The purpose of this article is: to recall, interpret and reveal the history of World War II, without any promotion of the spirit of Nazism or other intentions, please do not misinterpret. Thank you for your cooperation!
The Soviet Army fought a series of defensive and offensive battles to defend Moscow from September 30, 1941 ~ April 20, 1942. Determined to defend Moscow, the Soviets concentrated more than 30% of their total combat strength. Under Stalin's leadership, he calmly responded to the battle, with deep echelons of fortifications to prevent the German advance. On December 6 , the Soviets began a large-scale counteroffensive. On January 8, 1942, the Soviet Army launched a general offensive of more than 1.24 million people on three fronts, and carried out the Sechovka-Vyazma offensive, the Toropet-Holm offensive, the Rzhev offensive and the Borkhov offensive. The general offensive of the Soviet army lasted until April 20, advancing 100~350 kilometers to the west, recovering Moscow, Kalinin, Tula and Ryazan oblasts.
The German high command formulated an operational plan codenamed "Typhoon" for the capture of Moscow, which stipulated that three armored groups would carry out assaults from the Dukhovshina, Roslavl, and Shostka areas to the east and northeast, cutting off the Soviet defenses and encircling the Soviet forces in the Vyazma and Bryansk regions. It then surrounded Moscow from the north and south with fast groups, while infantry regiments attacked from the front, capturing Moscow before the onset of winter. The "Typhoon" campaign was carried out by the German Army Group "Center". The commander was Marshal Bock.
It had 3 armies and 3 armoured groups, as well as the 2nd Air Force. The total strength is 78 divisions, 1.8 million people, 14,000 guns of various kinds, 1,700 tanks and 1,390 aircraft.
The headquarters of the Soviet High Command determined that the direction of Moscow was the main direction of the German attack and was determined to defend Moscow. To this end, more than 30% of the total combat forces were concentrated, and three defensive lines with a depth of 300 kilometers were established west of Moscow, namely the Vyazma Line, the Mozaisk Line and the Moscow Defense District. At the same time, guerrilla units were organized to operate behind enemy lines to cooperate with the regular army. The Soviet army's attempt was to rely on the deep echelon configuration of the defensive area to prevent the German army from advancing towards Moscow, kill and wound the German army in large numbers, buy time, and create conditions for a counteroffensive. The Soviet Army defended three fronts west of Moscow: the Western Front, commanded by General Konev, and had six army groups.
The Bryansk Front, commanded by General Yelyomenko, had 3 army groups and 1 army group.
Reserve Front, commanded by Marshal Budyonny, with 6 army groups).
The entire strength of the Front and the Bryansk Front west of the Soviet High Command, as well as 2 armies of the Reserve Front, occupied the 1st line of defense; The other four armies of the reserve front occupied the second line of defense. The three fronts had a total of 95 corps, with a total strength of 1.25 million men, 7,600 guns of various kinds, 990 tanks and 677 aircraft.
Compared with the strength of the two sides, the German army has a greater advantage, its strength is 1.44 times that of the Soviet army, the artillery is 1.84 times that of the Soviet army, the tank is 1.71 times that of the Soviet army, and the aircraft is more than 2 times that of the Soviet army.
In Hitler's strategy against the Soviet Union, the main goal was to seize Leningrad and Ukraine, so as to gain control of the entire Baltic Sea and take possession of Ukrainian raw materials and agricultural products. However, the German army headquarters, headed by Marshal Brauchitsch and Admiral Halder, believed that the main forces of the Soviet army must be eliminated before the Soviet Union could be completely conquered. Moscow was the center of power in the Soviet Union, as well as the largest transportation hub and the second largest industrial center in the Soviet Union, and it was something that the Soviet army must not give up. Therefore, Moscow should be the main target, which would force the main Soviet forces to accept the battle under Moscow. But Hitler insisted that Leningrad and Ukraine were of greater importance than Moscow, denouncing the generals for being "old-headed," declaring: "Moscow is important, but in my opinion, it is just a geographical concept." The capture of Moscow should be the end of the drama, and before that, decisive victories in the south and north should be preceded. ”
On July 16, 1941, Army Group Center captured Smolensk and opened the gate to Moscow. Hitler insisted that Army Group Center suspend its eastward advance and deploy its main forces to support the operations against Leningrad and Ukraine. When the Battle of Kiev began, Hitler suddenly changed his strategy and decided to wait for the victory in the Battle of Kiev to return the focus of the operation to the Moscow axis, and only to impose a siege on Leningrad.
On September 6, 1941, Hitler issued Military Order No. 35, codenamed Operation Typhoon, and established the Battle of Moscow on October 2. The military order stipulated that the Moscow offensive was carried out by Marshal Bock's Army Group Center. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Corps and Weix's 2nd Army, which were fighting in Ukraine, returned north by September 30 at the latest; The 3rd Holt Panzer Corps of Army Group Center, which was fighting in Leningrad, and the 4th Panzer Corps of Hepner of Army Group North moved south by 15 September at the latest to the Smolensk area to join Army Group Center. By the end of September, Army Group Center had concentrated 74 divisions (including 14 armored and 8 motorized divisions), more than 1.8 million men, 1,700 tanks, 14,000 artillery and mortars, and 1,390 aircraft.
On November 7, despite the German presence in the city, the Soviet government held the traditional October Revolution Day celebration and military parade on Moscow's Red Square, where heavily armed Soviet troops passed in front of Lenin's tomb and then marched directly to the front. The British reported: "The battle to Moscow is in full swing, and <新闻纪事报>Moscow organizes the annual traditional military parade, which is an example of bravery and fearlessness."
On November 16, the German "Autumn Offensive" began. To the north , Hult 's 3rd Panzer Corps attacked southeast , capturing Klin northwest of Moscow on the 23rd , breaking through the Moscow–Volga Canal on the 28th , establishing a fortified bridgehead on the east bank of the river and capturing a large power plant that supplied most of Moscow's electricity. To the south of Holt, Heppner's 4th Panzer Corps occupied the town of Istra northwest of Moscow on the 27th, only 15 miles from Moscow, and Heppner could already see the red star at the top of the Kremlin Tower through his glasses; To the south, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army began its advance northward on November 18, and by the 25th its avant-garde regiment had approached Kahira, south of Moscow, and its main forces surrounded Tula. It seems that Moscow is at hand. The Soviets fought the Germans in the ice and snow.
However , the success of the armoured forces on both wings depended on the advance of Kruger 's 4th Army in the center. However , Kruger 's 4th Army was met with frontal resistance from the outset by powerful Soviet forces. Since Zhukov used all his elite forces in this direction, the assault of the 4th Army did not progress quickly at the beginning. On the 22nd, Marshal Bock, commander of Army Group Center, personally went into battle to command the 4th Army, and according to Halder's diary, Bock exerted "great energy" and threw all available troops into the battle, according to his own words, this situation was the same as the Battle of the Marne in 1914, "When the last battalion is in force, it may be possible to decide the victory." However , despite Bock's desperate efforts , each advance of the 4th Army was extremely difficult. When Bock thought that the Soviet reserves had run out, more and more elite Siberian divisions of the Soviet army appeared in front of him. Bock was already afraid that the battle would turn into the second "Battle of Verdun", a fierce war of attrition. On December 1, Bock launched another offensive with his tired division as a last-ditch effort. His efforts have finally yielded some progress. On December 2, a unit of the German 258th Infantry Division broke into the outskirts of Moscow.
By this time, the temperature had dropped to minus 40 degrees Celsius. Most of the Germans were left without warm clothing, thousands of personnel were frostbitten and hundreds frozen. The terrible cold not only destroyed the soldiers' bodies, but also brought the machines to a halt and the weapons to fail. In stark contrast to the Germans, the Soviet army from Siberia had sufficient winter combat equipment, and the new Soviet tanks T-34 and T-35 could still be launched in the bitter cold. On December 4, when the temperature dropped to minus 52 degrees Celsius, the Germans could no longer fight. With a heavy heart, Guderian decided to retreat first. It was the first retreat of his invincible armoured brigade since the Ping Poland. On December 5, the German offensive in all directions was halted by the terrible cold and the stubborn resistance of the Soviet army. Although Moscow was close and within range of their artillery fire, they were exhausted and exhausted. And the Soviets were ready to launch a powerful counteroffensive against the exhausted and half-dead Germans.
On 5 December, Konev's Kalinin Front took the lead in launching a counteroffensive against the Germans north of Moscow. The next day, Zhukov's Western Front also launched a powerful counteroffensive against German forces north and south of Moscow. Once the German army, which had been on the offensive for a long time, was subjected to a large-scale counterattack by the Soviet army, it was inevitable to be a little panicked, but the German army, which had been tempered by a long period of battle, showed rare resilience, and they quickly stabilized from the panic and retreated. Zhukov demanded of the troops: "Do not entangle with the enemy's rearguard units, but quickly bypass them, hit as deep as possible into the rear of the German army, and pursue the enemy day and night." At Zhukov's urging, the speed of the Soviet counteroffensive continued to accelerate. The German lines were broken through one after another and forced to retreat.
On 19 December, Hitler dismissed Army Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch and became Commander-in-Chief himself. He issued an order: "Everyone should fight back in his or her original position." When there are no established positions in the rear, it is absolutely not allowed to retreat". Although the German generals repeatedly demanded to retreat, and Guderian and Heppner were dismissed for retreating without permission, Hitler believed that he must not retreat, otherwise he would repeat Napoleon's mistakes. In this regard, the British military historian Fuller commented: "Although it was because of his stubbornness that the battle was brought to the brink of defeat, it was also because of his stubbornness that he did not jump into this abyss." Undoubtedly, his refusal to withdraw from Russia or the region east of Smolensk prevented an even more terrible catastrophe for his army than in 1812. ”
By the end of December 1941, the Soviets had recaptured the cities of Klin, Kaluga, and Kalinin, and relieved the German siege of Tula. Thus ended the Battle of Moscow. According to figures released by the Soviet High Command, the German army suffered more than 500,000 casualties, more than 1,300 tanks, 2,500 artillery pieces and more than 15,000 cars. It was the first major defeat suffered by the German army since the beginning of the war.
Regarding the reasons for the defeat of the German army under Moscow, Guderian and other German generals believed that Hitler called a halt in Smolensk and threw the main forces of Army Group Center into the Leningrad Ukrainian operation. This strategic guiding ideology was the main reason for the defeat of the German army in 1941. Most Western military historians and military theorists believe that the early arrival of winter in Russia and the lack of preparation of the German army for the cold and winter war were the main reasons for the defeat of the German army. The British military theorist Liddell Hart <战略论>wrote in it: "If we have to ask, what was the main reason for the defeat of the German army in the 1941 campaign? Its most appropriate verdict is 'defeated by natural factors.' ’”
In the Battle of Moscow, the Germans lost 500,000 people, including more than 100,000 frostbite, 1,300 tanks, 2,500 artillery pieces, and 15,000 vehicles of various kinds. But the Soviet attempt to annihilate Army Group "Center" was not realized. The Soviet victory at the Battle of Moscow declared the bankruptcy of Hitler's blitzkrieg. This battle not only changed the situation on the Soviet-German battlefield, but also developed Soviet military academia. In the process of defense, the Soviet army replaced line defense with a deep echelon configuration, and attached importance to tank defense, combining defense with counteroffensive. In the course of the offensive, valuable experience was gained in choosing a favorable opportunity for the general offensive, attaching importance to the formation of strategic reserves and concentrating on their use in the turning stage of the campaign, attaching importance to organizing coordinated actions of various branches of the armed forces, and organizing artillery attacks.