I'm Tang Tang, a history buff. Welcome everyone to [follow] me, talk about the past and the present, and discuss the general trend of the world. Gentleman I, just to learn and make friends!
How does the third campaign end? When planning before the war, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai had ideas.
1. An unexpected ending
On December 13, 1950, Mao Zedong demanded that the volunteers must cross the 38th parallel to fight, and at the same time, made it clear that the purpose of this campaign was to find and destroy several parts of the enemy in the north and south areas of Kaesong, and then rest according to the situation and prepare for the attack on Seoul.
On the 15th of the same month, Peng Dehuai reported the operational concept to the Central Military Commission, demarcating the campaign mission line in the areas north of the Seoul, Wonju, and Pyeongchang lines.
In this regard, Mao Zedong agreed, and made a special explanation:
"If you feel that the attack is not going well, you should withdraw your troops at the right time, rest and recuperate and fight again."
At that time, Mao Zedong emphasized that the 38th parallel must be crossed, and as for where to advance after the fight, he did not put forward any hard requirements. His basic idea was that if the attack went well, he could go farther south, and if it didn't go well, he would retreat at the right time. The depth of the campaign was roughly limited to a limited area south of the 38th parallel and a few dozen kilometers north of Seoul. Whether or not to attack Seoul or to cross the Han River is not within the pre-set target range.
Studying the telegrams during this period, it can also be found that before the campaign was launched, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai had no more than the 38th parallel, and telegrams were exchanged frequently, but after the battle began, Mao Zedong's telegrams to Peng Dehuai were greatly reduced, which was very different from the situation of several telegrams a day between Mao and Peng during the previous two battles.
This also reflects Mao's focus on the campaign not on the military side but on the political side.
He only focused on breaking the old impression of the 38th parallel in the eyes of the world, and once this impression has been broken, it can be regarded as the realization of strategic and political objectives, and then the combat operations can be handed over to the front commanders.
When Peng Dehuai was planning the campaign, he put a lot of thought into whether to occupy the 38th parallel. At first, he advocated that the troops should be withdrawn at the end of the campaign, and that the 38th parallel would still be occupied by the US and South Korean troops, but he soon changed this idea and made it clear that whether or not to occupy the 38th parallel in the end would depend on the outcome of the campaign.
He estimated that if more enemies were destroyed in this battle, the US troops would not only not be able to abandon the 38th parallel, but would also abandon Seoul and retreat to the south bank of the Han River. This speculation is quite accurate and basically consistent with the actual development process of the later campaigns.
As for the actions of the volunteers, Peng Dehuai always adhered to the principle of "steady advance", and in addition to emphasizing that the 38th parallel should be occupied, he also adopted a flexible strategy to deal with the enemy's targets in depth, including Seoul:
If the enemy abandons, they will seize it, if the enemy retreats, they will pursue it, and if the enemy forces hold on (mainly referring to the government's first-line defensive positions and Seoul), they will stop attacking, in short, "flexibly according to the actual situation".
It can be seen that in the planning stage of a campaign, it is flexible on when and how to end the campaign, leaving a large room for maneuver.
2. Peng Dehuai's worries
In the course of the actual development of the campaign, one of the most crucial decisions made by Peng Dehuai was to decisively end the campaign.
On January 4, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army entered Seoul, and thus the third campaign offensive reached its climax.
According to the development of the battlefield situation, Peng Dehuai decided to muster another effort to further force back the enemy on the south bank of the Han River and occupy Gimpo and Inchon in order to consolidate the occupation of Seoul; On the other hand, the troops were instructed not to pursue too far, and to stop waiting for the enemy fleeing south until Suwon was pursued.
At this time, the news of the liberation of Seoul spread rapidly, and the Chinese and North Korean people were jubilant. A salute of cannons was fired over Pyongyang, and the masses in Beijing took to the streets to revel all night.
The People's Daily published an editorial entitled "Wishing the Restoration of Seoul," saying:
"Seoul is the most important strategic city in North Korea... The re-liberation of Seoul deprived the United States of its strategic pivot in Korea," and put forward a highly agitative slogan: "Forward! Towards Daejeon! Towards Daegu! Go to Busan! Drive the U.S. invading forces that refuse to withdraw from Korea into the sea! ”
Kim Il Sung ordered Pyongyang and Seoul to fire 24 rounds of 240 cannons to celebrate the liberation of Seoul as a victory of great political significance. To make US imperialism realize that it is time for them to get out of Korea!
Faced with this scene, Peng Dehuai showed twelve points of sobriety and calmness.
According to Hong Xuezhi's account, Peng Dehuai resolutely believed at that time that it was impossible to drive the enemy into the sea by relying on the existing strength of the Volunteer Army.
First, after more than two months of fighting, the volunteers were extremely tired and had suffered a huge attrition, and they needed to replenish and recuperate.
Second, although the third battle was won, it failed to destroy the main force of the US army. The "United Nations Army" led by the US military has only been defeated and retreated, its reserve forces are still very strong, its technology and equipment are extremely superior, and the balance of forces between us and the enemy has not yet changed significantly.
Third, the front of the Volunteer Army has rapidly extended southward, and the transportation line has been extended to 500~700 kilometers; coupled with the frantic bombing by enemy planes, there is a lack of means of transportation, and it is even more difficult to replenish supplies, and most of the food needed by the troops needs to be raised on the spot, while the local people have limited surplus food, and it is difficult to guarantee their needs.
Fourth, the defenses of the east and west coasts were empty, and the flanks were exposed.
In the third campaign, although the enemy had set up a solid defensive line, it did not hold on, and the enemy's main force had a plan to retreat southward, and if it continued to advance rashly and aggressively southward, it would be difficult to guarantee that the situation after the landing at Inchon would not occur again once the enemy landed from the flank and carried out a flanking attack from the north and south.
3. The end of the third campaign
While everyone was celebrating the victory, Peng Dehuai was "very scared", which was really incomprehensible to outsiders. However, as the supreme commander of the Chinese and North Korean armies on the Korean battlefield, Peng Dehuai saw from the appearance of victory that "the volunteers may suffer doom at any time." This instinct and heart made him so worried that he reached the level of "not sleeping well for a few days and nights."
This reflects the insight and sobriety of a mature senior commander.
Du Ping said in his memoirs that several other leaders of the Volunteer Army headquarters agreed with Peng Dehuai's opinion and had no differences.
Han Xianchu, who was still in the front command, also sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai and pointed out: This campaign was fought by old backbones, and the troops fighting in front were extremely tired and had too many difficulties.
The masses along the south of the 38th parallel ran out, the enemy's houses burned down, and the grain was robbed, making it very difficult for the troops to eat and rest, and their physical strength was greatly weakened; in addition, the logistical supply could not keep up, and the troops at the front urgently needed food, ammunition, shoes, and other supplements.
At 24 o'clock on January 6, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Han Xianchu and Wu Ruilin, commanders of the left and right groups (columns) of the Chinese People's Army, and Fang Hushan, commander of the 5th Army Corps of the People's Army, ordering all units to immediately stop the pursuit, assemble on the spot and stand by, and at the same time pay attention to strengthening vigilance and air defense to prevent the enemy from counterattacking.
The telegram also made arrangements for the work of each department after it had been brought to the designated position.
On the night of the 7th, Peng Dehuai convened a meeting of the leaders of the Chinese and North Korean armies to discuss the next move.
Peng Dehuai pointed out:
Judging from various circumstances, it is obvious that the enemy is luring our troops to continue advancing, causing supply difficulties in the rear of our army, exposing both sides of the east and west coasts, and then taking advantage of its naval and air superiority to land on the flanks and rear coasts, and flanking from the north and south, in an attempt to repeat the old trick of landing at Incheon Port. Our Joint Command must always keep a clear head and must not fall into the enemy's trap.
On the 8th, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission, reporting that the third campaign had ended.
During this period, the Central Military Commission and the War Department conducted a study of the Korean war situation and came to the following conclusions:
If there is air force support, or 20,000 or 30,000 vehicles to transport, or the strategic reserve of the two corps can be put into force immediately, the volunteer army can continue to pursue southward and develop a campaign victory; However, none of the above conditions are currently in place, and it is very dangerous to continue the pursuit. Therefore, Peng Dehuai's decision to stop the pursuit and end the campaign was agreed.
The third campaign began on December 31, 1950 and ended on January 8, 1951, with a duration of 8 days and nights.
The number of enemies destroyed in this battle is recorded in the "History of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea" of the Academy of Military Sciences as 19,000.
According to the statistics of the Operations Department of the Central Military Commission that year, a total of 13,009 enemies were killed, wounded, or captured, of which 5,979 were killed or wounded, 7,030 were captured, and 1,590 were killed or wounded by the United States and British troops. 456 artillery pieces of various types were captured, 54 tanks and armored vehicles were captured and destroyed, and 423 vehicles were captured and destroyed, which was much smaller than in the previous two battles.
The Volunteer Army lost 5,039 people in combat in this campaign, and the non-combat attrition exceeded the combat attrition, with a total of 9,975 people, of which 1,977, 3,051, and 3,443 were deserted, left behind, and sent out sick, respectively.
This reflects the fact that the fatigue of the troops has increased due to the fact that the troops have not been able to rest and recuperate in continuous operations, and non-combat attrition has become a major problem affecting the maintenance of the combat effectiveness of the troops.
4. Fight or stop?
On 8 January, the day Peng Dehuai reported to the Central Military Commission on the end of the third campaign, Chai Junwu, chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Chinese Embassy in the DPRK, telegraphed to Peng Dehuai: Prime Minister Kim Il Sung plans to go to Peng's headquarters on 10 January to discuss the issue of future operations.
In the telegram, General Chai Junjun gave an advance notice of what he had learned: Kim Il Sung believed that the rest time of the troops should not be too long, and one month would be enough; If the rest time is too long, and when the rivers melt the ice, it will be difficult for the troops to move.
This shows that the North Korean leadership has a different view of Peng Dehuai's decision to end the campaign and move to rest.
At the end of the first campaign, there were also cases where the North Korean leaders did not understand the decision of the volunteers to stop the pursuit. After negotiation and communication between the two parties, an agreement was finally reached. This time, something similar happened.
It was not only the North Korean side that objected to Peng Dehuai's decision to end the campaign, but also the Soviet side to blame it.
When the third campaign was launched, Peng Dehuai telegraphed Mao Zedong and told Razovaev, who had just replaced Shtkov as Soviet ambassador to Korea, that he would ask the Chinese side a series of 10 questions in a questioning tone through Park Il-woo, clearly revealing a sense of dissatisfaction.
Peng Dehuaidian said:
After Park Ilwoo explained the above questions, some of them have been agreed by Razovaev, and some of them are misunderstood because the translator has mistranslated the meaning.
For this reason, Peng Dehuai asked Nie Rongzhen to find a Russian translator with a higher level to come to the front, so as to avoid unnecessary conflicts caused by improper translation.
In fact, the root of the problem is not that the translation is improper, but that there are differences between the two sides on the guiding ideology of the war.
5. Stalin's suggestion
On 8 January, when Peng Dehuai decided to end the campaign, Razovaev again questioned him even more vigorously.
He accused Peng Dehuai of being "right-leaning" by name, saying:
"Who has won a battle and not pursued the enemy? How can there be such a commander? ”
He insisted that the volunteers continue the pursuit until Pusan, where they drove the enemy into the sea.
When these words reached Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai was unmoved. He said to those around him:
"Leave him alone, I am responsible for the people, and I am responsible for mistakes."
When Shakharov, the general adviser of the Soviet military in Beijing, heard the news and came to the War Department of the Central Military Commission, he also expressed dissatisfaction with Peng Dehuai's decision. Like Razovaev, he did not understand that the Volunteer Army did not take advantage of the victory to expand the results of the battle, pointing out that this would give the enemy a chance to breathe and make the mistake of losing fighters. Although Nie Rongzhen repeatedly explained, Shakharov still shook his head.
It was at this time that Stalin sent a telegram to Mao Zedong suggesting:
In order to avoid international condemnation of China, can the Chinese Volunteers control the north of the 38th parallel and the coasts on both sides, and let the Korean People's Army pursue it?
Here, Stalin showed the old way of a statesman -- he did not directly criticize Peng Dehuai's decision, as Razovaev and Shakharov did, nor did he openly express support or opposition to the attitude of the North Korean side, but put forward a proposal to let China and North Korea go their own way according to their own judgments on the grounds of "avoiding international criticism of China."
Mao Zedong forwarded this telegram to Peng Dehuai on the 9th.
6. The dispute between Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung
On January 10, Kim Il Sung, accompanied by Chai Junwu, went to Junzi-ri, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army.
Before the launch of the third campaign, the personnel of the Volunteer Army Headquarters moved south from Dayudong, passed through Beicangli and Yuquan stations, and arrived at Junzili in Dachuan County on December 18. From the third campaign onwards, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army (which is also the joint command of China and North Korea) was located in one of the mining areas of the area.
At 22 o'clock that night, Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung began their talks, which were attended by Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi and Chai Junwu. Prior to this, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Mao Zedong on Kim Il Sung's proposal to shorten the period of rest and recuperation and the troops to continue to move south, pointing out: Since the troops suffered heavy casualties, the current number of troops is insufficient, the supply is extremely poor, and the physical strength is weakened, it is difficult to continue fighting, and it is necessary to rest and replenish.
The contents of the meeting between Peng and Kim have been recorded.
Peng Dehuai first briefed Kim Il Sung on the current situation of the Chinese People's Volunteers and analyzed the current enemy situation.
He said:
In the more than two months since the Chinese People's Volunteers entered Korea, they have fought three consecutive battles, with more than 50,000 combat casualties, and about 40,000 people have fled due to illness and frostbite, with a total loss of 91,000 troops. At present, transportation is difficult, grain, ammunition, cotton clothing, and blankets cannot be transported, the physical strength of the personnel of combat units has been greatly weakened, and the personnel are extremely inadequate, so they urgently need to rest and replenish and improve the transportation conditions so as to facilitate the resumption of the war. At present, the enemy still has more than 200,000 troops on the front line, and he has deployed defenses on the front line of Pyeongtaek, Anseong, Jecheon, and Samcheok.
It is very important for our troops to make full preparations to destroy more enemies in the next battle and not to allow the main force of the enemy to retreat to the narrow area of Busan. From all sides, if the 70,000 or 80,000 enemy troops are not destroyed and no other special political events occur, the enemy will not withdraw from Korea. It makes the most sense to wipe out the enemy as much as possible in North Korea.
Kim Il Sung said:
The volunteers are to rest, but the time should be as short as possible. You can send 3 armies to the south first, and then rest for 1 month before moving south.
Peng Dehuai replied:
This could intimidate the enemy into abandoning a number of more places. But now our army is tired, and it has not been replenished, there are no cars to transport troops, and there are no tanks and planes to cover. It is difficult for our army to destroy the enemy in pursuit by fighting with the enemy's motorized units in the night foot operation, and it will be difficult to force the enemy to retreat to a small area in the southernmost part of the peninsula too early, which will not be conducive to the division and annihilation of the enemy in the next campaign of our army, and will increase the difficulty of the next campaign.
Kim Il Sung said:
It is also important not to destroy the enemy, but to expand the territory.
Peng Dehuai explains:
It is better to expand the territory than to destroy the enemy first, because after destroying the enemy, you will naturally get the territory. At present, the central issue is to strive for the continuation of the victory and the destruction of the enemy.
In order to convince Kim Il Sung, Peng Dehuai showed a telegram from Stalin transmitted by Mao Zedong. Kim Il Sung did not express his position after seeing this, but called Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Park Heon-yong to come to the talks overnight.
As a result, the talks were suspended, and Peng Dehuai invited Kim Il Sung to a late dinner.
That night, Kim Il Sung stayed at the headquarters of the Volunteer Army, in the hut where Han Xianchu lived next door to Peng Dehuai.
In the middle of the night, when the guards on duty reported to Peng Dehuai that Kim Il Sung had not yet fallen asleep and that the lights in his room had not been extinguished, Peng Dehuai immediately took out his own sleeping pills and personally sent them to Kim Il Sung.
On the 11th, Peng Dehuai received an urgent telegram from Mao Zedong, the content of Mao Zedong's telegram was similar to the meaning expressed in Stalin's telegram, and he did not make a ruling on whether to end the offensive and turn to rest, but proposed that the DPRK should deal with it according to its own judgment.
For Peng Dehuai, who is working face-to-face as North Korea's leader, the telegram provided him with an alternative to avoiding a "bull-to-bull" approach.
On the afternoon of the 11th, Park Hyun-yong rushed to Junzi-ri to attend the talks according to Kim Il Sung's instructions.
At the beginning of the talks, Park Hyun-yong said with certainty: As long as the volunteers continue to attack south, the US military must withdraw from North Korea.
Peng Dehuai asked rhetorically: Really? If our army pursues it, will the US military definitely retreat?
Park Hyun-yong replied: Really, the US military must withdraw from North Korea.
Peng Dehuai said: Since the US military wants to withdraw from the DPRK, this is in line with the demand put forward by the Soviet representative to the United Nations, Malik.
Park Hyun-yong said: If our army does not advance southward quickly, the US military will not retreat.
Peng Dehuai asked again: Will the US military definitely retreat?
Park Hyun-young replied: I will definitely retire. The U.S. military has to find an excuse that if our army does not pursue it, the U.S. military will not retreat.
Peng Dehuai asked: What is your basis?
Park Hyun-yong replied: The American people oppose it, and there are contradictions within the bourgeoisie.
Peng Dehuai said: This is a factor, but it cannot play a decisive role today, and if we destroy 3~4 divisions and 50,000~60,000 people of the US army, this factor will become a favorable condition.
In two months' time, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army will be much stronger than they are now, and then they will march south according to the situation.
Park Hyun-yong said: At that time, the US military will not necessarily retreat.
Kim Il Sung interjected: It is best to have three corps of the Volunteer Army attack south within half a month, and the rest will rest for one month before moving south.
At this time, Peng Dehuai's "emotions began to be a little excited, and his attitude tended to be serious."
He said:
You used to say that the United States would not send troops, and you never imagined what would happen if the United States sent troops; Today you think that the United States will definitely withdraw from North Korea, but you do not think about what will happen if the United States does not withdraw from North Korea.
You hope for a quick victory, without concrete preparations, and the result will prolong the war; If you rely on luck to win the war, you may lead the war to defeat! It took two months for the Volunteer Army to rest and replenish, and not a single division could advance south until it was fully prepared. If you think that my Peng Dehuai, the commander-in-chief of the Sino-Korean coalition forces, is incompetent, he can be removed from his post or even killed!
The atmosphere suddenly became tense, Kim Il Sung, Park Xianyong were silent, and Deng Hua, Hong Hakzhi and others were not easy to interject.
After a pause, Peng Dehuai talked about the opinion of the DPRK that it should act on its own judgment in accordance with the spirit of Mao Zedong's call, saying:
Since you believe that as long as our army attacks southward, the American army will definitely retreat, I propose that the entire coastline from Inchon to the north of Xiangyang be guarded and the rear maintenance of the line of communication should be assumed by the Chinese Volunteers, and that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Army Corps of the People's Army, totaling about 120,000 men, have rested for two months and are under your own command, and that they may continue to advance southward according to your wishes. If the U.S. military withdraws from North Korea as you think, I will of course celebrate the liberation of Korea. If the U.S. troops do not retreat, the volunteers should advance south as planned.
Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yong both said that the KPA has not yet recovered its vitality and cannot advance south alone.
Peng Dehuai said angrily: You go to the experiment, and the lessons learned are also valuable!
Kim Il Sung and Park Hyun Young said: This is not fun, and a test will cost tens of thousands of people.
Peng Dehuai said: You just said that as long as our army advances south, the US military will withdraw from North Korea. It's hard for me to understand your inconsistent thinking.
After Peng Dehuai's repeated explanations and arguments, Kim Il Sung and Park Hyun Yong admitted that they had the idea of a quick victory, and said that since the volunteers were not ready, they would rest for two months.
On the 12th, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Mao Zedong to report the results of the talks, saying that Kim Il Sung had agreed to take a break and stop his southward advance.
A few days later, Peng Dehuai went to Kim Il Sung for further talks with him, and returned on the 18th.
On the 19th, Peng Dehuai telegraphed Mao Zedong about the negotiations, pointing out:
Kim Il Sung and the other North Korean leaders realized that it was impossible and risky for the Korean People's Army to unilaterally pursue the retreating American and South Korean forces alone. They also claimed that they had convened a meeting of the Politburo of the Party Central Committee and that the Chinese side's suggestion that it would be necessary to rest for two months in order to prepare for a future offensive was correct.
Mao Zedong forwarded both of Peng Dehuai's calls to Stalin.
Stalin quickly replied, stating:
"The leadership of the Chinese Volunteers is correct," "There is no doubt that the truth is in the hands of Comrade Peng Dehuai," and he praised Peng Dehuai for defeating the most powerful US imperialism in the world with such inferior equipment, and as a genius military strategist of our time.
Stalin also criticized Razovaev and forbade him to speak nonsense, and later simply transferred him back to China.
This controversy among the gentlemen reflects the difference between the two ideologies on the guidance of war. It is understandable that the DPRK leader proceeds from good subjective intentions and hopes to liberate the whole of Korea in one go, but if he really does this, it will not only not work in actual combat, but will certainly lead to disastrous consequences.
With the spirit of being highly responsible for the war and his farsightedness in thinking about the prospects for the development of the war situation, Peng Dehuai was not swayed by discussions, accusations, and criticisms from all quarters, and adhered to correct judgments, which played a vital role in preventing another reversal in the course of the war due to mistakes in strategic guidance.
It should be noted that the controversy at the end of the third campaign was a controversy between the allies, comrades within the coalition forces. Although China and the DPRK have differences in understanding, they were able to reach a consensus on ideology and understanding through face-to-face and open discussions. This shows that the leaders of the two sides have a general understanding of the general situation and stress the overall situation.
(End of text)
If you have other topics or opinions about the field of history, you can [follow] me for a private chat, or you can leave a message in the comment area below and reply as soon as possible.