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今天小編為您帶來博士論文《考慮公平關切的雙管道供應鍊系統營運政策研究》6.3 均衡分析。
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Today, the editor brings the " Equilibrium analysis of the doctoral dissertation 《Consider the research of the operational strategy of fair and concerned dual-channel supply chain system》”.
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内容摘要：Abstract
本期推文将從思維導圖、精讀内容、知識補充三個方面介紹博士論文《考慮公平關切的雙管道供應鍊系統營運政策研究》6.3 均衡分析。
This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on Operational Strategies of Dual-channel Supply Chain Systems Considering Fairness Concerns》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on equilibrium analysis.
思維導圖：Mind mapping
精讀内容：Intensive reading content
本小節對模型進行均衡分析。首先分析情形1：僅零售商縱向關切時的均衡政策。首先表示出縱向關切的零售商的效用函數，描述了零售商的最優化問題。通過逆向遞推法可以得到供應鍊成員的最優決策，得出引理6.2：需求資訊不對稱時，隻有零售商縱向關切時，供應鍊成員的最優價格和最優利潤。最後對引理6.2進行證明。
This section conducts an equilibrium analysis of the model. Firstly, it analyzes Scenario 1: equilibrium strategy when only retailers have vertical concerns. It begins by representing the utility function of retailers with vertical concerns, describing the optimization problem faced by retailers. Through backward induction, optimal decisions of supply chain members can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.2: when there is asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits of supply chain members occur only when retailers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.2 is proven.
然後分析了情形2：僅制造商縱向關切時的均衡政策。首先表示出制造商在具有縱向關切情況下的效用函數和制造商的最優化問題。通過逆向遞推法可以得到最優決策，得出引理6.3：在需求資訊不對稱下，隻有制造商縱向關切時，供應鍊成員的最優價格和利潤。最後對引理6.3進行證明。
Next, Scenario 2 is analyzed: equilibrium strategy when only manufacturers have vertical concerns. It begins by representing the utility function of manufacturers with vertical concerns and describing the optimization problem faced by manufacturers. Through backward induction, optimal decisions can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.3: under asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits of supply chain members occur only when manufacturers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.3 is proven.
最後分析了情形3：制造商和零售商均縱向關切時的均衡政策。此時制造商和零售商均縱向關切，二者均在乎供應鍊系統利潤的配置設定是否公平，均已自身公平效用最大化最為決策目标，表示出最優化問題。根據逆向遞推法可求得供應鍊成員的最優決策，得出引理6.4：需求資訊不對稱下，供應鍊成員均縱向關切時，二者的最優價格和利潤。最後對引理6.4進行證明。
Finally, Scenario 3 is analyzed: equilibrium strategy when both manufacturers and retailers have vertical concerns. In this case, both manufacturers and retailers are vertically concerned, and they both care about the fairness of profit allocation within the supply chain system. They aim to maximize their own fairness utility as decision criteria, representing the optimization problem accordingly. Through backward induction, optimal decisions of supply chain members can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.4: under asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits occur when both manufacturers and retailers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.4 is proven.
知識補充：Knowledge supplement
1、逆向歸納法（倒推法）Backward induction
逆向歸納法的特征是：博弈行為是順序發生的。先行動的理性博弈方在前面階段選擇行為時必然會先考慮後行動博弈方在後面階段中将會怎樣選擇行為，隻有在博弈的最後一個階段選擇的，不再有任何後續階段影響的博弈方，才能直接作出明确選擇後面的行動者在進行行為選擇前，所有以前的行為都可以被觀察到，而當後面階段博弈方的選擇定以後，前一階段博弈方的行為也就容易确定了。
The characteristic of backward induction is that game actions occur sequentially. Rational players who act first consider how subsequent players will behave in later stages when choosing their actions in earlier stages. Only players who make choices in the final stage of the game, with no further influence from subsequent stages, can make clear decisions. Before subsequent players make their choices, all previous actions can be observed. Once the choices of subsequent players are determined, the actions of previous players become easier to ascertain.
逆向歸納法的方法是：博弈分析從動态博弈的最後一個階段開始，每一次确定出所分析階段博弈方的政策選擇和路徑，然後再确定前一個階段博弈方的政策選擇和路徑。當逆推歸納到某個階段時，這個階段及後續的博弈結果就可以肯定下來，該階段的選擇節點等于一個結束終端。不斷重複上述逆向遞推過程，直至第一階段，最後得到各博弈方在不同階段的政策選擇及其行為路徑組合。
The method of backward induction involves analyzing the game from the last stage of the dynamic game. In each iteration, the strategy choices and paths of the players in the current stage are determined, followed by the determination of strategy choices and paths for the players in the preceding stage. As the backward induction process progresses to a certain stage, the outcomes of that stage and subsequent game stages can be confirmed, with the choice node of that stage acting as a terminal endpoint. This process of backward induction is repeated iteratively until reaching the first stage, ultimately yielding the strategy choices and behavioral paths combinations for each player across different stages.
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參考文獻：[1] 趙燕飛. 考慮公平關切的雙管道供應鍊系統營運政策研究 [D]. 重慶: 重慶大學, 2022.
文案|Whisper
排版|Whisper
稽核|Wang