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Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

author:Xiao Min studied history

In 219 AD, the Famous Shu Han general Guan Yu, in order to take advantage of Liu Bei's superiority in Hanzhong, took advantage of Cao Wei's new defeat in Hanzhong to take advantage of the northern expedition to Jingzhou, when there was only a small number of troops near Jingzhou cao's clique, and the army facing Guan Yu's Northern Expedition could not last at all.

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

In order to rescue Cao Ren, Cao Cao sent several large armies led by the general Ban to support Cao Ren, who knew that jingzhou was in the rainy season at that time, when Yu Ban reached Xiangyang, the Han River soared, and Yu Ban's troops were downstream of the Han River, Guan Yu took advantage of the advantages of time and place to take advantage of the opportunity to "flood the Seventh Army", this battle made Guan Yu famous, but also achieved his "Wei Zhen Huaxia" prestige.

Guan Yu's battle was widely used by successive generations of soldiers after this, but because it required natural and geographical advantages, this "flooded Seventh Army" existed in history like a flash in the pan, until more than a thousand years later, another famous general in New China used this move "Flooded Seventh Army", and this battle fought by the US army.

This founding general is Lieutenant General Wu Xinquan of the 39th Army, one of the ten aces of the Volunteer Army, and this battle also made the United Nations Army Ridgway admire the tactics of the Volunteer Army.

On December 31, 1950, the Chinese Volunteer Army launched the "Third Campaign", and the Volunteer Army, which threatened the victory of the First and Second Battles, broke through the "38th Line" in the third campaign and marched into the vicinity of the "37th Line", and the biggest result of this campaign was the liberation of Seoul by the Volunteer Army, which was the first time that the Chinese people had captured a foreign capital since the Opium War of 1840.

This campaign greatly boosted the confidence of the Chinese people in confronting us imperialism, and for a while the worries about the US military in the early days of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea were swept away, and even most of the commanders and fighters in the country demanded that the volunteer army continue to penetrate deeper to obtain greater victories.

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

Although the volunteer army has achieved one victory after another, there is a huge crisis hidden behind this, and although the third battle is of great political significance compared with the previous two battles, the results of the battle are much worse than the first two at the military level.

Moreover, more importantly, at this time the volunteers were exhausted by continuous combat, and because the front line was too long, the supplies and ammunition in the rear could not be replenished in time.

More importantly, at that time, the volunteer army was in South Korea, and the South Korean army adopted the method of "fortifying the wall and clearing the field" in order to drag down the volunteer army before retreating, and the route for the volunteer army to solve the logistics supply on the spot was also cut off by the "United Nations Army".

In the face of this huge crisis, General Han Xianchu, deputy commander of the Volunteer Army, first discovered the crisis, and he immediately summarized and reported the situation of the front-line volunteers to Mr. Peng.

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

After learning about the actual situation on the front line, Mr. Peng also decided to rest on the spot based on the actual situation and wait for the logistics to arrive before engaging the US army.

However, MacArthur, then commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Army", was not at all willing to lose, and shortly after the end of the third campaign, MacArthur launched the "Fourth Campaign" with the aim of repeating the "Inchon Landing" plot while the Volunteer Army was unstable.

In the face of MacArthur's aggressiveness, the volunteer army adopted the tactic of "letting go from the west to the east", once again giving full play to the advantages of the volunteer army and fighting with the enemy, at the Han River, the 50th Army and the 38th Army of the Volunteer Army stubbornly blocked the attack of the "United Nations Army", foiling MacArthur's plot, while the Volunteer Army on the front line also got a breathing opportunity to retreat on foot and in an orderly manner.

Seeing that his plot did not defeat the Volunteers, MacArthur angrily declared to the world: 'All-out war is to be waged.' ’

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

MacArthur's astonishing remarks startled Truman, who was far away in the White House, and he immediately replaced MacArthur and let Ridgway, then commander of the 8th Army, take mcArthur's command.

The so-called "three fires for new officers to take office", at this time, Ridgway had just taken over MacArthur's position, and he wanted to complete MacArthur's unfinished strategic concept and use the mechanized corps of the US army to crush the volunteer army.

Ridgway also specially dispatched the 3rd Regiment of the US 1st Marine Division, which was crippled in the previous "Battle of Chosin Lake".

On the other side, Wu Xinquan, then commander of the 39th Army, was also tasked with blocking this unit and buying time for the retreat of the other brother troops.

At this time, the 39th Army had just withdrawn from the front-line battlefield, and in the previous battles, the 39th Army's tenacious combat gave the enemy a major blow.

However, the volunteer soldiers were human after all, and the soldiers of the 39th Army were also tired after repeated battles, and due to continuous combat, the weapons and ammunition had already bottomed out, and the troops were in urgent need of supplies.

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

And what about the U.S. military on the other side? The mechanized corps advanced quickly, and they were supported by a trinity of artillery from land, sea, and air, which gave them an advantage over the Volunteers.

Therefore, in such a state, even if the combat effectiveness of the soldiers of the 39th Army is strong, if they resist the US army in a conventional way, it will undoubtedly be on paper.

As the troops retreated to the Huachuan area, looking at the terrain in front of them, Wu Xinquan, who was known for his resourcefulness, suddenly thought of a move, and it was this sudden clever plan that saved the entire volunteer army.

There is no special terrain in the Huachuan area from the geographical point of view, but it is not far from Huachuan Lake, and the local people have built a "Huachuan Reservoir" with the help of this lake, looking at the Huachuan Reservoir in front of them, General Wu Xinquan thought of a strategy against the enemy.

At this time, the volunteer army was exhausted after continuous combat, and it was undoubtedly unwise to block the US army in this state, so it was only to use unconventional combat methods, at this time Wu Xinquan thought of the historical battle of Guan Yu's "flooded Seventh Army", although it may not cause heavy casualties to the US army, but to a certain extent, it can play a role in blocking the enemy, and the flooding of the lake will inevitably make the road muddy, and the mechanized troops of the US army will undoubtedly lose the ability to pursue.

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

Therefore, after thinking of this strategy, he immediately sent a unit to garrison the upper reaches of the Huachuan Reservoir to hold the high ground to prevent the Us army from occupying, while he personally led the chief of the operations section of the 39th Army to conduct a field survey and inquire in detail about the situation of the reservoir for local staff.

After actual measurement and investigation, General Wu Xinquan found that the water storage capacity of the Huachuan Reservoir was not enough to stop the speed of the US army, and it was necessary to store water after a period of time.

So he immediately ordered all 12 gates of the Huachuan Reservoir to be closed, and at the same time, he constantly sent small troops to penetrate behind the enemy to carry out continuous attacks to delay the attack of the US army.

Compared with MacArthur's boldness, Ridgway was more cautious in the face of the volunteer army, and to some extent, Wu Xinquan's success in storing water was thanks to Ridgway's caution, otherwise it was not necessarily easy to assume that it was Facing MacArthur.

It should be said that Ridgway is also a famous general who has experienced hundreds of battles and has a lot of combat experience, but he has never calculated that Wu Xinquan will use this move, because there are really no similar battles in the Western historical world.

On April 9, 1951, the U.S. 1st Marine Division finally reached the lower reaches of the Han River, and due to the continuous marching, the U.S. Army was exhausted at this time, and the surrounding terrain was unobstructed, and the shadow of the volunteer army could not be seen at all, and in this state, the U.S. Marine Division also relaxed its vigilance.

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

But what they did not expect was that the movement of the 1st Marine Division had already been mastered by the 39th Army, and at this time the 39th Army was ready for everything but the East Wind, and it could flood the US army just by blowing up the reservoir.

When he learned that the U.S. army was about to cross the Han River, Wu Xinquan knew that the opportunity had come, and he had already evacuated the local residents beforehand.

At the moment when the floodgates were about to be opened and discharged, there were also differences within the 39th Army, and some commanders and fighters wanted to blow up the reservoir in order to speed up the flood discharge, so that they could not only block the enemy's advance but also annihilate the enemy in large quantities.

Faced with this idea, Wu Xinquan insisted on only opening the gate to release water to oppose blowing up the reservoir, and he also put forward his own views:

The first reservoir was built at the expense of the local people, and after this battle, the local people still have to live here, if only to speed up the release of floodwater, regardless of the lives of the people, then what is the difference between this and those US imperialists?

Secondly, speeding up the discharge of floodwaters can indeed kill and injure the enemy in a large area, but the huge casualties of the US military may also cause crazy retaliation from the US military, and the retaliation of the US military after that is also unbearable for the volunteer army.

Third, the task of the 39th Army is mainly to block the enemy, and the opening of the flood gate and flood control has achieved its goal, so there is no need to blow up the reservoir.

General Wu Xinquan's idea was also the opinion of most of the commanders and fighters.

At noon on April 9, 1951, the gate of the Huachuan Reservoir was finally opened, and for a time the entire reservoir rushed downstream like a monstrous beast to the American troops downstream.

Due to the abundant water storage, after only 40 minutes, the water level of the entire Han River soared by 1.5 meters.

In the face of this sudden "spectacle", the US military was dumbfounded at once, and in front of "nature", tanks, armored vehicles, and cars all looked so pale and powerless, and they were swept away by this sudden flood in an instant.

And this monstrous flood not only affected the US troops on the front line, but even the US ammunition and tents in the far rear were affected, and the US troops were scattered by the impact and fled.

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

From a tactical point of view, the flood could not cause major casualties to the US military, because the level of modernization of the US military was too high, and there were not a few people in the US army at that time, and although the tanks were washed away by the water, they were not damaged internally, and they could continue to be used as long as they were overhauled.

The problem, however, is that the flood has disrupted the deployment of time, and it all takes time.

At that time, the 39th Army and the US Army needed time, and the US Army was directly trapped in the water for 6 days and 6 nights because of this flood, and by the time they gathered their troops again to prepare for pursuit, they had lost the best time to pursue.

By the time the troops were regrouped, the 39th Army had formed new defensive positions with the brothers and successfully covered the transfer of the brothers.

Relying on this move to "flood the Seventh Army", Lieutenant General Wu Xinquan effectively delayed the attack of the US army without spending a single soldier or a single shot.

Wu Xinquan did not fire a single shot, trapped the US army for seven days and seven nights, Ridgway: Can the battle still be fought like this?

At this point, the battle after Ridgway took office also ended in failure, and could only be forced to stop the northward advance on April 21, and the fourth campaign ended everywhere, and Wu Xinquan's battle also became Ridgway's nightmare, and many years later, Ridgway thought of Wu Xinquan's move or a little frightened, because he was afraid that he would never think that Wu Xinquan would actually use this move in front of the modern army.

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