Mahmoud Salem is an Egyptian writer and political analyst
Source: Al-Monitor, April 22, 2023 Compiled by Shi Zhihong, Sultan Research Center, Yangzhou University
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Force (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (nicknamed "Hemeti"), clashes erupted across Sudan on April 15.
The conflict involved a number of deep-seated factors, including increasing pressure on the RSF as a paramilitary force to be integrated into the SAF, a process that was too rapid to be liked by the RSF. The popular topic in Sudan was the issue of the military's blocking of Sudan's civilian-led democratic transition, but these pressures have led to a fundamental shift in the topic of how to prevent another long-term and destructive civil war in Sudan.
So far, numerous different narratives have attempted to reduce the conflict to a regional proxy war between Egypt and the UAE, which is in a historic state of "cash-shyness." Three times in the past nine years, Egypt has relied on aid from the UAE to sustain itself financially. Thus, even if Egypt wishes to do so, it is not in a position to play the role of a proxies in a dynamic conflict, both financially and practically.
What's more, to call the conflict a regional proxy war is simplistic when discussing a country as complex as Sudan. To date, every war in the Sudan has been a multi-layered conflict. The following is an attempt to describe all stakeholders in this conflict and their positions.
01 Conflict protagonist
Lieutenant General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo.
The RSF's prominent leader, who rose from the Janjaweed militia that was once active in Darfur in western Sudan, eventually took over leadership of the RSF when it became a formal part of Sudan's national security apparatus under Bashir. In early 2017, Sudan's parliament passed the Rapid Support Force Decree, placing it under the control of the President's Office, thus ending its paramilitary status.
Under Khmeti's leadership, the RSF grew into a large, well-trained, urban fighting force, and his control of Sudan's western border allowed him to establish direct contacts with regional and international actors, and allowed him to control gold mines throughout the region (which produced about 40 percent of Sudan's gold exports, worth billions of dollars a year), as well as African migrants and human trafficking through Libya.
Khmeti's unconventional rise in military power has angered the Khartoum-based Islamist-leaning Sudanese Armed Forces military hierarchy, who are also angry with his ethnic and tribal background (Hemeti comes from historically marginalized Darfur Arab tribes), but it has not stopped them from sending troops to Yemen to aid Saudi Arabia (against the Houthis in Yemen), plotting to overthrow al-Bashir's regime, or deposing Sudan's civilian civilian transitional government through a coup in 2021. More recently, Khmeti publicly denied and regretted the 2021 coup.
Since the conflict began, Khmeti has tried to characterize his actions as an attempt to save the democratic transition, accusing Burhan of being an anti-democratic radical Islamist who claims he is using foreign power to kill Sudanese civilians.
Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Burhan.
As Sudan's defense minister and commander-in-chief of Sudan's armed forces and de facto supreme leader of Sudan's transitional regime, Burhan came to power in April 2019 in a coup that led to the ouster of 30-year-old President Bashir. He served as military attaché at the embassy in Sudan in China, later promoted to inspector general of the army, and then promoted to defense minister within 3 months. He is also known for overseeing Sudanese military deployments in Yemen, where he worked with Khmeti's forces.
As the highest-ranking figure in the Sudanese Armed Forces, Burhan is considered a member or influenced by Kizan (Arabic for a cup made of clay for drinking water that has been handed to travelers on the road to quench their thirst) for thousands of years, a small group of al-Bashir Islamist supporters with Muslim Brotherhood roots. These ties with the Muslim Brotherhood have always made Egypt and the UAE skeptical of Burhan, but given Burhan's institutional legitimacy as the head of the army, they have worked with him and supported him on several occasions. The SAF is twice the size of the RSF, with an air force and heavy weapons, but it is not as well-trained and suitable for urban warfare as the RSF.
Burhan has sought to consolidate his position by maintaining formal relations with "old allies" in regions such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Chad, and to secure his future position in Sudan by forging new ties with Israel. Burhan's unclear state and capricious stance on loyalty prevented him from gaining support from the UAE authorities in 2022, and his order for the release of some Islamist prisoners also made the UAE authorities dislike him. Since the beginning of the conflict, he has called the RSF a dangerous militia and has rejected all calls for dialogue, which some Sudanese say is due to pressure from Jizan who wants to eradicate the RSF and return the deposed (al-Bashir) regime to power.
02 Other Sudanese forces
Alliance of Signatories to the Framework Agreement. More than 40 civil society parties and groups signed the Framework Agreement (March 19, 2023, Sudan's ruling Transitional Sovereignty Council reached an agreement with various civilian political organizations to transfer power to a civilian government on April 11) to make Sudan's democratic transition process work. The coalition represents civilians, but does not have any real militia of its own. It has publicly condemned the dissolved regime after the 2019 coup and its National Congress Party political alliance, arguing that it hasten the current conflict in order to regain power. It sided with civilian protesters.
National Congress Party. The political coalition was the ruling party of Bashir's era, but it still has a national organization, as well as tribal and financial support. Many claim that it still has influence over the Sudanese Armed Forces and is also allegedly behind the Sudan Shield Forces and the Patriotic Entity, formed last December by retired Lieutenant Colonel Abu Aqelah Mohamed Kikal, in the Butana region of central Sudan. Both forces claim that they are not rebel groups opposed to the Sudanese Armed Forces but were established to protect their areas and areas, which now include Kordofan, White Nile, Red Sea and Khartoum States. The silence of the Sudanese Armed Forces on their formation has sparked speculation that they have the tacit approval, if not direct support, of Burhan. Forces loyal to President Al-Bashir, who stepped down in 2019, are leaning toward backing the Sudanese Armed Forces.
The Justice and Equality Movement. The rebel group, a non-Arab group from the Darfur region of western Sudan, took up arms against Bashir in 2003 under the leadership of Jibril Ibrahim. It is a formidable fighting force backed by Sudan's neighbor Chad and has sent fighters to Libya on the side of the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli. In recent years, its ranks may have been reduced compared to other groups in Darfur, and its affiliation is unclear.
The Sudanese People's Liberation Army – North. The force was formed in 2017 when Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North split, and its leader, Abdelaziz al-Hilu, took most of its fighters. Based in the Nuba Mountains of Southern Kordofan State, the force is the largest rebel faction in the region and aims to turn Sudan into a secular state. Siru dislikes the Islamists in Khartoum and the Arabic-speaking elites who seek to impose an Arab identity on Sudan, which means he does not support the Sudanese Armed Forces, the RSF, or forces loyal to Bashir. Its position is tilted towards the Sudanese civilian population.
Sudan Liberation Movement's Minnawi faction. The faction is led by Darfur rebel leader Minni Minnawi, who is allegedly stationed in and operating in Libya as part of foreign mercenaries belonging to Libyan rebel leader General Khalifa Haftar. It tends to support RSF.
Sudan Liberation Movement's Al-Nur faction. Led by Abdul-Wahid al-Nur, who lives in exile in France, it is the last major remaining armed group in Darfur, with organizations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan regions. The group's membership is said to have been shattered by Nur's prolonged absence, but his fighters are also said to have fought alongside Haftar in Libya. Its affiliation is unclear, although it may be skewed towards RSF.
03 Sudan is in close proximity to the country
Egypt. Given its long-standing relationship with the Sudanese military, Egypt is firmly supporting Burhan, but is currently financially unable to support Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces in any other way. On the first day of the conflict, the RSF captured some Egyptian soldiers and referred to them as foreign invading forces supporting Burhan, which dealt a blow to Egypt's anti-Khmeti stance. Thanks to the intervention of the UAE and various guarantees from Khmeti, the captured soldiers returned safely to Egypt, allowing Egypt to save face after three days of public humiliation. The Cairo authorities are unlikely to continue to be a factor in either of the two sides to the conflict, opting instead to work on a ceasefire and dialogue.
Libya. Libya's government of national reconciliation is unlikely to take a stand on the conflict, and Libyan opposition general Haftar has many Darfur fighters in his forces. In May 2020, Haftar received 1,200 RSF fighters from Hemeti to support the former's forces in the war south of Tripoli. Haftar's side is pro-RSF, but it currently publicly denies any support or involvement.
Ethiopia. On April 21, Sudanese media linked to the Sudanese armed forces accused Ethiopia of exploiting Sudan's ongoing infighting to attempt to invade disputed territory in the Al Fashaga area, allegedly thwarted by SAF, an allegation Ethiopian officials strongly denyed. Fashaga, a fertile agricultural land, has been the site of various tensions on the border between Ethiopia and Sudan for 33 years. The Ethiopian invasion is ironic because Ethiopia has accused the Sudanese Armed Forces of using the 2020 Tigray conflict to invade Ethiopian soil. Officially, it does not support either side of the Sudanese conflict, but it is definitely not pro-SAF. Most likely, it supports Bashir's former loyalists, or even the RSF.
Chad. The Arab tribe to which Khmeti belonged lived across the border between Chad and the Sudan, and whose ancestral ties to Chad would allow him to rally fighters and support from eastern Chad if needed. Khmeti also maintains ties with various armed groups in the Central African Republic, many of which have ties to Russia's Wagner Group. Chad supports RSF.
04 Regional powers
Saudi. Although Saudi Arabia has been a player in Sudan's political transition process from the start, it has so far remained neutral in Sudan's conflict, although one of its planes was burned in the breach. The Saudis don't necessarily trust Burhan, but they don't want to see the Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudan destroyed in a senseless war. In addition, both RSF and SAF have fought on the side of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, so thankfully Saudi Arabia is not currently on either side, as Saudi financial support is sure to lead to an exponential escalation of violence. The authorities in Riyadh are now neutral and hope that it will remain neutral.
U.A.E. According to multiple reports in The Wall Street Journal this week about the conflict and leaks, the UAE has been accused of supporting Khmeti in a proxy war, which UAE officials have denied. The UAE does not deny its history of hiring Khmeti's troops to fight in previous conflicts, but this is different from using them to fight a civil war in their home country that has put the UAE's multibillion-dollar investment in Sudanese farmland projects at risk. The UAE and Burhan have also signed a contract to build a new Red Sea port, which the UAE has long hoped for for its food security control supply chain.
Given the scale and nature of these investments, it is not a holistic approach for the Abu Dhabi authorities to confront Sudanese state institutions, so it makes no sense for the UAE to push for an armed conflict that could end in a victory for the Sudanese Armed Forces. The UAE has always sided with the old establishment, believing that instability is bad for business. That being said, the Abu Dhabi authorities are extremely allergic to anything that smells of the Muslim Brotherhood and if it is forced to choose between Burhan or Khmeti, it will choose Hemeti, which it knows and trusts over the Brotherhood. The official position of the UAE is neutral, but leans towards the RSF.
05 World power
China. China has a history of investing in Sudan and has known Burhan since he was military attaché to the Sudanese embassy in Beijing. However, it supports stability and believes that fighting is bad for investment. It officially supports the Sudanese state, but does not provide financial support to the Sudanese armed forces in this conflict, so it remains neutral.
Russia. There are many reports that RSF cooperated with the prestigious Russian Wagner Group in the Central African Republic, and Khmeti sold Sudanese gold and smuggled it to Russia. If this is true, then Russia is firmly supporting the Khmeti side, but given the geopolitical harmfulness of the Sudanese conflict and the fact that Wagner himself is mired in the war in Ukraine, it is unlikely that the Moscow authorities will or will be able to realistically provide any form of practical support to Khmeti, as this will certainly lead Western countries to support Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces. Moscow is currently officially neutral.
United States. The conflict has been exacerbated by the lack of a proactive approach by the United States Government to the democratic transition process in the Sudan compared to any other country. When Burhan and Khmeti staged a military coup against the civilian-led transitional government in 2021, it was widely expected that the United States would sanction the two generals for their anti-democratic behavior. However, the U.S. government has not seriously considered imposing sanctions on military personnel responsible for the coup. As Foreign Policy reported last year, this led to a conflict between Jeffrey Feltman, the Biden administration's U.S. special envoy who supported sanctions against the generals of the Khartoum administration, and Molly Phee, assistant secretary of state for Africa. The United States has so far avoided imposing such sanctions.
Sudan is not a priority for the Biden administration, whose entire foreign policy strategy is now focused on the war in Ukraine and confronting China.
UK and EU. Like the United States, they have refused to sanction Sudan's generals for the 2021 coup and believe that pushing for an agreement that primarily protects generals from any criminal liability would be an important step in supporting Sudan's transition to civilian government.
06 Conclusion
The situation in the Sudan remains very volatile. This could be a well-planned skirmish that uses the threat of further escalation to shift the conversation from democratic transition to stability. Or it could become an existential war between two branches of Sudan's security apparatus, which could unleash unimaginable suffering and escalate into a conflict — the scale and intensity of which makes the war in Syria look like a picnic.