As a far-reaching military struggle in the 50s of the 20 th century, the Korean War directly determined the life and death of the participating armies and the strategic decisions of the planners, among which the 180th Division of the ROK, as one of the main combat units, was subjected to an extremely harsh environment and heavy pressure during this period. This study will provide an in-depth analysis of the difficulties experienced by the unit during the campaign, reveal the dilemmas of its situation, and explore the decision-making factors behind them.
New orders with major adjustmentsIn the spring of 1951, the 60th Army of the 3rd Corps of the Sino-Korean Allied Forces absorbed the troops of the 180th Division and deployed them on the Korean battlefield. The Jiangnan area, which was originally garrisoned by the 180th Division, was faced with a sharp increase in the pressure on the defensive line of the two divisions due to the transfer of this division.
Difficult choices to fight alone
In the face of severe challenges, the 180th Division had to make a quick choice: to attack the US Tenth Army according to the original plan, or to seek other strategies to deal with the complicated war situation? Under the command of division commander Li Qiwei, the unit chose the strategy of fighting and withdrawing at the same time, inducing the volunteers to go deep into the crisis of reversing. As the Volunteer Army approached, the 180th Division was in an increasingly dangerous situation, and the troops continued to retreat, and the communication with the main forces became increasingly difficult.
Struggles in the face of encirclement
Under the severe blow of the United States, the 180th Division, located in the Korean River Valley, was forced to deal with the dual pressure of a large theater of operations and a shortage of manpower. Regrettably, its support team had already withdrawn as ordered, making the situation of the Department even more difficult. Immediately after that, the U.S. 24th Division immediately seized the defensive positions that originally belonged to the 63rd Army in the border area between Korea and China, forming an encirclement of the 180th Division, making it unable to extricate itself.
Command errors and communication confusionAt a critical moment, the 180th Division was in trouble due to improper command and communication failures, and the situation became increasingly serious. Upon learning of this situation, Wei Jie, commander of the 60th Army, immediately sent a distress signal to the Corps, but at this time the Corps was already starting to evacuate, and the rescue operation was almost paralyzed. Despite its best efforts to secure reinforcements, the 180th Division remained isolated and the battle was extremely tense.
Stubborn resistance and unremitting fightingThe 180th Division of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which was in a difficult situation, remained firmly stationed in its position despite the dangerous situation. Chief of Staff Wang Zhenbang proposed the strategy of withdrawing part of the troops south for rest and recuperation, leaving a small part of the troops to continue to defend the south of the Yangtze River. However, after receiving the order from the superiors, the division was fearless and dangerous, resisted the enemy's attack with all its might, and defended the safety of the battle line.
In the case of the interruption of communications, the 180th Division briefly lost contact with the higher regiments, and then successfully restored contact. The Corps ordered its 2nd Regiment to set up a defensive line at Jiade Mountain to deal with a potential enemy attack. However, due to communication delays, the main forces of the 180th Division fell into enemy encirclement. In order to get out of the predicament, the division headquarters resolutely decided to take the risk of implementing the plan to escape from the north, and despite many difficulties and great sacrifices, it finally successfully evacuated from the battlefield, and although there were heavy casualties, it still retained part of its combat effectiveness.