I'm Tang Tang, a history buff. Welcome everyone to [follow] me, talk about the past and the present, and discuss the general trend of the world. Gentleman I, just to learn and make friends!
On January 21, 1949, Dean Acheson succeeded Marshall as U.S. Secretary of State.
At this time, the Chinese Communist Party had already won the Liaoshen Campaign and the Huaihai Campaign, and was about to win the Pingjin Campaign. A new China has emerged on the Asian horizon. Whether the United States will accept reality and establish a relatively normal relationship with New China, or will it continue to go against the trend of Chinese history and be hostile to New China? This is a major issue facing Truman and Acheson.
The answer depends on some basic notions of the Truman administration about the nature and capabilities of the new China. They are collective, common ideas, and certain personnel changes and differences of opinion within the circle of decision-makers do not change their fundamental content and dominating role.
They were already influencing U.S. policy when Acheson was secretary of state, and they continue to exert significant influence long afterward.
1. Prejudice in the United States - the CCP's hostility to the United States
The first basic idea is that the Chinese Communist Party is hostile to the United States.
When Marshall failed to make China, American policymakers decided that the "new policy" of the Chinese Communist Party was a "reckless" attack on the United States as the successor of German, Japanese, and Italian fascism.
Accordingly, the CIA predicted at the end of 1947 that if the Chinese Communist Party took power in the country, China would be as strongly anti-American as the Soviet Union.
During 1948, U.S. officials in China continued to report to Washington that the Chinese Communists were attacking the United States. According to Stuart, these attacks have been more intense than during Marshall's mission to China, and they are "strikingly similar to the arguments and invectives of other Communist leaders around the world."
In the eyes of American officials, the Chinese Communist Party's attitude stems purely from ideology and its desire to seize power, and therefore not something that the United States can push to change.
Stuart told the State Department with prejudice:
There is no shortage of precedents in China's political history for using lies as a weapon, but no one has ever "used them so skillfully and systematically" as the Chinese Communist Party has attacked the United States, which shows that the CCP has done anything to seize power in the country, and that it is in league with Soviet Union and international communism.
In a report in mid-June 1949, the CIA admitted that the CCP had grounds to resent the United States' aid to Chiang in the civil war, but also concluded that its anti-American attitude was "mainly determined by the opposing positions of the Chinese Communists and the United States toward the Soviet Union and world communism," and that the Chinese Communists would continue to be hostile to the United States as long as the United States and the Soviet Union were opposed.
At the beginning of 6 June of the same year, a research group composed of representatives of 18 agencies, including the State Department, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, confirmed that New China, like the Soviet Union and other Communist-run countries in Europe and Asia, was an enemy of the United States.
2. U.S. Prejudice - The CCP is Asia's "Titoism"
The second basic idea is that the Chinese Communist Party follows the Soviet Union.
Accurately grasping the views of Acheson and his subordinates on Sino-Soviet relations is of great significance in judging the US policy toward New China, and it must be explained in detail.
Before Acheson became secretary of state, he viewed the Chinese Communist Party as a complete vassal of the Soviet Union, and although it was overwhelmingly dominant in the government, some officials still believed that there was a contradiction between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union.
In February 1947, Kennan, who was about to become director of the State Council's Policy Design Office, said in a speech that the Soviet Union would find that the Chinese Communist Party was not something it could control.
In May of the same year, John Melby, press secretary of the embassy in China, after carefully analyzing Lu Dingyi's article, felt that the Chinese Communist Party's view of the world's major contradictions and the middle ground showed that "Yan'an has many independent ideas and practices, and they will not be weakened by the Kremlin's anger." ”
Melby predicted that unless the Soviet Union was more tolerant of the independence of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party would resist its great-power doctrine with "the most astute strategy of the century."
John Cabot, the consul general in Shanghai, holds a similar view. He pointed out to the Far Eastern Department of the State Department that the Chinese Communist Party leaders have a strong sense of national independence, so the Russians "the more they try to do whatever they want, the more opportunities we have to exploit the sensitivity of the Chinese and the rising nationalist sentiment to advance our interests."
The rupture of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in June 1948 greatly encouraged this view. Immediately after the incident, the CIA called it the most significant development of the international communist movement in 20 years.
In particular, it reminded top decision-makers that "the Chinese Communist Party is guilty of most of the crimes that Tito was accused of [by the Soviet Union]".
Kennan also believes that after the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Soviet Union is the most likely:
"I can't say to you at the moment whether Titoism will spread in Europe, but I am almost certain that it will spread in Asia."
In the final months of 1948, the State Department's Policy Design Office and the Far Eastern Division were pushing policymakers to reconsider the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party in order to develop U.S. policy toward China after the defeat in the civil war with Chiang.
Immediately after Acheson became secretary of state, he confirmed that there was a "germ of trolling" between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union.
He and his subordinates saw that the Chinese Communist Party had won the victory through its own struggle, not on the support or guidance of the Soviet Union, and that "Mao Zedong was not a real servant."
They also know that the Chinese Communist Party not only had differences with the Soviet Union in the past, but also "does not always agree with the Kremlin even now."
They paid special attention to the Xinjiang and Northeast issues, because the so-called "separation of the northern border provinces of China by the Soviet Union contained the seeds of an inevitable conflict between China and the Soviet Union."
They also deliberately look for signs of "Western influence" within the Chinese Communist Party, and even believe that there is likely to be a division between "pro-Soviet" and "nationalist" factions in the top leadership of the CCP, and that the latter faction may eventually overthrow the former faction.
For all these reasons, Acheson affirmed that the United States should be prepared to use all means to exploit any rift between New China and the Soviet Union. This idea was repeatedly stated in a number of 1949 policy documents of the US administration on China policy.
However, Acheson and his subordinates' views on Sino-Soviet relations were not limited to that.
3. Why does the United States think that it is futile to recognize New China?
If we look at only this aspect, it is easy to deduce, as many American scholars do, that the Truman administration (or at least the State Department) intended to establish normal relations with New China, and to explain its policy and behavior toward New China accordingly.
In fact, the problem is much more complex.
First, Acheson and others argued that a split between China and the Soviet Union was a distant possibility, and that the Chinese Communist Party was following the Soviet Union for the time being, and would probably remain so for a long time to come.
The status quo of Sino-Soviet unity is far more important to U.S. policymaking than the prospect of Sino-Soviet split.
Kennan was aware of the problem as early as January 1946, when the Chinese Communist Party's relations with the Soviet Union were far from close. On the one hand, he felt that the CCP and the Soviet Union were at odds, and on the other hand, he believed that "Yan'an had no choice in its foreign relations, and the development of events kept Yan'an in or forced it into the Soviet orbit." ”
By 1949, there was no doubt that the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Union would seek common ground while reserving differences and confront the enemy together. U.S. Consul General in Peking Coleb told the State Department twice in May and June that "Titoism" in China was unlikely anytime soon.
At the same time, an inter-ministerial study group with State Department officials estimated that the existing mix of forces in the world, including the CCP's presence in the Soviet bloc, was unlikely to change over a long period of time.
When Acheson himself became secretary of state, he laid down a premise of US policy toward China:
"The natural point of conflict between the Chinese Communists and the USSR has not yet developed".
In his opinion, the CCP is still integrated with the Soviet Union, and "the full power of nationalism has yet to be unleashed."
At the end of 1949, when the administration was deliberating on its policy toward China and East Asia, he emphasized:
"We must accept the fact that the Chinese Communists are Marxists and regard the Soviet Union as their great and only friend," and that the split between China and the Soviet Union may take more than 10 to 20 years.
The idea that the United States needs to wait for the split of China and the Soviet Union is obvious to American policy.
Philippe Strauss, head of the China Section of the State Department, told Australian Embassy officials in the United States in early June 1949:
"Even if the Chinese Communists show signs of independence from Moscow's control, it is likely to be due to factors inherent in Sino-Soviet relations, rather than from Western actions, such as on the issue of recognition." ”
Kennan also believes that the Chinese Communists will not pay attention to the "goodwill" of the United States and will not split with the Soviet Union because of the United States' wooing.
Acheson saw the same thing.
At the beginning of his inauguration, he envisioned a wedge between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, he admitted that if there was a rift between China and the Soviet Union, it would be caused by the Soviet Union, and that "it was almost impossible for the United States to do anything to bring about a [Sino-Soviet] conflict at first," and the fact that the Soviet Union broke with Yugoslavia reinforced this belief.
State Department officials believe that the emergence of "Titoism" was not due to the fact that Western countries were co-opting Yugoslavia, but because the Soviet Union bullied and hurt Yugoslavia, and that "Sino-Soviet estrangement may well appear in the same way ... It is almost impossible, or absolutely impossible, that our recognition [of the new regime in China] will contribute to this state of affairs. ”
This is tantamount to saying that it is futile for the United States to take action to ease the confrontation with the Chinese Communist Party.
4. Reconciliation or hostility?
However, in the view of State Department officials, the United States is not completely out of the task of promoting Sino-Soviet contradictions.
While encircling the new China is unlikely to work, swearing and slander may help to achieve the goal.
Davis advocated claiming that the Chinese Communist Party was a puppet of the Soviet Union in order to use the "agitation method" to stimulate the CCP to alienate the Soviet Union.
In early December 1950, during a meeting with British Prime Minister Attlee, Acheson explained why the United States pursued the policy of "making China regard Russia as its only friend," which Attlee criticized.
Acheson said that while the United States, like Britain, believed that there was a possibility of a split between China and the Soviet Union, "the question is not whether this analysis is correct, but whether it is possible to act on it." ”
"Maybe in 10 or 15 years we may see a change in Chinese attitudes, but we can't afford to wait that long... It would not be cost-effective for us to try our luck on China's distant future and jeopardize America's immediate security."
It should also be pointed out that the contradiction between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union is only one aspect of the Sino-Soviet contradiction considered by Acheson and others.
On the other hand, the anti-Soviet Chinese "nationalism" and "democratic individualism" were opposed to international communism.
They apparently believe that even if the Chinese Communist Party falls out with the Soviet Union and thus creates a situation that the United States can exploit, the Chinese Communist Party will most likely remain communist in nature and may still oppose the United States and exclude Western forces.
On the contrary, anti-Soviet Chinese "nationalism" and "democratic individualism" have always been closely linked to the influence of the United States and represent the hopes of the United States in China.
From the fall of 1948 to the spring of 1949, Stuart told the State Department several times:
The Chinese are individualistic by nature, incompatible with communism, and pro-American and Russian-disgusting by nature. He believes that the United States should promote nationalism and basic freedoms at the same time in order to encourage Chinese people to show a "rebellious spirit."
Acheson agreed.
The basic policy document he presided over at the beginning of his tenure emphasized:
Sooner or later, "political resistance to the Chinese Communist Party" in China will emerge and develop into a "mass movement expressed in the form of the Chinese nation," and the United States should strive to discover and support this "new revolution" in order to promote the Chinese Communist Party to become a "truly independent government" or to compete with the Chinese Communist Party.
Since then, he has repeatedly threatened that China's democratic individualism will eventually overthrow the "foreign system," calling on the Chinese people to "change the communist foundations of their government" and "the unfortunate position of being in the Soviet sphere of influence."
A British scholar noted that the Truman administration's attempt to encourage "the 'Titoism' of the Chinese people" by refusing to recognize New China and lead them to eventually overthrow "the regime imposed by Moscow" has come into contact with a question that is very important for the study of the history of Sino-US relations, that is, what was the core content of US interests in China at that time?
At different times, the connotations of US interests in China are different, and the importance of its various components has also changed. However, the ideological and cultural influence of the United States has always been an important part of US interests in China, and they are all the more important when the Chinese revolution has dealt a devastating blow to US political forces in China.
Acheson wrote a memo in 1949 entitled "American Interests in China." He divided these interests into seven parts, the most important of which was the influence of American thought and culture.
He believes that American cultural institutions and cultural activities nurture a large part of China's future leadership elite, spread American influence through contact with a large number of Chinese, and arouse less wariness and hostility among the Chinese people. The importance of other institutions is also largely related to American ideology and culture.
Only by linking the Truman administration's expectation of a "new revolution" in China with its understanding of US interests in China can we grasp the fundamental reasons and practical characteristics of its commitment to safeguarding US interests in China.
5. Why does the United States think that China cannot get rid of its economic backwardness?
In the spring of 1949, Truman wrote to Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican leader of the Senate, in which he argued that aid to the Kuomintang should be gradually suspended, and on the other hand, he comforted him with the saying that "the Russians will eventually become China's 'foreign devils.'"
The argument that promoted the Sino-Soviet contradiction was also used by the State Department and the White House to justify a number of other considerations and decisions, notably the decision to allow Japan-occupied Japan to conduct limited trade with China, the consideration of recognizing New China in the fall of 1949, and the decision not to use American military force to prevent the "fall" of Taiwan in the same year.
The promotion of Sino-Soviet contradictions was nothing more than an argument used by Acheson and others, consciously or unconsciously, to convince themselves and others of their reasonableness.
Treating them as manifestations of a policy of trying to reconcile with New China in order to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union does not convincingly explain why the US government, while at the same time taking many hostile actions that only strengthen Sino-Soviet unity, provided Acheson and others with a psychological comfort in believing that they were not opposing the liberation of the Chinese people, but against the enslavement of the Chinese people by the Soviet Union and the international communism it dominated.
This was shown by a speech by Acheson in the early 1950s.
He said:
"The Chinese revolutionary movement, which began half a century ago, was an expression of the ambition of the Chinese people, but now it has been captured by the Communists. They seized power and reversed the true purpose of the revolution. Because... China, with its long and glorious history, is being forcibly incorporated into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and becoming a vassal of the Soviet political system and the Soviet economy".
These remarks are not merely untrue, they also reflect a real psychological need, that is, to imagine the US policy toward China as legitimate and noble, otherwise the US Government will be "in a position where it is possible to pursue its foreign policy half-heartedly and guiltily," as Morgenthau and Thompson said, and the third basic concept that determines the US policy toward New China is that China cannot become an East Asian power in the foreseeable future.
U.S. officials are somewhat gloating at the devastation caused by China's long war, and applaud the enormous difficulties faced by the Chinese Communist Party in rebuilding the country.
At the end of 1948, the embassy in China told the State Department:
The Chinese Communist Party will have a hard time in power, "the natural agricultural economy is in a serious crisis, and the part of the national economy organized in the Western way is in an equally serious situation." At almost all levels, political institutions no longer function as intended, and loosely controlled anarchy has emerged. ”
It believes that the Chinese Communist Party cannot meet the minimum needs of the Chinese people, let alone industrialize the country. State Department policy designers have also concluded that the CCP is incapable of addressing "the real difficulties that await them."
The CCP's weakness lies not only in the lack of funds, raw materials, industrial equipment and technology, but also in the lack of a modern administrative system.
Kennan and others estimate that even if the CCP draws a large number of experienced managers from outside the party, it will not be enough to avoid "appearing incompetent in all but political surveillance and political punishment."
Acheson did not see this estimate as insufficient, failing to see the very difficult task of establishing a strong central government in a country plagued by stubborn localist tendencies.
Not only that, but in the eyes of US officials, the Communist Party of China also has a fundamental weakness, that is, Marxism-Leninism does not conform to China's national conditions, and socialism cannot make China prosperous, rich and strong.
They expect the Chinese Communist Party to either impose socialism, which is met with "passive resistance and skillful resistance from Chinese individualism," or even provoke upheaval, or slow social reforms, risking a loss of ideological fervor and the dynamism that comes with it.
In short, China will remain a weak country with an extremely backward economy, extremely poor people, and political turmoil for a long time to come.
Therefore, the Truman administration believed that the USSR would not significantly increase its power as a result of the Chinese Communist Party's seizure of national power, and the United States would not be very seriously threatened by this, at least for a generation or two.
This psychologically comforted the US policymakers, enabling them to swallow the bitter consequences of the failure of the China policy with less difficulty, and at the same time somewhat restraining the tendency of the United States to directly interfere in the Chinese revolution. But that's only one side of the story.
Contempt for the power and potential of the new China made the Truman administration see no need to respect the new China and thus unscrupulously hostile to it, especially on the Taiwan issue.
This also led to a great underestimation of China's interests, boldness, and military capabilities at a critical moment in the Korean War, thus causing a catastrophe of war between China and the United States.
Narrow economic fetishism has blinded the eyes of US policymakers, making them unable to understand that New China can become an East Asian power that the United States has to look up to without being able to shake off its economic backwardness.
6. Why did New China have to rely on the United States economically?
Closely related to underestimating New China's capabilities is the fourth basic concept, that is, New China has to rely on the United States economically. U.S. officials argue that the Chinese Communist Party must rely on foreign education if it is to overcome enormous economic difficulties "in any lasting way."
However, most of the required foreign aid could not have been taken from the Soviet Union.
In early 1949, Sulzberg, a newspaperman close to the official Washington authorities, reported:
"The State Department's point of view... It was the Soviet Union, even if it had established a close and fraternal relationship with Mr. Mao Tse-tung, that it was unable to provide the Chinese with the cadres and assistance necessary to deal with their fundamental problems, and that the Communists would drag themselves down in a miserable and desperate situation, as General Chiang Kai-shek had done before. ”
Therefore, the only way out for the new Chinese regime is to seek help from the United States.
Cabot once proudly wrote:
Only from the United States did the Chinese Communists get enough oil, cotton, machinery, export markets, know-how, technical training, and "a whole bunch of other things," and they could not even "stand for a moment the severance of our church schools and hospitals from the United States."
Some of the expressions made by the Chinese communists that they are willing to develop economic relations with the United States have made US officials believe that the Chinese communists have great demands on the United States.
That being the case, it seems that the United States can use economic means to get the Chinese Communist Party to change its policies and policies.
Stuart told the State Department:
The best hope for protecting U.S. interests in China is that the CCP is increasingly aware of the need for U.S. goods and technical assistance.
As these needs become more urgent, the attitude and policy of the Communists toward the Americans is expected to improve. ”
Cabot focused on the division of the Soviet Union and advocated using US economic aid as a lever to force the Chinese Communist Party to get rid of the "extreme pro-Soviet bloc."
Moreover, U.S. officials envisage this as a way to prevent the revolutionary transformation of Chinese society and to nurture reactionary forces in China.
In a telegram transmitted to Truman by the State Department, Stuart said:
"We can impose conditions on our aid that it may fundamentally affect the implementation of totalitarian procedures. Fundamental freedoms, well-planned advocacy, and productive business will have an inspiring moral impact on those who share our beliefs.
It is not impossible, and this will lead to the formation of political parties whose struggles, however fierce, will not lead to the devastating results of armed conflict. From all this, there will be a kind of at least ... From our point of view, there are promising political structures and general sentiments. ”
US officials also believe that we must not give first and then take from New China, but must take it first and then give it, that is, we must first change our principles and policies in accordance with the wishes of the United States before we can obtain economic help from the United States.
The U.S. Consul General to Peking, Coleb, wrote in January 1949:
"If one day the Communists want to get serious about relief and credit, the United States will have to think about it, and only on the basis of shrewd bargaining." That said, we should make it clear that we will only do so if the deal makes us politically and economically profitable. ”
Policymakers share this view. In their opinion, the United States has "the most effective weapon against the Chinese communist regime" in the economic field.
Obviously, in this field, as in the political field, the Truman administration has no intention of reconciling with New China.
(End of text)
If you have other topics or opinions about the field of history, you can [follow] me for a private chat, or you can leave a message in the comment area below and reply as soon as possible.