"What merit do I deserve?"
This sentence was said by Peng Dehuai in October 1951 when he rejected north Korea's "National Flag Medal of the First Class."
In order to commemorate the first anniversary of the volunteer army's entry into the Korean war, the grateful Korean people decided to award him this highest honor. Finally, on October 25, peng Dehuai received this precious medal at the Volunteer Army Headquarters under the advice of the Central Military Commission.
Why do you want to refuse in the first place?
Mr. Peng's explanation is as follows:
"I just did some specific work in the rear, and this medal should be awarded to those combat heroes, and I can do more than they deserve!"
The world says that Mr. Peng is a knife and a knife; the world says that Mr. Peng loves to get angry before the battle, as if he is not a Confucian general no matter how he looks at it. But his comrades-in-arms around him all knew how much he loved soldiers like sons. When he was in Korea, he rushed to the crown three times in anger, in order to save the lives of the young soldiers.
In this issue, what I want to tell you is a "death order" that has made Mr. Peng extremely distressed. This cruel "death order" was given by himself, but the guards around him later recalled him after giving the order:
"He was restless, and day by day he stood alone in the darkness on the slopes of the drizzling hills, looking south. But at the same time, he kept calling the front line and strictly ordering them not to retreat, not to retreat..."
Today, more than 70 years later, we can no longer imagine what kind of torment Mr. Peng's heart is when he says the three words "no retreat". What we do know is that after the war, Americans used the radio to shout: We are willing to negotiate!
What's going on with all this?
One: Ridgway is not the "2nd MacArthur"
The Battle of Chosin Lake was a disgrace to MacArthur's life. The "five-star general" finally understood what kind of opponent he was facing.
On December 23, 1950, the day before the battle of Chosin Lake, Walker, commander of the U.S. 8th Army, drove a jeep to command the troops to retreat, only to collide with a South Korean truck and destroy the vehicle on the spot.
Walker's death demoralized the U.S. army, and MacArthur had to choose another general who could "take on the heavy responsibility" to play. That night, Matthew Bunker Ridgway, the army's deputy chief of staff, who was having dinner with friends in Washington, received a call from his superiors and hurried to the Pentagon for a meeting.
Two days later, Ridgway showed up at MacArthur's official residence in Tokyo, and the two had a famous conversation:
MacArthur told Ridgway: "Don't underestimate Chinese, that's a dangerous force." Ridgway just listened and didn't speak. He couldn't understand how MacArthur, who had always been arrogant and confident, could be as judgmental as before.
In order to reassure his old superiors, Ridgway said very firmly: "General, if I get there and find that the situation is favorable to me, will you oppose me to launch a counter-offensive?" ”
MacArthur listened, put down his big pipe, laughed, and said to Ridgway, "Matthew, the 8th Army is yours!" Do a good job! ”
Ridgway dared to say this for a reason: his father was a veteran colonel in the Army, he graduated from west point at the age of 22, and participated in World War I and World War II. He is cold, arrogant, and does not talk much, but he can always give his opponents a fatal blow.
A few days later, as soon as Ridgway arrived in Seoul, South Korea, from President Syngman Rhee to the generals, deeply understood that Ridgway was not the "second MacArthur." If MacArthur was like a tiger, Ridgway was a wolf walking in the dark. Wolves, on the other hand, are often the most terrifying.
When he first arrived in Seoul, Ridgway saw the U.S. troops like this:
The warriors descended from the narrow road, timid, without radio or telephone contact, without even daring to move, and they lacked the imagination to deal with the enemy.
Ridgway, 56, saw such an American army for the first time, and he was determined to turn things around. So, after that, he did several things:
First, he hung a grenade (some say he hung both) on his shoulder. At first, his subordinates thought he was just putting on a show, but as time went on, the American soldiers were willing to believe that the commander was very different.
Second, as soon as he found the opportunity, he flew along the confrontation line between the two armies in an old-fashioned aircraft, flying at an altitude of only 1,000 meters. Above the snow, Ridgway could see the terrain clearly. This act of "not being afraid of death" undoubtedly greatly stimulated the subordinates.
Again, he found maps and front-line operational logs, studied them carefully, and he once said that he should be familiar with the geographical environment of North Korea as he was familiar with his own backyard garden.
The above 3 points are not possible for other arrogant US generals. Therefore, under his stimulation over and over again, the morale of the US military as a whole has obviously been improved.
At the same time, Ridgway also has a great "advantage": he knows how to advance and retreat, and can withstand pressure.
Within a few days of arriving in Seoul, Ridgway asked the U.S. ambassador to inform South Korean President Syngman Rhee: "The US troops will withdraw from Seoul, and your South Korean government will also withdraw in advance!" ”
Of course, Syngman Rhee disagreed, asking: "Didn't you say when you first took office that you would stay in Korea for a long time, and why did you have to evacuate Seoul just a week later? ”
Ridgway was not intimidated by this "radical method", and he very calmly told Syngman Rhee two sentences:
First, you'd better go to the front line and listen to the trumpets that blow when the Chinese army attacks, and see how your own army is fleeing like a flock! How could such an army carry out my counter-assault plan!
Second, I am only evacuating Seoul now and am not ready to leave North Korea!
Not going against the trend, this is where Ridgway and MacArthur are different.
Many friends may see this and feel strange: Isn't it just a US army general? Why overestimate him so much, and make others discouraged to destroy their own prestige!
I fully understand everyone's feelings, but I always hope that you will understand: Among the generals in the US army, Ridgway is the one that gives our army the most headaches. The difficulties he created for the volunteers were enormous. Not treating the U.S. military as a fool and facing up to what kind of enemy we were facing back then is the greatest respect for the volunteer army.
Two: Ridgway's poison scheme, Peng Dehuai's "death order"
In late April 1951, the Fifth Campaign began. This was a "duel" between Peng Dehuai and Ridgway, and it was also a life-and-death battle for the volunteer army.
After repeated front-line inspections and day-to-day study of front-line war reports, Ridgway finally discovered the weakness of the volunteer army, and he called the volunteers' offensive: the prayer offensive. He believed that the volunteer logistics were fragile, and that each attack could only last for a week or so.
As a result, he quickly adopted a well-designed tactic, namely:
Retreating at a speed of 20 miles a day, trying to avoid close combat and night battles with the Volunteers, relying on long-range artillery fire to inflict maximum damage on the Volunteers, while the powerful U.S. Air Force was ordered to go all out to cut off the Volunteers' rear supply lines.
During this time, the volunteer soldiers on the front line fought very hard, but their ambitions were high, and they often said in a contemptuous tone: "American soldiers, never dare to fight with us bayonets!" ”
The results of the front line are still expanding, the South Korean troops are still fleeing in a panic, and everything seems to be proceeding in the direction our army wants. But at this time, with 30 years of experience in bloody battles, Peng Dehuai was keenly aware that the US military may be brewing a strategic encirclement of the volunteer army. If this is the case, then the main 3 corps of the Volunteer Army may face the danger of total annihilation.
It should be said that at this time, he can still maintain absolute sobriety, and Peng Dehuai is worthy of being a world-class military expert.
Subsequently, under great pressure, he issued an order on May 21:
All the troops on the front line stopped attacking, quickly retreated, and turned to the vicinity of the 38th line for defense!
It should be said that Peng Dehuai's decision directly concerned the life and death of the volunteer army. Moreover, there were many people who did not quite understand him when he gave his orders.
Peng Dehuai's reaction was quick, but Ridgway's movements were faster!
Just one day before the volunteer headquarters ordered the retreat, Ridgway, who found that the counter-offensive was ripe, had already issued a counter-offensive order. At this time, almost all of our army's supplies were exhausted, and the main force was quite far away from the 38th Line; and at this time, the US army not only had no problem in supplying, but the soldiers were still holding a lot of energy.
What to do?
After a period of offensive and defensive conversion, both Ridgway and Peng Dehuai noticed a small town called "Tieyuan". Cheonwon, located in the "navel" part of the Korean Peninsula, where three railways intersect between North and South Korea. The mountain range and towering peaks were particularly suitable for the Volunteers to build a new strategic defensive line.
But the fatal thing is that north of the Iron Plains is a horse Flat River, suitable for the mechanized troops of the US army. Once the Americans occupied The Iron Plains, the exhausted volunteer forces could no longer find favorable terrain to resist. In this case, the Tieyuan Blockade Battle became a life-and-death battle to defend the main force of the volunteer army.
Who's going to fight this battle? Peng Dehuai fell into contemplation.
All the main forces were glued to the US troops outside, and it was easy to retreat and defend the Iron Plain! At this time, Chairman Mao's arrangement as early as December 1950 played a decisive role.
As early as that time, Chairman Mao made meticulous arrangements for the strategic use of the effective forces of the volunteer army. In his telegram to Peng Dehuai on December 17, he had already proposed: "If there is an opportunity to use more troops in two or three months, consider using Yang Dezhi's corps!" ”
Therefore, in the days that followed, Yang Dezhi's 19th Corps had been doing supplementary training in Andong, Changdian and other places in the northeast. With this arrangement by Chairman Mao, Peng Dehuai had a bottom in mind. He immediately called the headquarters of the 19th Corps and asked Yang Dezhi to hold the Iron Plains for 15 to 20 days.
Yang Dezhi was a tough general in our army, and he never instigated him in the anti-Japanese battlefield and the liberation battlefield. However, at this time, he had just entered the DPRK, and it was very difficult for him to receive such an order. As for the reason, it's realistic:
The 19th Corps has three corps, 63rd, 64th and 65th. Before Peng Dehuai's order was issued, the 65th Army, which had just entered the DPRK, had already exchanged fire with the AMERICAN troops; and the 64th Army was already in the far west, struggling with the US troops advancing north. Neither of these two armies could lay down their current positions to defend Tieyuan.
Therefore, the only thing that Yang Dezhi could use in his hands was the 63rd Army. However, at this time, the comparison between the situation between the 63rd Army and the US army is as follows:
First, there is the comparison between the generals. The commander of our 63rd Army, named Fu Chongbi, was only 35 years old, walked through the Long March, and participated in the liberation of Taiyuan and Zhangjiakou; the commander of the US army was Van Vliet, 24 years older than Fu Chongbi, who participated in World War I and World War II, and was one of the most famous generals in the US army.
Second, the strength of the two armies is compared. At that time, the strength of our 63rd Army was about 24,000, and the US army sent 4 whole divisions with a total strength of 50,000 people.
Finally, there is the equipment comparison. Everyone knows how well our army is equipped, and the most lethal weapon of the 63rd Army at that time was the 240 artillery pieces. The four divisions of the US military have a total of more than 1600 artillery pieces and more than 300 tanks, and the strong support of the Air Force is needless to say.
In this contrast, it may be fine to keep it for a few days, but it is almost impossible to keep it for more than half a month. Soon, Peng Dehuai's phone rang again. His voice was hoarse and low, and he firmly gave the "death order": "Even if the 63rd Army is wiped out, it is necessary to hold on to The Iron Plains for 15 to 20 days!" ”
Through the telephone search, Yang Dezhi found Fu Chongbi, commander of the 63rd Army, who was commanding the operation, on a position.
Fu Chongbi is Yang Dezhi's beloved general, who has followed him to the south and the north for many years, and there are always endless words when the two meet on weekdays. But at this time, Yang Dezhi did not know what to say to Fu Chongbi. He just asked over and over again: "You say, do you have any difficulties?" ”
Fu Chongbi never spoke.
Yang Dezhi saw him like this and asked again, "Did you hear me?" Is it difficult to stay for 15 to 20 days? Fu Chongbi still didn't say anything. Many years later, the old general Yang Dezhi learned that in fact, there was a meeting within the 63rd Army on the same day, and everyone's opinion was: Not a single difficulty was mentioned. Because if it is mentioned, it will increase the burden on the friendly troops.
Fu Chongbi did not ask for soldiers or guns, but Yang Dezhi still tried his best to make up 500 veterans for him. There were only 500 of them, and he couldn't get out of the many.
At this point, the most magnificent battle in the history of the 63rd Army of the Chinese Volunteer Army began.
Three: Peng Dehuai looks to the south day by day
The army pressed the frontier, and Fu Chongbi put the 3 divisions under his command into a "pin" shape. To this day, there are still military fans who believe that under the circumstances at that time, if it were not for the heart of "must die", there would not be such a formation. This formation itself means to die and sacrifice.
Ridgway and Van Vleet were both desperate for The Iron Plains, and in just the first hour, they poured 4,500 tons of shells at the 189th Division of our Volunteer Army. For a time, the iron plains were full of fire, and the smoke covered the sun. The soldiers of our army in other directions looked at it and wiped their tears.
At that time, Peng Dehuai's headquarters was no more than a hundred miles away from Tieyuan. This meant that once the Iron Plains were lost, the American tanks would be able to reach the headquarters in less than two days. The comrades around him all advised Peng Dehuai: "General Manager Peng, let's retreat a little!" Your safety is paramount! ”
Peng Dehuai shook his head and did not withdraw a step. He could not eat or sleep, and often stood alone in the night, looking south in the direction of The Iron Plains. The guards did not dare to come forward and disturb, so they followed behind and accompanied them. But at the same time, he kept calling Fu Chongbi and telling him: We must stick to it! Don't back off! I don't go back either!
After 14 days and nights, the US army finally lost its strength and announced: a full retreat. Ridgway did not expect the volunteers to be so capable of carrying, and in the end of the fight he himself could not understand at all, he asked the intelligence personnel: "Are you sure that the war report is correct?" How many people on the other side are in Tetsuhara? ”
In fact, the number of people is really not as many as Ridgway imagined. Taking a regiment under the 188th Division of the 63rd Army as an example, the total strength of the regiment was 2700 people when it entered Korea, and only more than 200 people were left after a few days of fighting in Tieyuan. But these more than 200 people have been guarding for a whole week. The situation in the other regimental headquarters is basically similar to this.
After the battle, Peng Dehuai personally went to the position. Seeing that the clothes on the soldiers' bodies had turned into wisps of cloth and that the position was already a scorched earth, Peng Dehuai said a word, "The motherland thanks you," and he could not say any more.
The Tieyuan Blockade Battle played a key role in preserving the main force of the volunteer army, and he meant that the series of arrangements and deployments made by Ridgway earlier were ultimately unsuccessful.
After the war, the Pentagon ordered that the "United Nations Army" enter a period of strategic defense;
After the war, the "United Nations Army" never thought of encircling the main force of our army again;
After the war, Ridgway was no longer the "god" of the US military, and he was questioned a lot from the US mainland and South Korea. In this regard, he was the same as his old superior, MacArthur.
What the officers and men of our army did not expect was that on June 30, 1951, the month after the end of the Tieyuan Resistance War, Ridgway issued a statement to Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung through the form of a radio, shouting that the "United Nations Army" was willing to negotiate with the volunteers on the armistice, let's negotiate!
This statement means that Ridgway, the always arrogant "lone wolf", has bowed his head mentally, and he also understands MacArthur's original helplessness. Since then, armistice negotiations have been taking place in a stop-and-go. It wasn't until July 27, 1953, that the Americans had to sign an armistice.
End:
In the Tieyuan Blockade War 71 years ago, the 63rd Army invented many ways of playing, such as the "three flowers" tactic invented by a company commander, which annihilated more than 800 enemy troops with only a dozen people. In addition, there are many tactics that are gradually discovered and declassified after many years after the end of the battle.
A large number of military historians are still studying the battle and trying to find more tactical ways to explain how the lovely people of the past completed this "impossible task".
The author believes that there will be many answers to this question, from the perspective of tactical play, from the perspective of military equipment, from the perspective of position type, and so on. But one thing is certain: the key to winning or losing a war is man. Having such a general and having such a soldier is the key to the answer. With this article, I would like to commemorate those who have worked hard for New China.