The Taiwan independence forces are always plotting something unseemly on the island, such as secretly deploying long-range cruise missiles and trying to attack the mainland with long-range cruise missiles.
However, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense clearly pointed out that every move of the Taiwan military is under the control of the PLA, and the PLA is very aware of the deployment and operation of the Taiwan military.
According to outside analysts, this shows that the PLA has achieved 24-hour surveillance of Taiwan and unilateral transparency of its intelligence on Taiwan.
So, how did the PLA achieve 24-hour surveillance of the island? As a matter of fact, we have a lot of methods on the issue of reconnoitring and monitoring the island.
1
Our army can monitor Taiwan 24 hours a day
The first is our means of 24-hour surveillance of Taiwan. In fact, it is not easy to really achieve 24-hour continuity, personnel rest, equipment continuous working hours and working windows and other factors, will affect the continuity of monitoring.
For example, in aerial reconnaissance, if you want to achieve 24-hour uninterrupted reconnaissance, you need multiple reconnaissance planes to take turns to take off, and even so, it will cause serious losses to the state of the fleet and personnel, and it is difficult to sustain it.
Judging from the public information, there are three main ways for us to conduct long-term surveillance on Taiwan Island: coastal radar stations, coastal electronic reconnaissance equipment, and hydrolistening arrays in relevant sea areas.
First of all, let's talk about the coastal radar station, which is the one with the most public information, and some friends may have seen the air and sea surveillance radar we have deployed along the southeast coast.
The role of these radars is actually very simple, that is, as part of our territorial air defense system, to monitor air targets in the airspace of Taiwan Island and sea targets in the waters of Taiwan Island.
From a military point of view, on the one hand, these radars can provide early warning information for our air defense system and protect the security of our national territory and airspace, and on the other hand, they can collect information on the activities of Taiwan's military aircraft and warships, and analyze Taiwan's military information.
For example, we can collect the number of sorties taken off and landed by Taiwan's fighter planes every day, and analyze and judge the combat readiness, proper rate, and reaction speed of Taiwan's fighter units through their take-off and landing sorties.
This information will come in handy in the future when formulating air defense suppression tasks against Taiwan's fighter planes.
There is little public information on electronic reconnaissance equipment along the coast, but the more famous one is the electronic reconnaissance equipment that we used at a certain base on the southeast coast to deal with the Leshan radar on Taiwan Island.
The equipment of this base can not only collect information on the electromagnetic signals of the Leshan radar, but also have the corresponding electronic jamming equipment to jam the Leshan radar and sabotage the attempt of this US-made radar to collect information on the air situation in our interior.
As for the underwater water listening array, there is very little public information, and no information such as location and quantity is known.
We only know that according to the information of public papers, we have deployed water listening arrays in the surrounding waters, and these sonar arrays deployed on the seabed can monitor the activities of ships on and below the water in the relevant sea areas through the noise emitted by the navigation of ships.
2
Our army's reconnaissance means are diverse
Compared with the 24-hour uninterrupted surveillance, which is more difficult, it is simpler to carry out long-term and multi-frequency reconnaissance operations on Taiwan Island, and we have many more reconnaissance methods.
We use space reconnaissance as an example: There are satellites in our space that operate in ordinary orbits and pass over Taiwan Island once in a few days to conduct reconnaissance, and there are also satellites deployed in specific orbits that can reconnoiter Taiwan once in a few hours.
Our satellites can conduct optical reconnaissance of Taiwan Island, that is, take pictures, infrared reconnaissance, and use radar for imaging, and even electronic reconnaissance satellites deployed in orbit that can collect electromagnetic signals from Taiwan Island.
There are even more means of aerial reconnaissance, from our large electronic reconnaissance aircraft to small reconnaissance UAVs, from fighters to AWACS aircraft, from high-altitude and high-speed UAVs to strategic bombers.
As long as our military planes are operating around Taiwan Island, they have the ability to collect intelligence information on Taiwan Island.
More professional, such as electronic reconnaissance aircraft, high-altitude and high-speed unmanned aerial vehicles, can carry out strategic-level reconnaissance on the entire island of Taiwan, foreign media reported that our army's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has crossed the sky over Taiwan Island, but it has not been substantiated.
Our fighters and early warning planes can collect information on the combat readiness of Taiwan's fighters and the training level of Taiwan's pilots during high-frequency cruises around Taiwan.
If it is equipped with a reconnaissance pod or an electric warfare pod, it can also collect intelligence during the cruise.
The same is true for the Navy's warships, whose destroyers and frigates can observe the state of Taiwan's warships at close range and analyze information on Taiwan's warships while cruising around Taiwan.
Our navy also has specialized reconnaissance ships, such as the Type 815A electronic reconnaissance ship, which can collect, summarize, and analyze all kinds of electromagnetic signals of the Taiwan military around the island, and analyze the information of the Taiwan military's communications network.
The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped by our army can go to Taiwan Island and surrounding islands, as well as some islands such as Kinmen Island, to conduct reconnaissance and collect intelligence, especially topographic intelligence information, which is crucial for landing operations.
3
Our army has unilateral intelligence transparency
From the above analysis, we can find that our PLA has built a fairly complete sea-to-air surveillance system and intelligence reconnaissance system, and most of the activities of the Taiwan military cannot escape our surveillance.
Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that the dynamics of the Taiwan military are fully grasped.
When the Taiwan military fighter planes are lifted into the air, we can track and lock them down throughout the whole process, and the Taiwan military will build a new position, and the satellite photos may be placed on the desks of our analysts in a few hours.
As soon as the Taiwan warship leaves the port, it may be "caught" by a warship in our vicinity. As for the situation of the previous military exercises of the Taiwan military, the information we have may be more comprehensive than that of the top level of the Taiwan military.
Such an astonishing intelligence gap determines that our military has a unilateral and transparent information advantage in the face of the Taiwan military.
It can be said that it is clear where our missiles are going to hit, where our troops are going to land, and where our warships are going to intercept the fleeing Taiwan independence elements.
Such an intelligence superiority can further expand the PLA's overall superiority on the battlefield, eliminate the remnants of Taiwan independence forces more quickly and accurately, realize national reunification as quickly as possible, and reduce collateral damage to the island.