The past is like smoke. The tragic consequences of the soviet invasion of Afghanistan are still worth pondering and studying today.
On December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union blatantly invaded Afghanistan in pursuit of world hegemony. The central leadership of the CPSU thought it could easily take Afghanistan, but it ended up in the quagmire of the Afghan war. The injustice of the Ten Years' War became the last straw that crushed the Soviet Union, and the result was self-evident that the Soviet Union was on its way to collapse.
Afghanistan's strategic location
Afghanistan is located in the central and western parts of Asia, and it has been a place of contention in Eurasia since ancient times, and its strategic location is very important. In the early 1830s, the British invaded Afghanistan and began their colonial rule.
In 1919, the Afghan people finally regained their independence after three anti-British struggles. At this time, Afghanistan was still a constitutional monarchy, and the royal power occupied an important position in Afghanistan. In 1963, King Zahir of Afghanistan forced his cousin Daoud to resign as prime minister by amending the constitution. In this regard, Daoud was dissatisfied with this and found a patron in the Soviet Union, hoping to return to power.
In 1973, Daoud staged a coup d'état while the king was out on medical conditioning and proclaimed the Republic of Afghanistan, after which Daoud became the first president. After Daoud came to power, he pursued a pro-Soviet policy, and the Soviet Union took the opportunity to develop a branch in Afghanistan, the Afghan People's Democratic Party. Because the Soviet Union was so blatant, Daoud was quite dissatisfied with the Soviet Union and began to purge pro-Soviet forces at home.
On April 26, 1978, Daoud abruptly arrested the leader of the Afghan People's Democratic Party. The next day, under the command of another leader of the party, Amin, the army stormed the presidential palace and killed the Daoud family, known as the "Ten-Hour April Revolution in Afghanistan." On the same day, the Soviet Union announced its recognition of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. After the Afghan People's Democratic Party came to power, it followed the example of the Soviet Union everywhere and built socialism at home. Of course, the purge in Afghanistan also intensified under the influence of the Soviet Union.
The focus of the purge of the People's Democratic Party was the "banner faction" headed by Karl Mel. The Soviets, in order to protect KarlMel, managed to keep him in the Soviet Union, which caused Amin's displeasure. Nor did the Soviet Union expect that the democratic republic of Afghanistan, which it aspired to, would be such a state rife with terrorism. At the beginning of 1979, the contradictions between Taraki and Amin, the general secretary of the Afghan People's Democratic Party, became increasingly fierce, and they were like water and fire, and they wanted to get rid of each other. Of course, the Soviet Union supported Taraki, and Brezhnev even warned Taraki that he should be aware of dangers. All of this was detected by Amin in advance and decided to preempt it.
On September 14, 1979, Amin staged a coup d'état, expelling Taraki from the party and making himself President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. After Amin came to power, he openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union, especially after Amin's secret execution of Taraki, and the contradictions between the two sides reached their peak.
The decision of the Soviet Union: not to send troops directly
The CPSU Central Committee was bent on getting rid of Amin, and Brezhnev even felt guilty about Taraki's murder, believing that taraki had not been protected. Faced with the choice of whether to send troops to Afghanistan, the Politburo of the CPSU decided to convene a politburo meeting to study the situation in Afghanistan.
At the meeting, Foreign Minister Gromyko made a lengthy statement, while most of the members only made some concurring interjections. At this point, the agreement to send troops to Afghanistan prevailed. At this point in the discussion, Kosygin asked an important question: "Who will we fight when we must send troops?" For this reason, comrades must first do their work and wait for the development of events. In this way, the Central Committee of the Cpsu asked Kosygin to contact the Afghan government first and make a decision based on the specific circumstances.
After two days of discussion, the CPSU Central Committee reached an agreement on the situation in Afghanistan: for the situation of the Afghan revolution, weapons should be used to support the situation, but not direct troops. Until the autumn of 1979, the policy of the CPSU Central Committee was to temporarily send troops.
Amin comes to power: the Soviet Union decides to send troops
The central committee of the CPSU went from insisting on not sending troops to sending troops to sending troops brazenly to Afghanistan, and this key turning point was that Amin killed Taraki and replaced him. After Amin came to power, he killed Taraki despite soviet opposition, which greatly embarrassed the Soviet Union. In the months that followed, the Amin regime executed "dissidents," plunging Afghanistan into a state of spooky terror.
On October 10, 1979, Andropov, on the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, took Kalmyle to Moscow to plan a plan to replace Amin. On 26 December, Andropov and Gromyko reported to Brezhnev on the issue of sending troops to Afghanistan. On the night of December 27, Soviet special forces directly attacked and killed Amin in one fell swoop, and KarlMail, with the support of the Soviet Union, succeeded him as the leader of Afghanistan.
On December 25, 1979, Soviet troops officially invaded Afghanistan. Although the countries of the world have different views on the soviet union's behavior, they are almost unanimous in condemnation. U.S. President Jimmy Carter demanded an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and an end to interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. But the Soviet Union ignored it, believing that with powerful weapons and equipment, it would be able to quickly end the war. Brezhnev said to the members of the Politburo of the CPSU with great ambition: "We only need to end the fighting in three or four weeks." ”
The harsh reality of war was not as simple as the leaders of the CPSU had imagined. Guerrillas across Afghanistan used guerrilla tactics to pin down a large number of Soviet troops, and the "national jihad" made the Soviets exhausted. During nearly a decade of war, the morale of the Soviet army was getting lower and lower, which eventually triggered the collapse of the "Red Empire".