The U.S. recently revealed to the media that the U.S. and Chinese defense ministers are expected to hold their first face-to-face meeting in Singapore later this month. However, the U.S. side also cautiously foreshadowed that despite the meeting's schedule, there could still be last-minute uncertainties.
[The US side looks forward to the opportunity to meet with Defense Minister Dong Jun at the end of the month]
This statement seems to imply that the United States is not fully sure that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will be able to meet with Defense Secretary Dong Jun in person. Recently, although the Chinese and US militaries have conducted a series of bilateral or multilateral exchanges, uncertainties still exist. In particular, if any unexpected situation arises in the Taiwan Strait on 20 May, the US preparations may be in vain.
However, from another perspective, the face-to-face exchanges between the Chinese and US defense ministers for the first time in two years have a certain symbolic significance for the relationship between the two militaries. The rapid transition from online calls to in-person talks, just over a month later, demonstrates the efforts of the United States and China in steadily promoting the resumption of high-level exchanges.
It is worth mentioning that during Russian President Putin's visit to China, the Pentagon announced that representatives of the Chinese and US defense ministries had contacts and discussed a series of security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. This move is likely to be a preparation for the upcoming defense ministers' talks.
With the news of the United States, people from all walks of life have begun to pay attention to whether the Chinese and US defense ministers will meet at the Shangri-La Dialogue. In general, the international community generally hopes that the two major powers will maintain dialogue, and the concrete outcome of the negotiations is not the most important concern.
If the defense ministers' talks can be held smoothly and both sides agree to continue to maintain communication and establish an institutionalized and normalized military diplomacy framework, then this will be seen as an important sign that the U.S.-China military relationship has returned to the right track.
[Defense Minister Dong Jun may attend the incense meeting]
The meeting not only continued the framework of China-US diplomatic interaction, but also was an important link in the orderly resumption of bilateral military interaction in accordance with the consensus of the two heads of state after the phone call between the Chinese and US leaders and the visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
This year's Shangri-La Dialogue is expected to be held in Singapore in late May and early June. However, until the official announcement between China and the United States is made, things are still full of suspense.
As has always been the case, the Shangri-La Dialogue, as a rare multilateral dialogue platform in the Asia-Pacific region, will discuss sensitive military and security topics. Therefore, the figure of the Chinese and US defense ministers can be seen in all the previous incense meetings, and even if there is no direct dialogue on the sidelines, there will be a confrontation in the air.
It can be seen from this that this year's Shangri-La Dialogue is likely to be the second multilateral dialogue event attended by Defense Minister Dong Jun after the SCO Defense Ministers' Meeting.
[The Chinese and US defense ministers just had a phone call not long ago]
Judging from the current interaction between the Chinese and US militaries, if the Chinese and US defense ministers both confirm to attend the meeting, then it is very likely that the two sides will arrange a sideline meeting instead of a simple on-the-spot interaction, which is also a kind of respect for the host Singapore. Moreover, letting the media out on the eve of a similar dialogue has become a tried-and-true tactic for the United States.
However, it should be made clear that, as we have previously emphasized, China-US relations are currently in the stage of "stopping the decline and stabilizing", and the resumption of high-level military exchanges between the two sides is the result of personal consultations between the two heads of state, which provides a political guarantee for military interaction. The military, as an extension of politics, cannot hold dialogue when Sino-US relations are still at a low ebb.
However, there are indications that the expectations of the U.S. and China for the defense ministers' dialogue are not high, because the current problems facing the U.S.-China military relationship cannot be solved through the defense ministers' dialogue alone. In terms of military diplomacy, the U.S. military still adheres to the mindset of bloc confrontation, while we mainly adopt the strategy of seeing and dismantling the moves.
Proceeding from our standpoint, Sino-US military relations should follow the three principles of valuing peace, valuing stability, and trust, and regard military relations as the cornerstone of stability in the development of Sino-US relations. However, in view of the current US strategy toward China, it is not easy for the Chinese and US militaries to achieve the goal of non-conflict and non-confrontation. Moreover, it is even more difficult to gradually accumulate mutual trust while opening up and pragmatic cooperation.
[The Biden administration regards China as its biggest strategic competitor]
The United States has long viewed China as its greatest strategic competitor. When the US military applies for funding from Congress, it often uses China as an excuse to exaggerate the so-called "China threat," as if it has regarded China as an imaginary enemy.
In addition, some high-level hawks and some think tanks in the US military have frequently mentioned the possibility of a war between China and the United States, and such arguments often have a certain market in the United States.
Moreover, the military alliance system that the United States has built in the Asia-Pacific region and the highly targeted exercises it has conducted with its regional allies are far from the principle of "peace is precious" advocated by us, let alone putting stability first. So when the Biden administration claims that it "does not seek conflict with China," its credibility can be imagined.
At the same time, we also need to take into account that the United States does not have high demands for the improvement of Sino-US relations, and only hopes to maintain contact with China. This mentality of getting by and having a dialogue for the sake of dialogue is actually serving the US strategy toward China. Today, the domestic and foreign affairs of the United States basically revolve around competition with China, and the United States is vying for the right to define competition and try to take the initiative.
[Face-to-face talks between Chinese and US defense ministers should remain calm]
While face-to-face meetings between Chinese and U.S. defense ministers are more effective than phone calls, the upscaling is limited. After all, there are several key problems in the U.S.-China relationship. If the United States fails to make substantive changes, the détente between China and the United States will always face a bottleneck, and the risk factors cannot be fundamentally eliminated.
If Austin is able to meet with Defense Secretary Dong Jun during the Shangri-La Dialogue, the U.S. focus will likely be on crisis management. Essentially, however, the so-called crises are all problems created by the United States itself, which have had an impact on the Asia-Pacific security landscape, and which China is now asking for help to solve. This line of thinking is clearly unworkable and runs counter to China's demands on U.S.-China military relations.