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Editor-in-chief: Cui Xiaohan
Chief Writer: Xu Yan
Advisor: Mao Xinyu
From December 31, 1950 to January 8, 1951, the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army jointly launched the third campaign. At that time, the volunteer army was very tired after continuous fierce battles and thousands of miles of pursuit, why could they still occupy Seoul in one fell swoop and advance to the south of the Han River?
Despite the fatigue of the continuous attack, the enemy retreated south in panic
The main feature of the third campaign jointly launched by the Chinese and North Korean armies was that, out of political considerations, the Chinese Volunteers changed their original plan of resting and recuperating for the winter and launched an offensive war against the enemy who had prepared for defense. During the campaign, the Chinese and North Korean forces occupied Seoul and advanced to the 37th parallel, achieving a major victory.
After the great victory in the second battle, the difficulties of the Volunteer Army also increased, the number of troops was reduced to 100,000, and the 9th Corps was unable to participate in the battle for at least two or three months due to severe frostbite. Only 260 vehicles were lost due to air raids and accidents, and the supply was extremely difficult. Peng Dehuai, who was on the front line, deeply felt these problems and reported to Mao Zedong on December 8, 1950, proposing that the 38th parallel should not be avoided for the time being, and that he should be fully prepared to fight again in the spring of next year. Proceeding from the strategic intention of liberating the whole of Korea, Mao Zedong pointed out to the head of the Volunteer Army on December 13: "Our army must cross the 38th parallel." While agreeing to steady progress and opposing a quick victory, Mao Zedong put forward a demand on December 26 to "strengthen political mobilization in the army (no return to China without destroying the enemy in Korea)."
In accordance with the strategic intentions of the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong, the Volunteer Army Command determined the deployment of the third campaign on December 15. The battle was determined to dispatch 9 corps, with 5 corps (including 1 corps of the KPA) to carry out the main assault in the direction of Seoul on the western front, and 4 corps (including 2 corps of the KPA) to carry out an auxiliary assault on the eastern front. In terms of tactical guidance, it is emphasized to concentrate absolutely superior forces, open a breakthrough with firepower, divide and encircle the enemy after a breakthrough, and maintain a superior force for continuous assault in the depth of the enemy.
At 17 o'clock on the evening of December 31, the Volunteer Army launched a full-front attack on the enemy's 38th line defense line on the Western Front. Before the start of the attack, the troops showed excellent camouflage skills. The units entered the starting point at dawn, and then used branches and snow to camouflage, and finally evaded the reconnaissance of enemy planes and forward sentinels during the day, and launched a surprise attack at night. At the beginning of the attack, the Volunteer Army concentrated more than 100 artillery pieces and carried out short fire preparations in the main directions. This was the first large-scale use of artillery in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and it played an important role in opening a breakthrough.
Before the Chinese and North Korean armies launched the third campaign, the US troops were panicked because they had just been hit hard, so they mostly withdrew to the second line to rest and recuperate. The South Korean (ROK) troops on the front line were demoralized and had no fighting spirit, and fled in a hurry after being hit hard.
The Chinese and North Korean troops occupied Seoul and could not pursue it due to supply difficulties
After the Chinese People's Volunteers and the People's Army broke through the 38th parallel on the night of Chinese New Year's Eve in 1951, after two days and one night of interspersed pursuits, the South Korean (ROK) army on the first line had collapsed on 2 January. Although the American military police intercepted the road, Ridgway personally placed the jeep in the middle of the road in an attempt to stop what he described as an avalanche-like rout, to no avail. The rout and escape of the South Korean (ROK) army east of Seoul has put the more than 100,000 "United Nations troops" in the Seoul area in danger of being deeply surrounded by the Chinese and North Korean forces from the right flank and fighting on their backs north of the Han River. Therefore, Ridgway ordered the abandonment of Seoul despite the opposition of the South Korean (South Korean) government.
After discovering that the enemy was retreating on all fronts, the Sino-Korean Joint Division immediately ordered a full-line pursuit. Since the enemy army was all motorized troops, it was impossible to catch up on foot, and only a small number of the enemy's covering troops were eliminated. The British 29th Brigade was arranged by the U.S. military to cover the retreat north of Seoul. The 50th Army of the Volunteer Army cut off the brigade's retreat by interspersing on the afternoon of January 3. Although most of the brigade broke through under the cover of tanks and planes, after nightfall, the volunteer troops pounced on the British tanks with anti-tank grenades and blasting canisters, destroying and capturing 31 tanks in one fell swoop, and annihilating a British tank squadron and two infantry companies. This is a successful example of the use of infantry weapons to destroy tanks in the history of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
On the night of January 4, 1951, one division of the 50th and 39th armies of the Chinese People's Volunteers, together with the 1st Army Corps of the Korean People's Army, entered Seoul. On January 7, the 50th Army occupied Suwon, and on January 8, the 1st KPA Army occupied Inchon again. On the same day, the Chinese and North Korean troops had advanced to the 37th Parallel, and the third battle came to an end. During the campaign, according to the statistics of China and North Korea, a total of 19,000 enemies were killed, most of whom were South Korean (South Korean) troops. The casualties of the Chinese and North Korean armies were only 8,500 (including 5,800 volunteers).
Although the third campaign won the capture of Seoul and had a great political impact in the international community, it failed to annihilate the enemy's main force militarily, and advancing too far south only increased the difficulty of transportation.
Peng Dehuai decided to take a break, and the headquarters still planned to launch a spring offensive
After the second and third campaigns launched by the Chinese People's Volunteers, the enemy was defeated and retreated 400 kilometers within a month. However, the "United Nations Army," which had modern equipment, retreated on a motorized march, and its troops were not fatigued, and the main force was not annihilated, and at the same time, it was quickly replenished by strong reserve forces and advanced means of transport. The volunteers pursued 400 kilometers on foot in the snow for a month, but they were exhausted. After the end of the third campaign, the rear transport line of the Volunteer Army was extended from 100 kilometers a month ago to 700 kilometers, and most sections were in a situation where there was neither air cover nor ground air defense weapons. Under the enemy's tight air blockade, the front line could not be supplied with food and ammunition.
Faced with this situation, Peng Dehuai explained internally: "The third battle was carried out with some reluctance (fatigue)", "food and ammunition could not be provided, and the troops were very tired and urgently needed to rest." And considering that Korea is a long and narrow peninsula, the east and west coasts can be landed everywhere, the coast must be fortified, bandits and stragglers must be cleared, and the rear can be consolidated. In addition, our strategic reserves have not been able to catch up in time, the coast is exposed, and there is no naval protection, so once the enemy takes advantage of the empty landing in our rear, it will repeat the lessons of the past. ”
At that time, the operations department of the General Staff in Beijing also studied the situation in Korea and believed that if there was air force support, or 20,000 or 30,000 vehicles to transport it, or if it could immediately put into the strategic reserve of two corps, then it could pursue the attack to the south. However, if none of the above conditions are met, the pursuit is very dangerous.
Considering the difficulties on the Korean front, the Central Military Commission decided to rest the volunteer army for two months, and at the same time proposed the next offensive deployment. In accordance with this demand, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army proposed: "After the next campaign begins, we will continue to fight and destroy the enemy in one go and liberate all Korea." The proposition of this task reflected the underestimation of the enemy's forces at that time.
The imtimely misestimation of the enemy's forces after the Third Campaign was an inevitable phenomenon when the armed forces of New China had just transformed from a Chinese-style modern war to a world-class modern war. As a result of this mistake and the lessons that followed, it played a certain role in breaking the shackles of the traditional model and in the subsequent development of China's national defense modernization.