At present, the war in Ukraine is tight, the prospects are uncertain, and the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations have all tightened sanctions against Russia. However, the United States and NATO also said that they had no intention of sending troops. In recent days, in response to the war, the United States has also proposed conditions for russia to withdraw its troops.
Outside the battlefield, the dollar rose sharply, oil and gas rose sharply, gold rose sharply, and the euro fell sharply. Turkey, a member of the European Union, has experienced a phenomenon of centrifugal departure from Germany, and India has abstained from voting on Ukraine-related issues three times. The background of the Russian-Ukrainian war is dazzling, and the strategic and tactical operations of the United States in pursuing the minimum cost and obtaining the greatest benefits in the situation are undoubtedly revealed.
It is precisely at such a "sensitive moment" that the "political and strategic considerations" of the United States toward Taiwan have once again become "important." On March 1, the United States sent a luxury mission of former national security and defense officials from both parties to visit Taiwan. He met with Taiwan's administrative departments, defense departments, and security departments to discuss "Chinese mainland military threat to Taiwan." Pompeo, a former secretary of state during the Trump administration, was "actively invited" by the DPP authorities to taiwan from March 2 to 5 for discussions, visits, and dinners. Against the background of the entanglement of the War between Russia and Ukraine, the high-level politicians in the United States have come and gone, and apart from strengthening US-Taiwan relations and angering the mainland, what are the ulterior motives? Should Taiwan's strategic relations with the United States be "escalated again?"This article observes it from the angle of "Biden's drama and Taiwan's embarrassment."
I. The Biden administration continues to "add drama"
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the turmoil, the trend of war, and the geopolitical impact are unimaginable. The US-Russia relationship has become a "big move" released by the Biden administration in the international community. It is presented as a window for Biden to continue to "add drama" to foreign policy since he came to power.
Since the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the Biden administration's domestic support has fallen sharply. Polls are currently on record for any U.S. president in 40 years. The epidemic, the economy, the lack of recognition of the legitimacy of election, social divisions, and sharp internal contradictions dwarf the Bidenism, which is known as "walking on two legs" and strengthens domestic strength, with bidenism that actively leads the Western alliance. The pinch between internal and external factors has increased the uncertainty of the Democratic Midterm Elections in November this year. "Amplifying the move", through alliance cooperation, intensifying the confrontation between the United States and Russia, and holding russia down has become the main consideration of the Biden administration's foreign policy to "add drama" to the United States. At the very least, it is conducive to turning the fierce international conflict into an opportunity for the Democratic Party to offer voters the opportunity to confide in the government, or to express their moral support for the government's "defense of democracy and freedom" at the international level. It is possible that the Democratic Party will "pass the test" smoothly in dealing with the "test" of the midterm elections. Ensuring Europe's trust in the United States, etc., is secondary.
"Adding drama" also includes showing that the Biden administration has the ability to lead "democracy and freedom", the ability to control the international pattern and the restructuring of the world economy, and realize the "American Dream" marked by "America is back". The core is to promote the Us "grand strategy" proclaimed by the Biden administration, which is mainly based on diplomatic means and under the banner of internationalism.
For example, in his inaugural address to Congress on February 4, 2021, Biden emphasized: "Diplomacy is back at the center of U.S. foreign policy." We will repair our alliance and interact with the world again. Biden stressed that in the choice of policy tools, for us, the use of force is a last resort, not a first choice. Diplomacy, economic development, and governance should be the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy."
Here, Biden emphasizes the importance of foreign policy and alliance relations, and depicts the "grand strategy" of the United States, which is actually an extension of the concept of the "total victory strategy" in which the Democratic Party competed for the world during the Clinton administration. The United States under the Clinton era believed that in the world after the end of the Cold War, the biggest and most direct threat to the overall national strength of the United States will not appear in the short term. Not only does the United States have no adversaries around the globe, but it also has the ability to control the globe. The new strategic goal set by the United States is to "win the world with total victory" and to make the United States the "last and only empire" in human history. The United States has set detailed strategic goals, and the first step is NATO's eastward expansion. The purpose of the eastward expansion was not only to Europe, but also to control the entire Eurasian Plate. Asia and China have also become targets for the United States. In order to realize the "advent of the 21st century under the leadership of the United States", to realize the "American Dream" as soon as possible, the "total victory strategy" is ready to take risks. The first guiding principle is "fidelity to internationalism".
The course of history that followed showed that the goals of the United States had been thwarted. During the George W. Bush administration, under the high-profile counter-terrorism, the US military hegemony ran rampant in the world, Europe was relegated to "old Europe", and Russia applied to join NATO three times, but all refused. The George W. Bush administration also established the "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization" at the State Department, a "new order" that ended in a financial crisis.
During the Obama administration, the United States launched a two-ocean, two-pact strategy (Atlantic, Pacific, NATO, and Asian Mini-NATO) and proposed to return to the Asia-Pacific region. The George W. Bush administration's "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization" was upgraded to the "Division of Conflict and Stabilization Operations." "Internationalism" was transformed into Obama's special term Smart power" (soft power). This time was equally fateful. The United States began to realize that "it is difficult to win a total victory," but as a banner for safeguarding US hegemony and a sharp weapon for interfering in its internal affairs, it is impossible for the United States to abandon the "total victory strategy."
During the Trump administration, the United States strengthened its management of the "small NATO" in Asia and upgraded the Asia-Pacific strategy to the Indo-Pacific strategy. After Biden took office, he basically signed the contract as ordered, the UNITED States should cover the Atlantic and Pacific, and the United States must also contain China, so it has strengthened US-Taiwan relations, and the separatist Democratic Progressive Party has become the object of US blessings. The release of information such as the release of the so-called taiwan's possible emergence as a quasi-ally of Asia's "small NATO" with the support of the United States has become a prominent feature of the US policy toward Taiwan. In the military, political, and economic fields, Taiwan seems to be linked to the US Indo-Pacific strategy, and the DPP authorities have turned to the United States on one side and posed as uniting with the United States to resist China. The DPP authorities have openly played the role of the United States in containing Chinese mainland and "countering China" in the western Pacific. Cross-strait relations have been reversed.
Second, the United States "strategic reassurance", Taiwan "show" or "fill in the gaps"?
Return to the US bipartisan "luxury group" to visit Taiwan. The banner played by the United States is "strategic re-assurance of Taiwan," and when we look at it, the content is still those few medicines -- the "one-China policy," the "Taiwan Relations Act," and the "Six Guarantees" to ensure that Taiwan will enhance its self-defense capability. So far, in addition to the information released by the Taiwan media on the US side's proposal that Taiwan implement a conscription system, the United States and Taiwan have been silent about the contents of this visit to Taiwan.
In terms of public opinion, there is a half-concealed statement: "The Biden administration decided to send a more moderate special mission to Visit Taiwan first" in order to "balance the political effects of the more radical Pompeo delegation." How gentle? Where is the temperature? Brushstrokes passed. In addition, in response to Peng Pei's visit to Taiwan, There is also a sense of vigilance in Taiwan society that "weasels give chickens a new year" and that "Taiwan cannot become a springboard for war." Some civil society groups shouted the slogan "War dealers are not welcome". Other well-known media personalities lashed out at Peng Pei'o for coming to Taiwan to entertain guests with public funds. Little has been mentioned about the implications of U.S. military adventurism and Taiwan.
A reasonable analysis is that the US delegation's visit is bound to throw out a temptation. That is to say, the United States manipulates the situation between Russia and Ukraine in Europe, and in the Asia-Pacific region, It needs Taiwan to cooperate with the military adventurism of the United States. When the United States needs to launch a "new round of offensive," the United States may throw out temptations to "trap" Taiwan.
One of the possible policies is to meet the political needs of the DPP, and at the same time to "re-elevate" Taiwan's regional status, so that Taiwan can play a role in "filling the gaps" for the "total victory strategy" of the United States. For example, the United States can follow the model of Ukraine's accession to NATO through "constitution-making" and "discuss" with the DPP authorities the relationship between Taiwan's "referendum constitution-making" and Taiwan's "security." Through US-Japan relations, through the hands of the Democratic Progressive Party, we can disrupt regional peace and cooperate with the United States in "containing China." In terms of regional economy, the United States can position Taiwan as a "democratic Taiwan," signal the DPP authorities to "re-head southward," participate in the "shaping process of US economic cooperation in Southeast Asia, and keep pace with the US regional economic strategy," thus forming a situation in which the United States and Taiwan confront the RECP and forming a so-called "combination of Taiwan's interests and US regional interests."
An illustration is worth noting. Mo Jian, director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), who specializes in gathering intelligence in Taiwan, publicly stated on the occasion of the arrival of the US delegation that while praying for the Ukrainian people, he "will naturally convey the concerns of the Taiwan people to the State Department." This is an indirect "simulation" of Taiwan as the next Ukraine. There are hints that the United States will once again use Taiwan as a "military springboard" to provoke and provoke the mainland.
Third, the embarrassment of the DPP
The war between Russia and Ukraine, the smoke of gunfire, and the visit of the US "luxury group to Taiwan" show very clearly the United States' pursuit of the "strategy of total victory" and the intention of the United States to control Taiwan in the western Pacific, in addition to the need to "add drama" to Biden's political career. Whether Taiwan is "putting on a show" or "filling in the gaps," the DPP authorities are in an awkward situation on the premise that there has not been any substantive change in the US stand on Taiwan. In the light of the world spotlight, the DPP's "visit" to former senior US officials showed a certain "alternative low profile." This is rare.
One of the embarrassments is that they know that the US "strategic re-guarantee is false" and that the "luxury group" has not provided any new policy tools, and must also express acceptance of the Biden administration's arrangement, taiwan will play a role as the United States' "total victory strategy" to fill the vacancies, and pay the DPP's space for cross-strait relations will be smaller and smaller. The United States continues to maintain a vague strategy of security for Taiwan, the United States refuses to make specific commitments, and the DPP "loses points." It is clear at a glance.
The second embarrassment is to highlight foreign policy and lose ground. On the Lithuania issue, whether it is donating masks, setting up offices, or recently donating money to Ukraine, the DPP's attempt to get involved in Eastern Europe under the circumstance that Taiwan cannot define its own security has become a joke. The deliberate vacillation between the ambiguity of the US strategy toward Taiwan and the clarity of its strategy toward China will play a role in intensifying the political dispute over Taiwan security on the island.
For example, after the mainland's Coast Guard Act came into effect in February 2021, the DPP authorities signed a coast guard agreement with Palau, which has a defense cooperation plan with the United States, and a "memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a coast guard working group" between Taiwan and the United States. In this way, there is a so-called "security system" between Taiwan, Palau, and the United States. The problem is that Palau's defense powers are vested in the hands of the United States. Last year, the US ambassador to Palau accompanied President Palau on his visit to Taiwan, which was a "trial" of an example that endangered Taiwan's "security autonomy." Does the DPP want to perform another scene?
The third embarrassment is that blind people touch the elephant in the direction of Taiwan's economic development. At present, the most important issue in Taiwan is to develop the economy and solve the people's livelihood. In regional economic cooperation, Taiwan is in a marginal position, with six gods and no masters. In January this year, the RECP officially came into effect, and the tariff reduction of up to 91% in the region cannot be enjoyed by Taiwan. Cross-strait economic and trade has accounted for 45 percent of Taiwan's trade, and the mainland has also announced a one-year extension of ECFA, but the DPP wants to push "cross-strait non-subordination" and be pro-US and resist China.
Today, the Biden administration is also economically "marching." The United States announced that President Joe Biden will hold a summit with southeast Asian leaders in March and a quadrilateral dialogue mechanism summit in Asia in May. This year, Biden will also attend a series of meetings in Southeast Asian countries. Judging from Biden's speech in Congress on March 1, it has been closely linked to the deployment of suppressing China and restoring the US economy. How does the DPP accept the "regional torture" carried out by the United States against Taiwan?
Embarrassed, the DPP adopted a "half push and half take" stance toward the US calculations. Tsai Ing-wen stressed that Taiwan and Ukraine have three major differences: First, there is the Taiwan Strait as a natural risk, but Ukraine borders Russia; Second, it has a better geopolitical position and strategic advantage than Ukraine; Third, the importance of the global supply chain is beyond Ukraine's expectations. Please note that the "universal values" that the United States often "encourages" the DPP, and the "positioning of Taiwan's democratic regions" proclaimed by Lai Ching-te during his visit to the United States, are not mentioned.
A senior person in the KMT pointed out the key to the embarrassment of the DPP authorities: During the KMT administration, there were military exchanges and crisis buffer mechanisms between the two sides of the strait, and there were no security worries in Taiwan at that time. Now, the Russian-Ukrainian war shows from another side that the US security commitment to Taiwan is "more fragile" and more unreliable. What's next for Taiwan? Do you still want cross-strait relations?
How many opportunities are there in the United States? How long will the DPP be "pro-US and resist China"? If we engage in "constitution-making" and "constitutional revision," accept arrangements, and respond to the "small NATO" of the United States, we will be politically cutting off the DPP's own back road. This is even more dangerous than "the visit of the luxury group and the false "strategic re-assurance" of the United States against Taiwan! (The author is a researcher at the Shanghai Taiwan Studies Association)