US media: US diplomatic thinking should get out of the "shackles of the Cold War"

Reference News Network reported on July 17 that the website of the bimonthly "Foreign Affairs" published an article entitled "Cold War Trap" on July 13, written by Justin Winnock. The full excerpt is compiled below:

When U.S. policymakers and commentators needed guidance, they habitually turned to the Cold War. They draw lessons from the events of the Cold War, ask Cold War figures for advice, and compare the characteristics of the Cold War with the present. Cold War history has set the wording for debates about America's approach to the world. U.S. President Joe Biden's recent assertion that "a new Cold War" is "not needed" with China is just the most striking example of the habitual way of thinking of the entire foreign policy community in its analysis.

Deeply bound by the concept of the Cold War

This Cold War impulse hinders more than it helps. Inconsistencies between today's realities and Cold War history hinder efforts to find a new U.S. strategy. For about 80 years, U.S. policy has been based on the country's superiority in economic, military, technological, and political power. This dominance enabled the United States to seek the unconditional surrender of the overextended Axis powers in World War II, contain the rising but war-battered Soviet Union, and achieve regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, most analysts agree that America's declining share of global GDP, shrinking military superiority, diminishing technological superiority and diminishing diplomatic influence mean that Washington will soon face a multipolar world for the first time since World War II. Yet Americans are still bound by the idea of a dying era when their power reigns supreme.

The history of the Cold War has become a shackle that constrains Americans' view of the world. The history of the Cold War dominates their perception of the past, distorting the way they understand conflicts, approach negotiations, recognize their own capabilities, and even analyze problems. This is so because the history of the cold war limited the debate to the possibilities of an unusual era that has become a bygone era. This narrow frame of reference misled those who tried to learn from the cold war and obscured the centuries-old historical inspiration before the eyes of those who sought to go beyond it.

The political scientist Richard Neustadt and the historian Ernest May have warned readers to be wary of historical analogies that, while unhelpful or misleading, dominate policymakers' analysis. The Cold War has become such an analogy. To take a key measure, Harvard's Great Power Wars program shows that America's share of global GDP has fallen from about 20 percent in 1991 and less than 17 percent today, from 50 percent after World War II. As William Burns, the CIA director, former deputy secretary of state, wrote in this journal in 2019, "The United States is no longer the only big child in the geopolitical realm." In this case, there is only one way to get out of the unhelpful Cold War framework: study more history.

Find answers from history

For Americans to think clearly about their approach to a multipolar world, they must understand the countries that have successfully dealt with previous multipolar orders. Analysts can consider the Congress of Vienna in the 19th century. This conference reorganized Europe after the Napoleonic Wars in order to better manage two types of conflicts: one was the clash of powers, which was dealt with by new territorial arrangements guaranteed by security alliances and conflict resolution regimes; The other is governance conflict, which is addressed by agreements on governance principles and a coalition of conservative countries. Alternatively, policymakers could consider the Anglo-German confrontation that began in the late 19th century, during which Britain and Germany had mutually beneficial trade relations and geopolitical competition. These examples make it easier to imagine how the United States and China might sort out and manage disputes in trade, ideology, and geopolitics, rather than allowing the Cold War to unfold in full swing.

History may also change analysts' perceptions of trading with rivals. At the beginning of the 20th century, something similar happened: Britain reconciled with its old rivals France, Japan, Russia, and the United States in order to ease the burden of protecting the colonies and concentrate on a rising Germany. In this confrontation, from the late 90s of the 19th century to the early 10s of the 20th century, London and Berlin repeatedly tried to de-escalate the contest by holding talks about the navies and colonies of the two countries. In Chinese history, there are countless examples of dynasties making deals with their enemies. Both the Han and Song dynasties developed elaborate treaty, trade, and diplomatic regimes to coexist with powerful neighbors that could not be defeated in war, while striving to increase their relative power. At a time when U.S. dominance is in decline, these historical facts suggest that states can compensate for their weaknesses by prioritizing multiple goals, weighing trade-offs, and changing partnerships – a way of thinking and acting that is a far cry from the rigid binary opposition of the Cold War.

History also helps analysts learn how to manage in a world with limited resources. From the beginning of the 17th century to the end of the 18th century, the overextended Netherlands fell out of the ranks of great powers due to its failure to balance competition and resources. With the important exception of the Vietnam War, the history of the Cold War has not accustomed Americans to the problems that nations face when they fail to align their goals, ways, and means.

The way we see the world needs to change

These and other historical facts help sensitize Americans to see the world differently: one based on tolerable trade-offs rather than intransigence; a way to base on the difficult initiative of prioritizing multiple goals rather than overall victory; an approach based on practical policies rather than fanatics; an approach based on combining military and economic power with diplomacy rather than brute force; A way of living with people Americans can neither change nor ignore.

Of course, Americans can't find a simple answer by copying an old strategy manual. They must always start with the uniqueness of their place and time, such as cultural values, domestic politics, scientific and technological progress, and the unprecedented demands of today's transnational issues. Nor should they overkill and forget the Cold War.

To succeed in the coming multipolar era, the United States must break the shackles of the Cold War. Today, the U.S. foreign policy community is struggling within the limits of history — limitations that undermine its imagination and should not exist, and that could easily be overcome if analysts broadened their horizons by taking a deeper look at the past.

Source: Informational message