[Reading Mao's Annals (440)] "I can't help North Korea, in the form of a volunteer army"

In 1950, Mao Zedong was 57 years old.

Condemn the United States

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. On the 27th, the United States decided to send its navy and air force to invade the territorial waters and airspace of the DPRK and attack the Korean People's Army. At the same time, the Seventh Fleet was ordered to dispatch to the Taiwan Strait to obstruct the Chinese people's planned deployment to liberate Taiwan. On the 30th, the U.S. Army was ordered to enter the war in Korea.

On June 28, Mao Zedong presided over the eighth meeting of the Central People's Government Committee at the Qinzheng Hall in Zhongnanhai. Zhou Enlai made a report on the current international situation and his statement on the statement of US President Harry S. Truman. Mao Zedong made a speech, emphatically stating:

The Chinese people have long stated that the affairs of all countries in the world should be managed by the people of all countries themselves, and the affairs of Asia should be managed by the Asian people themselves, not by the United States. The US aggression against Asia can only arouse extensive and resolute resistance from the Asian people. Truman also stated on 5 January this year that the United States would not interfere in Taiwan, and now he himself has proved that it is false, and at the same time he has torn up all international agreements of the United States on non-interference in China's internal affairs. The United States has exposed its imperialist face in this way, which is very beneficial to the Chinese and Asian peoples. The US interference in the internal affairs of the DPRK, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries is completely unreasonable, and the sympathy of the entire Chinese people and the broad masses of people throughout the world will stand on the side of the invaded, and will never stand on the side of US imperialism. The people of the country and the whole world unite to defeat any provocation by US imperialism.

The point will be Su Yu, but Su Yu is seriously ill

On July 6, Mao Zedong called Su Yu and told Chen Yi and Rao Shushi:

Comrade Su Yu was asked to complete the affairs of the three fields before 16 July and come to Beijing on 18 July to accept the task.

On July 7, according to Mao Zedong's proposal, Zhou Enlai presided over a meeting of the Central Military Commission to study the issue of defending national defense and forming the Northeast Frontier Army. On the 10th, Zhou Enlai once again presided over the meeting to study this issue. On the same day, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of the "United Nations Command" in the absence of the Soviet Union. On the 8th, MacArthur was appointed commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Forces".

On July 10, Mao Zedong replied to Su Yu:

If you are sick, you should recuperate and can come slowly, but I still hope that you can come to Beijing in early August. At that time, if you are in good health, you will take up work, and if you are not well, you will continue to recuperate.

On July 13, Mao Zedong reviewed the "Decision on Defending the Northeast Frontier" submitted by Zhou Enlai. With regard to the transfer and deployment of troops, the decision proposes that about 255,000 troops will be transferred to four corps, three artillery divisions, and four antiaircraft artillery regiments, and that the final units to be transferred will arrive in the designated areas in the northeast by 5 August. With regard to the command structure, it was decided to propose Su Yu as commander and political commissar of the Northeast Frontier Army, Xiao Jinguang as deputy commander, Xiao Hua as deputy political commissar, and Li Jukui as logistics commander. Mao Zedong instructed: "Agree, implement it accordingly." Nie copied and filed the case and complied with it, and the original was returned to me. ”

On July 17, Mao Zedong drafted a letter to the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for the Central Military Commission, Tang Liang, Zhang Zhen, and Zhou Junming transferred Su Yudian:

Chairman Mao's former telegram asked him to come to Beijing in early August, and depending on the situation, he either stayed in Beijing to recuperate or take up a job. Now Su has gone to Qingdao to recuperate, very well. If he is seriously ill, he will continue to recuperate in Qingdao, and if he is seriously ill, he will continue to recuperate in Qingdao, and if he is cured, he will look forward to coming to Beijing.

On August 8, Mao Zedong replied to Su Yu:

Comrade Luo Ruiqing received the letter he brought, but he was still seriously ill and was very concerned. The new mission is not urgent at the moment, so you can recuperate until you recover. The place of recuperation, if Qingdao is suitable, it will be in Qingdao; If Qingdao is not very suitable, you can come to Beijing and hope to decide on it.

Request for assistance from the USSR Air Force

On July 20, Mao Zedong wrote to Stalin:

Having studied the question of the air cover of our troops dispatched to the Sino-Korean border, and the transfer of the Continental Air Force to the use of jet aircraft and the receipt of all equipment from the two Soviet air divisions, we welcome your offer and express our special thanks to you and the Soviet Government for the help you have given us. We intend to send the jet air divisions you have sent to cover our troops, to be stationed near Shenyang, with two regiments in Anshan and one regiment in Liaoyang. In this way, with the coordinated action of the destroyer regiment of the mixed brigade of the continental air force stationed near Andong, the problem of covering the troops and protecting the industrial zones of Shenyang, Andong and Fushun can be solved.

Planned for the threat of the U.S. military

On August 4, Mao Zedong presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to discuss China's countermeasures after the US armed invasion of Korea. Mao Zedong pointed out in his speech:

If the US imperialists win, they will be proud and threaten the mainland. We can't help the DPRK, we must help, and in the form of a volunteer army, of course, we must choose the right time, and we can't help but be prepared.

On August 5, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram for the Central Military Commission:

The Border Guard units are now concentrated and may not be operational during August, but should be ready to be operational in early September. Comrade Gao Gang was asked to assume the main responsibility and convene a meeting of the cadres of all armies and divisions in mid-August to give instructions on the purpose, significance, and general direction of the operation, and to ask all units to complete all preparations within this month and be ready to go into battle. Morale must be high and the preparations must be adequate, and the ideological questions in the troops must be answered. We should order Xiao Jinguang, Deng Hua, and Xiao Hua to attend this meeting.

Under the above guidelines, the deployment of troops is at your discretion. If it is advantageous for the 38th Army to be stationed along the Siping Railway, it can be transferred in this way.

On the same day, Mao Zedong met with Deng Hua and said:

Truman didn't seem to be going to stop in North Korea. Your analysis of the possibility of the US military carrying out a three-in-one landing operation on the east and west coasts of Korea is very insightful. After assembling in the Northeast, your mission is to defend the Northeast Frontier, but you must prepare for war with the Americans, prepare for an unprecedented battle, and prepare them to fight the atomic bomb.

He hits the atomic bomb, we shoot the grenade, seize his weak point, follow him, and finally defeat him. I'm still the same old saying, despise him strategically as a paper tiger, value him tactically as a real tiger. There may be no combat missions during August, but they should be ready to be operational in early September.

We have just sent a telegram to Gao Gang, asking them to convene a meeting of the cadres of the various armies and divisions of the border guard army in mid-August to explain the purpose, significance, and strategic direction of the operation. Be sure to complete all preparations within this month and be ready to go into action.

On August 20, Mao Zedong read Nie Rongzhen's report on August 19. The report pointed out: If the war of aggression of the US imperialism continues, although we have the first step of deployment, it may not be enough to deal with the incident, and we should deploy a second line of troops in the mobile area in the Guannai. It is suggested that the three corps of the 19th Corps of the Northwest Military Region should be assembled after the autumn harvest in September and moved to Jinan or Zhengzhou Luoyang area for rest and recuperation as a maneuver. Mao Zedong's instructions:

Comrade Dehuai: I hereby send you one of Nie Rongzhen's suggestions. Whether the 19th Corps can be deployed according to Nie's suggestion, please consider it and look forward to the resumption.

The U.S. military is scheduled to land at Incheon

On the evening of 23 August, Zhou Enlai took Lei Yingfu to Mao Zedong's residence, where Lei Yingfu reported on the results of the Central Military Commission's War Bureau's study on the Korean war situation: The enemy army may land at Incheon, Wonsan, Nampo, and other places, and the possibility of landing at Inchon is the greatest. Mao Zedong believed that the analysis and judgment of the combat bureau were reasonable and very important. To this end, He Zhou Enlai decided:

(1) Inspect and supervise the combat readiness work of the Northeast Frontier Army, and strictly order it to complete all operational preparations before the end of September and ensure that it can be dispatched at any time.

(2) Inform the DPRK and the Soviet Government of the possible landing of enemy troops at Inchon and other places, and inform the DPRK that it should be prepared for the worst-case scenario.

3. The General Staff Headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should closely monitor the changes in the Korean war situation.

On August 27, Mao Zedong read the telegrams of Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, and Xie Fang to Gao Gang and the Central Military Commission. The telegram said: Cui Xingnong, chief of the reconnaissance section of the Corps, Tang Yuanzhong, chief of staff of the 118th Division of the 40 th Army, He Lingdeng, chief of staff of the 39th Army, and Huang Dengbao, deputy commander of the 8th Artillery Division, are hereby selected to go to the DPRK in the name of military attache of the embassy in the DPRK to understand the situation and collect materials. Mao Zedong instructed: "Zhou: Please order these people to come to Beijing with Chai Junwu, and you will teach them face-to-face, and then go to work in the DPRK." ”

Postpone the plan to attack Taiwan

On August 11, Mao Zedong drafted a letter to Chen Yi for the Central Military Commission and told Rao Shushidian:

Agreed with the reviews and the policies and measures mentioned in the August 8 call. …… Taiwan has decided not to fight in 1951 and will make a decision in 1952 depending on the situation. Kinmen Island may decide not to fight before April 1951 and to be on standby after April.

On August 25, in preparation for a possible landing attack by Taiwan's enemy forces on Chaoshan and Hailufeng, Mao Zedong drafted a reply to Deng Zihui, Tan Zheng, Zhao Erlu, Ye Jianying, and Fang Fangdian for the Central Military Commission:

The South China Branch has not learned of the cold telegram transferred to the Chaoshan Prefectural Committee. It is extremely likely that the enemy in Taiwan will launch a landing attack on Chaoshan and Hailufeng. You must:

(1) Strengthen reconnaissance work so that our troops can obtain reliable information before the enemy conducts a landing attack;

(2) To strengthen the troops, please consider transferring one force (such as a strong division) and one artillery fire from the west to strengthen the east to ensure the coastal defense line of Chaoshan and Hailufeng, and send a corps-level command to take command, so that it can be resolutely annihilated in the event of an enemy attack;

(3) Strengthen the operational readiness of the party, government, military, and people in all aspects, eliminate the peaceful ideology among the cadres, and relieve the army and local armed forces of their production tasks, and concentrate all their efforts on preparing for war. The situation in the area and your opinions.

On September 29, Mao Zedong instructed Hu Qiaomu:

In the future, please note that you will only say that you will fight Taiwan and Tibet, and do not say any time. I have deleted all the 1951 tasks from the congratulatory messages of various political parties, because one of them is to attack Taiwan and Tibet.

Determined to help North Korea and give ideas for North Korea

On September 5, the ninth meeting of the Central People's Government Committee was presided over at the Qinzheng Hall in Zhongnanhai. Zhou Enlai made a diplomatic report, saying:

As a result of the intervention of the United States, the Korean War will move towards a protracted situation. After invading Taiwan and Korea, the United States invaded the mainland's airspace and shot and killed the mainland's people. We want to fully expose the crimes of aggression committed by US imperialism.

Mao Zedong then made a speech, stating:

For the people of the DPRK, we need help and encouragement. The Korean people were of great help to the Chinese revolution, and they helped them in several stages of the Chinese revolution. So we should do our best to help them today. As things stand, the possibility of a protracted Korean war is gradually increasing.

In the past, our estimates of the Korean war situation were both quick and protracted. The so-called quick victory means that the Korean People's Army took advantage of the victory to pursue and drive the US troops and the remnants of Syngman Rhee's puppet army into the sea. Now that the United States has increased its military in Korea, the likelihood of a protracted war has increased. The final victory belongs to the Korean people. U.S. imperialism today has many difficulties, internal quarrels, and external inconsistencies.

It has only one strong point in military affairs, and that is Tieduo. In addition, there were three weaknesses: first, the front was too long, from Berlin in Germany to North Korea; second, the transport route is too far, separated by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; Thirdly, the combat effectiveness is too weak. However, US imperialism may also be messing around today. If it wants to do that, it's not good if we're not prepared, and if we're prepared, we'll deal with it.

The so-called "doing that" is nothing more than fighting the Third World War, and the atomic bomb will be fought for a long time longer than the First and Second World Wars. Our wish is not to fight, but if you must fight, we have to let you fight. You hit yours, I hit mine, you hit the atomic bomb, I hit the grenade, seize your weak point, follow you to fight, and finally defeat you.

On 15 September, the invading US troops landed at Incheon on the west coast of Korea, and the situation of the Korean war changed dramatically.

On September 16, Mao Zedong protested against the invasion of China's airspace and territorial waters by US planes and ships, and gave instructions:

Zhou: The northeast and the coasts of Shanghai and Shandong (where fishermen discovered them) continue to discover the incursions of US planes or ships, and it is inappropriate to ignore them. Coastal incidents, the Military Commission has materials.

On September 20, he reviewed and revised the draft of the telegram drafted by Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang to Kim Il Sung on the operational guidelines of the Korean People's Army. The full text of the telegram is as follows (the words added and rewritten by Mao Zedong are highlighted with emphasis):

Reported on 18 September. Please convey to Comrade Kim Il Sung: We believe that your long-term combat thinking is correct. The bravery of the DPRK military and civilians is admirable. It is estimated that the enemy is still likely to increase on the Inchon side, and its purpose is to extend the occupation to the east, cut off the communication between the north and the south of Korea, and advance towards the 38th parallel. And the KPA must strive to hold the north of the 38th parallel, and it is possible to fight a protracted war. Therefore, please consider the question of how to preserve the main forces so that they can be annihilated individually under the general policy of self-reliance and long-term struggle.

At present, the main force is exposed to the enemy's position, and the stalemate will be too much, and if the enemy occupies Seoul, the KPA rear road is in danger of being cut off. Therefore, it would be advisable for the main force of the KPA to assemble and maneuver, seek out the enemy's weak points, and divide and annihilate the enemy. In combat, it is necessary to concentrate forces, and in each battle we should use a small number of troops and firepower to pin down the majority of the enemy in separate ways, and with the absolute superiority of the majority of forces (three to five times) and firepower (more than two times), we must encircle and annihilate a small number of enemies (such as a regiment) divided by us.

In combat, it is most taboo to divide forces equally, and it is most taboo to only defeat or stop the enemy but not to annihilate the enemy's living forces. As long as we can annihilate the enemy's vital forces, even if we only annihilate the enemy's regiment and battalion at a time, we can gradually weaken the enemy and be conducive to long-term operations. If the US military is equipped with strong firepower and it is difficult to break through and divide it for a while, it is advisable to consider first targeting Syngman Rhee's puppet army, concentrating the main force, annihilating one or two regiments at a time, and one or two divisions every month, and after half a year, the puppet army can be wiped out, and the minions of the US imperialists will be eliminated, so that the US imperialists will be isolated, and then they will be annihilated individually.

Under the principle of protracted warfare, it is necessary to fully estimate the difficult aspects, and all human, material, and financial resources must be mobilized and used in a long-term manner, so as to prevent the subordinates from becoming desperate. The enemy demands a quick victory and fears protracted victory, while our People's Army has a quick victory, and it is impossible to win only a protracted war. The above statements are put forward from the standpoint of friends and comrades for your reference. Whether it is appropriate or not, Shang Qi will consider replying.

On 28 July, the U.S. forces occupied Seoul, and the Korean People's Army carried out a strategic retreat.

On September 20, Mao Zedong read Gaogang's telegram to Ni Zhiliang and the Central Military Commission on September 18. The telegram said:

It is estimated that after our army enters the territory of the DPRK, the Yalu River Bridge may be bombed, and the huge supply of troops will mainly rely on road vehicles. We have a very poor understanding of the situation of the DPRK's roads and railways, so please ask the DPRK side for a detailed road map and indicate the width of the bridges and the depth of the water in each place, so that we can prepare and plan the equipment.

Mao Zedong instructed: "Zhou: This kind of telegram is very bad, go to a telegram to stop it, please read and send it." Mao Zedong's telegram for Zhou Enlai to restore Gaogang and Ni Zhiliang was:

(1) Do not indicate to any party that our army has the intention of going abroad, and do not do it if it does not involve such intentions in investigating the combat situation in Korea or asking for a road map; (2) Gao's telegram to Ni on 18 August expressed the above-mentioned intentions, which is very inappropriate, and all matters concerning the representations of Northeast China and Ni to the DPRK in the future must go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and should not be handled directly.

On September 30, Zhou Enlai delivered a speech on "Striving for the Consolidation and Development of the People's Victory" at the National Day celebration meeting. The speech solemnly stated in response to the Korean War:

The Chinese people love peace, but in order to defend peace, they have never and will never be afraid to resist wars of aggression. The Chinese people must not tolerate foreign aggression, nor can they allow the imperialists to wantonly invade their neighbors and turn a blind eye.

This speech was reviewed and revised by Mao Zedong.

On October 1, the South Korean Army crossed the 38th parallel. MacArthur issued an "ultimatum" to the DPRK, asking the Korean People's Army to unconditionally "lay down its arms and stop fighting." On the same day, Stalin sent a telegram demanding that China immediately send at least five or six divisions to the 38th parallel, so that the DPRK could organize a battle to defend the area north of the 38th parallel. In the middle of the night, Kim Il Sung urgently met with Ni Zhiliang and asked the Chinese government to send troops for support.