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Today, the editor brings the " Equilibrium analysis of the doctoral dissertation 《Consider the research of the operational strategy of fair and concerned dual-channel supply chain system》”.
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内容摘要:Abstract
In this issue, we will introduce the 6.3 equilibrium analysis of the doctoral dissertation "Research on the Operation Strategy of Dual-channel Supply Chain System Considering Equity Concerns" from three aspects: mind map, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.
This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on Operational Strategies of Dual-channel Supply Chain Systems Considering Fairness Concerns》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on equilibrium analysis.
思维导图：Mind mapping
精读内容：Intensive reading content
This section performs an equilibrium analysis of the model. First, let's analyze scenario 1: the equilibrium strategy when only the retailer is vertically concerned. First, the utility function of the retailer with vertical concerns is expressed, and the optimization problem of the retailer is described. Through the reverse recursive method, the optimal decision of supply chain members can be obtained, and Lemma 6.2 is obtained: when the demand information is asymmetric, only when the retailer is concerned vertically, the optimal price and the best profit of the supply chain members. Finally, Lemma 6.2 is proved.
This section conducts an equilibrium analysis of the model. Firstly, it analyzes Scenario 1: equilibrium strategy when only retailers have vertical concerns. It begins by representing the utility function of retailers with vertical concerns, describing the optimization problem faced by retailers. Through backward induction, optimal decisions of supply chain members can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.2: when there is asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits of supply chain members occur only when retailers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.2 is proven.
Then, the equilibrium strategy in Scenario 2: when only the manufacturer is concerned vertically, is analyzed. Firstly, the utility function of the manufacturer in the case of longitudinal concern and the optimization problem of the manufacturer are expressed. The optimal decision can be obtained through the reverse recursive method, and Lemma 6.3 is obtained: under the asymmetry of demand information, the optimal price and profit of supply chain members are only the vertical concerns of the manufacturer. Finally, Lemma 6.3 is proved.
Next, Scenario 2 is analyzed: equilibrium strategy when only manufacturers have vertical concerns. It begins by representing the utility function of manufacturers with vertical concerns and describing the optimization problem faced by manufacturers. Through backward induction, optimal decisions can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.3: under asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits of supply chain members occur only when manufacturers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.3 is proven.
Finally, the equilibrium strategy of scenario 3: when both manufacturers and retailers are vertically concerned, is analyzed. At this time, both manufacturers and retailers are vertically concerned, both of them care about whether the distribution of profits in the supply chain system is fair, and both have their own fairness and utility maximization as the most decision-making goal, indicating the optimization problem. According to the reverse recursive method, the optimal decision of supply chain members can be obtained, and Lemma 6.4 is obtained: under the asymmetry of demand information, the optimal price and profit of supply chain members are all longitudinally concerned. Finally, Lemma 6.4 is proved.
Finally, Scenario 3 is analyzed: equilibrium strategy when both manufacturers and retailers have vertical concerns. In this case, both manufacturers and retailers are vertically concerned, and they both care about the fairness of profit allocation within the supply chain system. They aim to maximize their own fairness utility as decision criteria, representing the optimization problem accordingly. Through backward induction, optimal decisions of supply chain members can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.4: under asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits occur when both manufacturers and retailers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.4 is proven.
知识补充：Knowledge supplement
1、逆向归纳法（倒推法）Backward induction
The characteristic of the inverse induction method is that the game behavior occurs sequentially. Only when the player chooses in the last stage of the game, and the player who no longer has any influence in the subsequent stage, can directly make a clear choice, all the previous behaviors can be observed, and when the choice of the player in the later stage is determined, the behavior of the player in the previous stage is easy to determine.
The characteristic of backward induction is that game actions occur sequentially. Rational players who act first consider how subsequent players will behave in later stages when choosing their actions in earlier stages. Only players who make choices in the final stage of the game, with no further influence from subsequent stages, can make clear decisions. Before subsequent players make their choices, all previous actions can be observed. Once the choices of subsequent players are determined, the actions of previous players become easier to ascertain.
The method of reverse induction method is as follows: game analysis starts from the last stage of the dynamic game, determines the strategy choice and path of the player in the analyzed stage each time, and then determines the strategy choice and path of the player in the previous stage. When inferred backwards to a certain stage, the outcome of this stage and subsequent games can be determined, and the selection node of this stage is equal to an end terminal. The above reverse recursive process is repeated continuously until the first stage, and finally the strategy choice and behavior path combination of each player in different stages are obtained.
The method of backward induction involves analyzing the game from the last stage of the dynamic game. In each iteration, the strategy choices and paths of the players in the current stage are determined, followed by the determination of strategy choices and paths for the players in the preceding stage. As the backward induction process progresses to a certain stage, the outcomes of that stage and subsequent game stages can be confirmed, with the choice node of that stage acting as a terminal endpoint. This process of backward induction is repeated iteratively until reaching the first stage, ultimately yielding the strategy choices and behavioral paths combinations for each player across different stages.
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References:[1] Zhao Yanfei. Research on the operation strategy of dual-channel supply chain system considering fairness concerns [D]. Chongqing: Chongqing University, 2022.
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