On the first day of the Ukrainian war, the Battle for Antonov Airport was the biggest highlight. The Russians dispatched a company of reinforced paratroopers, taking helicopters, but under the cover of Wu Zhi, they directly attacked The Antonov airport, more than 100 kilometers from the border. This is the airport of the Antonov Design Bureau in Gostomer, on the same side of the Dnieper River with the center of Kiev (the main international airport, Boryspil International Airport on the other side), which is mainly used for cargo.
The success or failure of operations will be a hot topic of controversy for many years to come, but the operation itself and the use of paratroopers are worth paying attention to.
There are several theories about the arrival time of the Russian paratroopers, generally considered to be more reliable at noon, as well as 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. Let's say it's noon, which is interesting.
On a broader front, russian operations had begun at dawn. That is to say, when the Russian paratroopers arrived at Thetonov airport, they had already missed the first time, not only the Ukrainian army at the airport was already alert, but also the Ukrainian army along the line. This is exactly the case, the Russian helicopter group on the way forward, was intercepted by Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles, several helicopters were hit, at least one of the pilots of Wuzhi was rescued by the group of aircraft returning after the operation.
Why did the Russian military choose such a "strange" time?
Arrived secretly at the first sound of the first gunshot at dawn, naturally reaching the maximum suddenness. But this requires a night voyage, which is technically more difficult. This is not the biggest problem, Russian pilots and helicopters may have this capability. The problem lies in strengthening the company. This is a small force, much larger than the average special forces, but for such a large airfield, the strength is still thin. If the operation is smooth, the follow-up forces can immediately meet in the assault landing; but if the operation is not smooth, the next day will have to face the counterattack of the Ukrainian army for a whole day, and it is likely to be unable to withstand it.
Reaching the maximum suddenness naturally increases the chances of a successful assault landing. But the situation has been tense for some time, the Soviet surprise attack on the airfield and then the surprise landing is a script that has been used twice in Prague and Kabul, and the Ukrainian troops from the same military academy will not be defenseless against this, and may have been prepared on the runway. The Russian military can not rely on satellite pictures alone to accurately judge, and the reconnaissance plane or drone sent will have to fight grass and snakes, and only when the paratroopers land can they confirm. But at that time, I guessed that the situation had changed, and it was too late. You can only prepare with two hands. It turns out that the two-handed preparation was right.
If you arrive in the afternoon, there is time to control the airfield, the Ukrainian army reacts and launches a counterattack until after sunset, and there is a little time to prepare for the battlefield before sunset. But the time is in a hurry, after all, the airport is so big, it is not completely defenseless. If you can't control the key points of the airport before sunset, you will be very passive.
Arriving at noon is more moderate, there is plenty of time to land from a relatively safe position that is remote and not easy to attract the attention of the Ukrainian army, and then maneuver on foot to the terminal building of the airport and important commanding heights, seize the target, and consolidate the position, preparing for the Ukrainian counterattack at night. This deployment proved to be the right one.
The second problem is the size, if a brigade is transported at once, the strength is much more abundant, and it is even possible to rush into Kiev without the preparation of the Ukrainian army and take control of the Ukrainian government. But such a movement is too big, the action is delayed for too long, and there are more variables.
After World War II, there were basically no more airborne operations than battalions, partly because the movement was too large, the time delay was too long, the suddenness was not achieved, and the enemy's counterattack had arrived. An enhanced company used about 30 helicopters and a brigade had at least 300-400 helicopters. The Russians may have had so many helicopters, but the range of helicopters was limited, and the pre-war assembly was bound to attract attention, and suddenly it was lost.
Ukraine is not Iraq. The Ukrainian army does not have the C3I capability, NATO has, and has been helping the Ukrainian army to watch it. If you don't wear the gang in advance, the strengthening company is the largest scale. When the large group of aircraft flew in, the Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles were all "awake," and the losses were more than that.
The third question: Why don't you parachute down? Why not parachute infantry combat?
Antonov Airport is close by, and the plane landing is just right. After the first wave of breakthrough, the conditions for follow-up helicopter follow-up have disappeared, the Russian air defense suppression is not effective, and the "awakened" Ukrainian air defense is a huge threat to the follow-up aircraft group, and there is no way to reinforce, only to wait for the ground armored forces to break through and meet.
Parachute reinforcements are possible, and parachutes may also drop armored forces that helicopters cannot carry. The Russian parachute infantry combat is famous, and if the reinforced company is strengthened by infantry combat (even if it is a thin-skinned infantry battle with reduced materials), the daytime control of the airfield and the night battle are completely different.
But parachutes were only carried out before the reinforcement company controlled the airfield and the Ukrainian counter-attack, and the window was too small to even exist. After the ukrainian counterattack began at night, the artillery fire was fierce, and the danger of parachuting in front of the enemy at night was too great, which was a senseless sacrifice.
This is actually a natural paradox of airborne combat. Airborne operations must be carried out in places close to the enemy's key points to achieve the strategic purpose as soon as possible; but even if the enemy is not well defended here, this is also the place where the enemy's counterattack will come the fastest, and reinforcements are difficult. The operating conditions of parachute infantry warfare are harsh, the time is long, the real suitable occasions for use are very limited, and there is a problem of supply in the back, unless fuel and ammunition can be seized on the spot. The airport was supposed to be an ideal place, flat and wide, and all kinds of parachute infantry exercises were actually basically conducted at the airport. The airport also naturally has a large amount of fuel available, and ammunition still needs to be found in another way. However, the Russian army did not use parachute infantry warfare at The Antonov airfield in the end.
The fourth question is why follow the open river surface path?
The losses of Russian helicopters were basically occurred when they were advancing along the river. The river is open, and the aircraft can be seen flying in the distance, which is not conducive to concealment. This, of course, is detrimental. But on the other hand, the open river surface ensures the minimum distance from the missile shooter to the helicopter.
If you encounter the regular vehicle-mounted field anti-aircraft missiles of the Ukrainian army, the helicopter is basically dead. The Russian army only pinned its hopes on the radar of the Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles was not turned on and was not in a state of combat readiness. This is a reasonable speculation, in fact, the Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles did not pose a threat to the assault aircraft group.
This is because before the war, the Ukrainian army has not yet confirmed that the Russian army has the intention to start a war, and the air defense radar should not be started prematurely to avoid exposing the position, and the first wave will be stopped. The radar does not turn on, the missile is blind, so there is nothing to do. However, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles are different, based on visual observation, and they are fired when they are operated. In fact, Russian helicopters were shot down by shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles.
When the helicopter is flying close to the ground, it is most afraid of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles that suddenly emerge from the trees or buildings, and there is no time to dodge. When flying on open water, if the water surface is open enough, the helicopter is simply outside the range of the shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, which is safe. If it is within range, it is only hoped that the opponent will pass before it is launched. Really bad luck, at least you can see the missile attack, a little chance to fire foil strips, flash bombs, a little chance to maneuver to avoid, whether it is useful depends on the character.
This is also the reason why the Russian army cannot use a larger fleet. The first wave still has a little hope of rushing past, and the subsequent fleet does not have this hope. The density of "stingers" in the hands of the Ukrainian army may be higher than that of the regular NATO army, which is clear to the Russian army.
Why the Russian military did not stay and provide fire support for the reinforcement company was the last question.
The Russian military was in the initial operation, mainly escorting. After arriving at Antonov Airport, it is not clear how much role it played, it was not mentioned in the news, there was no more information, it is estimated that there was none. After strengthening the landing and general control of the airport, it was returned. When the reinforcement company first took control of the airfield, there was not much fierce fighting and probably did not require the support of the armed forces.
But in the case that Il-76 can't land and the backup will have to wait until tomorrow, why doesn't Wu Zhi stay to help strengthen the company guard the airport? The Ukrainian counter-attack was definitely supported by artillery fire and armor, and the pressure on the paratroopers was heavy.
These more than 100 kilometers are theoretically within the round-trip voyage of Wuzhi, but the Russian military Has brought additional fuel tanks with it, indicating that in the case of full weapons, only additional auxiliary fuel tanks can ensure sufficient fuel. In other words, even if the Russian military remained, it could not effectively dispatch at night without refueling. Seizing airport fuel is possible, but not guaranteed.
At this point, the experience of the U.S. military in Vietnam can be borrowed. In Vietnam, the forward positions of the US military need constant supply of food, ammunition, water and oil. Grain bombs can be airdropped, but oil and water are not easy to handle. But the U.S. military has developed large rubber bags, which can be filled with water and oil. The rubber band is very strong, and the C-130 can be dropped directly on a U.S. position like a bomb, without the need for a parachute. When passing at very low altitude and low speed, use a deceleration umbrella to slow down, so the rubber bag is equivalent to throwing it directly to the ground at a low speed at a low altitude, and the impact is not too big and very precise. Of course, it was pushed out through the tailgate, not from the belly or under the wing.
Of course, the water bag is used for soldiers to drink water, and the oil bag is used to refuel vehicles and generators. Some designs require another airdrop small oil pump, and some designs have their own oil pumps, connect the pipe, and you can refuel. If the Russian army has such oil bags, it can use the Il-76 to airdrop a few at a very low altitude, which can solve the refueling problem of Wuzhi. At night, the ability of the reinforcement company to repel the Ukrainian armor and even suppress the Ukrainian artillery was much stronger. It was certainly dangerous for the Il-76, but the danger on board was much lower than that of dozens of paratroopers. China may also need to study this simple, practical technology.
Direct use of air support from fixed-wing aircraft is of course another approach, but the Russian Air Force is not powerless, and low-altitude close-range air fire support at night is even more tying. Fixed-wing aircraft also have limited time in place, making it difficult to provide full-time fire support.