In recent days, the situation in Russia and Ukraine has continued to escalate, arousing the concerns of all countries. The Ukraine crisis is the largest crisis in the former Soviet Union in the 30 years since the end of the Cold War. This is not only a conflict between Russia and Ukraine, or between Russia and the West, but also a complex and profound international conflict between multiple forces that takes place at a sensitive time for international power shifts. The Crisis in Ukraine is also a major event in the 21st century that has involved the reconstruction of the global order, the reshaping of the geopolitical pattern in the Eurasian region, and the re-understanding of key issues in world affairs.
What is the underlying context and immediate cause of the Crisis in Ukraine? What is the future? Feng Shaolei, a professor at the Institute of International Relations and Regional Development of East China Normal University, published an article in the journal Academic Frontiers for analysis. Because this article was written in the summer and autumn of 2021, it fails to include the latest developments on the Ukrainian crisis, but this article's overall review of the Ukrainian crisis helps to understand the current rapid changes in the situation. Recommended reading!
An explosion occurred in Kiev Source: CNN
01
The motives, processes and characteristics of the Ukraine crisis
Deep background and direct triggers. From a longer-term perspective, the following three fundamental changes are the deeper context of the Ukraine crisis. First of all, for more than two decades, Ukraine's national political development direction has been uncertain, the domestic constitutional system has changed, the state governance function is weak, the social economy has fluctuated for a long time, corruption has prevailed, and people's livelihood is difficult, which is a long-term internal cause of this turmoil. The West's attempt to divide the world by so-called "democracy and authoritarianism" and to bring Ukraine into the sphere of influence of Europe and the United States is an important background for the Ukraine crisis.
Second, Ukraine's particular historical location at the westernmost tip of the eurasian continent's eastern and western civilizational interface is another deep cause of the crisis. The religious and political history of Western Europe has had a profound influence on the western part of Ukraine, but Kiev itself is the birthplace of Russian civilization. In the special context of post-Cold War geopolitics, the expansion of Western forces such as NATO and the European Union, the traditional influence of Russia and the intertwining of local traditional canine teeth have prominently manifested in Ukraine as an unstoppable pull and collision between the East and the West, making the country a whirlpool of great power disputes. It is difficult for Ukraine to replicate the national and regional construction paths of other countries (such as Switzerland, Austria, etc.) that are also in the same european civilizational region. The established historical background of civilization that is difficult to avoid, and the overall strategic design of the International Transformation based on ideology in the West, have paved the way for this crisis.
In addition, there is a key background, that is, Russia's relationship with the West. On the one hand, the West's prejudice against Russia is deeply rooted; on the other hand, compared with the depression weakness in the painful transition of the 1990s, the growth of Russia's national strength in the Golden Decade and the spirit of Power led by Putin have made Russia no longer willing to deal with the West as a loser of the Cold War, but rushed to catch up, for tat, and confronted the West with the Eurasian Economic Union promoted by Russia. All of these dark currents have laid the groundwork for the outbreak of the Crisis in Ukraine.
The immediate causes of the crisis in Ukraine can be analyzed from three perspectives. First, the "civilized divorce" soviet disintegration process has not yet ended, and the "Soviet disintegration syndrome" is still deeply troubled by the former Soviet Union countries in difficult transition, and the United States has been instigating "color revolutions" to push Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO. The EU's exclusive "EU Associated States Agreement" and "Eastern Partnership" plans on the Ukraine issue have pushed russia's security and economic lifeline to the bottom line and provoked a strong backlash from the Russian side. Second, the EU-Russia energy cooperation system, which was originally the "glue" of EU-Russia bilateral relations and has a series of infrastructure as a guarantee, is being shaken due to the sudden occurrence of the Ukrainian transit gas crisis and the "shale gas revolution", the intergenerational change of European politics, the unclear direction of transatlantic relations, and other emerging uncertainties, resulting in the tendency of Russian-EU relations to be alienated and antagonistic. Third, the Ukrainian crisis is intertwined with multiple conflicts, not only between Ukraine and Russia, but also between the east and west of Ukraine, the struggle between radical far-right and oligarchs, and the complex game between various other political interest groups.
Stages and points of crisis evolution. The Ukrainian crisis has seen different phases of evolution. The following is a brief review of the main points of each period in order to observe the development mechanism of the situation.
The first phase, in 2013, was the ukrainian government's shift from negotiations with the EUROPEAN Union to cooperation with Russia and sparking mass protests. For almost a full year in 2013, the EU negotiated with Ukraine on the "EU Associated Countries Agreement". Against the backdrop of the EU's basic lack of communication with the Russian side and its consideration of its demands, Russia decided to retaliate with a tit-for-tat, offering a large number of preferential conditions to persuade Ukraine to join the "Eurasian Economic Community" formed by the former Soviet Union countries. At this stage, both Russia and Europe placed Ukraine in the context of exclusive competition. On the one hand, both sides placed excessively high expectations on the realization of their respective strategic intentions; on the other hand, neither side was fully prepared for the reactions of public opinion and complex internal and external interactions of all parties.
The second phase, from early 2014 to late February 2014, was marked by a coup d'état on February 22, 2014. In late January 2014, despite a series of concessions by the authorities, including the restoration of the presidential system provided for in the 2004 Constitution, amnesty for the legal responsibilities of protest participants, and the formation of a coalition government with the opposition, the upsurge of popular demonstrations continued, with the occupation of government buildings on February 16 and the launch of larger demonstrations on February 18, resulting in the injury of a large number of police officers and the death of some people and policemen. In the meantime, the United States stepped up its intervention and urged the European Union to join forces to put pressure on Yanukovych's regime. Caught between the inside and outside, Yanukovych, who was cornered by the opposition within the ruling camp, had to sign a political agreement with the opposition on February 21 to make a full concession, and invited Germany, France, Poland, and Russia to witness. Within a day, however, the agreement, which had been confirmed by all sides, was overthrew by a violent coup d'état by the more radical opposition. Subsequently, Yanukovych fled, Tymoshenko was released, and Ukraine formed a pro-Western transitional government.
The third phase, from the end of February to the end of March 2014, was the declaration of independence and accession of Crimea to Russia. On February 23, the Ukrainian parliament announced the repeal of the Law on the Basis of State Language Policy and the abolition of the official status of the Russian language, which was opposed by the Russian side. On 6 March, the Crimean Parliament passed a resolution announcing that Crimea would join the Russian Federation as a federal subject. On March 16, Crimea demanded accession to Russia through a referendum. On March 18, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered an important speech in which he spoke highly of Crimea's demands for independence and return to Russia. On 27 March, the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on Ukraine, affirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and urging all parties to resolve the Ukrainian crisis peacefully through direct dialogue.
The fourth phase, in April 2014, was marked by unrest in eastern Ukraine and the conclusion of the Geneva Accords. Catalyzed by the situation in Crimea, in early April 2014, there was a succession of turbulence in the eastern region of Ukraine, and Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk and other places successively proposed to imitate Crimea's independence, autonomy, or accession to Russia. The West began sanctioning Russia. On April 17, the foreign ministers of Russia, the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine held talks in Geneva, demanding that the parties stop confrontation and reach an agreement on easing the situation in Ukraine, but no real progress was made.
The fifth phase, from early May to early July 2014, was highlighted by the Ukrainian general elections on 25 May 2014 and the first meeting of the heads of state since the crisis at the 70th anniversary of the Normandy landings on 6 June of the same year. The confrontation between regimes in eastern Ukraine, southern Ukraine and Kiev is feverish. Russia is cautious about the demand for autonomy and the annexation of Russia in eastern Ukraine. On May 7, Putin conditionally supported Ukraine's presidential election. On May 25, after the ukrainian presidential election, the "chocolate king" Poroshenko expressed his willingness to reconcile after the first round of election, but refused to negotiate peace with pro-Russian forces in the east. On June 6, at a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the Normandy landings, Putin met with Western leaders and Poroshenko for the first time since the Ukraine crisis. In his inaugural address on June 7, Poroshenko decided to join the European Union, saying he would not impose federalism, insisted on fighting separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, and emphasized that the Ukrainian language was the only Chinese. The crisis situation in Ukraine has not eased.
The sixth phase, in mid-July 2014, was the crash of a Malaysian Boeing 777 airliner in Ukraine near the Russian border on July 17, 2014. Against the backdrop of the situation in eastern Ukraine, the crash of the 7.17 Malaysia Airlines airliner became an important turning point. Under the rapid public opinion offensive launched by the West, Russia is facing tremendous pressure. The United States exerted strong pressure to persuade Germany and other allies to begin imposing the toughest sanctions the West had joined forces to impose on Russia since the Cold War. Russia retaliated by banning the import of Western agricultural products. The situation is once again in a white-hot situation.
The seventh phase, from late July to the end of August 2014, consisted of Russian humanitarian assistance in mid-August 2014 and quadripartite talks between the German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian foreign ministers in mid-to-late August. In late July, taking advantage of the public opinion environment of the Malaysia Airlines incident, Ukrainian government forces stepped up their crackdown on pro-Russian civilian forces, and Poroshenko demanded that the eastern problem be resolved within two weeks. Civilian armed forces in eastern Ukraine have suffered heavy losses one after another, civilians have suffered severe injuries, and the areas occupied by civilian armed forces in Donetsk and Luhansk are shrinking and being cut off day by day. At the beginning of August, Russia proposed to rescue with humanitarian assistance, and after international coordination, many parties reached a preliminary consensus. On August 17, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine held a quadripartite talks to once again hold difficult consultations on the route of humanitarian aid into Ukraine and the ceasefire in the east. However, when the crisis took a turn for the better, civilian forces in eastern Ukraine suddenly and publicly disclosed that Russia was providing equipment and training personnel. Russian officials deny this. At the same time, the Ukrainian far-right group issued an ultimatum calling for the reorganization of ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs within 24 hours and the release of the protesting accomplices in the square where they were arrested a few days ago, or else they would be protested by launching an armed insurrection. The situation in Ukraine remains highly tense.
The eighth phase, from September 2014 to February 2015, is the main point of the "Minsk Agreement". Bloody clashes broke out in the Donbass region of Ukraine in April 2014, followed by a "counter-terrorism operation" carried out by the Ukrainian government in the eastern region. On September 5 of the same year, the Minsk Protocol was signed by Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (oscecommunist), And Russia (known as the "Tripartite Contact Group") and the civilian armed forces of eastern Ukraine. On 12 February 2015, the Tripartite Liaison Group signed a document with civilian forces in eastern Ukraine entitled "Comprehensive Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreement", which is widely known as the "New Minsk Agreement". The agreement aims to facilitate the objectives and work of achieving a comprehensive ceasefire by the end of the year, developing and implementing a new demining plan, withdrawing troops and equipment, and releasing and exchanging detainees. The parties expressed their readiness to seek consensus on legal arrangements for the special status of local autonomy in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the framework of the "Normandy model" (consultations at all levels of the four countries of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine) and the Tripartite Contact Group. While the agreement still has many ambiguities and its main provisions have not been truly implemented since then, it offers hope for conflict mitigation.
In the ninth phase, from March 2015 to April 2019, the main point is that the forces of the parties have been in a game and continued to glue for many years after the "Minsk Agreement". After the signing of the new Minsk Agreement, in November 2014, the "Luhansk People's Republic and Donetsk People's Republic" (hereinafter referred to as the "Two Republics") in eastern Ukraine held leadership and parliamentary elections. On 18 March 2015, Poroshenko signed an amendment to the law on the special system of local self-government in individual regions of Donbass. Ukrainian civil militants alleged that the amendment was not recognized because it violated article 12 of the new Minsk agreement, which provided for coordination with representatives of the "two republics" on all election-related issues. On April 17 of the same year, about 300 U.S. paratroopers from the Army's 173rd Airborne Combat Brigade arrived in Ukraine. The Russian side accused the US side of violating the new Minsk agreement. Since 2015, Russia and Ukraine have repeatedly negotiated on the dispatch of peacekeeping troops, but without success. During this period, the confrontation between Russia and NATO has escalated. In February 2016, osceive drone footage showed rebels deploying their own multiple rocket launchers. In December 2017, the U.S. government approved plans to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons such as anti-tank missiles. The two sides accused each other of violating the provisions of the Minsk agreement. In January 2018, the Ukrainian parliament passed the "Donbass Reintegration" bill, which refers to Russia as an "aggressor state" and designates Donbass as a "temporarily occupied territory." The Russian side said that "the bill has buried the Minsk agreement." In November of the same year, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry issued a statement denying recognition of local leaders and parliamentary elections in the "two republics" and calling them sabotage of the Minsk agreement. Between 2014 and 2019, the United States allocated more than $1.3 billion to Ukraine. In fiscal year 2020, the United States plans to allocate an additional $250 million to Ukraine for military aid and an additional $600 million to counter Sino-Russian influence. At this stage, the Russian-Ukrainian Kerch Strait conflict, the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of Friendship was abolished by Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became independent from the Russian Orthodox Church, and Ukraine will join NATO and the European Union into the constitutional amendments and enter into force. In response, Russia issued passports to residents of the "two republics" of Ukraine. The confrontation between the two sides has not eased, and it has intensified from time to time.
The tenth stage, from May 2019 to the present, focuses on cooperation and confrontation after Vladimir Zelenskiy took office as President of Ukraine on May 20, 2019. After zelenskiy, the "political elite" took office as president, the crisis in Ukraine showed signs of easing. Earlier, Russian President Putin told former US Secretary of State Pompeo that he was willing to fully restore relations with the United States; although the United States called China and Russia "major competitors" in the 2017 US National Security Strategy Report, it still needs to coordinate and communicate with Russia in regional conflicts and bilateral issues. On May 22, Putin spoke to the Franco-German leadership to advance the implementation of the Minsk agreement. However, there are still clear differences in the positions of Russia and Ukraine on the eastern issue: Putin insists that the Minsk agreement is the only way to resolve the conflict and demands that Ukraine must implement the Minsk agreement; while Zelenskiy insists on negotiations on the premise of recovering Crimea and not giving special status to the eastern conflict zone. Under the premise that Russia and Ukraine's principled positions cannot be compromised, the two sides could have negotiated a ceasefire, exchange of prisoners of war, improving the infrastructure of the disputed areas, and sending peacekeepers if necessary, but the crisis has been difficult to see relief in the absence of fundamental changes in Russia's relations with the United States and Europe. On December 9, 2019, the leaders of Russia and Uzbekistan attended the "Normandy Model" four-nation summit to seek a solution to the Ukrainian crisis, and 20 days later, Ukraine and the civilian armed forces in eastern Ukraine exchanged prisoners of war in an all-round way, but the positions of Russia and Ukraine on a series of issues did not fundamentally change. In early 2020 and the spring and summer of 2021, the eastern region of Ukraine was again tense against the backdrop of changes in major-country relations.
Several outstanding features of the Ukrainian crisis process. First, there are many roles in this crisis, ranging from traditional sovereign state actors to interest groups representing different historical and civilizational backgrounds; both self-proclaimed representatives of the current international order (the United States, the European Union) and "revisionists" (Russia) who have been accused of existing systems; both alliance-style action collectives (such as NATO and the European Union) and a large number of political units that resist "sides" and tend to be neutral (such as the Central Asian countries and the BRICS countries outside Russia). The complexity of the characters reflects the multi-dimensional political and historical connotations of this crisis, and also greatly increases the difficulty of crisis management.
Second, the crisis process is full of twists and turns, complex and changeable: not only do the positions and strategies of all parties vary from time to time with the orientation of problems at various stages, but also, such as the sudden occurrence of the Malaysia Airlines incident, the intertwining of secret diplomacy and public action, and the difficulty of distinguishing the truth and lies in the media war, have also made the entire crisis handling process confusing. In addition, although political leaders of various countries have direct dialogue through the hotline, they also use vicious words to hurt each other, which greatly affects the trust between countries and severely tests the relations between major countries.
Third, there is a high risk of a large number of "head-on collisions" between the parties in the conflict. The overall strength of the European Union, the United States, and Ukraine is higher than that of Russia, and Russia is not willing to show weakness, and its armament construction has strengthened under the pressure of sanctions. In view of the specific historical background of globalization being hindered but still moving forward, the parties to this conflict are far from being friend or foe as they were in war or cold war; rather, the parties present a great deal of friend and foe, mutual influence and restraint in the competition, during which the relationship structure between interests and value orientations is very complex. This crisis has been prolonged for a long time, and it is difficult to distinguish between time and place.
Fourth, the crisis affects the direction of the global order, the reshaping of the Eurasian geopolitical pattern, the status of nation-states, the existence of buffer zones between major powers, regional cooperation and security architectures, and a re-awareness of a series of key issues in world affairs, such as the Cold War, containment, sanctions, alliances, neutrality, international intervention, domestic institutional changes, and foreign policy relevance, as well as the three key issues of domestic transformation, international order, and inter-state relations involved in "international transformation". Therefore, the radiation effect of this conflict will spread to all aspects and aspects of future international relations, and the impact will be quite broad and far-reaching.
02
The impact of the Ukraine crisis
The crisis in Ukraine lasted far longer than people estimated at the time of its outbreak, and the confrontation and destruction caused by the crisis also deeply affected all aspects.
Vicious competition among major powers has continued for a long time. First of all, the strategy of the United States and the European Union toward Russia has its own background and consideration. Judging from the situation after the Ukraine crisis, the United States is determined to win its strategy toward Russia and has its objective background. Since the 2020s, the United States has intervened in the Middle East to cause turmoil, and it is difficult to return to Asia further, and only the events in Ukraine may indicate that its diplomatic strategy has been enterprising. In addition, cutting off Russia's ties with the European Union is also a deep strategic consideration for the United States. The heated debate between the U.S. elite and the major think tanks has not stopped the rise of neoconservative and Democratic camps on anti-Russian issues. In contrast, the traditional political view of the more moderate forces represented by Kissinger and Brzezinski advocating the balance of power in sensitive Areas of Europe is clearly marginalized and cannot stop the US hardliners against Russia.
Second, from the perspective of the policy objectives of the United States and the European Union towards Ukraine and the status of their implementation, there are three situations.
First, the policy areas that the United States and Europe have unanimously promoted. These policies are based on similar geopolitical and ideological positions between the United States and Europe. After the Ukraine crisis, the United States and Europe worked together to restore Ukraine's territorial and sovereign integrity, did not recognize Russia's sovereignty over Crimea, and encouraged Russia to resolve the Donbass conflict through the Minsk agreement. At the same time, the United States and its allies have retaliated against Russia's actions in Ukraine. Over the years, Washington has imposed sanctions on hundreds of Russians, as well as some sectors of the Russian economy in areas such as defense, energy and finance. The European Union, Australia, Canada and Japan have imposed similar penalties on Russia.
Second, in the specific implementation of the policy, the United States and Europe have their own emphases. For the United States, Ukraine is its preferred destination for foreign aid, which provides it with an average of more than $200 million a year, and in response to Russian intervention, Washington has stepped up its support for the Ukrainian government, providing more than $600 million a year in development security assistance. The U.S. military provides training and equipment to Ukraine, including sniper rifles, grenades, launchers, night vision equipment, radar and anti-tank missiles. NATO holds joint exercises with Ukraine every year, including the Sea Breeze Joint Maritime Military Exercise and the Rapid Trident Multinational Military Exercise. It is with this support that, although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, its goal of eventually becoming a full member of NATO is confirmed through its constitution. It can be seen that on the issue of Ukraine and Russia policy, to a certain extent, the United States and Europe have a "red face" and a "white face".
Third, there is a clear divergence between the United States and the European Union in terms of policy objectives toward Ukraine. First, in June 2020, after the epidemic stabilized, Trump was interested in restarting the Group of Eight (G8) because the Group of Seven (G7) had indefinitely removed Russia from the Ukraine crisis. However, when Trump tried to invite Russia to return to the Group of Eight, not only the EU countries opposed it, but also Russia itself expressed its dissent. Second, the United States has put a lot of pressure on the Russian-European cooperation "Nord Stream-2" natural gas pipeline project, which Trump said would give Russia greater political influence. In late 2019, Washington imposed sanctions on companies involved in pipeline construction. This difference between the United States and Europe has profoundly affected the traditional relationship between the United States and Europe. Third, the domestic politics of the United States and Europe play a different role in Ukraine. In recent years, Democrats and Republicans have debated bitterly over whether Trump has used Ukraine to fight against his rival Biden; Europe as a whole has not had such unrestrained domestic strife to influence major diplomatic decisions.
In short, the United States has a generally tough attitude toward Russia, but it has changed from time to time; the EUROPEAN Union intends to deal with it independently, but it has too many constraints; and Russia's reluctance to give up its red line has its deep considerations. Behind the different attitudes of the three is that the United States still holds the power to surpass all "players", while Europe relies on organizing and coordinating this set of "soft kung fu" to "fulfill the friendship of landlords", and Russia is like a trapped beast forced into a corner, but still has a strong ability to fight tooth for tat and continue to game. Therefore, the confrontation between Russia and the West on the Ukraine issue is not only ideological, but also largely derived from geopolitical resistance, and the inextricable interests between various parties offset the influence of the relationship between them. Even if the relations between the parties will be adjusted on local issues or in a short period of time, it seems difficult to change the state of resistance for a long period of time.
It is difficult for Ukraine to take a turn for the better. In the seven or eight years since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, the situation has changed considerably. Ukrainians have grown closer to Europe and the United States in recent years, but at the same time have become significantly alienated from Russia, which is not conducive to any possible compromise. Even if Ukrainian sentiment toward Russia has picked up in recent years, it is far from being on a par with pro-Western and pro-Russian public opinion before the crisis. In the near term, therefore, there is no possibility of bringing the parties to a compromise to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.
Russia faces continuing challenges, but it still has a strong ability to resist. Whatever position it holds, and whatever it reflects, russia's overall strong and sustained counterweight to ukraine is clear.
There are many dilemmas in the disputed areas. First, the Ukraine crisis became Europe's biggest humanitarian disaster since the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The impact of war on the belligerent areas was devastating. Tens of thousands of local businesses have been forced to close, crimes such as robbery and smuggling have emerged, and a large amount of infrastructure has been damaged, making the Donbass region the third most polluted area in the world, with an area of about 16,000 square kilometers. Second, the economy of the eastern region of Ukraine has been hit hard. Donbass accounts for more than half of Ukraine's entire space economy, including the economic surplus of non-governmentally controlled territories. All the evidence suggests that the survival of Donetsk and Luhansk depends entirely on Russia, not only militarily but also economically, with more than 90 percent of the administrative public spending in both regions originating from Russia. Neither the two regions, as a whole nor as two independent regions, do not have sufficient economic and demographic structure to become a small independent country that is economically and materially sustainable. The two regions are heavily dependent on Russia and are effectively formally administered by Russia's interagency council, which plays the role of a "shadow government." In short, this is a conflict between geopolitics, conceptual competition, local interests and other factors, which needs to be examined from multiple perspectives.
03
Several revelations
The crisis in Ukraine reflects a major question in the third decade of the 21st century, namely, how to view the interrelationship between the crisis and the world order. There are generally three attitudes, one is that, as Tsegonkov said, allow the crisis to develop into a reversal of the international balance of forces and a fundamental turn in the international transformation, and wait to be resolved together. Second, unable to wait for the reversal of the balance of forces and the fundamental turn of international transformation, we are eager to use the crisis to achieve victory. Indeed, in the light of the current situation of the Ukraine crisis, such a position is both risky and impossible. Third, dealing with the crisis with a positive and rational attitude aims to promote the benign and steady development of the international transformation process. Given the uncertainty and uncertain prospects of the current overall crisis – the COVID-19 pandemic, relations between major powers, the world economy, and the internal political crisis in a number of countries – it is clear that any rush to make a fool of itself and inaction at the mercy of events is not advisable, and only rational mediation of the crisis can create the conditions for the sound progress of international transformation.
Finally, from the perspective of the crisis itself, the Crisis in Ukraine is not a simple regional crisis, but a comprehensive crisis under the conditions of the contemporary information society, including national political construction, national cultural identity, regional and global governance models, and interrelationship between major powers. It can be considered that this is an important rehearsal of the current global overall crisis. Therefore, this crisis cannot be hastily dealt with in a simple regional crisis approach, but must require an overall solution that encompasses the interests and wishes of all parties and integrates the complex needs and possible needs of various fields to find a way out. However, all parties may not have been fully prepared for this.
In response to the latest situation of the current situation in Russia and Ukraine, Professor Feng Shaolei said that the overall review of the crisis in Ukraine in this article hopes to help understand the rapid changes in the current situation.
First, the Crisis in Ukraine is not simply a regional conflict, but a matter of reshaping the political structure of security in Europe as a whole, and even the future evolution of the entire international order. Therefore, the entire Ukrainian crisis needs to be observed in terms of its relevance to the future regional and global order framework.
Second, the Crisis in Ukraine is not only a material process involving political, military, security, economic and other aspects, but also contains a large number of very profound ideological and theoretical and academic issues. For example, how do you view the interrelationship between ideological battles and geopolitical games? How do you view the need and possibility of institutional arrangements such as "buffer zones" and "neutral zones" in the political disputes between major powers? How should the two principles of territorial sovereign integrity and regional self-determination be viewed as the first question? Wait a minute. The different answers to these questions profoundly affect the entire process of crisis management.
Third, this article on the future trend of the Ukrainian crisis, although it should also provide more options in the new situation, but the existing summary and outlook hope to provide some preparation for understanding the present. The key point is that, given that the crisis in Ukraine involves major disputes over the entire transition, it is feared that only a clearer picture of the global transition can lead to a fundamental solution to the crisis. On the other hand, only from the present, not on the facts, but based on the in-depth promotion of global transformation, but also focusing on the evolution and improvement of the entire international order, only from such a position can we form a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the handling of the Ukrainian crisis itself.
Source: Academic Frontiers magazine and People's Forum Network (rmltwz)
Author: Feng Shaolei
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