The answer is not straightforward, but it tells us about the Taliban's law enforcement capabilities and raises questions about the future of the opium poppy ban.
Opium fields prepared for harvest in Balabaluk, Afghanistan, April 2009. (Photo by ResoluteSupportMedia/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by U.S. Navy First Officer Monica Brown. Photo by R. Nelson,
Article source: Lawfare
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There is no doubt that the Taliban have drastically reduced their opium poppy cultivation in the 2022-2023 poppy planting season, which is roughly the same as the reduction in production when they came to power in 2000-2001. This year's opium poppy harvest is orders of magnitude lower than last year's and much less than in any year except 2001 since the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) began its estimates in 1994. But the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Alcis, a geographic information service that has been actively working on Afghanistan's opium industry for many years, have given very different figures as to how much opium cultivation will remain this year after the Taliban imposed an effective ban.
This data gap needs to be addressed, as there is a significant discrepancy between the almost universal extinction of opium poppy and the concentration of its cultivation in certain areas. The answer to this question also sheds light on how the Taliban are in power – how they govern and enforce core policies, what the outlook holds for the coming year as the opium ban continues, and the economic and potential political impact that the opium ban could have on the Taliban.
Despite early skepticism about the seriousness of the enforcement of the opium ban announced by the Taliban's top leaders in April 2022 (given the Taliban's limited action on the 2022 opium harvest, which was harvested around the time the ban was announced), there is now no doubt that opium poppy cultivation has been significantly reduced to a fraction of the 2022 harvest. Farmers in Afghanistan's main opium-producing areas, particularly in Helmand province, where cultivation has been reduced by more than 99 per cent, have responded to the ban and Taliban law enforcement efforts by eliminating opium poppy cultivation. In areas where there was civil resistance, some fields were also uprooted, but only a small part of the total area under opium cultivation had been reduced.
But two publicly available estimates of the remaining opium harvest in 2023 are quite different. The Afghanistan Opium Survey, recently released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, estimates that the total area under opium poppy cultivation has decreased by 95 per cent in the country, while analysis of satellite imagery from Alcis shows an 86 per cent reduction in cultivation.
If the absolute value of the change is not significant, then a difference of about 10 percentage points between the estimated changes in opium poppy cultivation is not a big problem, as it could result in a difference of 15 to 30 per cent in the estimated total area planted for a given year. Past estimates of opium poppy cultivation have been contradictory and often vary so much, and in fact the range of error set by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in estimating the area under cultivation is often within that range. These differences have a limited impact on understanding the situation and policies of the opium industry.
As a result of the significant reduction in the area under cultivation in 2023, pure arithmetic translates into a three-to-one difference in the estimate of the 2023 opium poppy harvest – 10,800 hectares for UNODC and 31,088 hectares for Alcis. The large discrepancies in estimates of the remaining opium acreage have seriously affected our understanding of how and how the ban was enforced, although neither estimate undermines the overall effect of the ban. When the ban was initially announced in March 2022, few observers would have predicted a reduction of more than 80% in opium cultivation in 2023.
Of the more than 20,000 hectares estimated nationally, Badakhshan province accounts for more than two-thirds. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that the cultivated area in Badakhshan province is only 1,600 hectares, a decrease of 63% compared to the 2022 estimate, while the figure in Alches province is 15,388 hectares, an increase of 12% compared to 2022. There are also large differences, albeit smaller, in the figures for other provinces.
What's the bottom line?
To assess which of these two figures better reflects the actual situation on the ground, it is crucial to understand the different methodologies used in estimating the area under opium poppy cultivation in 2023. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has used its long-standing methodology, which relies on samples from the major opium-producing provinces while targeting key areas in other provinces. In contrast, Alcis analysed images of all active agricultural areas in the provinces, first completing satellite imagery analysis of the main early harvest provinces, then all the major opium-producing provinces, and more recently all provinces.
The UNODC approach of sampling the major opium-producing provinces and targeting key areas in other regions makes some sense in the early years when satellite imagery was relatively scarce and very expensive. But with a significant increase in the number of satellite imagery, including a five-fold increase in the number of Earth observation satellites between 2008 and 2021, and further increases thereafter, and a multifold decrease in the cost of satellite imagery, there is no need to work with limited samples. (The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) conducted a sample survey of 17% of arable land in half of Afghanistan's provinces in 2023). Satellite image analysis of all agricultural land is not only possible, but also cost-effective, and poppy fields can be surveyed several times during planting, cultivation and harvesting. The distinctive characteristics of the poppy fields and the tools developed by Alcis over the years facilitate the full coverage approach.
In the face of major policy changes, such as the Taliban ban, which has a huge impact on opium-growing areas, comprehensive coverage is even more important. In the context of a more stable policy environment and little change in opium poppy cultivation area, the difference between the two approaches has less impact. For example, there is little difference in the total area of opium poppy estimated in 2022: Alcis estimates the total area of opium poppy at 219,744 hectares based on its full coverage methodology, while the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates the total area of opium poppy at 233,000 hectares, a difference of only 6 per cent. This is fully in line with the 95 per cent confidence interval set by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for its national estimates. However, the dramatic changes brought about by the Taliban's opium ban mean that the sampling method has become misleading in the face of the concentration of remaining opium poppy cultivation in a few remote areas in the main opium-producing provinces. Sampling of remote areas with large surplus opium poppy cultivation, such as Nangarhar, Kandahar and Uruzgan, is therefore crucial, not to mention Badakhshan, where opium poppy cultivation has expanded.
Resistance to the opium ban in southern Nangarhar province and reports from the ground that the ban has been poorly enforced in Badakhshan province have reinforced the results of the Alcis satellite imagery survey of these areas and other poppy residue cultivation areas. It is therefore impossible to avoid the conclusion that the opium poppy cultivation in the 2023 harvest season is large - closer to 31,000 hectares than 11,000 hectares.
This is important because it provides an accurate baseline for assessing the 2024 opium harvest. If opium poppy cultivation ends up next year at around 30,000 hectares, or even a little more, it will be a huge achievement from the point of view of the continued enforcement of the opium ban – even more unprecedented than the Taliban's effective bans in 2000-2001 and 2022-2023. Past experience in Afghanistan has shown that after the first year, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain a national or provincial opium ban, as poverty in parts of the rural population worsens, coping mechanisms are exhausted and more resistance is created. But if the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates for next year were more accurate, for example showing about 30,000 hectares under cultivation, the 11,000 hectares would be highly misleading, falsely suggesting a significant expansion in opium poppy cultivation.
What does the impressive remaining poppy harvest in 2023 mean?
The higher estimate of opium poppy cultivation in 2023 after the Taliban ban is 31,000 hectares, but this does not affect the overall effectiveness of the ban or its demonstration of the Taliban's ability to enforce the ban that its leadership considers a core priority. No other Afghan Government, nor any other country, has been able to virtually eliminate the cultivation of major drug crops so effectively in one year. However, the large remaining harvest does help explain how the ban was implemented, what obstacles and resistance were encountered, and the strength and influence of the Taliban throughout the country.
As David Mansfield powerfully argues, after the Taliban announced the opium ban in April 2022, the Taliban ramped up enforcement of the ban over time, and under pressure and threats, most farmers decided not to grow opium poppy again during the 2022 fall planting season. The threat of eradication, self-eradication and modest government eradication actions have further reduced the area under cultivation in some areas, but eradication has accounted for only a small part of the reduction in opium poppy cultivation.
According to Alcis, the main exceptions to the large levels of opium poppy cultivation are in the entire province of Badakhshan (15,388 hectares in 2023) and in remote areas in Kandahar provinces (5,685 hectares), Daikundi provinces (2,165 hectares), Uruzgan provinces (1,878 hectares) and Baghlan provinces (1,474 hectares), which together account for 86% of the total area remaining under opium poppy cultivation.
These provinces have larger opium poppy cultivation and smaller opium poppy cultivation in other provinces, but the harvest is still impressive, and the provinces vary in ethnicity, geographical location and ties to the core leadership of the Kandahar Taliban. However, with the exception of Badakhshan province, the remaining opium harvesting areas tend to be located in more remote areas (Daikundi province is located in a very remote province). Another common feature is that these areas (and other areas with large opium poppy residue cultivation) are characterized by low land tenure, high human-land ratios, limited or non-existent opium stocks, increased poverty, climatic factors and water scarcity that limit alternative agricultural options, and few opportunities for non-farm economic activities. It is therefore not surprising that resistance to the ban is greater in these regions, despite differences in enforcement, such as those between more remote areas of Badakhshan and Nangarhar provinces, as Mansfield has documented.
However, some inter-provincial differences cannot be explained simply by these factors, and they may reflect more specific aspects, such as the heads of specific provinces and government leadership teams, as well as their broader networks and relationships. For example, in Herat and the north-western provinces (Badghis, Faryab, Juzjan, including Balkh province in the north), the implementation of the opium ban was much more thorough than in the Taliban heartland, Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan provinces. In contrast, the neighboring province of Helmand has been the country's largest opium-producing province, but opium poppy cultivation in the province has been virtually extinct. The area under opium poppy cultivation in Ghazni province has decreased even more than in Kapisa province.
Impact on the future
The Taliban's opium poppy ban reflects the focus of the Taliban's core policies and demonstrates its firm grip on power and enforcement. However, from an economic point of view, this move is a major mistake. The ban has resulted in more than $1 billion in lost rural income and livelihoods in an already fragile economy, and the impact has been devastating for poor families who do not have adequate land, opium reserves, or other sources of non-agricultural income. As the average farmer's opium reserves, other household assets, and coping strategies are depleted, these negative consequences will continue to manifest and may even worsen. In the current autumn planting season, strict enforcement of the ban will exacerbate this mistake and cause more Afghans to live below the poverty line. At the same time, other factors are hitting the Afghan economy, such as the sharp drop in humanitarian aid this year and the forced return of large numbers of Afghans from Pakistan, with more than 400,000 reportedly returning.
On the political front, despite some non-compliance with the ban in Badakhshan province and resistance in remote areas of other provinces, any negative political impact of the ban in its first year appears to be under control. However, if the ban is forcefully enforced for the second year in a row, the situation may be different. Nevertheless, the Taliban regime appears to be determined to continue the opium poppy ban and to take more resolute measures to combat the opium trade and processing. The promulgation of the new anti-drug law on 1 October and its propaganda, as well as the appointment of a Taliban from Kandahar as governor of Badakhshan province in September, are early signs. The recent sharp rise in opium prices is a strong indication that the market is reacting to the continued implementation of the opium ban.
While field visits, news reports and Taliban announcements can provide some clues about the implementation of the opium ban, satellite imagery will not be able to accurately understand how much opium poppy is growing in the main early-harvesting provinces in the coming months. Helmand province, as well as other southern and south-western provinces, will provide an earlier picture of actual planting, as well as whether the ban is fully implemented or is being weakened. Historically, large-scale eradication of opium poppy fields in Helmand province or elsewhere has usually occurred early in the planting season, rather than closer to the harvest, when the resistance is more intense.
The situation in the coming year seems to have three broad prospects.
The first scenario is to continue to "succeed". In this case, the ban was effectively enforced the following year, and opium poppy cultivation did not increase at any or little compared to the 2023 harvest of 31,000 hectares; This situation may encounter increasing resistance, very costly for the Afghan people and economy, and potentially politically damaging to the Taliban, but they are able to bear the costs and effectively enforce the national ban the following year completely and unprecedentedly. In this context, the crackdown on opium processing and trade is also likely to intensify, which is already beginning to emerge. But even if this vision is realized, the problems, resistance and pressure faced by the Taliban will further intensify in the third year. This was the case with the provincial ban on opium poppy cultivation imposed by the Islamic Republic in Nangarhar province in the 2000s, which lasted for several years but then became increasingly fragile and the Government paid a serious political price until the opium poppy harvest returned to a high level.
The second scenario is a complete failure. In this context, despite the Taliban's efforts to enforce the law, the resistance is snowballing, opium poppy cultivation will eventually be several times that of 2023 (although it is unlikely to return to normal levels of more than 200,000 hectares immediately), efforts to combat drug trade and processing may have only limited success, and the Taliban's limited ability to control the drug field has become very evident among the population. While the situation is more favourable to opium growers and others concerned economically, they will face considerable uncertainty, such as whether their opium fields will be eradicated. The political repercussions of such a complete failure will be unknown and unpredictable, but it could be serious and could weaken the Taliban in ways that other Taliban policies, such as restrictions on women's education and women's work, and international pressure and sanctions, have not.
The third scenario is some kind of de facto relaxation, which may be more beneficial in the short term to the economic interests of the Afghans and the political interests of the Taliban. In this context, while the ban has not been formally lifted, enforcement has weakened, with opium poppy cultivation increasing in areas where the ban remains entrenched in 2023 and at least a slight recovery in some core areas where opium poppy has been eradicated. Such a scenario would partially reverse the economic damage caused by the ban and limit the political damage inflicted on the Taliban. However, this is not a sustainable balance, and even if the opium poppy harvest in 2024 is much smaller than in the years before 2023, it will inevitably gradually increase over time and return to normal again within a few years.
As Mansfield and others have pointed out, there are no good options, and the overall extent of external influence on Taliban policy should not be exaggerated, especially in what it considers to be core policy areas, such as drugs. However, it is likely to be an important area for the future of the Taliban and Afghanistan. Here are some of the recommendations from this think tank:
Follow the situation closely to ensure that opium poppy cultivation, cultivation and eventual harvesting throughout the country are accompanied by timely analysis of full-coverage satellite imagery, complemented by selective field surveys and a review of Taliban announcements and public actions.
Ensure that multiple surveys are carried out during the season in the most important (actual and potential) opium-producing provinces, so that not only the status of the crop can be obtained, but also the progress of eradication efforts, the abandonment of opium poppy fields by farmers, etc.
When satellite imagery and other analyses can be carried out on a province-by-province basis, the results of the analyses are widely disseminated and made publicly available, rather than waiting until the last province has been harvested to provide a complete picture of the whole country. Decision-makers and analysts need timely information.
Moderate praise for the Taliban ban: the effective implementation of an inappropriate and unsustainable policy is not necessarily better than another policy or no policy at all, and is likely to run counter to the long-term goal of a long-term and durable elimination of drug crop production in Afghanistan.
Recognizing that the key to success in the fight against opium and other illicit drugs lies in strong economic growth and broad-based rural development, which will create jobs and livelihoods to replace the income generated by drug production — even if we admit that the prospects for doing so are bleak at the moment.
Don't advocate for stand-alone alternative livelihood projects, let alone fund them, which experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere has shown is not viable or sustainable. Instead, the composition of aid should be shifted from humanitarian to basic rural and other development.
Supporting treatment and harm reduction for problem drug users is an area that Afghanistan desperately needs, and more resources, better policies and practices will help.
Help ensure that remittances from other countries can be made smoothly and efficiently. While many Afghans have been forcibly deported from Pakistan, others have gone further afield, and their income and remittances back to Afghanistan are vital to the survival of many families.
This will require international action to facilitate payments and banking transactions, such as arranging third-party AML/CFT monitoring to boost the confidence of foreign financial institutions, as well as expanding innovative swap arrangements, the use of digital currencies, etc.
Related to this, the Taliban are more broadly encouraged to adopt sensible and broader economic policies to mitigate the damage caused by the ban and other shocks, such as preventing exchange rate appreciation and deflation, avoiding excessive taxation of the private sector, and providing more budget for development.
About the author: William Byrd is a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, who focuses on Afghanistan; He is a development economist who has worked at the World Bank and has lived and worked in China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.