Without a doubt, the most notable recent news is that Russian President Vladimir Putin has put Russian nuclear forces on high alert, which means that nuclear weapons are ready for immediate deployment and launch orders that may occur at any time, and of course, this announcement has aroused fear among citizens of many countries around the world, so much so that US President Joe Biden declared that the United States should not fear nuclear war.
The above situation takes place against the backdrop of several developments, beginning with a series of Western retaliation against Russia's war against Ukraine, which we are referring in particular to the initial economic restrictions that actually led to a plunge in the value of the Russian ruble, and the fact that Russia's plan to invade Ukraine did not seem to go as planned, and there was a retreat in some areas, and finally, the Western countries strengthened their military support for Ukraine during the war, some of which even supported Kiev's call to form a legion of foreign fighters willing to fight.
A long history of fear
A few years ago, Putin was at the forefront of opposition to the branding of nuclear weapons, when he even declared, "The branding of nuclear weapons is the last thing to do, which is malicious rhetoric that I do not welcome." "And now, he's doing just three days after the war started, and the main question that arises in all these events is whether Russia's nuclear weapons are just political manipulation, or does Russian military doctrine really make it possible?"
To understand this more deeply, we can refer to a six-page document published by the Russian government on June 2, 2020, outlining its views on nuclear deterrence, officially titled "Basic Principles of The Russian Federation's State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence," which states that Russia's threat to upgrade nuclear weapons or the first actual use of nuclear weapons is considered an act that would lead to "degradation" of the conflict and is in Moscow's interest.
But in this case, Russia regards nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence and sets a series of conditions to clarify this, so that the right to use nuclear weapons is a response to the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies, or to a competitor attack on sensitive government positions or military positions of the Russian Federation, which would undermine nuclear deterrence operations or respond to widespread aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons that could endanger the very existence of the State.
While these restrictions effectively reduce Moscow's options for deploying nuclear weapons, they remain elusive and easily adjusted to the whim and personal preferences of the Kremlin leaders. In fact, many analysts and scholars in the field — analysts and scholars from the United States and Europe — argue that Russia and the Soviet Union before that have followed the doctrine of incorporating nuclear weapons into their military exercises, with reports that Russian military exercises appear to be simulating the use of nuclear weapons against NATO members, suggesting that Russia may be more inclined to rely on nuclear weapons than other nuclear-armed countries.
This doctrine has deep historical roots in Russia, which regards nuclear weapons as the best and shortest deterrent when weak, and the only guarantee of Russia's continued deterrence is nuclear weapons, but in addition to all the above factors, there is a more important reason why some analysts believe that activating Russia's nuclear option is not a completely impossible option.
What is Russia doing at the moment?
The Soviet Union tested its first version of the thermonuclear bomb in 1953 four years after the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear bomb test on August 29, 1949, four years after the United States used the atomic bomb against Japan in World War II, and since then, the Soviet Union's nuclear warhead inventory has increased rapidly, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, peaking at about 40,000 nuclear warheads in 1986.
By the 1960s, Russia had developed three nuclear forces similar to those of the United States: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped with nuclear weapons, a set of weapons known as strategic nuclear weapons, weapons capable of striking enemies far from the country.
For more than half a century, Russia has been involved in agreements and treaties to reduce the number of its nuclear warheads, so that since the eighties, the number of Russian nuclear warheads has been reduced to only about 6,000, but as another side of the reduction, Russia is constantly committed to developing its arsenal and fully modernizing it.
In December 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin reported that modern weapons and equipment currently make up 86 percent of Russia's nuclear triangle, compared to 82 percent a year ago, and said he expected that number to rise to 88.3 percent in a year, Saying Putin said that today all key areas of the military are changing at an unusually fast pace, adding, "If you decide to stop for a second, you will immediately start to fall behind." ”
intercontinental ballistic missile
This is evident in several ways, for example, russia currently continues to withdraw its mobile Poplar missiles at a rate of 9 to 18 per year, replaced by the RS-24 Yars ICBM, which was first test-fired in 2007, adopted by the Russian Strategic Missile Force in 2010 and began production in the same year, and the arsenal now includes more than 147 such missiles, of which 135 can be launched using mobile platforms (16-wheeled vehicles) and only 12 require fixed launchers.
With a range of 12,000 kilometers (this is equivalent to 12 times the width of countries such as Egypt), Yars can carry 6-10 nuclear warheads, each with a capacity of 150-500 tons (the previous Poplar missile carries a warhead), "MIRV" technology enables this missile to carry multiple warheads, each of which can hit a different target, Yars is also designed to dodge missile defense systems, it maneuvers in flight and carries booby traps, so there is at least a 60-65% chance of penetrating anti-defense systems.
Yars only hit the target accurately within 100-150 meters of the target, it takes 7 minutes to prepare to launch the missile, and once on high alert, Yars can leave the base by a car traveling at a speed of 45 kilometers per hour, and can work in remote forest areas to increase its stealth capabilities.
God of the sea
One widely cited example is Status-6, known in Russia as the God of the Sea, a long-range nuclear-powered torpedo that a Russian government document describes as designed to create "extensive radioactive contamination areas that may not be suitable for long-term military, economic or other activities" or, more simply, to attack ports and cities, causing massive indiscriminate damage, a weapon with a potential power of 100 megatons, twice the power of the largest known nuclear explosion.
The Soviet Union began developing the weapon in 1989, but was interrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, as well as nuclear disarmament policies, but Russia later studied it, and information about the weapon was deliberately leaked by the Russian Ministry of Defense in 2015. It is understood that the range of this weapon is 10,000 km and the underwater speed can reach 200 km / h, which is much faster than the typical torpedo travel speed.
In addition to this, the Status-6 is planned to operate at depths of up to 1,000 meters, and interception is very difficult, and some even believe that this terrible technology can operate under the ice sheet of the Arctic, which is difficult to detect and intercept here, and this weapon will begin to work in Russia's nuclear arsenal within five years.
Tupolev's Fire
The Tu-160 multimodal supersonic strategic bomber is also part of Russia's recently developed nuclear arsenal, and although there are many large civilian and military aircraft, this aircraft is considered to be the most thrust and takeoff weight of fighters, and each aircraft of this type can carry up to 40 tons of ammunition, including 12 air-launched nuclear cruise missiles, and in total, this type of bomber can carry more than 800 weapons.
The aircraft was the last strategic bomber designed by the Soviet Union, but it is still in use today, and in addition, two different modernization plans of Tupolev are being implemented at the same time: one initial plan includes a "deep modernization" of the existing fuselage to integrate the next generation of engines, as well as new avionics and modern radar based on artificial intelligence technology, and another plan includes the integration of similar systems into the entirely new aircraft structure.
On November 3, 2020, Russia announced that the latest version of the Tu-160 (known in the West as Black Jack) has been launched from Kazan with a new NK-32-02 engine with a thrust of 55,000 pounds, the largest and most powerful engine ever installed on a military aircraft, and the first flight of the newly upgraded bomber lasted 2 hours and 20 minutes, flew at an altitude of 6,000 meters, and the new engine range was about 1,000 kilometers.
The modernization of the Yars, Status-6 and Tu-160 bombers is a few examples of the good development of Russia's nuclear arsenal, in addition to the fact that Russia is diversifying its scope, not only to strategic nuclear weapons (against distant enemies), but also to the development of (tactical) nuclear weapons, a term that refers to nuclear weapons designed for use on nearby friendly battlefields, possibly in disputed territories of friendly forces.
Russian inventory
In the current inventory of Russian nuclear warheads, there are about 1600 strategic warheads ready for strike, of which about 800 are mounted on intercontinental ballistic missiles, about 624 are using submarine-launched ballistic missiles, about 200 are using strategic bombers, in addition to about 985 other strategic warheads in the warehouse, and about 1912 non-strategic (tactical) warheads.
In addition to the military stockpile of combat troops, there are about 1760 decommissioned warheads, but they are still largely intact, waiting to be dismantled and restarted, leaving a total stockpile of about 6000-6300 warheads, which are only estimates, since countries have not disclosed the true number of their nuclear warheads.
Therefore, the conclusion is that Russia's nuclear modernization program, the increase in the number and scale of military exercises, the clear nuclear threat to other countries (what happened in Ukraine in 2022 is not new), and the Russian doctrine related to nuclear weapons all contribute to supporting the uncertain state of Russia's nuclear intentions!
Of course, the U.S. nuclear threat is no more than half a step behind Russia!