The restructuring of economic indigenousness includes two aspects. First, the decline of the country's overall economy has strengthened the economic subjectivity of its citizens. Their citizens have greater resilience and security in the event of an economic crisis.
Second, the weakness of the socio-economic status of migrants strengthens the object status of immigrants. Muslim immigrants suffer from structural discrimination and unfair treatment in employment for many years, making it difficult to integrate economically into Dutch society
Following the recovery from the recession that began in 1993, the Netherlands entered a new round of economic slowdown in the early 21st century. In 2002, Dutch GDP growth was only 0.2%, and in 2003 it fell to 0.16%. In 2009, affected by the European debt crisis, GDP growth was significantly negative, -3.67%. The European debt crisis and the controversy over the EU's deficit reduction plan also led to the collapse of the coalition government in 2012. There was a small peak in the unemployment rate, which reached 5.87 per cent in 2005
After entering the 21st century, the structural transformation of the economy in the Netherlands since the seventies and eighties continues. The proportion of industry and manufacturing in GDP has been declining, from 33.89% and 23.42% in 1969 to 17.7% and 10.92% in 2019, respectively. The share of services has been rising, from 52% in 1969 to 70% in 2019. 79 At the same time, the technological progress of traditional industries has brought about industrial upgrading.
The existing economic structure of the Netherlands has shown post-industrial characteristics, reflected in the production intensification of manufacturing, industry and agriculture, and the pillar status of the service sector.
The structural transformation of the economy brings about a transformation of demand in the labor market, thus creating a polarization of employment. Opportunities for local industry and manufacturing in the Netherlands have been significantly reduced, and the demand for labor in the service sector has increased. This transition has led to structural unemployment and a mismatch in the labor market. According to the European Economic and Social Cooperation (0ECD) survey, the demand for abstract tasks (including managers, professionals, technicians and assistant professionals) increased by 80% between 1996 and 2008.
Between 2009 and 2014, the demand for routine manual tasks (administrative work such as bookkeeping and clerical, as well as repetitive production or monitoring occupations, such as clerical support workers, process or related trade workers, and factory machine operators and assembly workers) fell by 120%. Nearly 45% of employees are unable to match jobs due to lack of skills, qualifications or field learning experience.
In addition, the transition rate of temporary workers in the Netherlands is also quite low. In 2008, less than one in five workers switched to a permanent full-time contract after three years. The proportion of temporary or part-time jobs with high mobility, less technology dependence and low wages is high. This means that even if the employment rate rises, it is due to the increase in temporary and part-time work.
At this stage, as in other advanced capitalist countries, the Dutch labour market was characterized by polarization. Empirical studies show that between 1999 and 2012, the Netherlands shared the same trends in international employment, with an asymmetrical pattern of polarization.
Employment in middle-income occupations has declined, and employment in lower- and high-income occupations has increased. However, employment growth in higher-skilled occupations is greater than in lower-skilled occupations. the threshold for unemployed middle class, either by re-engaging in skills training, to obtain high-paying jobs; Either move downwards into the low-income labor market. However, the low wages of migrant workers make them a strong competitor to the local labor force with certain employment advantages.
The global financial crisis and the European debt crisis continue to affect the overall economic performance of the Netherlands after 2010. Since the fourth quarter of 2011, the Dutch economy has been in recession again, and the GDP ratio to world GDP has fallen below 1%. In 2012, GDP fell by 0.9% year-on-year, and unemployment rose to 7.2%. The unemployment rate peaked at 8.2% in February 2014. After 2014, GDP growth and employment rates began to pick up.
During the phobia period, education and employment remain patterns of inequality. In 2014-2015, only 30% of immigrants in North Holland had higher education, compared to 41% of citizens. This disparity is related to school segregation. Sixty percent of students with immigrant backgrounds are concentrated in poorer schools, while citizens choose to send their children to fewer schools with immigrant students.
Despite the decline in overall unemployment in the Netherlands, the higher unemployment rate of non-Western immigrants than among native residents has not improved. Especially since 2008, the gap between non-Western immigrants and native citizens has continued to widen. Moreover, the unemployment rate among young people is higher than that of the elderly. Second-generation immigrants from non-Western backgrounds have higher unemployment rates overall than first-generation immigrants, although second-generation immigrants have better educational backgrounds and qualify for basic job thresholds.
In 2016, the unemployment rate among young immigrants (aged 15-25) from non-Western backgrounds was 22%, compared to 9% for Dutch citizens. This shows that non-Western migrants have difficulties in entering the labor market.
In order to emerge from the economic crisis, since 2012, the coalition government of the Labor Party and the FDP has carried out a series of neoliberal economic reform measures, including privatization of the public sector and state-owned enterprises, and cuts to public service budgets. Privatization has achieved remarkable results by reducing labor costs to cut costs and achieve higher economic returns. For example, reform of the health insurance system.
In 2014, the Dutch Senate rejected a bill that would allow health insurers to limit the freedom of insured people to choose a doctor, meaning that better care can only be obtained by purchasing higher-priced insurance. Meanwhile, the Senate is also discussing another bill that would allow hospitals to attract investors by distributing profits. These two Acts herald a fundamental shift from public institutions to the principles of market organization.
Muslim immigrants brought a large number of young and middle-aged workers to the Netherlands, but the overall quality of the labor force was limited. In 2008, Muslim immigrants from Turkey and Morocco accounted for more than 50% of the labor force aged 15-64 with a low level of education, almost double the proportion of Dutch citizens; Less than 20% of immigrants with higher education are far below the rate of Dutch citizens. Surveys on the use of Dutch, the official language, show that nearly 30% of immigrants have difficulty writing, and the subsequent improvement in the language level of immigrants is mainly related to the fact that second-generation immigrants have received a native education.
Relatively speaking, the level of education of second-generation immigrants is higher than that of first-generation immigrants. In the 20 years since 1983, the share of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants with only compulsory basic education has fallen from 66 per cent and 73 per cent to 27 per cent and 26 per cent, respectively, meaning that nearly three-quarters of the descendants of immigrants have received secondary education. However, the share of immigrants to higher education is still growing slowly, growing by only about 10% in 20 years.
As a result, most of the workforce is confined to low-skilled and physically demanding jobs in agriculture or heavy industry. In 2000, 84 per cent of immigrants of Turkish origin were employed in basic, low-end occupations, while only 26 per cent were employed in middle-level and above-high occupations. The figures were 76 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively, for immigrants of Moroccan origin. Moreover, these tasks are often of a short-term and temporary nature. People of Turkish and Moroccan descent have permanent jobs, 71 per cent and 76 per cent, respectively, compared with 86 per cent of native citizens.
In terms of income, the average income level of second-generation non-Western immigrants in 2014 was lower than in 2001, with average personal income and average household income falling to 51% from 63% and 77% in 2001 to 51% respectively. In terms of employment rates, the share of non-Western immigrants in the labor force rose to 10% in 2016, while women's participation increased by about 6% to 7%, but it is still lower than the labor force participation rate of native citizens. The restructuring of economic indigenousness has contributed to the development of Islamophobia in the Netherlands.
This restructuring is not only an emphasis on the priority of local groups in terms of job opportunities and economic benefits, but also an exclusion of immigrants' participation in economic production.
First of all, the objective conditions of the country's economy and society have become a background factor. The country's overall economy is facing recession, unemployment is rising, and the economy is undersupplied. At the same time, the polarization of the labor market brought about by the structural transformation of the economy has made immigrant groups a potential competition for employment among a group of local middle and working classes.
According to the theory of ethnic competition, foreign immigrants are the first to be hate-shifting targets of low-skilled native immigrants. Thus, when the economic crisis hit, the indigenous right-wing discourse argued that immigrants "stole their jobs" and took up too much unemployment security that should have belonged to their citizens.
Second, the significant socio-economic backwardness of Muslim immigrant groups themselves exacerbates their marginalization. Due to the migration history, demographic structure and religious background of labor migrants themselves, Muslim immigrant groups are characterized by low education level, low employment rate, low income, etc., and are vulnerable.
Immigrants are vulnerable to religious discrimination and injustice in employment opportunities and careers. This natural disadvantage makes labor migrants not as competitive as their own citizens when entering the labor market of the country of immigration. In a vicious circle of low education and low income, relatively poor immigrant groups must rely on the social welfare system to bail out. According to Johnston et al., there is a significant relationship between immigrants' enjoyment of benefits and nativists' distrust of government. Dependence on the welfare system was seen by Dutch nativists as a "thief of pleasure".
Nativist calls for immigrants to pay off the debts of the welfare system paid for by public taxes, and immigrants rely on the welfare system for more compensation because of socioeconomic segregation.
Finally, there is a positive interaction between the recession and the decline in the economic status of immigrants themselves. The more the economy declines, the more backward the economic status of migrants, further exacerbating Islamophobia in society. The radical privatization process in the social security and welfare sectors to stimulate the economy and get out of trouble, which led to public sector layoffs, lower wages, and a loss of public security about the welfare system, further catalyzed the development of Islamophobia. The policy paper of the Dutch left-wing Socialist Party (SP) states that "the Dutch welfare state system is being dismantled piece by piece.
Income disparities are widening and public provision, such as social security systems, social housing, education, public transport and health care, are being cut." It claims that "rapid and profound economic liberalization, complete liberalization of foreign capital, and the widespread transfer of previously publicly controlled activities to the market have led to the destruction of democracy and the strengthening of employers' power," which ultimately led to a "return to structural poverty."
The senator of the SPvd party argued that the neoliberal reforms had left "public services polluted, political choices become 'marketing'" and, finally, citizens lost "their" public institutions and became consumers. In this environment where public institutions are destroyed by marketization, the agenda of right-wing parties has also shifted from liberal "small government" ideas to the chauvinism of the welfare system, and a nostalgia for the welfare state. The sense of deprivation brought about by this decline has developed an exclusive nationalism through political mobilization.