This issue is the sixth issue of the U.S. Airborne Forces Combat History Series in World War II. The last issue focused on the first combat operation in which American paratroopers participated - the capture of French North Africa. In this issue, after the capture of French North Africa, the US paratroopers continued to attack Tunisia, another strategic point in North Africa, which was crucial for the future landing in Italy......
(The full text of this issue is about 7500 words, the content is long, thank you for watching)
Preempt Tunisia
Shortly after the Allied invasion of French North Africa, Admiral Darlan ordered the Vichy French army in North Africa to cease resistance. At the same time, the German-Italian army, which had been defeated by the British at the Battle of El Alamein in early November, was retreating westward at full speed. As a result, French Tunisia, which was strategically important, became the destination of the Allies and the Axis powers in a race from different directions. Since the paratroopers are the fastest to maneuver, they are naturally the first choice for participating in the completion of the preemption mission.
On the morning of 13 November, the operational officer of General Harold Alexander, commander of the Allied 18th Army Group, summoned Colonel Laver to the headquarters and informed him that he was about to participate in the operation to capture the important Algerian-Tunisian border town of Tebeza, which would be launched on the 15th of the same month (Army Group directly assigned the task, which shows the importance that the Allies attached to the airborne forces and the caution they were with when they were first used). Colonel Laver quickly drew up a plan for parachuting directly at Tebesa airfield after returning to his station, which planned to involve about 350 men from D, E and Battalion Headquarters, and the transport aircraft unit was the 60th Transport Aircraft Group, with a total of 22 C-47s. Allied intelligence was still not done well, and although Darlan had previously ordered the French not to resist, the attitude of the French troops stationed at the airfield was still unclear, and it was unclear whether the Germans had occupied the airfield.
On 14 November, the day before the parachuting, Colonel Laffer was told by a local Frenchman from Tunisia that there was a good airfield near Terbesa, three times larger than Terbesa, that was a base for French bombers. Colonel Laffer immediately asked the man to mark the location of the airport on the flight map, which was the Yux Le Barn Airport, and the flight map became the only source of information for future flights to the airport. Colonel Laffer immediately reported to Alexander's command, and the task was changed to parachute at the airfield of Yuxlebarn, and then send a company on foot to capture Terbesa.
In the early hours of November 15, soldiers of the 2nd Battalion of the 509th Regiment began to prepare for battle, and on the same airfield, British paratroopers were doing the same, and they were also going to carry out the airborne mission that day, the largest Allied airborne combat operation to date. At 7:30, according to the planned time, the first C-47 roared into the air. Subsequently, the planes formed a large "V" in small units of a three-plane formation, and the British Spitfire and Tempest fighters took off to escort them. The group flew first towards the coast and then turned inland to avoid the thick clouds that hung over the hilltops ahead.
Despite this, they still encountered thick clouds, and the group had to disperse to avoid a possible collision and regroup behind the thick clouds. At 9:45, the group spotted the target airfield and lowered the altitude to 100 meters. After selecting a landing field, Laver took the lead and jumped out of the cabin. Within a few minutes, the sky was full of colorful umbrella flowers, white umbrellas for personnel, yellow, blue, and red umbrellas for throwing objects. After landing, the American paratroopers were pleased to find that the airfield defenders were still French, not Germans. During the landing, 15 people were injured, including the commander of E Company who was seriously injured (later treated by French medics). This was due to the fact that the parachute landing was too rapid, which caused some people to fall into a rocky area ahead of schedule without falling into the airborne area.
Although the Ju-52 has made great achievements for Germany, after all, it was developed earlier, and its performance is far inferior to that of the C-47, and it is more vulnerable to damage.
Laffer quickly gathered the entire battalion, left the airborne area, and ordered D Company to dig trenches to defend the perimeter. Soon, D Company was in contact with the French at the airport, and Laver quickly sent his deputy battalion commander, Adler, with E Company (150 men in total) on foot to occupy the Tebesa airfield, 14 kilometers away. Laver set up his own makeshift command post on a high ground next to the airdrop zone, and when he looked closely at the Yuxlebarn airfield, he found that the French infantry had set up a well-positioned defensive position there, supported by 75mm guns. At the same time, he found that the airborne area was within all the range of Vichy French fire: if the Germans also occupied these positions, the 2nd Battalion of the 509th Regiment would face a massacre.
Soon, Colonel Burgess, a French army guarding the airport, accompanied by several French officers, arrived at Laffer's temporary command post, where he surrendered after shaking hands with Colonel Laffer. The French gave a warm welcome to the American paratroopers and helped them collect all the parachutes in the airborne zone in case they were stolen by the local Arabs. The French had a party with the American soldiers, and the French presented Colonel Laver with the regiment's glorious historical flag, and the American army returned the favor with an American flag. After arranging a stop, Laffer, Arrborough, and a soldier from the battalion headquarters crowded Colonel Burgess's Ray
Nol car. Go to Colonel Burgess's post in Faubesa. Along the way, Colonel Burgess told Laffer through an interpreter that the Germans could arrive at any time and that their reconnaissance unit had appeared nearby, while also saying that the French were willing to stand on the same front as the Americans.
By this time, Major Adler and 150 American commanders had arrived in Tebesa, and there was no sign of German arrival on the ground. Soon, a Ju-52 flew into the sky, and when it spotted the presence of Allied troops on the airfield, it immediately dived down from a height of 180 meters, and the Germans on board intended to strafe the only C-47 on the airfield with the machine gun they carried. However, it was met with heavy rifle fire from the ground, crashed shortly after flying away to the south of the airfield, and after reaching his headquarters in Tebeza, an ancient Roman fortress, Colonel Burgess and his party arranged rooms for the 2nd Battalion headquarters and battalion commanders.
Precise navigation, orderly formation flights, and unified airdrops are all necessary for a salty airborne operation.
Here, Raffer spoke by telephone to General Clarke, who was in Algiers. During the call, Clark ordered the battalion to defend only the area and not to attack in any way, much to the disappointment of Colonel Laver. General Clark's order, though not unreasonable, was not unreasonable: the 2nd Battalion did not receive any support and at the same time did not receive any supplies. However, in view of the situation at this moment in which both the German and Allied forces were desperately trying to seize Tunisia, and the favorable conditions in which the French army in North Africa generally leaned towards the side of the Central Powers after the German army occupied southern France, it was absolutely necessary to make a bold attack and enlist the help of the French army to seize the important stronghold. The opportune moment has been missed now, and it will take more time, more blood and steel to make up for it in the future. In stark contrast, the German troops were much more bold and bold in seizing Tunisia, and on many occasions they used the small forces at hand to bluff and dare to attack, and they were repeatedly successful.
This was also well understood by Colonel Laffer, who, in his consultations with Colonel Burgess, had learned that the Gaphosa-Gabes road to the southeast was the closest route for German troops from Tripoli to the area. It is reported that the French army defending at Gaphosa consisted of only 30 soldiers equipped with old armored vehicles and a few motorcycles, completely powerless to resist the German advance. By the afternoon, Colonel Laffer had already formed a plan in his mind to seize Gaphosa and, after occupying the place, send a reconnaissance force to the southeast of Gabes, and seize the seaside town of Gabes as appropriate. In the evening, Colonel Laffer spoke to General Clark on the phone again, and reluctantly obtained permission to send a reconnaissance force to Gaphosa, but not further.
Two buses were provided for the reconnaissance operation, enough to carry 40 paratroopers and enough food and ammunition for three days. On the luggage rack on the roof of each bus, Laffer arranged 2 paratroopers and 1 light machine gun. He had the two cars set off one hour apart, and after crossing the mountain road, they reached the flat road leading to Gaphosa. At the entrance to Gaphosa, American paratroopers made contact with the French forces there. Soon the French welcomed the Americans in the same way, and facilitated Laffer's communication with the American headquarters in Algiers, through which Laver obtained permission from the Allied command to transfer another 60 paratroopers to Gaphosa.
Laffer learned from information received by the local French reconnaissance unit that at this moment in the north, German and Italian armored forces and a large number of infantry had captured Kairouan, a Muslim holy city. The situation was urgent! He immediately decided to ignore General Clark's original restrictions and immediately advance to Gabès in the southeast. At the moment, Colonel Laffer has at his disposal two French armoured vehicles, some French motorcycle units, 100 American paratroopers and 15 British sailors who swam ashore after the ship bound for Malta was sunk. By this time Major Arraurough had flown back to the Allied headquarters in Algiers and reported to General Clarke, who had learned that Laffer, who had advanced 160 kilometers southeast from Gaphosa, had graciously not blamed him, but was ready to send a part of the infantry and tank destroyers to assist him.
But before American reinforcements arrived, the Italian 50th Special Tank Brigade (similar to the task force, with the 6th Infantry Battalion, the 557th Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion and the 15th Tank Battalion from the Centaur Panzer Division, and 3 artillery battalions, Brigade Commander Giovanni Imperiari de Franca Villa) and the German 5th Parachute Regiment were already on their way to Gaphosa. On the 21st, Gaphosa fell into the hands of German paratroopers. On 22 November, American paratroopers ambushed a small group of Italian armored units heading towards Gaphosa, and these paratroopers with only the most basic anti-tank weapons actually destroyed five Italian M13 tanks. On 26 November, American paratroopers attacked Gafosa, destroying some gasoline reserves, but were repelled by the Italian 50th Special Tank Brigade. Faced with a large number of enemies, Laffer had to retreat to Feriana. Before retreating, American paratroopers blew up a 40,000-gallon gasoline depot. Since they were already the most advanced of the Allied forces, central Tunisia fell into the hands of the Axis powers after they withdrew.
Italian M13/40 tank. The technical level of these things is not similar to that of the German tank lI, so that the airborne troops who lack heavy weapons can handle it.
Colonel Laffer joined up with reinforcements sent by General Clark to form the Tunisters, with Raffer as the commander of the special force. The task force comprises 2 Battalions of the 509th Regiment (Deputy Commander Adler Acting Battalion Commander), 1 Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment, 1 company of the French Algerian Native Infantry, 1 British minesweeper squadron and Company B of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. Laffer learned from the local intelligence agency that the German and Italian forces had fortified the Feder Pass, and he immediately decided to attack it. Supported by American P-38 fighter-bombers, the Tunisian contingent fought with German and Italian troops on the Tunisian-Algerian border for two weeks, and the fighting was mainly based on surprise attacks. On the night of 1 December 1942, they attacked the Feder Pass through the Sidi-Bu-Zid and Kasselin Passes, and after a full day of fighting, the contingent killed many enemy troops and captured 130 German and Italian prisoners.
Despite the valiant efforts of this small contingent, the situation did not go as the Allies had envisioned: on 28 November 1942, the German General Arnim commanded the 5th Panzer Army to launch a counterattack, and by mid-December the Allied offensive had been repulsed. In the south, the offensive of the British 8th Army, which had been chasing from Egypt, was finally stopped by German and Italian troops. But all this does not erase the exploits of this unit, especially the fledgling American paratroopers.
In his World War II memoirs, The Expedition to Europe, Eisenhower observed: "Up until this point, we had to flank the wide area from Terbesa to Gaphosa in the south, guarded by scattered French irregulars, who were reinforced by a detachment of American paratroopers under the command of the brave Colonel Edson Laver." Colonel Laver's record in that area is a short epic in itself. He was suspicious, quick, bold and courageous, and had a knack for attacking, and these were the things that left the enemy in complete confusion in a matter of weeks. "After the defeat of the first mission, the American paratroopers were finally able to show their elite infantry.
The battle for the capture of Tunisia was a race between the Allies and the Axis powers to seize an area over which neither side had full control. For the Allied forces, the terrain at the junction between Algeria and Tunisia is rugged, and it takes a lot of time for ordinary troops to move by road, and under such a special situation where the front line is very unfixed, it is a great speed advantage to use air assault units to seize transportation hubs and strategic centers. The problems that came to light during the operation were:
1. Insufficient logistical support has resulted in poor continuous airborne combat capability of the airborne troops, and the paratroopers have to use their own methods to collect some equipment sufficient for operations, which shows that the US airborne troops have not yet formed a complete set of logistical support systems.
2. Insufficient reconnaissance and intelligence (the Allies had already mastered air superiority at that time), and even the intelligence of the large airfields was learned by accident from the conversations of the locals, let alone the understanding of the deployment of the airfields.
3. Coordinated operations are still impossible, and the paratroopers are almost foxes into battle, and they are helpless in the event of an enemy that is not even a strong anti-airborne force, such as the two battalions of the Italian army. In contrast to classic airborne operations in the early stages of the war, such as the capture of the fortress of Eben-Emar by the German Airborne Forces, the German paratroopers and glider units were supported by fighter-bombers and dive bombers—one such support effectively suppressed enemy artillery and prevented enemy reinforcements, thus providing valuable support to vulnerable paratroopers, while the American forces were almost flat on this point.
4. It has not yet formed its own airborne combat principles, and is still in the stage of copying Germany's experience: in the early days of World War II, the German army still regarded paratroopers as irregular special forces, and only seized airfields, bridges and other targets for the subsequent main forces, so it placed great emphasis on seizing airfields through the first wave of parachuting, and then relying on the subsequent main forces to carry out large-scale field operations, rather than using airborne forces to carry out extensive parachute landings ( Too stubborn in the capture of the airfield cost the German Airborne Forces dearly in the battles of the Western Front and the Battle of Crete).
As a result of a series of dazzling performances of the German Airborne Forces in 1940-1941, this operational concept was generally accepted by other countries at that time or consolidated in the country, as can be seen from the Soviet Army's Airborne Operation Vyazma on January 18, 1942 and the Japanese Army's series of airborne operations in the East Indies in early 1942 (Manado, Palinpang, Kupangkou). The operational concept of landing the follow-up troops by airlift has become the mainstream of airborne operations. The fledgling US Airborne Forces are naturally no exception to "take Germany as a teacher". Just as the German airborne troops gradually formed their own airborne combat methods through setbacks and bloodshed, the US military will also find its own airborne combat path in the midst of defeat.
Assault on the bridge of Eljeme
After the German and Italian forces in North Africa retreated to Tunisia, the Axis powers began to send reinforcements to Tunisia on 9 November. Personnel are transported by plane and glider at an average rate of 1,000 people per day, while heavy equipment such as tanks is transported by sea. Once these reinforcements arrived in Tunisia, they were transported by train to the Maret Line in southern Tunisia. The Allies were determined to stop the German reinforcements by destroying an important railway bridge near the village of Erjeme, 120 kilometers east of the Kasselin Pass. Despite the concentrated bombardment of the bridge from the air, the effect was far from ideal. So, the commander of the 18th Army Group, General Alexander, decided to use paratroopers for this task.
After the previous three weeks of fighting, the number of paratroopers in the 2nd Battalion of the 509th Regiment has dropped to 85 people. By this time, the battalion had been withdrawn to Buffalik near Algiers, and the actual work was carried out by Acting Battalion Commander Yadler. Here they were reinforced by 180 reinforcements. Among the reinforcements was one Dan K. Second Lieutenant A. Di Reo, who is about to lead 31 men to carry out this bombing operation. Of the 32 men, 5 were demolition specialists at the battalion headquarters, 25 were newly arrived reinforcements, and 2 were French paratroopers who lived there and spoke Arabic fluently, and were tasked with bringing all the personnel back to their own lines in the dark of night after the blasting was completed. The 32 paratroopers will travel to their destination on three C-47 transport planes.
Erjemegan, located 176 kilometres behind enemy lines, was scheduled to be launched on the night of 16 December, with troops carrying 180 kilograms of TNT to parachute into an open field 8 kilometres north of the railway bridge, and then walk along the railroad tracks to the Erjemai bridge. After planting explosives to blow up the bridge, they will walk back to their controlled area before dawn. In the event of an enemy encounter, disperse your forces into small groups and withdraw to Allied lines.
At 21:30 on December 26, 1942, 32 paratroopers were ready to go. In addition to bringing the equipment necessary for normal combat, each person also brought a black survival kit with a saw blade, several fishing lines, a small compass and a pack of matches. After a pre-parachute routine, the three C-47s were launched at 22:30 and took off in bright moonlight without fighter escort. After an hour of flying, the plane had already flown to the village of Erjemai. But due to the fact that it was not possible to determine the airborne zone for a while, the plane flew several times around the village.
In the end, the leader thought that the airborne area had been discovered, and the paratroopers and equipment parachuted down and landed next to the tracks. Due to the fact that they could not see the ground clearly during a night skydive, many people experienced an impact when landing. Second Lieutenant Di Reo assembled his men half an hour after landing, but it took another hour to find parachute equipment. After locating the explosives, the pre-identified demolition crews quickly divided the explosives into small packets and carried them, and then the second lieutenant and his troops set off along the railroad tracks to the south. At the same time, Colonel Laver at Buffarick Airport was satisfied with the returning pilots that the troops had landed in the predetermined airborne zone — but in reality, no one knew that the transport plane had made a mistake and had landed 1.6 kilometers south of the railway bridge.
In the battle of the Airborne Forces, it has become almost a case of alcohol to seize any vehicle that can be used at any time. The U.S. Air Force has done this more than once in North Africa, and even played Garrison once......
The paratroopers were still tiptoeing south along the railway line, resting in an orchard after hours of walking with heavy equipment. At this point, Di Reo suspected that they had come to the vicinity of the bridge, so he sent two soldiers to the south, but half an hour later they reported that there was still no sign of the bridge ahead. Alerted to the fact that the transporter had dropped them too far north, he decided to continue south. At dawn, Di Reo ordered his troops to stop marching, and after observing the surrounding terrain, combined with the help of two French guides and maps, he finally realized that the force was now 32 kilometers south of the target, and they had been walking in the wrong direction all night!
Since it was already dawn, the possibility of the troops secretly carrying out their mission no longer existed, and the tired paratroopers could not go back another 32 kilometers anyway, and the enemy could appear at any time, Di Reo decided to use the explosives at hand to blow up a railway control station hundreds of meters away, and then use the remaining explosives to destroy as many railroad tracks as possible. As they planted the explosives and prepared to detonate them, the observation posts to the south and north reported that the Germans were approaching the area—and it was clear that the Arabs in the area had reported to the Germans after seeing them parachute. Di Reo summoned all the personnel, informed them of the situation, and ordered the rest of the people, except for the demolition crews, to retreat to the American line 144 kilometers to the west, in small groups, and the demolition crews to retreat in the same way after detonating the explosives.
A few minutes later, 160 kg of explosives were detonated, and the control station and more than 100 meters of railroad tracks were successfully destroyed. Di Reo formed a group of 6 people, including two French guides, and retreated westward. They rested in the bushes during the day and marched at night. The next day they heard cars passing on a nearby road, and considering that there was still a long way to go back to their own defenses, Di Reo decided to grab a car. After sparing a car, Di Reo took off his helmet, hid his pistol behind his back, and stopped an Italian truck. While the driver was frightened by the sudden appearance of the pistol, the other five people quickly climbed into the tarpaulin-covered truck body. After driving for several hours with a gun against the driver (passing a detachment of German troops on the road), the truck stalled due to engine damage. At this time, it was still 80 kilometers away from the US military line, and in order to prevent the driver from leaking secrets, they had to escort the driver with them.
In this way, they walked the trail at night, rested in the bushes during the day, and obtained food from the Arab villagers along the way, until finally came across a French outpost four days later and returned to the American line. The third airborne operation of the 509 battalion of the 2 regiment in North Africa was a real disaster: out of 32 people, only 8 returned. It was also the last airborne operation of American paratroopers in North Africa, and the battalion later participated in the defensive operation of the Kasseline Pass, and after the surrender of all German and Italian forces in North Africa in May 1943, it arrived by train to Oujda, French Morocco, and stationed in Camp Quunke—-- a hastily erected tent city.
The platoon-level operation of the US military was an airborne operation of the nature of attacking and disrupting behind enemy lines, and it was the most common form of airborne operation in World War II. However, the operation completely failed to achieve the original goal, and lost most of the participating troops. The reasons are as follows: 1. Compared with the German and British airborne forces of the same period, it is very common for inexperienced transport aircraft pilots and navigators to find the airborne zone accurately in real combat, especially under the conditions of night landing in unfamiliar places. The first British airborne operation of a similar nature, the Airborne Operation on Mount Voltuno, failed to complete its mission when an aircraft lost its course. In contrast to the Soviet Airborne Forces, which carried out the most and most successful such activities in World War II, Soviet paratroopers had the advantage of fighting in familiar territory or being picked up by partisans behind enemy lines, which is difficult for other countries to learn.
Compared with the later Allied airborne troops, at this time the US military has not yet realized the importance of arranging guides in advance in the parachute landing area before the airborne, and in addition, it was airborne in an unfamiliar place at night, and it should have parachuted to the north of the target, but it landed on the south of the target by mistake, and the troops failed to find out in time after landing, wasting a night's time, and losing the biggest advantage of the operation - concealment and suddenness, which was the most important reason for the failure of the operation, 2. The main force of the operatives was reinforcements who had never participated in the battle, and the rush to prepare (the troops were not notified until the day of the parachute) - this led to a fatal lack of intelligence gathering, and the unfamiliarity of the troops with the terrain and topography, which also had an impact on the failure of the mission and the almost total annihilation of the army.
Paratroopers in the set. Another element of a successful airborne operation is the rapid build-up after parachuting.
But even so, the paratroopers, having found themselves in the wrong direction and unable to carry out the original combat mission, were able to destroy the enemy's railway transport and sabotage the railway as much as possible in accordance with the spirit of the mission, and this tactical quality was very valuable for the Airborne Forces. Since airborne operations (especially large-scale airborne operations) are extremely prone to misplacement due to various reasons, this requires that officers and even soldiers at the grassroots level of paratrooper units must adapt themselves to the situation and be able to quickly determine their own combat objectives in accordance with the spirit of the mission and cause damage to the enemy as much as possible under the condition that it is no longer possible to accomplish the original combat mission.
Together with the previous two airborne operations, the US airborne forces were able to test the newly-born airborne troops in North Africa for the first time and gain valuable experience and lessons from them. In North Africa, the commander of the 82nd Division, Li Qiwei, communicated with Laffer and other officers of the 2nd Battalion of the 509th Regiment, and transferred some of the personnel of the battalion to supplement the 82nd Division (Major Arraurough was also among them, and was appointed as the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 504th Regiment of the 82nd Division), preparing to use their experience to serve the next airborne operations in Sicily.
【To be continued......】
The next issue will continue the early development history of the US Airborne Forces in World War II, and focus on not getting lost
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