The article recognized by the people of the world as the savior of the Chinese nation restores a real history to the reader

First, observation and anxiety outside the decision-making level

Jude returned from Russia on July 12, 1926, after a four-year absence. Before he went abroad in 1922, he had been struggling for 11 years to realize Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary ideals since he joined the Xinhai Revolution, and although he already had a high-ranking official Houlu, he could not see the hope of victory of the revolution. Why do revolutions always fail? He couldn't find the answer, just felt that "something must be wrong on some fundamental problem." He resolutely abandoned the high-ranking official Houlu and must find out where the crux of this "fundamental problem is wrong" and how to solve it. As he and Sun Bingwen told Sun Yat-sen before going abroad: "We decided to study abroad, and before we returned to political life in China, we would first meet with the Communists and study communism." Because "the Communists know something we should know." The Zhu De who returned to the motherland is no longer the Zhu De of 4 years ago. After 4 years of ideological tempering, he has changed from a democrat to a Marxist, and the development and future of the Chinese revolution are completely devoid of the wandering, chaos, pessimism and disappointment that he had before he left the country. He has found the key to understanding and solving the Chinese problem – Marxism-Leninism. Zhu De was full of confidence in the victory of the cause of the party and the people's revolution.

When Zhu De returned to China, the Northern Expedition war carried out in cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists had just begun. Chen Duxiu sent him to Sichuan to stabilize the forces of the warlord Yang Sen, in order to prevent Yang Sen from allying with the forces of the Beiyang warlord Wu Peifu, who controlled Hubei, and to alleviate the resistance of the National Revolutionary Army to the capture of Wuhan.

With the in-depth development of the Northern Expedition, just after the National Revolutionary Army conquered Wuhan, the situation of the entire Chinese revolution became extremely complicated. The clash of old and new contradictions was extremely fierce, especially the vigorous revolutionary movement of workers and peasants launched under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, which disturbed the right wing of the Kuomintang representing the landlord bourgeoisie, who had a premonition that the momentum of revolutionary development was a great threat to them. After a series of counter-revolutionary rehearsals, they finally betrayed the revolution completely in 1927 with the symbols of "April 12" and "July 15", and the vigorous revolutionary movement led by the Northern Expedition was declared defeated. This is due to the erroneous tendency of the Party's Central Committee to dogmatize marxism-Leninism, the resolutions of the Communist International and the experience of the Russian revolution, and the fact that the core leadership of the Party is completely subordinate to the opinions of the deputies of the Communist International and the CpSU.

Jude was a self-conscious Marxist. After returning to China, he threw himself into the party's work with full enthusiasm, demanded himself with a high degree of organizational discipline, and brilliantly fulfilled all the arduous tasks assigned by the party. In the course of accomplishing various specific tasks, Zhu De saw that there were errors in the direction of the party's principles and policies, and had a premonition that there would be an unexpected disaster. He witnessed the tragic scenes of "April 12" and "July 15" and felt very sad, believing that this was a huge disaster caused by the Party's mistake in direction.

Zhu De, who is outside the decision-making level of the party Central Committee, has no right to speak on the party's guiding ideology, principles, and policies, and not many people in the party know of his existence, but he feels from the implementation of the party's specific policy decisions that the party has great hidden worries about guiding ideology, principles, and policies, especially on some fundamental issues, and he has his own views.

First, Judd has his own views on all instructions of the Party Central Committee that are subject to the instructions of the representatives of the Communist International and the Russian Party. Zhu De believed that "whatever the Russians suggest", the Chinese revolution depends on Chinese itself. He used the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, the 1913 and 1915 revolutions as examples to show that without foreigners plotting, Chinese also carried out the revolution. In Judd's view, if the Comintern and the Russians really want to help us, "it is enough for the Russians to tell us the methods of the revolution" and should not take care of our revolution. Zhu De believes that "the China problem should be solved by the Chinese themselves." When Zhu De had such ideas and views, the Northern Expedition, which was co-organized by the Kuomintang and the Communists, was in full swing.

Second, Zhu De was very incomprehensible when he saw the party abandoning its leadership and not building its own army when cooperating with the Kuomintang. He dismissed Chen Duxiu as a policy of "right opportunism" by placing the Communist Party under the leadership of the Kuomintang and "never thinking of fighting for his own leadership on fundamental revolutionary questions" and not building his own army. He said that the party's "opportunist leadership does not want the army, hands the army over to the bourgeoisie, and one-sidedly emphasizes the mass movement, and its own party members do not serve as officers in the army, but only help others to do political work, which is really stupid!" ”

Third, Zhu De regarded Chen Duxiu's refusal to arm the workers and peasants and not to engage in agrarian revolution as a abandonment of the revolution. From the peasant family he was born into, combined with his struggle experience in the more than ten years after joining the Party and throwing himself into the Xinhai Revolution, Zhu De saw that the "problems of the Chinese revolution are concentrated on the land and peasant movements, and believe that this is the fundamental problem of the revolution." In response to the refusal of the main leaders of the Party to arm the workers and peasants: "The workers and peasants should be armed to save the revolution from betrayal from within. "How profound!

Jude's worries finally turned into a bloody reality. Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei betrayed the revolution, the Kuomintang carried out a policy of massacre against the Communist Party of China and the workers' and peasants' revolutionary movement it led wholeheartedly to help them, the number of CCP members was reduced from 60,000 to 10,000, hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants were killed, and the great revolution suffered a tragic defeat.

Second, stand up and change the direction of the revolution

In the face of the Kuomintang's frenzied policy of massacre, people of insight within the Chinese Communist Party rose up to resist. It was also with the support of the Communist International that the Party resolutely stopped Chen Duxiu's right-leaning opportunist leadership, reorganized the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee, and formed the Provisional Central Standing Committee composed of Zhang Tailei, Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, Li Weihan, and Li Lisan.

In mid-July, the central government decided to hold an armed uprising in Nanchang. On August 1, under the leadership of the former committee with Zhou Enlai as secretary, the Nanchang Uprising was held, the first shots of armed resistance against the Kuomintang reactionaries were fired, and the agrarian revolution began. Then, on August 7, the Central Committee held an emergency meeting, known in history as the "Eighty-Seven Conference." The meeting summed up the lessons and lessons of the defeat of the Great Revolution and realized that the Party had made a right-leaning mistake on three issues related to the success or failure of the revolution: First, in its relations with the Kuomintang, it practiced the policy of retreat and surrender and gave up the leadership of the proletariat; second, on the question of armament, it did not understand the extreme importance of the Party's grasp of the barrel of the gun, and did not arm the workers and peasants to build a strong revolutionary army; third, it did not actively support and lead the peasant movement and did not dare to meet the peasants' land demands. It was precisely these mistakes that buried the excellent situation of the Great Revolution and dealt a heavy blow to the revolutionary forces under the leadership of the Party.

The above-mentioned Zhu De's views on the party's principles and policies and his understanding and propositions on the fundamental issues of the Chinese revolution were confirmed by the summary and analysis of the party's "Eighty-Seven Conference." A person outside the Party's decision-making circle can skillfully control the entire revolutionary situation, can see the inevitable trend of the development of the situation, can see the crux of the problem and the measures that must be taken, and cannot have such a true insight without a profound understanding and experience of the history and current situation of the Chinese revolution, without profound Marxist-Leninist theory and eloquence.

Although the "Eighty-Seventh Conference" criticized Chen Duxiu's right-leaning capitulationism, defined the general policy of the agrarian revolution and armed resistance against the Kuomintang reactionaries, and began a historic turning point from the defeat of the Great Revolution to the rise of the agrarian revolution, the Party Central Committee at this time did not completely break free from the shackles of the Experience of the Communist International and Russia, and still maintained the inertia of thinking formed under their long-term influence. From the defeat of the Great Revolution to the end of 1928, the Party launched and led more than 100 armed uprisings throughout the country, including large-scale uprisings such as the August 1st Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprising, all with the goal of capturing the central cities. These more than 100 uprisings ended in tragic failures, "fighting hard and making ourselves utterly defeated." [9] The losses inflicted on the Communist Party of China and the Chinese by the "city center theory" of the Comintern and Russia are difficult to express in words, and the road of the Chinese revolution from defeat to victory began with Zhu Demao.

As we all know, the Autumn Harvest Uprising was aimed at conquering Changsha. Mao Zedong, who led the autumn harvest uprising, was ordered to lead his troops to attack Changsha, but because it could not be defeated, it failed and was forced to go to Jinggangshan. Mao Zedong has said many times that he grew from a scholar to a military expert, and in addition to the conditions of the times and the influence of Huxiang cultural traditions, he went up to the mountains to fight a war, and fought for more than 20 years after a fight, and it was Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang who forced him to "go to Liangshan." It can be said that it was only then that Mao Zedong truly realized that the "city center theory" of the Communist International and Russia was not suitable for China's national conditions, and it was only then that he changed the direction of the revolution and germinated and embarked on the road of "the countryside encircling the city." Previously, Mao Zedong advocated attaching importance to the armed and peasant movement of workers and peasants, solving the peasant land problem, mastering the barrel of a gun, and so on, but did not leave the service of the "urban center theory", and still followed the path of Chen Duxiu using the workers and peasants "as coolies" to attack the big cities. Mao Zedong shouted "against originalism" and stressed that "the victory of China's revolutionary struggle depends on Chinese comrades understanding the situation in China." It should be said that this is a sign that Mao Zedong got rid of the "city center theory" from his ideological understanding, and the time is 1930.

Zhu De was "forced" earlier than Mao Zedong. First of all, he fought bitterly for 11 years after joining the Xinhai Revolution, forcing him to resolutely abandon the high-ranking official Houlu to find the truth of the revolution. After he found Marxism, he profoundly summed up his revolutionary experience, conducted an in-depth investigation of European capitalist society such as Germany and France, personally felt the socialist system in Russia, and gained a comprehensive and clear understanding of what feudalism, capitalism and socialism were. Secondly, he firmly established and mastered the Marxist outlook on life, world outlook, and methodology, and gradually realized the beautiful prospects depicted by Marxism-Leninism on how to carry out social revolution in China's special national conditions and what forms of struggle and road to adopt. Like a well-rounded actor, he is only one stage away from showing his talents.

The August 1 Nanchang Uprising was also launched under the guidance of the "city center theory". Although Zhu De was also one of the leading members of the uprising command, he was not a core member, and he was still at the level of implementing the party's decisions, and could only do his best to carry out the tasks entrusted to him by the party. Whether it was the preparations that the party asked him to do in Nanchang before the uprising, or the appointment of him as the commander of the 9th Army after the uprising, the role of the vanguard when the rebel army withdrew from Nanchang and marched to Guangdong, the opening of the way for the main forces and the preparation of food and camps, or the task of rearguard after the division of the "Three Rivers Dam", Zhu De completed the task brilliantly.

Zhu De judged whether the party's principles and policies were correct based on the actual needs of the people. In today's parlance, it is called "practice is the only criterion for testing truth." On the way south to Guangdong, despite the busy military affairs, Zhu De had to take time to go deep into the people and understand the people's conditions. He saw: "The oppression of the peasants in Jiangxi is as deep as that of the peasants in my hometown, and even poorer, more desperate, and more miserable." Most of Jiangxi is mountainous and the harvest is very poor. The rent demanded by the landlord was as high as 70 percent of the harvest, and most peasants had to borrow usurious loans from the landlord every year, so that in this life, in the next life, and even in the future, their children and grandchildren could not repay it, and they would always work as cattle and horses for the landlord. They were so poor that they didn't even get a drop of oil in the pot, and they could buy at most a handful of salt at a time. They could only dissolve a pinch of salt in a bowl of water and dip the greens in salt water to cook. They described them as withered, unclothed, illiterate, living in dark and dirty huts with a mud wall and only one door. The landlord is a different story, "Shicheng County is a typical example of other counties." Most of the land in this area is owned by a family surnamed Ray. Two members of the Lei family were Kuomintang officers, one of whom was a general and commanded the local troops. The family had a house in the city, and in addition, there was a country mansion in the old cottage, where cash grain and other treasures were stored. In addition to the tenants, there were hundreds of long-term workers equivalent to serfs working in the fields, eating poorly, living badly, and at most wearing the tattered clothes thrown away by lei's family." A general who leads his army in a deadly battle with the enemy does not forget to conduct in-depth social investigations, and in the face of these real social conditions, it is conceivable that what waves will be caused in his heart.

Because the guiding ideology of organizing the Nanchang Uprising did not get rid of the shackles and shackles of the "urban center theory," it was also a mistake in direction. After the success of the uprising, instead of going deep into the countryside and combining the peasant movement with the peasant movement to carry out the agrarian revolution, he went south to Guangzhou and set off a revolutionary climax again.

Directional errors are fatal. After moving south to Guangdong, the main force was completely destroyed in Shantou, and the leading members of the command were dispersed: He Long and Liu Bocheng went to Shanghai, and Liu Bocheng immediately went to Moscow to study at the Frunze Military Academy; He Long went up the river back to his hometown in western Hunan and organized a team to continue the revolution. Ye Ting and Ye Jianying stayed in Hong Kong to take care of Zhou Enlai, and he fell unconscious from malaria and left for Moscow after recovering. Ye Ting and Ye Jianying remained in Southern China, and later participated in the Guangzhou Uprising, but also failed after a bloody battle.

After the enemy eliminated the main force of the rebel army, the 3,000 people led by Zhu Deshou, who remained behind the "Three Rivers Dam" hall, became a thorn in the enemy's eye. They formed a siege against Zhu De's troops from three sides, trying to eat them in one bite. Losing contact with the command, Zhu De did not know anything about the news that the main force had been defeated, and with the full support of the local peasants, he struggled to organize his troops to fight with the enemy several times his own for three days, and finally had to organize an evacuation from the battle due to nearly half of the casualties. When they retreated to Raoping, Guangdong province under the leadership of peasant fighters, they encountered He Long's troops, "more than 200 officers and men of the rebel army who retired from Chao'an led by Zhou Bangcai, chief of staff of the teaching regiment", and only then did they learn the news that the main force had been defeated in Shantou.

The entire party organization and military chain of command have disintegrated, and the main force has been scattered, what should Zhu De do? At this time, the entire unit was shrouded in defeat, morale was low, people were scattered, and the troops were in danger of disintegration. At this critical moment, Zhu De stepped forward and took on the heavy responsibility entrusted by history, and decided to immediately take the surviving troops out of the danger zone. He held a brief meeting of cadres at the All-German School in Maozhi and put forward the strategic decision of "going north in secret, advancing through the mountains of Shanxi, going straight to the south of Hunan and finding a foothold there," and then going to the border areas of Hunan and Guangdong, where the enemy's strength is weak and the peasant movement foundation is relatively good.

Zhu De raised the banner that had fallen down again, and used his wisdom and talent to preserve his living strength for the revolutionary cause of the party and the people. And in the difficult and difficult environment since then, he has roughly reversed the situation with his own great talent and brought the Chinese revolution in the right direction.

Third, eliminate interference and create a new situation in the revolution

Zhu De led the remaining 2,000 people through the mountains and mountains, in order not to be destroyed by the powerful enemy, he had to march at night, sleeping in the jungle during the day. They have no supplies, no reinforcements, and their situation is very difficult. What caused Zhu De even more a headache was the pessimism and despair pervading among the cadres at the army, division, and regimental level; they believed that the revolution had failed, that the bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution, that they had once again joined forces with the feudal landlords and imperialism, and that they were killing the Communists and the backbone of the workers and peasants in droves; that the enemy's forces were too great to resist and that if they continued the revolutionary struggle, it would be out-and-out adventurism. Therefore, they advocated the dissolution of the team.

Jude, apart from agreeing with their analysis of the counter-revolution, never accepted their conclusions. He said: "If you accept this conclusion, you are betraying the revolution." "He told the senior cadres who advocated disbanding the ranks that you can get a career and survive safely after you go out, and if you have the conditions, you can also return to your hometown or go abroad or something." But neither the workers nor the peasants can do so. The people have absolutely no room for retreat, they either fight to the end until the agrarian and anti-imperialist revolutions succeed, or they are forced to fall back into the abyss of feudalism and imperialist oppression. Jude also pointed out: "The workers and peasants are so poor that they die without fighting, and it is better to die than to die as slaves." Thousands of ordinary people have a flame of hope burning in their hearts, they need leadership, and we can lead. ...... To abandon them is to betray. As for myself, as long as there is one more man left with me, I will continue to fight; even this man has deserted, and I dare say that I can mobilize other people. I refuse to surrender to warlordism. I have chosen the path of the people's revolution, and I will persevere to the end. ”

It is a pity that these people were swept into the revolutionary ranks by the revolutionary torrent to seek personal development, and they had Zhu De's vision and mind. They simply could not listen to Zhu De's enlightenment and exhortations, and continued to carry out activities that scattered the hearts and minds of the army; many of them did not resign under their influence, and some even left in whole shifts on their own, undermining the discipline of the masses and infringing on the interests of the common people from time to time, making it difficult for the entire contingent to continue. There is a danger that the troops will collapse in an instant, and the revolutionary flame that survived after the Nanchang uprising may be extinguished immediately.

Zhu De had a hard time bringing the team to Tianxinwei in Anyuan County, Jiangxi Province, and he was determined to carry out an ideological rectification of the troops, to have a showdown with the defeatists on the basis of education, to solve the problem of leaving behind on the principle of voluntariness, and never to allow them to continue to corrupt the troops. He personally convened a general meeting of all military personnel to preach the revolutionary situation and tasks, pointing out the conditions and reasons for the sure success of the revolution, that difficulties are temporary, and that the final victory must be ours. Zhu De delivered an exciting speech for more than an hour, strengthening the revolutionary conviction of many people, and finally said: "Everyone knows that the Great Revolution has failed, and our rebel army has also failed!" But we still want revolution. Comrades, those who want the revolution to follow me, and those who are not revolutionary can go home! Not reluctantly! Su Yu recalled: "Comrade Zhu De's sonorous and powerful words incisively analyzed the political situation at that time and showed the bright prospects for the inevitable development of the revolution, which was convincing and touching. Chen Yi recalled: "People listened to Commander-in-Chief Zhu's work, gradually became firm, and saw a bright future; at that time, without the leadership of Commander-in-Chief Zhu, this unit would surely collapse." "Commander-in-Chief Zhu pointed out a bright future and increased the revolutionary conviction of the masses on the darkest days when the mood of the masses was low to zero degrees and discouraged. Without the vision of Marxism-Leninism, it would be impossible." In another paragraph of Zhu De's congratulatory speech on his sixtieth birthday, Zhou Enlai said: "In the course of the revolution, you have experienced hardships and twists and turns, and you have endured countless hardships, but you have always held high the torch of revolution and illuminated the bright future, so that thousands of people can follow you and move forward with confidence." How apt Zhou Enlai's words were!

Those who are not firm are mainly middle-level and high-level cadres and those who are deeply influenced by them, and there are more than 800 people who will leave in the end. Because of the dangerous situation, Zhu De was not allowed to calmly rectify the troops, but he immediately set up a confiscation committee, declaring that only the confiscation committee had the power to confiscate the landlord's property, and did not allow each other to do anything and undermine discipline. Although there were fewer people in the troops, there were no more negative factors after the defeatists left, and the troops were filled with a spirit of new hope. This was the result of Zhu De's political education and ideological rectification of the troops, which was called "Tianxinwei rectification" in history. The troops have been injected with new ideological vitality and have a new spiritual outlook. Zhu De led his troops to attack Xinfeng, crushed the landlord militia, confiscated the landlord's money and grain, and solved the extremely poor material problem that had affected the health of the troops. Taking advantage of the high morale, Zhu De set out from Xinfeng and captured the Tungsten City Dayu in southwest Jiangxi. Dayu is located on the border of Gansu and Guangdong, and has a good revolutionary tradition, during the Northern Expedition, the former Fourth Army of the Iron Army also left a transport station, with hundreds of sets of quilts and other military supplies. The person in charge of the station handed over the supplies to Zhu De's troops, and the people also joined the team, and hundreds of tungsten miners and local farmers joined the army. Moreover, the more than 200 people who had originally left the team also asked to return to the team, and Jude welcomed them back without prejudice.

Just as Zhu De led his troops from Xinfeng to Dayu, war resumed among the factions of the new Kuomintang warlords, and a scuffle broke out among the Warlords of the Guangdong, Gui, and Xiang clans. They were so busy fighting each other that they had to temporarily relax their pursuit of the rebels. Zhu De seized the opportunity and decided to reorganize the troops. Because when this unit set out from Raoping, Fujian Province, it was grouped together by several parts, mainly a part of Zhou Shidi, a part of the main force of Chaoshan that was withdrawn in defeat, and a part of Zhu De's original command. With the assistance of Chen Yi, Zhu De did two things: First, he straightened out the organization and discipline of the party and the group, and second, he unified and reorganized the troops.

The party organizations in the troops existed during the Northern Expedition, but only a few party members were in the upper leading organs and officers, and among the soldiers, except for a few companies, the general company did not have party members. Therefore, the work of the Party cannot go deep into the grassroots and among the soldiers. In this rectification, the party and league members were re-registered, the party and league organizations were readjusted, and party branches were established, so that the party organizations became a strong core of leadership, thus completely placing the army under the party's absolute leadership. Although at that time, due to the small number of party members, they did not know how to set up party branches into companies, they took the measure of sending some outstanding party members to serve as instructors at the grass-roots level and assigning some party and league members to various companies, thus strengthening the party's work at the grass-roots level.

While rectifying the party and regimental organizations and strengthening the political and ideological work of the troops, they have carried out unified reorganization of this unorganized unit. After the defeatists left the troops, the original army, division, and regiment were no longer worthy of their names and had become empty shelves, zhu De reorganized these units into a column, making himself the commander of the column, Chen Yi as the column instructor (that is, the party representative), and Wang Erzhuo as the column chief of staff. An infantry detachment consisting of three infantry brigades was set up; the remnants and scattered personnel of the original divisions were organized into a special service brigade; at the same time, a machine artillery brigade was formed, equipped with an Eighty-Two mortar, two heavy machine guns, and two hand-held machine guns; and the remaining cadres were formed into a teaching team, which was directly under the leadership of the column department. The column headquarters was built on the basis of Zhu De's Ninth Army Headquarters. Zhu De reorganized the troops at Dayu in Jiangxi, which is known in history as "Dayu reorganization".

The reorganized unit has taken on a new look, greatly improved its organizational and spiritual outlook, formed a strong and consolidated combat collective, and the feeling of despair on the way from Raoping, Fujian Province, to the west has long since disappeared, and has become a combat unit with capable organization and flexible command.

Zhu De led the reorganized troops to continue to search for a "foothold" and reached the Shangbao area of Chongyi County, a mountainous area at the junction of the three provinces of Xiang, Guangdong and Gansu, in early November. During the period of the Great Revolution, the peasant movement in the Shangbao area was very high, the revolutionary influence was relatively deep, it had a good mass base, and it was also a continuous mountainous area, which was convenient for the hidden activities of the troops. After Zhu De led his troops from Nanchang, after 3 months of marching and fighting, he arrived at Shangbao to gain a firm foothold. In order to adapt the troops to their work tasks and combat methods in the new period, Zhu De seized this opportunity to carry out strategic and tactical rectification training for the troops.

In this rectification training, Zhu De generally educated the troops on the change of tasks, focusing on publicizing the new tasks of the army in the new period: from the simple marching and fighting wars in the past to going deep into the countryside to mobilizing the masses in addition to marching and fighting, fighting local tyrants, dividing up the land, and helping the localities establish political power. On the basis of universal education, technical and tactical rectification and the restoration of suppressed mass organizations were carried out at the same time, and the troops were trained and tempered from practice.

Why should we pay attention to the military technical and tactical training of the troops? Because most of the commanders in the unit were from the original Ye Ting Independent Regiment, many were from the Whampoa Military Academy, and under the direct influence of the Comintern and Russian advisers, they only knew how to fight regular wars; many of the soldiers participated in the Northern Expedition war and accepted regular wars, and they also fought regular wars after the Nanchang Uprising. Now that the situation and tasks have changed, the set centered on the cities can no longer be used, the troops have moved to the mountainous areas and embarked on the road of "encircling the cities with the countryside." It is necessary to change from regular warfare to guerrilla warfare and learn the strategies and tactics of guerrilla warfare. They have a big class every one or two days, and the small class is maintained every day, mainly requiring the troops to change from fighting big battles to small battles, that is, fighting guerrilla warfare, changing the "front-line" combat formation to a 'herringbone' combat formation, and so on. Zhu De later said: "We retreated from Fujian to Jiangxi, and began to be forced to go up the mountain and forced to carry out guerrilla warfare. This has the advantage that from then on it begins to turn in the right direction - the direction of guerrilla warfare, not by adopting the method of occupying the big cities in the past, but by seeking truth from facts, uniting with the masses, launching mass uprisings and creating revolutionary base areas. Tactics have also changed, and battles that are certain will be fought, battles that are not certain will not be fought, and battles that are not certain will be fought without 'swimming'. If the direction is right, the revolutionary forces can exist and develop. ”

It is worth mentioning that Mao Zedong took him to Hunan to participate in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and a part of the wuhan garrison of the former Northern Expeditionary Army led by Wu Zhonghao followed Mao Zedong to Jinggangshan and broke up with Mao Zedong in a battle, and they came to Shangbao and also participated in Zhu De's technical and tactical training. Here, Zhu De learned for the first time from Wu Zhonghao's arrival that Mao Zedong had gone to Jinggangshan, and immediately sent a representative to Jinggangshan to contact Mao Zedong.

Zhu De led his troops to reorganize and train in Shangbao for about 20 days, completed the reorganization and training of the strategic and tactical changes of the troops, and the reorganized troops were renamed the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. This rectification training is called "Shangbao Rectification Training" in history. Zhu De's "Tianxin Wei Rectification", "Dayu Reorganization", and "Shangbao Rectification Training" of the troops are known in history as the "Three Rectifications of Gannan Province".

Since then, Zhu De led this brand-new unit to carry out extensive guerrilla warfare in the combined parts of the three provinces of Hunan, Guangdong, and Gansu, carried out the agrarian revolution, and assisted the localities in establishing people's power; in particular, he organized, led, and supported the "Nianguan Rebellion" launched by the Xiangnan Special Committee of the CPC; it was the largest, fruitful, and far-reaching peasant uprising in the early stage of the agrarian revolution led by the party; it greatly encouraged the revolutionary masses who were in a depressed state after the defeat of the great revolution, and the strength of the workers' and peasants' revolutionary army was also greatly developed, and a number of cadres, such as Huang Kecheng, were also greatly developed It was at this time that Xiao Ke, Deng Hua, Yang Dezhi, Tang Tianji, etc., led the local peasant rebel army to defect to Zhu De's ranks. Xiao Ke said in the "Draft History of the Shonan Uprising": "From the beginning of the Yizhang Nianguan Rebellion in January 1928 to April 1928, comrades Zhu De and Chen Yi led the Nanchang Rebel Army and the Shonan Peasant Army, a total of more than 10,000 people, and met with the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Comrade Mao Zedong at Jinggangshan for more than 3 months. During these three months, an armed insurrection established a Soviet government in 6 counties, including Yizhang, Chenxian, Leiyang, Yongxing, Zixing, and Anren; formed 3 peasant army divisions and two independent regiments; and launched a vigorous agrarian revolutionary movement. The revolutionary storm spread across more than 20 counties, and more than 1 million people participated in the uprising. It can be said that it is rare for our Party to launch a series of armed uprisings in the countryside on such a large scale, with so many participants and so long in holding out. Zhu De later said: "The Shonan uprising mobilized the masses, and this direction is right. However, at that time, the Hunan Provincial CPC Committee and the Shonan Special Committee carried out 'Left' blind activism, indiscriminately burned and killed indiscriminately, and as a result, they were separated from the masses and isolated themselves; although they occupied more than 10 counties and towns in Shonan, they finally failed to withdraw from Shonan and went to Jinggangshan to join Chairman Mao. Zhu De recalled the meeting with Mao Zedong: "On April 28, 1928, this part of our detachment and the local armed forces in Shonan county met with the victory of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army directly led by Chairman Mao in The City of Lang in Ninggang County, and on May 4, a meeting was held to celebrate the division in The City of Chang, announcing the establishment of the Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army (later renamed the Red Fourth Army). Since then, under the direct leadership of Chairman Mao, the main force of our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has developed, grown stronger and stronger day by day, and many major victories have been won in the struggle to consolidate and develop the revolutionary base areas in Jinggangshan. ”

"Zhu Mao" joined Jinggangshan and began a new voyage of the Chinese revolution, but the most important issue was to consolidate the construction of base areas. Zhu De later said: "It was only then that our team began an organized guerrilla war. I still have some old experience with guerrilla warfare. In the past, starting from the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, he fought wars with Beiyang warlords in Sichuan and Yunnan, and fought for 10 years, always winning the victory over the masses with few. The main experience in the military field is the adoption of the tactics of guerrilla warfare. I remember that when I was studying military affairs in Moscow, the instructor tested me and asked me how to fight after returning to China, and I replied: The tactics of warfare are 'fight if you can win, and leave if you can't win', and 'drag the team up the mountain if necessary'. It was also criticized at the time. In fact, this is the idea of guerrilla warfare. So, at this point, I took the lead a little bit. In just a few words, Zhu De's great contribution to the construction of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area was revealed.