What is the Spring and Autumn Alliance? As an act of diplomatic relations, the Spring and Autumn Alliance was integrated into the Zhou Rite and was part of the system of the Ming Kings "Hui" can be interpreted as assembly, referring to the assembly activities held for a specific event; "Alliance" means an oath of alliance and emphasizes the blood sacrifice ritual that relies on religious and moral forces to win trust from each other. During the Western Zhou Dynasty, there were two forms: regular and irregular, the former being the ritual law of the Son of Heaven to show the royal family's strength and consolidate its dominance to the princes, that is, "to make the princes hire their careers for a career, to preach ceremonies from time to time, to demonstrate again, and to show their manifestation by meeting again"; The latter is aimed at dealing with matters to be resolved between the king of Zhou or the princes, such as the king's general soliciting disobedient people and the discord between the princes, that is, Zheng Ren You Ji said, "If there is something, it will meet, but if there is no agreement, it will be an alliance." After the fall of spring and autumn, the King of Zhou declined, and the regular alliance gradually ran aground, and the irregular alliance for the purpose of handling affairs became the mainstream. However, since consultations among the countries did not necessarily lead to an unanimous agreement, "there must be a meeting of the alliance, but there is no need to exhaust the alliance" was the norm at that time. It should be pointed out that although the etiquette norms followed by the "meeting" and the "alliance" and their binding force on the participants are not the same, they both have behavioral characteristics such as seeking political consensus and forming a relationship of mutual trust, so when discussing their diplomatic role, scholars often do not distinguish between the two, and collectively refer to them as "alliances." However, after Qi Huan Gong convened the Northern Xingzhi Conference, the nature of the alliance changed significantly, and the intention to consolidate its dominance when he returned to Western Zhou was only that the center of the arch guard was "from the king to the uncle". The purpose of this alliance was not to defend against common threats, but to quell civil unrest in the Song Dynasty. At the same time, Qi Huan Gong obviously deprived the country of its alliance autonomy because he did not destroy it. Two years later, Duke Huan of Qi reunited with various countries in Yuzhen and began to dominate the princes. Since then, presiding over the alliance has become a symbol of hegemony, and the Duke of Jinwen, the Duke of Chu Zhuang, and even the lord of Wuyue, who rose in late Spring and Autumn, have all taken this as their heart. As for small countries, alliances against aggression have become a luxury. More often than not, the threat is inherent in the alliance itself: on the one hand, failure to join the alliance may lead to disaster; On the other hand, when a strong country competes for hegemony, no matter which side of the alliance the small country participates in, it will automatically become the enemy of other big powers or blocs. It is not difficult to see that for most of the Spring and Autumn period, the alliance existed under a hierarchical system, which determined that it had many independent characteristics compared with the modern alliance that existed in the anarchy of the world. First, national strength is often the key to determining its hierarchical status. This is related to the transactional nature inherent in the authoritative contract: in order to obtain and maintain dominance, the dominant state must not only provide a political order favorable to the client state, but also bear the self-restraint costs of discipline the client state and the promise to the client state not to use excessive force. Therefore, only powerful countries can enjoy special interests at the top of the hierarchy. As the Chu people said when Jin and Chu competed for the first place on the eve of the Binghui Alliance, "If Jin is always first, it is Chu who is weak." In addition, the Spring and Autumn Alliance was mixed with coercive factors, which were reflected not only in the fact that rising countries forced weak countries to participate in the alliance in the early days of establishing a hierarchy, but also in the violent continuation of alliances by the dominant countries when they felt that their status was threatened or loosened. Qi Huan attacked the Song Dynasty and Jin Wen led his division to besiege Xu, all with the intention of coercing the weak country to obey. During the Jin-Chu hegemony period, the repeated actions of the two countries to attack small states such as Zheng, Song, Chen, and Cai on the grounds of violating the alliance confirmed the weakening trend of the dominant parliament to use coercive means against the self-centered hierarchy.
Since the hierarchical alliance in the Spring and Autumn period had such a huge impact on the survival of the princely states, the decision of a country's alliance would inevitably touch and be influenced by the interests of the entire domestic ruling group, the monarch and the nobles of the world. In fact, the form of power organization in the princely states during the Spring and Autumn period was considered to be "neither an autocratic regime of the personal dictatorship of the monarch nor a democratic republic, but an aristocratic dictatorship with aristocratic republics." Therefore, in order to restore the decision-making process of the alliance of the Spring and Autumn countries, we must consider the role of the two decision-making forces of the monarch and the secretary at the same time. This paper argues that the selection theory provides an analytical framework for this, which analyzes the political survival of leaders in relation to the support of specific groups, arguing that the latter has the ability to help leaders entrench themselves in the center of power, and may also depose them out of dissatisfaction with the share of fat or the leader's performance, and that this key group that can both carry and overturn the boat is the winning alliance. At present, there have been studies on its successful application in the context of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty. According to the theory of choosing people, the princes of the princely states are the rulers, and the hereditary nobles under the feudal patriarchal system are the indispensable victorious alliances that maintain their rule, and Sima Qian's description of "in the Spring and Autumn Period, thirty-six kings are killed, fifty-two are lost, and the princes are unable to protect their social weeds" reflects the real threat to the political survival of the rulers brought by the restless victorious alliance within the Spring and Autumn princes. Faced with the challenge from the winning alliance, the selector theory holds that the ruler will respond by waging foreign wars, adjusting the distribution of benefits, and reorganizing the winning alliance. The study of applying the theory of choosing people to the context of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty also shows that the princes of the princely states would re-"shuffle" the composition of the winning alliance by implementing changes in the law, promoting the lower nobles (scholars) and even commoners, so as to achieve checks and balances on the aristocracy. Dr. Qing's purpose. The selection theory focuses on the initiative of the ruler, but does not pay enough attention to the initiative and strategic behavior of the winning alliance. In other words, the ruler and the winning alliance are like two opposing sides in a chess game: when the ruler takes action against the winning alliance for political survival, such as counterbalancing or even eliminating its power, the winning alliance does not sit still.
In addition, the participation of the secretary in diplomatic activities such as the alliance may not be based on the consideration of the overall interests of the country, but may also be based on his own interests. This is why the secretary would support alliances between his country and other countries (even if that alliance would not benefit the country at all). For example, in the eleventh year of the Duke of Huan, the Yong clan of the Song state forced Zheng Zhong to support his grandson Zheng Gongzi Tu, otherwise he would "die", so he formed an alliance with him, obeyed the Song people's request, "established it with the return of the Duke of Li", and took advantage of the convenience of assisting the establishment of the monarch to specialize in government affairs and erect the new monarch. This incident was regarded by Sima Qian as the main reason for Zheng Guo's weakness, and commented that "Zheng Guo is not prosperous". This commentary points out that Zheng Guo's alliance with Qiang Song in order to survive politically in his own country was the prelude to the destruction of Zheng Guo's national fortune
Why do alliances in the Spring and Autumn period often cause one side of the alliance (especially a weak country) to fall into passivity or even decline? This requires an analysis of the inherent "hierarchical" nature of the Spring and Autumn Alliance. For small countries, alliance with a strong country means recognizing the status of the other side, and giving them a courtesy and obeying their orders. Taking the State of Lu, which has been recorded in more detailed historical records, as an example, Duke Lu and his people actually paid a heavy price for this diplomatic strategy in terms of material and dignity compared to the ardent friendship with Qiang Qi and Sheng Jin. According to the record of the "Li Ji Wang System": "The princes are to the Son of Heaven, and they are appointed by a small appointment in one year, a major appointment in three years, and a dynasty in five years." However, "in the world of spring and autumn, the king of the Lu dynasty is two, such as the Jing Shi one, and the Qi to the tenth has one, and the Jin to the twenty." In order not to lose the protection of the Qi state, only Lu Xuangong, the first monarch, sent Jixi Zhitian to ask for favor after his "ten years of assuming the throne, not one dynasty and five dynasties to Qi". As for Lu Guo's submission to Jin, there were also humiliating things such as losing his right to the field of Wenyang, attacking other countries as an agent, and Lu Gong personally going to Jin to listen to taxes, which shows the hardship of relying on a strong country. It is understandable why, with the exception of a few superpowers that have the power to compete for hegemony, such as the Spring and Autumn Five, most monarchs maintain a similar view to Machiavelli's admonition: weak and small countries should not form alliances with powerful countries unless they are forced to.
When the alliance is hierarchical, the alliance is a constraint or even weakening for the monarch, but for the secretary who has a power competition relationship with the monarch, this external alliance often means political empowerment. First, if Dr. Qing had voluntarily brokered an alliance at a time of national crisis, it would have greatly enhanced its prestige and influence and expanded its political capital for development. If it can also be rewarded by the monarch, it will also be conducive to the expansion of its material power. For example, in the eighth year of Duke Wen, Dongmen Xiangzhong was ordered by the monarch to ally with the Jin Qing Zhao Dun in Hengyong. Hengyong was close to Yiluo's Rong, and after Xiangzhong arrived there, he sensed that Rong Di had the intention of invading Lu, and because he did not sue the monarch, he arbitrarily allied with him in the violent land, and stopped the Rong people's attempt to destroy Lu. The scripture "Zhenzhi" means "Gongzi Sui", which believes that although his actions are slightly unruly, they can benefit the society and the country, so they are worthy of respect. After that, Xiangzhong promoted and maintained the alliance between the State of Lu and the State of Qi, and Xiangzhong's family power became stronger and stronger, suppressing Sanhuan for a time. If the alliance of the Kingdom of Lu and Xiangzhong are mutual achievements, then Xiang Jun's selfish intention of "wanting the soldiers of the princes to take their name" can be described as naked. After the matter was completed, Xiang Jun asked Song Xianggong for a reward, and obtained sixty cities, which could be called both fame and fortune.
Second, because the hierarchical Spring and Autumn Alliance constituted a practical constraint on the power of the monarch, it was not uncommon for the alliance to be used by the secretary to fight the monarch. For example, Wei Qing Sun Lin's father had a good relationship with Jin and had represented Wei Guo in alliance with Jin many times. In the twenty-sixth year of Duke Xiang, Duke Wei favored Ning Xi and made him attack Sun Lin's father, "Father Lin rushed to Jin, and asked people to dedicate themselves to the Duke", "Jin people are for the death of the Sun clan, summon the princes", begged Wei and established a Duke. (4) A similar practice of "seeking foreign aid" also exists in the Qing ethnic dispute. For example, in the eighteenth year of Duke Wen, Duke Luwen died, Xiangzhong and Shuzhong disagreed on the choice of the new monarch, so Xiangzhong asked the state of Qi for help, "seeing the Marquis of Qi and asking for it", Xu, established Duke Xuan and killed Shuzhong, and the dispute ended with Shuzhong's retainer Ran running to Cai in his family.
Finally, for those who survived the political struggle, active participation in the National Assembly Alliance is not only a signal of power released voluntarily (to show the real power that each country already holds in its own internal affairs), but also helps to absorb better domestic and foreign political resources (laying the groundwork for the next transformation of the secretary power). For example, in the sixth year of Duke Wen, Duke Xianggong of Jin died, and Zhao Dun, known as the "Summer Day", promoted the ministers Fox Shooting Gu and the Doctor to the Shi Hui, and established his concubine Linggong. Duke Ling was young, and Zhao Dun held great power, and successively allied with the princes in Hudi and Xincheng, becoming the first doctor to preside over the alliance of princes in the Spring and Autumn Period, and was also regarded as the first person to shake the monarchy of the Jin state.