In 1948, I served as the head of the liaison department of the political department of the 13th column of Huaye and the head of the democracy movement. In September, before the Battle of Jinan, I received a notice from my superiors asking me to go to Yidu, where the East China Military Region is located, to receive a new mission. Shu Tong, director of the Political Department of the East China Military Region, pointed out when assigning tasks to us: Huaye and Zhongye should cooperate in fighting a major campaign to annihilate the Liu Zhi clique centered on Xuzhou. In order to cooperate with this campaign, it was necessary to instigate the troops of the Kuomintang Third Appeasement Zone stationed in the northeast of Xuzhou to revolt at the beginning of the campaign. Your task, in your capacity as a representative of Commander Chen Yi, is to contact General He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia, deputy commanders of the Kuomintang Third Appeasement Zone, who have long been related to our party, to convey Commander Chen Yi's instructions, to learn about the situation of our party's work in the department over the years, to find out the attitude of the senior generals of the department, and to win over the uprising of one or most of the department. Shu Tong particularly stressed that Commander Chen Yi demanded that efforts be made to mobilize Feng Zhi'an, the commander of the appeasement zone, to revolt with the troops in order to expand political influence. After that, he asked me if I had any difficulties and gave me encouragement about the victory in the Battle of Laiwu.
After receiving the mission, I rushed to the front line headquarters of Huaye in Qufu. In Qufu, Chief of Staff Chen Shiqu briefed me on the enemy's posture and our army's troop deployment and operational intentions, and studied with me the question of how our army could coordinate with the uprising. Afterwards, I passed through Yanzhou and Jinan to the frontline office of the Luzhongnan Military Region, which was operating in Tengxian County, and accompanied by Sun Bingchao, deputy chief of the Enemy Engineering Section of the office, secretly entered Jiawang through the 111th Regiment of Zhang Zhaofu of the 37th Division of the 77th Army of the Third Appeasement Zone. For the sake of secrecy and convenience of activities, I appeared under the pseudonym Chen Huiguo, a major general of the ministry, and Sun Bingchao under the pseudonym Li Mengyun, in the name of my secretary.
I first met with General He Jifeng, who was in Jiawang at the time and was the deputy commander of the Third Appeasement Zone and the director of the forward command post. I emphatically conveyed to him Commander Chen Yi's assessment of the war situation, his determination to launch the Huaihai Campaign, and his operational policy, and hoped that he would hold high the patriotic banner and lead his troops to revolt and withdraw from the civil war. At that time, he clearly and firmly stated that he would do his best to win over the majority of the troops to revolt and cooperate with our army in the battle, so please rest assured that Commander Chen.
From then on, in my capacity as a Kuomintang major general and senior staff member, I was ostensibly preparing to meet the communist army, but in fact I was planning a plan to throw myself into our army. I was in and out of the forward command post with him. During the time he spent with He Jifeng, it can be said that he was open-minded and talked about everything, he insisted on listening to the Xinhua News Agency's radio every day, and talked about the battle situation the most. He was full of confidence, and repeatedly said that it was his long-cherished wish for many years to lead his troops to revolt and return to the arms of the people. He talked about his feelings about fighting hard against the Japanese invaders in the "77 Incident" at Lugou Bridge; he talked about the unforgettable scene of seeing Chairman Mao Zedong and receiving education in Yan'an; he talked about his experience of supporting Li Xiannian's troops in the Central Plains during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression; he talked about the humiliation of Chiang Kai-shek's transfer of him to Chongqing to be censored; he talked about how he and Zhang Kexia did not agree with Feng Zhi'an's dispatch of troops to attack the liberated areas, which led to the annihilation of a brigade of the 59th Army in Fei County, Shandong; and also talked about the Kuomintang Liu Zhi's "suppression of the general" Internal attempts at operations, the deployment of individual units, and the state of the officers and men of the troops at that time. He also believed that the majority of the 77 th Army was more sure, and that in particular, Guo Jiafang, commander of the 132nd Division, had contacts with our party in his early years, and he had a clear attitude and active action in organizing the uprising of the whole division, and was a reliable force for the uprising of the troops.
However, some officers still have doubts and need to work further in depth. The 59th Army was more difficult, and he discussed with Zhang Kexia that as long as the work was done in depth, there was still hope. These remarks have given me a more comprehensive and profound understanding of General He Jifeng and strengthened my confidence in organizing the uprising of this unit.
Soon after, I traveled from Jia Wang to Xuzhou to meet with General Zhang Kexia. God has been friends for a long time, they have met each other as before, and they have a good conversation. First of all, I conveyed to him the greetings of Commander Chen Yi and expressed his gratitude. At the same time, he told him that the leaders of Erye Huaye were preparing to launch the Huaihai Campaign to eliminate the Kuomintang defenders stationed in the Xuzhou area, and hoped that he would cooperate closely. At that time, he hesitated to launch the Huaihai Campaign and raised a number of questions. I gave a detailed account of the national war situation, the situation in which I took the initiative and Chiang was passive; our army had the experience of annihilating the enemy in the war of liberation, and in particular, the wise decision and correct operational policy of Chairman Mao Zedong in launching the Huaihai Campaign; despite some difficulties, it was still possible to win; and at the same time, I also expressed that it was understandable that I was worried about him. When I talked about the hope that he would cooperate closely with He Jifeng to lead the uprising, he said that he would persist and do his best to cooperate and actively do a good job in preparing the 59th Army for the uprising. I will definitely convey to my superiors and express my gratitude to his superiors for the strategic deployment and intentions he provided, as well as the deployment of the fortifications and troops of the city, as well as the reminders of the problems that our army needs to pay attention to in combat. When talking about Commander Chen Yi's hope that Feng Zhi'an would revolt together to expand his political influence, he believed that Feng Zhi'an had great concerns, and he said that he would do his best, but the difficulties would be greater.
During this period, I also met with the 132nd Division with division commander Guo Jiafang and deputy division commander Sun Mingquan to learn about the division's preparations for an uprising and to study how to solve all the difficulties that could be expected. They also went to the 111th Regiment of the 38th Division and talked to the regiment commander Zhang Zhaofu and the three battalion commanders respectively, and they all expressed their determination to lead their troops to revolt.
According to the attitude of Generals He and Zhang and some other officers, it was decided to prepare for the uprising on the basis of the 132nd Division and the 111th Regiment of the 37th Division of the 77th Army, and at the same time strive for the 59th Army to act together, and studied the most difficult preparatory plan. In order to ensure the smooth progress of the preparations for the uprising, a temporary party branch was set up according to the pre-departure plan, with me as the responsible person, and the members included Sun Bingchao, He Jifeng's adjutant and underground party member Li Liancheng, commander of the third battalion of the 111th Regiment and underground party member Wang Shijiang, commander of the machine gun company of the second battalion and underground party member Feng Zhizhong.
First of all, it is necessary to find out the attitude of the principal officers and do their work in a targeted manner according to the actual situation. According to our thorough analysis, we believe that the thinking of the senior officers of the Third Pacification Zone at that time can be roughly divided into four types. The first type is the progressive elements represented by He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia, who are politically inclined to us and hold a certain amount of real power, and are our strength to rely on. The second is dissatisfied with the dictatorial civil war policy of the Chiang clique, and at the same time, seeing that the general trend has passed, they want to find another way out of personal and group interests, but they are full of misgivings about the policies of our party and our army. The focus of our work is really on this group of people. Usually He Jifeng talks to him separately first, and then I come forward. The main content of the conversation was to analyze the situation and make them understand the injustice of the anti-people civil war launched by the Chiang Kai-shek clique and that it was doomed to failure; the people's liberation war was about to be won throughout the country, and only by joining the ranks of the people could they have a bright future. At the same time, in view of their concerns, we focused on publicizing the policies of our party and our army toward the insurrectionary troops, and ensured that after the uprising, they would be reorganized into our army and included in the official sequence, and that the officers would retain their original posts, so as to dispel their worries and strengthen their confidence. Of course, for staunch progressives, there is also the question of clarifying policies, reassuring scruples, and strengthening confidence. The third is that although they are dissatisfied with the rejection of the Chiang clique, they still have great illusions about the Chiang clique and are particularly obsessed with the old way of life, such as Feng Zhi'an, Wang Changhai, commander of the 77th Army, and Liu Zhensan, commander of the 59th Army. It was difficult to mobilize them to revolt, but we managed to do everything we could. Fourth, the diehards represented by Deputy Commander Li Wentian and Chief of Staff Chen Jiyan, mainly spies and political workers, are the main obstacles and dangers to the uprising, and we have taken necessary precautions against them.
The second is the resettlement of family members. As mentioned earlier, in October of that year, Chiang Kai-shek had ordered all the families of the officers of the ministry to be relocated to Jiangnan as hostages. Fear of persecution of their families and lack of food and clothing after the uprising was a common concern among officers. The resettlement of family members has become one of the key issues that contributed to the uprising. Since I didn't have any money with me when I went, I first took out the 3,000 taels of gold he had saved from He Jifeng as our loan, and sent a special person to Jiangnan to settle the family of the chief official. After the uprising, Hua Ye repaid the money he had advanced, relieving them of their worries. The families of He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia were both in Beiping at the time, and Huaye later telegraphed to the Central Committee, and the Central Committee ordered the Beiping underground party to take them out safely and escort them to the liberated areas.
Thirdly, it is important to ensure that communications are open and confidential during operations. The Kuomintang has always been wary of miscellaneous units, and the communications departments of these units are all sent by the Kuomintang military communications department and are tasked with monitoring and controlling the troops. The uprising could not succeed without effective control of the communications sector. For this reason, we made special efforts to do the work of Fan Yunmen, the communications director of the ministry, and took coercive measures, after which Fan performed well in the uprising and played an important role.
In Jiawang or so, I found out the attitude of the principal officers of the Third Pacification Zone and did preliminary propaganda and organizational work. Based on my investigation and preliminary work, and after analyzing the current situation, I believe that the intention of the Huaye leadership to win over one or most of this army's uprising can be realized. At the end of October, I returned to Qufu and reported to Commander Su Yudai and Chief of Staff Chen Shiqu. Chief of Staff Chen Shiqu clearly instructed that the Huaihai Campaign would be launched on 8 November, and that the 7th, 10th, and 13th Columns would cross the canal from Sansui District to the south to separate Xuzhou from Huang Botao's corps. He and Zhang were asked to revolt at the time of the campaign as planned, to get out of the canal defense line, and to strive to control the bridges over the canal in order to ensure the smooth crossing of the river by our army. At the same time, they also studied the means of contact, the identification signs at night, the route of marching, and the locations of several of our cadres, and decided that the contact password of the insurrectionary troops should be "Yang Side troops," and that they should wear cotton clothes at night and turn off their flashlights three times; after the uprising, they drove to the liberated areas by two routes, one from Hanzhuang to Lanling, and the other from Taierzhuang to Lanling; during the uprising, I assisted He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia in the command post in coordinating the command, Sun Bingchao assisted Guo Jiafang, and Li Liancheng was in the 111th regiment. Su Yu and Chen Shiqu have repeatedly stressed that they must reiterate to the officers and men of the uprising that they will carry out their policies and will never break their promises.
At the beginning of November, Sun Bingchao and I entered Jiawang again through the third battalion of the --- Regiment in Hanzhuang. During my short stay in the 3rd Battalion, I told Wang Shijiang, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, that our army's action was imminent, and I asked him to make preparations in advance. Wang Shijiang's old mother was in Xuzhou at the time, and he had expressed the hope that the underground party organization would take the old man to the liberated area before the uprising. However, due to time constraints, it was no longer possible. When Wang Shijiang learned of this situation, he took a very firm attitude and said that he would obey the party's decision and resolutely revolt on time. After I arrived in Jiawang, I immediately conveyed the instructions of the head of Huaye to He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia, but did not disclose the specific time of the campaign, only hinted that he should prepare quickly. After that, they and I were in our predetermined positions, and the organization of the uprising entered its final stage.
The process of organizing the uprising was not smooth sailing, and it was full of struggle from beginning to end. As the time for the campaign drew closer, so did the struggle. In late October, the various units of our army in East China began to move southward, and the situation on the periphery of Xuzhou became increasingly tense. The demand for middle- and lower-ranking officers in the Sansui District to find another way out is becoming increasingly intense. He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia both hope to act as soon as possible. Liu Zhensan, the commander of the 59th Army, felt that the situation was not good, and persuaded Feng Zhi'an to pull the troops away, but after Feng refused, he left the team in a fit of anger and went to Shanghai. Feng Zhi'an, Wang Changhai, commander of the 77th Army, and others still wanted to resist stubbornly, and in late October they began to adjust their deployments, strengthening the firearms and troops on the front line of the canal, and preparing to hold on to the river. At the end of October, Feng Zhi'an hurriedly returned to Xu from Nanjing, and successively talked to Cui Zhenlun, commander of the 1st and 8th Division, and Guo Jiafang, commander of the 132nd Division, and acquiesced in Cui and Guo to take over the commanders of the two armies in the future. Previously, Cui Zhenlun and Yang Gansan, commander of the 38th Division, had expressed their agreement to Meng Shaolian, deputy commander of the 59th Army, to the uprising, but at this time, Cui was shaken again, which affected Yang Gansan's attitude. After Meng Shaolian's repeated persuasion, Cui and Yang still hesitated. In fact, this repetition is also very natural. It must be pointed out that although the officers and men of this unit were the old units of the Northwest Army, and they were influenced by our party in history and resented the rejection and discrimination of the Chiang clique, after all, it was an old army, and it was impossible for them to make up their minds to break away from the reactionary camp and stand on the side of the people without going through struggle. In fact, the timely capture of the Wannian Gate on the north bank of the canal by our army played a great role in promoting the uprising of the department.
By November 6, I officially informed He and Zhang of the date of the uprising. At this time, the attitude of the 59th Army was still unclear. I made an urgent agreement with He Jifeng and others to send Sun Bingchao back to the unit (10th column) to report again, and to take decisive action when our troops moved, if the forward troops in Sansui District had not yet revolted. At the same time, our army is requested to exert pressure on the 59th Army in order to cooperate with the internal struggle work and urge it to revolt.
Previously, on November 4, the Huaye Command issued an order for a campaign offensive. The troops were rushing to the departure area day and night. On the 5th, the 10th Column on the right wing of the Northern Front had crossed Tengxian and Guanqiao and was advancing rapidly towards Hanzhuang. On the night of the 6th, the commander of the 10th Column Song Shilun and the political commissar Liu Peishan strayed into the enemy's front line because they looked at the terrain, but fortunately they were in the defense area of the 1st Regiment and 3rd Battalion, and the battalion commander Wang Shijiang immediately reported to Song Shilun and Liu Peishan about their underground party members, and then was ordered to revolt in advance. At the same time, the seven verticals and thirteen verticals respectively entered the Wannian Gate and Taierzhuang. By the 7th, the first-line defender company in Sansui District reported that our army was moving abnormally, especially after discovering that our army was preparing sailboats, it was determined that our army would start to cross the river and fight. The atmosphere in the Jiawang command post in Sansui District suddenly became tense, and the military headquarters of the 59th Army was also panicked. On the night of the 7th, our 7th Column began to cross the river and fight. At about 2 o'clock in the morning of the 8th, our 21st Division captured the northern position of Wannian Zhaqiao. A battalion of the 539th Regiment of the 108th Division of the 59th Army was partially annihilated, and the rest was withdrawn to the south bank, and our 21st Division completely controlled the two bridges in the north and south of the Wannian Gate. To the west of the Wannian Gate, our 19th Division has also successfully crossed the river, and several bridges have been erected between the Wannian Gate and Hanzhuang, and the large army is crossing the river in a steady stream. To the east of the Wannian Gate, my thirteen columns have surrounded Taierzhuang and approached the bridgehead. The 38th Division of the enemy's 59th Army was in a state of emergency, and the entire canal was shaken. After the Wannian Gate was lost, Feng Zhi'an severely reprimanded him and recaptured it within a time limit, otherwise he would be "engaged in military law" against Liu Jingyue, chief of staff of the 59th Army, and Yang and Cui. At this point, the officers of the 59th Army, who had been shaken, had panicked under our military pressure and Feng's strict orders. From the night of the 7th to the early morning of the 8th, after Meng Shaolian worked again, the chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, commanders of the two divisions, and the directors of the 59th Army were all determined to revolt. So He Jifeng came to the military headquarters of the 59th Army and spoke to the officers present at that time. Starting from the history of the ministry's anti-Japanese war at Xifengkou and Lugouqiao, he recounted how the ministry fought bravely and made heavy sacrifices, and how it was rejected and discriminated against by Chiang's lineage, and how the troops became smaller and smaller, and the supply became worse and worse. At the same time, the contact with our army was clearly proposed, and the withdrawal from the civil war was announced. The officers and men present were very excited and expressed their willingness to revolt. However, because the relationship with the 59 th Army is not deep, the officers and men are still apprehensive about working with He, and some people ask He what way to get in touch with the PLA? He replied: I have a way. At this time, according to the original plan, He asked Adjutant Guan Xianchang, the chief of the division, to take me to the military headquarters of the 59th Army. When I arrived, He introduced to them: This is Mr. Yang Side, a representative of the Communist Party of China. These people were meeting the representatives of the Communist Party for the first time, and they were facing a fateful juncture, so they were serious and slightly cramped when they met. I shook hands with them one by one, and when they were comforted and calmed down, I first gave an account of the war situation in the whole country at that time, and gave a detailed account of the policy of our Party and our army towards the officers and men of the uprising. They clearly welcomed their determination to revolt, and in order to ensure that the troops would be incorporated into the official sequence of the Chinese People's Liberation Army after the uprising, the military palaces at all levels would not move their original posts and would never break their promises, and so on. At the same time, it was announced that Zhang Kexia was about to come to the front line and walk with the 59th Army, and only then did they completely stabilize. The officers present at that time came to shake hands with me, and the atmosphere was very harmonious and warm. He then signed the order for the troops to march to the liberated areas, which was countersigned by Meng, Cui, Yang, and others, and in Yang's absence at that time, Gu Xiangzhen, deputy chief of staff, asked for his consent by telephone.
The 59th Army abandoned the darkness and turned to the light, resolutely turned the matter right, and the solution of the problem was surprisingly smooth and exciting. He Jifeng immediately called Guo Jiafang and told him to act as planned. I called Zhang Kexia and asked him to leave Xu Laijiawang as soon as possible, and to make a final effort to get Feng Zhi'an back. At that time, Zhang was in a meeting at the Feng Public Security Department, and it was inconvenient to speak. Afterwards, Zhang said that before the uprising, he had advised Feng several times to make a big plan and find another way out, but Feng could not abandon his illusions about Jiang and his old way of life, and he was always determined. By the early morning of the 8th, Zhang Kexia ventured out of Xu by car and arrived at Jiawang via the 132nd Division.
After calling Zhang Kexia, He Jifeng and I decided that everything would go according to plan. After Zhang arrived, the operation officially began at 2 p.m. Zhang Xian led the 59th Army to the north from the East Road, and the troops of the 77th Army to the West Road. At that time, it was urgent to report the situation to our army in order to obtain cooperation. Since Comrade Sun Bingchao had already returned to the unit, I took a telephone and two telephone soldiers to the Wannian Gate in He's jeep to connect with our side, and soon connected with Commander Chengjun of the Seventh Column. Cheng Jun quickly replied that Commander Chen Yi instructed that he should still try his best to win Feng Zhi'an to act together in order to expand his political influence. Later, Cheng Jun sent a battalion of instructors, and I led them to contact the 59th Army.
In accordance with Commander Chen Yi's instructions, we made our last efforts to win Feng Zhi's order, and He Jifeng personally called Feng to ask Feng to come to Jia Wang to command the troops, and sent a car to pick him up, but Feng finally did not come. At the beginning of the operation, He sent a car to send Feng's things to Xuzhou, and did his best to be benevolent to Feng. Afterwards, Feng went to Liu Zhi and Chiang Kai-shek to plead guilty, wept bitterly, and asked for punishment. In order to make the remnants of Sansui continue to work hard, Jiang immediately gave Feng Yuan the number of the two armies and asked him to form another army. It was not until after Huang Botao's corps was annihilated that Jiang became angry with Feng and revoked the two military numbers of Feng's department.
On the morning of the 8th, Zhang Kexia came to Jiawang and immediately went to the military headquarters of the 59th Army to give a speech, and then immediately led the military headquarters of the 59th Army to move according to the predetermined route. Jia Wang's command immediately began to act. Everywhere at the command post indicated that they would be willing to act as they pleased. Fan Yunmen, the communications director who had been won over by me, led people to subdue the communications personnel sent by the communications department of Jiang Yan's department as planned, took control of the radio station, controlled communications, and cut off the external contacts of various ministries. Originally, it was worrying that there were more than 2,000 people in the cadre training group led by Liu Zizhen, the chief of education, but when the situation took a sharp turn for the worse, Liu's attitude also changed, and he finally led his troops to act together.
At two o'clock in the afternoon, He Jifeng spoke to the officers and men of the Jiawang command post and the cadre training regiment, and then immediately set off and marched east along the route of the 59th Army. Prior to this, the 38th Division had already made contact with our 13th Column, and the --- regiments of the 132nd Division and the 37th Division had also moved as planned to get in touch with our 10th Column. By the night of the 9th and the early morning of the 10th, the rebel forces had all crossed the canal and made contact with each other. At this point, more than 23,000 officers and men from a command post, a military headquarters, and three and a half divisions in the Kuomintang Third Appeasement Zone were liberated from the Kuomintang barracks, joined the ranks of the people, and began a new journey.
The uprising led by He and Zhang played a major role in our victory in the Huaihai Campaign. Comrade Su Yu once said: "If my troops go south are delayed in Jiawang for four hours, Huang Botao may retreat to Xuzhou, and the battle situation will be different." "Due to the uprising of the unit, the defense line of the canal from Weishan Lake in Taierzhuang was opened for me, so that the three columns of Huaye quickly crossed the canal, and forced the enemy's Xuzhou to "suppress the general" and urgently transfer the Li Mi Corps, which was covering the westward retreat of the Yellow Corps, to return to Xuzhou, thus giving way to the defense line of the Bulao River, so that our army could cross the Bulao River without the threat of invincible firepower, completely cut off the connection between the Huang and Li Corps on the 9th and 10th, and threatened Xuzhou. At the same time, our eastern front pursued the troops of Huang Botao's corps, completed the encirclement of the enemy, and successfully realized the first phase of the Central Military Commission's and Huaye's operational attempts, which played a key role in achieving the victory of annihilating Huang Botao's corps in the first phase of the Huaihai Campaign. Secondly, this unit revolted when the campaign was launched, which disrupted the deployment of the Kuomintang's "Battle of Xu Beng", which greatly shook the minds of Chiang's officers and men, and directly caused their thinking to waver. Du Yuming once said that he heard the news before he went to Xuzhou from Beiping to take over the command post, and that he "went to the battlefield with the mood of going to the execution ground." At the same time, since this force was the last remaining major force of the Northwest Army, his uprising showed that the Kuomintang camp had reached the point of disintegration and rebellion.
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory of the Huaihai Campaign, I wrote a limerick poem praising the righteous deeds and feats of Zhang Kexia and He Jifeng's uprising.
[Yang Side (November 17, 1921-September 7, 2018), a native of Tengxian County (now Tengzhou City), Shandong Province, joined the Chinese National Anti-Japanese Vanguard in March 1937, enlisted in the army in March 1938, and joined the Communist Party of China in September of the same year, with the rank of major general. Former Director of the Liaison Department of the General Political Department and Director of the Office of the Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs of the CPC Central Committee. 】