the rear and ground forces had not been deployed, but at this time, the implementation also had to be endured and temporarily abandoned, leaving the leather brigade, the fifth brigade, and the ninth column in Lianshui, and still being able to delay the enemy's advance.
The above-mentioned policy is still the implementation of the principle of central concentration of forces, but it requires a unified understanding. The instructions of the Central Committee are determined to be carried out in order to take the initiative to counterattack and defeat the enemy.
Chen Zhangli
November 1