The Paper's reporter Yu Xiaoxuan
In erder, a border town bordering Armenia in eastern Turkey, snow covers Mount Ararat, Turkey's highest peak. Noah's Ark, recorded in the Book of Genesis, anchored here after the Great Flood, on a mountain just over 30 kilometers from Armenia, overlooking its capital Yerevan in the distance. But it's a land of sojourn, and there has never been a boom in border trade — the border between the two countries has been closed for 29 years.
Fortunately, as Relations between Turkey and Armenia warm up, the small town of Erder seems to be on the verge of coming to life. Flights between Yerevan and Istanbul resumed flights after a two-year hiatus on 2 February. A few weeks ago, Turkey launched talks on normalizing relations with Armenia, and the Armenian foreign minister is expected to visit Turkey in March.
Coincidentally, Turkey and Israel, another "enemy" who often fights against each other, also show signs of normalizing relations. Decades ago, pro-Western Turkey was intimate with Israel, but during President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's more than a decade in power, Turkey distanced itself from the "enemies of Islam." In 2010 and 2018, Turkey recalled its ambassador to Israel twice. Until recently, Erdogan announced that Israeli President Herzog will visit Ankara in mid-March, and Turkish-Israeli relations will enter a "positive new era".
As the domestic economic situation deteriorates, Turkey is trying to open up the diplomatic landscape, moving from bold radicalism to eclecticism. Over the past year, Turkey has been trying to open a new chapter in relations with its once-"blacked-out" neighbors, a list that includes not only Armenia and Israel, but also the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other countries.
On February 2, 2022, local time, two-way flights between Istanbul, Turkey and Armenia were opened on February 2, and a large number of passengers traveled. Pictures of this article People's Vision
The third reconciliation of the "old enemy" in a hundred years
Between 1915 and 1917, during the ottoman rule, a large number of Armenians in Turkey were brutally killed, and the Armenian side claimed that the victims amounted to 1.5 million, which some scholars believe is a genocide of the same nature as the Jewish Holocaust. But Turkey has not acknowledged the existence of an Armenian "massacre", believing that the death toll is exaggerated. This historical event also made turks and Armenians "old enemies" for a century.
Around 1915, Armenian refugees were women and children.
In fact, in 1991, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence from the Soviet Union, but turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia due to disputes over the Armenian "holocaust". In 1992, the two countries tried diplomatic talks for the first time, but as the war in Nagorno-Karabakh escalated, the talks ended in failure. After Armenian occupation of the Kerbajar region belonging to Azerbaijan in 1993, Turkey announced the severance of direct trade relations with Armenia, the closure of border crossings between the two countries and the severing of land, rail and air transport routes.
In 2008, under the impetus of "football diplomacy", Turkey and Armenia began a second attempt to reconcile, and then Turkish President Gül traveled to Yerevan to watch the World Cup qualifiers between Turkey and Asia, becoming the first Turkish leader to visit Armenia. The following year, Sargisson arrived in Burse, Turkey, to watch the two countries play soccer teams again – just a few days after the two sides signed an agreement in Zurich, Switzerland, to end long-standing hostilities, normalize relations, and set a timetable for the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of borders.
However, the reconciliation process has been bumpy under the strong opposition of nationalists in Azerbaijan and Turkey. In 2010, then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan renewed his solidarity with Azerbaijan, withdrawing his support for the Zurich Agreement, and Armenia suspended the ratification process. To this day, the agreement is still under consideration by the parliaments of both countries.
In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia's defeat provided an opportunity for a third reconciliation in Turkey. This time, Azerbaijani President Aliyev also welcomed the normalization talks in Turkey.
"After the new round of nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the situation in Transcaucasia has emerged in a new balanced pattern, and Turkey has begun to improve its relations with Armenia and strive to get rid of Western pressure, thereby enhancing the economic and people-to-people exchanges between the two countries and laying the foundation for opening up a corridor with Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries." The two countries have recently resumed flights and are expected to continue to improve their relations. Zou Zhiqiang, a researcher at the Middle East Research Center of Fudan University, told the surging news (www.thepaper.cn).
Armenia is "wrapped" inland between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea by Turkey, Iran and Georgia, largely excluded from regional transport and energy projects, and opening its borders with Turkey means opening Armenia's gateway to Europe. At the same time, eastern towns like Ödel are also the least developed regions of Turkey, where their economies are deteriorating under the constant pressure of currency depreciation and inflation. Opening the border is undoubtedly a win-win for the economies of the two countries.
However, Zou Zhiqiang also pointed out that the positions of the two countries and the attitudes of the domestic people are still complicated, and it is not optimistic to fully normalize relations. Since Turkey provided direct military assistance to Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, most Armenians still resent Turkey.
On October 7, 2020, in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a bomb that had not yet exploded after being shelled on a local road.
"The main purpose of opening borders is to encourage economic development. But building a 'brotherly' relationship? No, it's not possible. In an interview with French 24 television, one Yerevan resident described his relations with Turkey in an Armenian proverb: "If your enemy becomes your friend, you still have to hold a stick in your hand." ”
On the other hand, as Turkey's general election approaches, Erdogan will also be more cautious about Armenia and avoid arousing dissatisfaction with the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which is allied with the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Israeli President Herzog
Want to get an "empty glove white wolf" from Israel?
While engaging with its land neighbor Armenia, Turkey also wants to "reconcile" with Israel on the other side of the Mediterranean.
On February 3, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Israeli President Herzog would visit Turkey in mid-March, but the Israeli president's office did not respond directly. On February 6, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett said that "it is not excluded that the president will meet with Erdogan." ”
The Times of Israel reported on February 10 that senior Israeli Foreign Ministry officials secretly visited Turkey last month in preparation for Herzog's visit. However, Erdogan announced on January 27 that Herzog's visit was in mid-February, and it is unclear why it was postponed.
Turkey has a decades-long partnership with Israel, and the two countries work closely together militarily and intellectually. Between 1985 and 2000, Israel sold more than $5 billion worth of tanks, missiles, drones, artillery and intelligence equipment to Turkey. But after Erdogan came to power, Turkey became increasingly inclined to support Palestine, and Turkish-Israeli relations gradually became tense.
In May 2010, the Israeli military stopped a Turkish rescue ship bound for the Gaza Strip by force, killing 10 Turks, and Turkey subsequently announced a recall of its ambassador to Israel. In September 2011, Turkey decided to downgrade Turkish-Israeli relations to the second secretarial level and suspend all military agreements between the two sides. Relations between the two countries normalized in 2016 but deteriorated again two years later as the U.S. embassy in Israel was moved to Jerusalem. In recent years, Erdogan has repeatedly "cursed wars" with former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and has declared Israel an "enemy of Islam."
"Improving relations between Turkey and Israel is an important part of improving the diplomatic environment around it." Zou Zhiqiang pointed out that in the face of the isolation in the dispute in the eastern Mediterranean region, in Turkey's view, Israel is an object that can be won, and Israel's natural gas is also one of the sources of imports for Turkey, which lacks energy.
Over the past decade, exploratory drilling along the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon in the eastern Mediterranean has uncovered large quantities of natural gas and oil, making the area a point of contention over maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones (EEZ). In 2020, Israel signed an agreement with Greece and Cyprus on the construction of a natural pipeline in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is planned to start from the coastal natural gas reservoir in Israel's Levant Basin, cross the Eastern Mediterranean, reach the Greek island of Crete, and then pass through the Greek mainland and finally reach Italy. Turkey, also in the eastern Mediterranean, has been resentful of this, but has been excluded from cooperation.
However, there have been reports in recent days that the US government has informed Israel, Greece and Cyprus that it no longer supports the proposed East Mediterranean gas pipeline from Israel to Europe, and the analysis believes that in addition to environmental and geopolitical considerations, the United States also has concerns about excessive costs. And that seems to have given Turkey an opportunity – just days after the news broke, Erdogan announced that Israeli President Herzog would visit Ankara.
"We can use Israeli gas in Turkey, and in addition to that, we can work together to get gas to Europe." Speaking to reporters on a flight back from Ukraine, Erdogan said the issues would be on the agenda during Herzog's visit.
The Israeli media was less enthusiastic about the proposal. An opinion piece in the Jerusalem Post called Turkey's Israeli agenda an "empty glove white wolf," warning that Israel would send gas to Turkey and that Turkey could use those economic gains to continue funding Hamas.
Wang Jin, an associate professor at the Middle East Institute of Northwest University, pointed out to the surging news that natural gas cooperation is only a topic discussed between Turkey and Israel, and Turkey has taken the initiative in this regard, but Israel will not choose to send natural gas from Turkey to Europe. Wang Jin believes that Israel's willingness to reconcile also lies in the series of encirclement of Iran, and asked Turkey to close Hamas's offices in Turkey, and Turkey is forced by economic pressure to seek Israel's help.
Turkey's diplomatic "breakout"?
"Turkey is much bigger than Turkey." This is something Erdogan often emphasizes. Over the past decade, Turkey has used the revival and reconstruction of historical and cultural heritage and memory to raise the banner of "neo-Ottomanism", to some extent achieving the goal of projecting its influence into a broader geopolitical space, but this radical foreign policy has also caused Turkey itself to constantly fall into conflict with its neighbors and traditional allies.
Since last year, relations between Iran, Saudi Arabia and other major countries in the Middle East have eased. Turkey has also begun a diplomatic "breakthrough", throwing olive branches to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and other countries that have previously been in bad relations.
"Changes in the middle east policies of major powers and tensions in the relations between major powers have increased the insecurity and uncertainty of countries in the Middle East, but previous experience has proved that confrontation is not the best choice." Zou Zhiqiang said, "The changes in international relations in the Middle East region have also filled Turkey with a sense of crisis, especially the continuous convergence of Israel's relations with the Gulf countries, prompting Turkey to adjust its policies according to the situation, change its isolated position and maintain regional influence." ”
"Turkey's current economic difficulties continue, inflation is high, erdogan government is facing great pressure from the 2023 general election and the centenary of the founding of the country, and it is urgent to seek economic support and improve the domestic economic situation, stabilize the ruling position, and win the next general election has become its biggest concern." Improving relations with regional powers can yield direct economic benefits. Zou Zhiqiang said.
Such diplomacy also paid off quickly. Last November, Crown Prince Mohammed of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates visited Ankara to sign an energy and infrastructure cooperation agreement with Turkey and also announced a high-profile investment fund of $10 billion in Turkey. On January 19 this year, the two countries signed a $4.9 billion currency swap agreement, which greatly eased the pressure on foreign exchange reserves faced by Turkey's central bank due to the sharp depreciation of the currency.
In early January, Erdogan announced that he would visit Saudi Arabia in February. Shortly after the news was released, The Saudis lifted an informal ban on Turkish goods imposed four years ago, Gulf Online reported.
But Zou Zhiqiang also pointed out that Turkey's current efforts to improve relations with major powers in other regions do not mean a fundamental change in its peripheral diplomacy, but a timely adjustment based on changes in the situation and its own needs.
"Turkey is also unwilling to give up its vested interests and original position in regional affairs, but has only eased its attitude and tone on Regional issues such as Palestine and Libya, no longer adheres to a tough confrontational attitude, and partially transfers interests." He stressed that "improving relations is also a need of both sides and does not mean unilateral concessions by Turkey." ”
Editor-in-Charge: Zhang Wuwei Photo Editor: Chen Feiyan
Proofreader: Yan Zhang