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Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

author:The self-reserved land of Fusheng
Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

On December 20, 1970, General Li Tao, former director of the Third Department of the General Staff, died of illness in Guangzhou at the age of 65. He was one of the four ethnic minority generals among the 57 founding generals, and was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

Li Tao, formerly known as Li Shengcai, used to be known as Li Xiangmin and Li Xiangqi, was born on September 4, 1905 in Xinpo Village, Yanshou Township, Rucheng County, Hunan Province. Mother Jane is of the Yao ethnic group. Li Tao is the only son in the family, entered the village's private school at the age of 7, followed his father to Dade Primary School in Yanshou Township at the age of 9, and then transferred to the county model primary school. He is gifted and intelligent, and his reading grades have always been among the best. When his father died of illness at the age of 13, he completed his studies at the prefectural model elementary school with the financial support of his grandmother and several uncles. In 1923, Li Tao was admitted to the Hunan Provincial No. 7 United High School in Chenzhou, where he became acquainted with his revolutionary guide, Zhu Qingxun.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

In the spring of 1926, shortly after Li Tao joined the party, the organization arranged for him to return to Rucheng County with Zhu Qingxun to carry out the work of party building. Soon after, he was sent to study at the Hunan Political Training Institute in Hengyang (later moved to Changsha), and after graduation, he was sent to the Propaganda Brigade of the Left Wing Army of the National Revolutionary Army stationed in Changde as a propagandist, and the leader of the brigade was Zhou Yiqun, a member of the Communist Party. At the beginning of 1927, Li Tao returned to Rucheng to carry out the workers' movement as an instructor of the workers' movement of the Hunan Provincial Federation of Trade Unions. In February of the same year, the first workers' congress of Rucheng County was held in the county seat, and Li Tao was elected chairman of the county federation of trade unions and concurrently served as the leader of the workers' pickets. Li Tao's fellow countryman, General Zhu Liangcai (political commissar of the Beijing Military Region after the founding of the People's Republic of China), once recalled: "Comrade Li Tao participated in the patriotic student movement very early. When I was running a peasant association in Rucheng, Li Tao was the chairman of the Rucheng Federation of Trade Unions and participated in leading the workers' and peasants' movement in the county. He was only 22 years old at the time. ”

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

In August 1927, Wu Zhenmin (born in the second phase of Huangpu), Yang Shiqing, Li Fangqi (that is, Li Yunchang, born in the fourth phase of Huangpu, who served as the first vice minister of the Ministry of Justice after the founding of the People's Republic of China) and others led the Huichaomei Peasants' and Workers' Salvation Army to fight thousands of miles from the Hailufeng area to Rucheng, Hunan, and after joining with the local peasant army, they held the Rucheng Rebellion and occupied the county seat. According to the opinion of Zhou Enlai, military minister of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Second Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army was formed, with Chen Dongri as the division commander, Wu Zhenmin as the deputy division commander, and Wu Wenyuan as the chief of staff. It has three regiments, one regiment each of the Guangdong Peasant Army, the Rucheng Peasant Army, and the peasant armies in Rucheng from other places.

On August 15, the Rucheng bandit He Qilang colluded with the 47th Division of the 16th Army of the Kuomintang to raid the county seat, and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army suffered heavy casualties. Wu Zhenmin, Lin Junjie, Zhu Qingxun and other leaders of the peasant army and hundreds of soldiers died heroically. The 400 to 500 men of the Second Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, led by Chen Dongri, Yu Kun, and Li Yunchang, joined up with the Rucheng Peasant Army led by He Jucheng and Li Tao. In September, according to the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Second Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army was reduced to the First Regiment of the Second Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. In late September, in order to cooperate with the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan-Hubei, the 2nd Division and 1st Regiment successively conquered Guidong and Rucheng, and established the Rucheng County Soviet Government.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

At the beginning of November, after Zhu De and Chen Yi led the team of the Nanchang Uprising to Chongyi and Rucheng areas, in order to preserve their strength, they accepted the number of the 140th Regiment of the 47th Division of the 16th Army of Fan Shisheng's Division. During this period, Zhu De got in touch with the 1st Regiment of the 2nd Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army and asked the 1st Regiment of the 2nd Division to also accept the number of the 16th Army. It was at that time that Li Tao met Zhu De for the first time. At the end of November, the 2nd Division and the 1st Regiment were renumbered as the 16th Army Special Service Battalion of the Kuomintang in Lechang, Guangdong. He Jucheng served as the battalion commander, and Huang Wencan served as the deputy battalion commander. At the end of December, Zhu De and Chen Yi led their troops to prepare to go south to join the Guangzhou uprising troops, but unexpectedly, the Guangzhou uprising quickly failed, and they had to be transferred to Yizhang to participate in the southern Hunan uprising.

Due to the slow action of the special service battalion and Huang Wencan's internal response to the enemy, he was attacked by Wang Jia's regiment of the 16th Kuomintang Army at the Shaoguan Girls' School, and He Jucheng and others were shot and died during the breakout. Li Tao, Song Yuhe (later served as director of the Logistics Department of the New Fourth Army and commander of the Logistics Command of the East China Military Region; after the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as deputy director of the General Logistics Department, director of the Barracks Management Department, and deputy director of the Construction Engineering Department), Fan Zhuo, and others escaped from the barracks and the First Regiment of the Second Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, which had participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, was completely wiped out. Li Tao then went south to Guangzhou. Soon after, he went to Hong Kong, where he was left to work in the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, and then went to Shanghai to work in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

In April 1929, Li Tao went from Shanghai to the southwest Jiangxi Soviet region to serve as the instructor of the first brigade of the second independent regiment of the Jiangxi Red Army. This company was originally a bandit, but was later absorbed by the Nationalist Army, and they defected to the Red Army for a while, and soon conspired to attack the First Brigade and defect to the enemy. When Li Tao found out, he immediately took resolute measures, arrested the bandit leader, and then mixed the two brigades. After a period of political education and training, this unit became a real Red Army unit. Since then, Li Tao has successively served as the political commissar of the 3rd Detachment of the 1st Column of the Red 6th Army, the political commissar of the 8th Detachment of the 3rd Column, the political commissar of the 1st Column of the 3rd Red Army, and the political commissar of the 7th Division of the 3rd Red Army. In 1930, in the first anti-"encirclement and suppression" operation in the Central Soviet Region, Li Tao and division commander Chen Bojun led the 7th Division to participate in the Longgang battle of "capturing Zhang Huizan in front".

There are usually three theories: First, Wang Liang's 10th Division of the Red Fourth Army; second, Su Yu's 64th Division of the Red 22nd Army; and third, Huang Gonglue's Red 3rd Army, that is, the 7th Division led by Li Tao and Chen Bojun. The battle of Longgang was a battle of annihilation of the 40,000 main forces of the Red First Army against the 9,000 men of the enemy's 18th Division. However, the author is more inclined to another statement: according to Gao Zili, the political commissar of the Red 64th Division, in his article "Mourning the National Heroes of the Anti-Japanese War in the North to Find Comrade Huaizhou": Xun Huaizhou, then the commander of the 100th Regiment of the 34th Division of the Red 12th Army, led his troops to capture Zhang Huizan, the commander of the White Army, alive in the first anti-"encirclement and suppression", and was promoted to the commander of the 35th Division of the Red 12th Army for his merits.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

In June 1932, Li Tao was transferred to the political commissar of the 39th Division of the 13th Army of the Red Fifth Army and led his troops to participate in the Battle of Nanxiong Shuikou. Later, because of his support for Mao Zedong's ideas, the leaders of the "leftist" line were dismissed from the post of political commissar of the division, and he was transferred to the head of the enemy engineering department of the political department of the Red First Army, the director of the political department of the Red 9th Army Corps, and the director of the political defense sub-bureau. In October 1934, when the Central Red Army set off on the Long March, Li Tao was transferred to the head of the Executive Section of the Red Army Work Department of the Central Political Security Bureau, and accompanied the Long March of the Central Military Commission. In early November, the Red Army entered the city, and he was asked to go home to see his relatives. Li Tao rejected his offer on the grounds of military urgency, and when he returned to his hometown again, it was more than 20 years later. After the Zunyi Conference, the Red Army was reorganized, and Li Tao was transferred to the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission (the predecessor of the Third Department of the General Staff) as political commissar. Soon after, Li Tao was transferred to the post of commander of the column of the Central Military Commission, and under the direct command of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, he led the column of the Central Military Commission to complete the Long March and reach northern Shaanxi. In November 1935, Li Tao was transferred to the head of the Executive Department of the Northwest Political Security Bureau.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

In the spring of 1936, when the Red Army marched eastward to Shanxi, Li Tao was transferred to the head of the United Front Work Department of the Political Department of the Red Army. In the winter of the same year, Li Tao was sent to Xi'an Yanghucheng Department to do united front work, and in order to facilitate the work, he changed his original name to Li Tao and changed his name to Li Tao. After the Xi'an Incident, Zhou Enlai sent Li Tao to Zheng Weisan and Chen Xianrui of the 74th Division of the Red 25th Army in southern Shaanxi to serve as vice chairman of the Military Committee of the Southern Route Army and vice chairman of the Military and Political Committee of the Red 74th Division. After that, the Red 74th Division was renamed the Southern Shaanxi Anti-Japanese Allied Army, marched into the Lintong and Baofeng areas, and cooperated with friendly forces to prevent the pro-Japanese army from attacking Xi'an. In April 1937, Li Tao was transferred to the Red Army Liaison Office in Xi'an as the director. After the Lugou Bridge Incident, the liaison office was renamed the Eighth Route Army Office in Xi'an, and Li Tao remained the director. In September 1937, Li Tao went to Wuhan with Dong Biwu to establish the Wuhan Office of the Eighth Route Army and served as the director. A great deal of work has been done to develop the anti-Japanese national united front.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

On November 25, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek convened the highest military conference in Hengyang, and CCP representatives Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, and Guo Moruo were invited to attend. At the meeting, Chiang Kai-shek put forward the principle of "emphasizing politics over military affairs, guerrilla warfare over regular warfare, turning the enemy's rear into the front, and using one-third of his forces behind the enemy's back." In order to open up a battlefield behind enemy lines and extensively carry out guerrilla warfare, Chiang Kai-shek accepted the proposal of the Chinese Communists, and the two parties jointly established the "Nanyue Guerrilla Cadre Training Class." In January 1939, Zhou Enlai, secretary of the Southern Bureau of the Communist Party of China, decided to send Ye Jianying to lead more than 30 people, including Li Tao and Bian Zhangwu, to Nanyue to participate in the teaching of the cadre training class. Li Tao served as a political instructor in the cadre training class, teaching courses such as Mao Zedong's "On Protracted War", the CCP's anti-Japanese proposition, and how to do mass work. Soon after, Ye Jianying was transferred back to work in the Southern Bureau, and Li Tao took over as the head of the working group and the head of the CPC delegation, and continued to work in the Nanyue guerrilla cadre training class.

Through the cadre training class, Li Tao and others made many friends in the national army and expanded the influence of the CCP in the national army. In 1940, Li Tao went to work in the Guilin office of the Eighth Route Army. After returning to Yan'an in 1941, he served as director of the Economic Construction Department of the Logistics Department of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, secretary general of the Central Military Commission, deputy director of the War Department and director of the Second Bureau, and assisted Ye Jianying, chief of staff of the Central Military Commission and director of the Operations Department, in charge of the work of the Second Bureau (Intelligence Bureau), the Third Bureau (Communications Bureau), the High Staff Office and other departments, and participated in the study of operational issues. Under the circumstance that the business work was very heavy, he also led all the staff of the Second Bureau to insist on working and producing on the one hand, and survived the most difficult period of the Anti-Japanese War.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, Li Tao served as the acting director of the Operations Department of the Central Military Commission. At that time, the Central Military Commission's Operations Department was in charge not only of operations, but also of intelligence, communications, military affairs, equipment, military training, surveying and mapping, and so on. Under the direct leadership of Zhou Enlai, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and acting chief of the General Staff, and Ye Jianying, secretary of the Rear Committee of the CPC Central Committee, Li Tao, who was the head of the Operations Department, became a senior staff officer and right-hand man of the head of the Central Military Commission during the War of Liberation. In late June 1946, Li Tao organized the First Bureau of the Military Commission to compile and print the "Battle Sequence of the National Army", which comprehensively included the situation of the Kuomintang government's Ministry of National Defense and various battalions, Sui Bureau, theaters, and garrison headquarters, as well as the numbers, stations, strengths, subordinate relationships, and names of commanders of 15 group armies, 91 armies, 251 divisions, special forces, infantry and cavalry units, and local armed forces, and approved the total strength of the Kuomintang army to be about 4.07 million people. It was praised by Mao Zedong as very useful.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

In May 1948, Li Tao officially became the head of the Operations Department and the director of the First Bureau of the Military Commission. At the end of the same year, with the end of the Liaoshen Campaign, Li Tao led the staff to calculate and come up with such a set of very gratifying figures: the strength of the People's Liberation Army exceeded 3 million, while the strength of the Jiang army had been reduced to 2.9 million. After receiving the report, Mao Zedong personally drafted a telegram for the Xinhua News Agency entitled "The responsible person of the CPC Central Committee will be able to fundamentally overthrow the Kuomintang government in about one year": "China's military situation has now entered a new turning point, that is, the balance of forces between the two sides of the war has undergone a fundamental change. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has long had an advantage not only in terms of quality, but also in terms of quantity. This is a sign that the success of the Chinese revolution and the realization of peace in China are imminent. ”

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

There has always been a debate among the people about Li Tao and Li Kenong, two outstanding leaders of the CCP's intelligence front, but who is more powerful? In fact, this kind of debate is meaningless, because they are originally one, just like the left hand and the right hand. Li Kenong himself is one of the "Three Heroes of Longtan", mainly responsible for the selection and deployment of intelligence personnel, the acquisition of intelligence, and the instigation of rebellion and anti-speciality, while Li Tao is responsible for analyzing and judging the information obtained, and providing valuable information to the top decision-makers, the two complement each other and are indispensable. Just like the accountant and the cashier, one is a rake for money, and the other is a box for money. This is also the reason why both were awarded the rank of general at the same time in 1955.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

On March 25, 1949, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Military Commission and their subordinate agencies moved from Xibaipo, Pingshan County, Hebei Province to Beiping. Li Tao arrived in Beiping with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and participated in the military parade at Nanyuan Airport. On October 1, he participated in the founding ceremony. In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, everything was left to be rebuilt, from marching into Tibet to suppressing bandits in Guangxi, from unifying the establishment of the whole army to establishing various branches of the armed forces...... As director of the Operations Department of the Central Military Commission and director of the First Bureau, Li Tao can be described as having a lot of opportunities and lack skills. In addition to assisting Nie Rongzhen, acting chief of the General Staff, in doing a lot of organizational work and participating in the organization and compilation of infantry drill codes, internal affairs, queues, discipline and other regulations, he also served as the president of the Engineering School of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission (the predecessor of Xidian University), and participated in the establishment of the People's Liberation Army Surveying and Mapping School and the Surveying and Mapping Bureau of the General Staff.

On November 1, 1949, Mao Zedong wrote: "The seal of the Central Military Commission refers to the seal of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People's Government, which was activated on the same day. Comrade Li Tao is requested to be responsible for keeping one. This shows that Li Tao plays a pivotal role in the Military Commission. In 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, Li Tao's work became even busier, and the heavy work made Li Tao, who was nearly half a hundred years old, almost on the verge of collapse, until 1952, when the Central Committee decided to transfer Zhang Zhen, who was nearly 10 years younger than Li Tao, as the head of the War Department.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

In March 1952, Li Tao returned to his "mother's home" General Staff Department III (Intelligence Department) as minister and political commissar. In view of the secrecy and high technical nature of the work of the three departments, Li Tao proposed that a "high threshold" policy should be implemented for technical cadres. All technical cadres who are transferred to work in the three departments must be strictly examined and selected. Once you enter the job, don't transfer easily. He asked the cadres of the three departments to be popular in the three departments, specialize in the three departments, and work in the three departments for a lifetime. Li Tao himself did exactly this, and he often said: I will never leave the three departments except under three circumstances: I must not disobey the higher authorities; I cannot fail to leave if I make a mistake; and I will never be able to do it again if I die of old age, sickness, and death. Li Tao faithfully fulfilled his promise and devoted himself to the intelligence cause of our army until his death. In 1959, Li Tao proposed that Major General Peng Fujiu, the first vice minister, be the minister, and he would only serve as the political commissar. In his work, he respected and actively supported the work of the young minister and several other deputy ministers, and later promoted two young bureau chiefs to deputy ministers, so that there would be successors to the leadership groups of the three ministries.

Although the founding general had never commanded a war, he was an intelligence expert on a par with General Li Kenong

In 1964, Li Tao became ill and lost his sight after overwork, and left his post the following year to recuperate. On October 20, 1969, Li Tao, who was seriously ill, was "evacuated" to Guangzhou, and on December 20, 1970, General Li Tao died of illness in Guangzhou at the age of 65.

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