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今天小编为您带来博士论文《考虑公平关切的双渠道供应链系统运营策略研究》6.3 均衡分析。
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Today, the editor brings the " Equilibrium analysis of the doctoral dissertation 《Consider the research of the operational strategy of fair and concerned dual-channel supply chain system》”.
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内容摘要：Abstract
本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍博士论文《考虑公平关切的双渠道供应链系统运营策略研究》6.3 均衡分析。
This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on Operational Strategies of Dual-channel Supply Chain Systems Considering Fairness Concerns》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on equilibrium analysis.
思维导图：Mind mapping
精读内容：Intensive reading content
本小节对模型进行均衡分析。首先分析情形1：仅零售商纵向关切时的均衡策略。首先表示出纵向关切的零售商的效用函数，描述了零售商的最优化问题。通过逆向递推法可以得到供应链成员的最优决策，得出引理6.2：需求信息不对称时，只有零售商纵向关切时，供应链成员的最优价格和最优利润。最后对引理6.2进行证明。
This section conducts an equilibrium analysis of the model. Firstly, it analyzes Scenario 1: equilibrium strategy when only retailers have vertical concerns. It begins by representing the utility function of retailers with vertical concerns, describing the optimization problem faced by retailers. Through backward induction, optimal decisions of supply chain members can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.2: when there is asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits of supply chain members occur only when retailers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.2 is proven.
然后分析了情形2：仅制造商纵向关切时的均衡策略。首先表示出制造商在具有纵向关切情况下的效用函数和制造商的最优化问题。通过逆向递推法可以得到最优决策，得出引理6.3：在需求信息不对称下，只有制造商纵向关切时，供应链成员的最优价格和利润。最后对引理6.3进行证明。
Next, Scenario 2 is analyzed: equilibrium strategy when only manufacturers have vertical concerns. It begins by representing the utility function of manufacturers with vertical concerns and describing the optimization problem faced by manufacturers. Through backward induction, optimal decisions can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.3: under asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits of supply chain members occur only when manufacturers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.3 is proven.
最后分析了情形3：制造商和零售商均纵向关切时的均衡策略。此时制造商和零售商均纵向关切，二者均在乎供应链系统利润的分配是否公平，均已自身公平效用最大化最为决策目标，表示出最优化问题。根据逆向递推法可求得供应链成员的最优决策，得出引理6.4：需求信息不对称下，供应链成员均纵向关切时，二者的最优价格和利润。最后对引理6.4进行证明。
Finally, Scenario 3 is analyzed: equilibrium strategy when both manufacturers and retailers have vertical concerns. In this case, both manufacturers and retailers are vertically concerned, and they both care about the fairness of profit allocation within the supply chain system. They aim to maximize their own fairness utility as decision criteria, representing the optimization problem accordingly. Through backward induction, optimal decisions of supply chain members can be obtained, leading to Lemma 6.4: under asymmetric demand information, optimal prices and profits occur when both manufacturers and retailers have vertical concerns. Finally, Lemma 6.4 is proven.
知识补充：Knowledge supplement
1、逆向归纳法（倒推法）Backward induction
逆向归纳法的特征是：博弈行为是顺序发生的。先行动的理性博弈方在前面阶段选择行为时必然会先考虑后行动博弈方在后面阶段中将会怎样选择行为，只有在博弈的最后一个阶段选择的，不再有任何后续阶段影响的博弈方，才能直接作出明确选择后面的行动者在进行行为选择前，所有以前的行为都可以被观察到，而当后面阶段博弈方的选择定以后，前一阶段博弈方的行为也就容易确定了。
The characteristic of backward induction is that game actions occur sequentially. Rational players who act first consider how subsequent players will behave in later stages when choosing their actions in earlier stages. Only players who make choices in the final stage of the game, with no further influence from subsequent stages, can make clear decisions. Before subsequent players make their choices, all previous actions can be observed. Once the choices of subsequent players are determined, the actions of previous players become easier to ascertain.
逆向归纳法的方法是：博弈分析从动态博弈的最后一个阶段开始，每一次确定出所分析阶段博弈方的策略选择和路径，然后再确定前一个阶段博弈方的策略选择和路径。当逆推归纳到某个阶段时，这个阶段及后续的博弈结果就可以肯定下来，该阶段的选择节点等于一个结束终端。不断重复上述逆向递推过程，直至第一阶段，最后得到各博弈方在不同阶段的策略选择及其行为路径组合。
The method of backward induction involves analyzing the game from the last stage of the dynamic game. In each iteration, the strategy choices and paths of the players in the current stage are determined, followed by the determination of strategy choices and paths for the players in the preceding stage. As the backward induction process progresses to a certain stage, the outcomes of that stage and subsequent game stages can be confirmed, with the choice node of that stage acting as a terminal endpoint. This process of backward induction is repeated iteratively until reaching the first stage, ultimately yielding the strategy choices and behavioral paths combinations for each player across different stages.
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参考文献：[1] 赵燕飞. 考虑公平关切的双渠道供应链系统运营策略研究 [D]. 重庆: 重庆大学, 2022.
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