This article is excerpted from Albert Kesselring, translated by Sun Bo, The Last Day of Soldiers: Albert Kesselring's Military Memoirs
Rommel's decision to launch a counterattack on January 21, 1942, stemmed from an idea that came from the chance of his combat staff officer, who later became a general, Westphal, flying over the weakened enemy lines in his "stork" aircraft; The idea came out of nowhere, ready and implemented as quickly as possible, and well camouflaged. Rommel had made it a habit to keep his actions secret from the Italians for as long as possible, for the simple reason that he did not trust them. It is undeniable that the suddenness brought about by absolute secrecy is the basis for victory, so every means of secrecy must have its own merits. But it is also certain that such behavior will make it more difficult to command any allied war, after all, Rommel was a subordinate of Marshal Bastieco and the Italian High Command. It was only after Rommel's attack that I informed Marshal Count Caballero in Rome, and he became extremely agitated at the thought of the possibility of another setback. On my advice, he flew to Africa on 22 January 1942, accompanied by me, but did not go directly to Rommel. He first went to inspect the Italian command, and my concern was my air force and logistical supplies.
First visit to North Africa: In late 1941, Kesselring (second from right) inspects the 2nd Group of the 2nd Dive Bomber Wing, and the first from right (with his back to the camera) is Geisler, commander of the 10th Air Force.
First visit to North Africa: from left: Fleulich, Rommel, Kesselring, Cluwell and Gauzer.
(Translation: Fleulich was the commander of African aviation at the time, Crüwell was the commander of the African Army, Gause was the first visit to North Africa by the African armored group, from the left, Fleulich, Rommel, Kesselring, Cluwell, and Gaozer chief of staff, and some Chinese translations translate the last two surnames as "Kluwell" and "Gauss" according to the English pronunciation. ）
By January 1942, we had a clear idea of the strength, deployment and combat qualities of the British army. I strongly supported Rommel in this offensive campaign in front of Marshal Caballero, and as long as it stopped in time, I would not take special risks. The distribution of British forces and shortages proved from the opponent's point of view that this military operation was reasonable and feasible, and it was possible to take Benghazi in one fell swoop, thus securing the supply of the Axis army. After much bargaining with the Italians at the meeting, we finally agreed to carry out an offensive campaign with limited objectives. I tried to mediate in this meeting and was not an opponent of this military operation, and some of the statements I saw after the war were the opposite. Caballero's autograph testifies to me. The Italian High Command did not want to endure any new setbacks and was therefore unwilling to take any risks. Despite the agreement, I was well aware of Rommel's idea that he would only advance on victory until he had to stop due to the resistance of the enemy. That's also the right thing to do. The offensive campaign, launched with admirable boldness and textbook support from the African Air Command, reached the so-called Ein Ghezale position by 30 January 1942. The glory of victory belongs to Field Marshal Rommel. At the time, he was unparalleled in commanding armored forces and daring surprise attacks. Although the aviation sent by Germany and Italy to Africa was relatively weak, and the combat effectiveness of Italian aviation was limited, it was slightly superior to the British on the whole. The shortage of power fuel on the German side was not enough to give the British a chance to save the situation. German fighters dominate the skies here; How much "Stuka" was loved by his own people, how much he feared the British officers and men. I was very impressed by the "Night Fire Magic" cast by British aviation outside Benghazi to think that there was a powerful bomber formation at work, and brought all movement in the light area to a standstill.
I'll add a small episode here because the process is unique. On 23 January 1942, I flew my "stork" to send Marshal Caballero to the meeting, because only that plane could be used at that time, and Caballero insisted that I accompany him. The controversy prevented the meeting from ending as scheduled, turning the return flight, which was supposed to land in Oughelle at dusk, into a night flight. In this way, a German air marshal flew a plane unsuitable for night flight, transported the most senior "Italian marshal" across the desert, and finally returned the feared Count Caballero to the arms of his generals unharmed. The hugs and kisses that follow (Italian: abbracci and bacci) are by no means poetic fiction!
In Italy, in 1942, Kesselring walked off the Fi-156 in summer uniform, one of the most common service aircraft of the German army in World War II, with good flight characteristics and takeoff and landing performance, but not suitable for night flight
Kesselring's special aircraft during his tenure as commander-in-chief of the Southern Front, the Seabel Fh 104 contact/trainer aircraft with the fuselage number WNr.0028.
In early February 1942 , as Rommel 's counterattack halted at Ain Gezale , the German-Italian forces in Tripolitania were in a situation similar to that of the British 8th Army at Benghazi not long ago. How long the fruits of victory in the offensive can be maintained depends on the replenishment of manpower and material resources. As the unfavorable season of the year drew to a close, the supply lines of the British became shorter and shorter, especially as the situation was. The immediate priority is to rehabilitate the ports in Benghazi and Derna. By the standards of southerners, Italians showed extraordinary energy in the restoration work, even daring to make some daring temporary innovations. The best port construction engineers from all over Italy were recruited to Benghazi and excelled in this work. Within days of capturing Benghazi, the first freighter could enter the port to unload cargo. We were also fortunate to find that Germany's original ammunition depots and other warehouses were intact and could be used as a supplement to the sea supplies. Despite these unexpected advantages, there is an urgent need to complete preparations for the air raid on Malta as soon as possible. The preparatory period has already been thornily delayed by the situation in Africa, but the results have proved to be worthwhile.
Through meetings with the commanders of the 2nd Air Force in Sicily, I was confident that everyone had the guiding principles of operations and fully grasped the spirit of the order to attack. When I inspected the troops, I found that the officers and men were full of confidence and their enthusiasm for fighting was high. The basic idea expressed by the 2nd Air Force in its order to attack Malta was: annihilate enemy fighters by surprise attack, or at least severely damage their strength so that they could not pose a serious threat to subsequent bombing; Attack three airfields in intensive waves, destroy aircraft on the ground with heavy bombs, light anti-personnel bombs and airborne weapons, and render the runway unusable, at least temporarily.
The Heinkel He 111 was the backbone of the German "heavy" bomber wing at the time
Subsequent attacks by the bomber wing were aimed at enhancing the destructive effect on airfields and destroying port facilities and ships as much as possible, while avoiding the impact on urban facilities; Daylight attacks must be carried out without interruption and with strong fighter cover, preventing British fighters from approaching our bombers and pursuing them until they are annihilated.
Single-machine attacks should be carried out frequently at night to obstruct the clean-up and repair of debris. The next part of the plan was to send dive bombers to sink a small number of British supply ships entering the port and block the entrance to the port by dropping mines.
The Ju 87 can launch extremely accurate attacks on slow-moving ships
The plan placed high demands on each unit, but it was successfully completed with acceptable losses. The battle with this island fortress became quite difficult at one point. There are natural facilities, hangars, warehouses and bomb shelters deep inside the rocks on the periphery and in the harbor, and even the heaviest time-lapse bombs are powerless against them, and even attempts by fighter-bombers to blow up entrances have failed. Only with small bomblets that trigger the fuse, multiple carpet bombings have a chance to achieve greater results. The British concentrated powerful ground anti-aircraft fire and, aided by the anti-aircraft fire of ships, formed a fire barrier covering the port, breaking through its interception required not only a sufficiently tenacious will, but also the inevitable loss of some aircraft.
The moments that are vulnerable during dive bombing are "turning into a dive" and "changing out maneuvers" after completing a dive, as these actions need to slow down the flight and disband the flight formation. To reduce the losses incurred at these two stages, it is only possible to arrange for fighter jets to dive with them, and specifically designate some fighters to meet at the changed altitude. The bravery and flexibility shown by the British fighter units are also worthy of recognition, especially the tactics of diving from high altitudes (10,000-12,000 meters) to attack the dense formation of German bombers, which have developed to the point of perfection in their hands. The organization of the unloading operation also deserves high praise: in an incredibly short time, incoming tankers and cargo ships can be unloaded, and the cargo is transferred to the underground bulletproof storage room at the terminal.
The command of the 2nd Air Army, located in Messina, showed itself excellently in planning and carrying out this offensive. Here it is worth mentioning in particular the name of the army's resourceful and excellent chief of staff, General Deichmann Aviation.
Air raids on Malta were temporarily interrupted several times as offensive forces were diverted against the British convoys, the annihilation of which was a prerequisite for victory over Malta. With the exception of a few ships that escaped, it was likely that all of these convoys would be wiped out in extremely fierce battles.
The British army sent a number of escort convoys to supply Malta, and the picture shows the American tanker "Ohio" miraculously surviving after repeated attacks
The main offensive began on April 2, 1942, and by May 10, 1942, I consider this task completed. As a result of the victory in Malta, we temporarily gained sea and air supremacy over the supply routes from Italy to Africa. The volume of replenishment is sufficient to meet the actual needs. After the bombing, capturing the island was like probing for something. The failure to turn this into reality was a serious mistake made by the German and Italian high commands, which eventually led to bad consequences. To their credit, the fact that the Luftwaffe succeeded in limiting its combat to purely military objectives was also acknowledged by the British.
The British never gave up sending support and supplies to Malta
The British army sent a large number of Spitfire fighters to Malta, which greatly enriched the island's air defense forces
With the victory of the air raids on Malta, the Wehrmacht high command felt that the situation had eased so much that most of the air could be diverted to the Eastern Front. Of course, there are enough forces left in the Mediterranean to monitor Malta, strike at enemy convoys, cover our convoys, without having to use the forces of the African Aviation Command. But in the long run, this force was not strong enough to prevent the rebuilding and resupply of the island fortress in Malta during subsequent operations.
However, once the reorganized Malta regained its strong combat effectiveness, it would seriously threaten our supply shipments as it did in the summer and autumn of 1941.
Italy's missed opportunity to occupy the island when it first entered the war will surely go down in history as a fundamental mistake.
Although the Wehrmacht high command realized early on that this was a key location for the crisis, it was content to use the air force to suppress it, ignoring my repeated calls for the capture of the island and the subsequent support of the Italian high command and Rommel. This is a deliberate failure to correct the first mistake after it has been made, thus compounding the mistake and becoming the second fundamental mistake in command and the decisive flaw in the guidance of war in the Mediterranean.