Tencent shares, the highest-priced stock in the first two cities, "lost in Tianjin"

Per reporter: Peng Fei Wu Zepeng Intern reporter Yang Xia Per reporter Per reporter: Zhang Haini, Yang Xia

How bullish is Tencent (300392, SZ; yesterday's closing price of 7.60 yuan)? After its listing in 2014, it became the highest-priced A-share stock in only two months. How miserable are Tencent shares? Less than 4 years after its listing, the company, which was once on par with Guizhou Moutai (600519, SH; yesterday's closing price of 1969.52 yuan), has come to the edge of the cliff.

Next, qingdao Haoji Asset Management Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Qingdao Haoji), which appeared as a "white knight", became the second largest shareholder of Tencent shares in 2018, and the former A-share stars also showed signs of rebound. According to the original agreement, Qingdao Haoji, which has a state-owned asset background in Qingdao, will officially enter the shares of Tencent through equity transfer. However, in the change of the board of directors in 2020, the sudden failure of qingdao Haoji's two nominated directors laid a discordant foreshadowing for this supposedly beautiful "marriage".

In 2019, the performance of Tencent shares has improved, but in the first three quarters of 2020 and 2021, it continued to suffer a cliff-like decline. At the same time as the revenue declined, the advance payment of Tencent shares increased strangely, which led to the continuous "objection" of the company's directors, and representatives from Qingdao Haoji even directly gave the reason that "it is impossible to judge whether the large advance payment has commercial substance".

The "Daily Economic News" reporter learned in the investigation that as the second largest shareholder, Qingdao Haoji's objections are not unfounded. "It's obviously not a normal way to do business." In the view of a financial person familiar with Tencent shares, the directors continue to raise objections, indicating that the company's problems may already be serious, otherwise there would not be such a violent reaction.

Objection: Two shareholders abstained from voting consecutively

On October 27, 2021, when releasing the third quarter report of 2021, Tencent co., Ltd. also issued an explanation of objection, and the company held the eighth meeting of the fourth board of directors on October 26, 2021 to consider the "Proposal on the Company's Third Quarter Report of 2021", and directors Wu Zhifeng, Dang Guojun and Zhang Shaohua abstained from voting on the above proposal.

In fact, this is not the first time that the above three people have raised objections. As a member of the board of directors of Tencent Shares, Wu Zhifeng abstained from voting on the regular financial report of Tencent Shares for four consecutive times on the grounds that there were major deficiencies in internal control, and Dang Guojun and Zhang Shaohua also voted against the company's 2021 semi-annual report.

For Tencent shares, compared with Wu Zhifeng, the identities of Dang Guojun and Zhang Shaohua are obviously more sensitive. The reporter learned during the investigation that Dang Guojun and Zhang Shaohua are currently working in Qingdao Global Wealth Center Development and Construction Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Qingdao Wealth), and Qingdao Haoji, which is 100% controlled by the company, is the second largest shareholder holding 15% of the shares of Tencent.

For the reasons for abstaining from voting in the third quarter of 2021, Dang Guojun and Zhang Shaohua said that the company's third quarter report in 2021 showed that the revenue fell by 98.09% year-on-year to 5.707 million yuan, and the prepaid accounts rose by 289.3% year-on-year to 545 million yuan, lacking rationality, and the two could not judge whether the large advance payment had commercial substance.

The reporter noted that the balance of Tengxin's prepaid accounts as of the end of September 2021 was 545 million yuan, compared with only 140 million yuan in the same period last year, on the grounds that "procurement resources were prepaid by supplier payments".

"It is obviously unreasonable for listed companies to borrow so much money on the liability side and make some advance payments on the asset side." In the view of a financial person familiar with Tencent shares, these advance payments are returned at the end of each quarter, prepaid again at the beginning of the next quarter, and returned at the end of the quarter, which is obviously not a normal business.

"It shows that the problem of this company is already very serious, otherwise we would not have had such a violent reaction." In mid-January 2022, after Tencent replied to the inquiry letter for the third quarterly report of 2021, a qingdao wealth person said in an exchange with the Daily Economic News reporter.

Rift: State-owned assets into the ownership of the bitter wait for 3 years without success

As the second largest shareholder, the fierce reaction to listed companies is more derived from the direction of the development of Tencent in recent years, which has deviated from the prediction made by Qingdao State-owned Assets in that year.

About 4 years ago, the failure of restructuring, the decline in stock prices, the actual controller's equity pledge touched the liquidation line and other whirlpools appeared together, so that Tencent shares had to face the risk of suspension of stock listing, at that time, the emergence of Qingdao Haoji was like a "white knight".

From the perspective of equity relationship, Qingdao Haoji is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Qingdao Wealth. According to public information, Qingdao Fortune was established in 2012 by the Laoshan District Finance Bureau, and its main business is financial investment, asset operation and real estate development.

Qingdao Haoji, backed by Qingdao State-owned Assets, was first associated with Tencent shares due to a debt in April 2017. At that time, on the eve of announcing the termination of major asset restructuring, Tencent borrowed 220 million yuan from Qingdao Haoji to "replenish blood".

At that time, the situation of Tencent shares was quite embarrassing. The company, which landed on the ChiNext board in September 2014, was listed for less than a year, and its stock price was speculated to 220 yuan (no reinstatement), once surpassing Guizhou Moutai and becoming the highest-priced stock in the two cities.

The good times did not last long, the company whose main business was to provide advertising and public relations services for customers on the Internet, and soon entered the channel of stock price collapse. Especially after 2016, with the company and the actual controller Xu Wei suspected of bribery by the unit, Tencent shares, whether it is the main business or the stock price, are deteriorating.

From 2016 to 2018, Tencent co., Ltd. planned major asset restructuring three times, all of which ended in failure. At the same time, the company's performance has been a loss for two consecutive years, and the company's non-net profit from 2016 to 2018 was -269 million yuan, -121 million yuan and -0.91 billion yuan, respectively.

Qingdao Haoji appeared as a strategic investor. On February 14, 2018, Tencent Co., Ltd. and Xu Wei, the company's largest shareholder and actual controller, signed the Strategic Cooperation Framework Agreement with Qingdao Haoji in Qingdao. On June 5 of that year, Tencent issued a suspension announcement disclosing that Xu Wei intended to join hands with the company's second largest shareholder, Tesser Grand Universe (Beijing) Investment Consulting Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Tessell), to introduce Qingdao Haoji, a partner in line with the company's development strategy.

On September 20, 2018, Qingdao Haoji was transferred to 57.6 million shares of Tessell's unlimited sale conditional circulation shares, becoming the second largest shareholder of Tencent shares, holding 15% of the shares of the listed company.

According to the agreement, after the first purchase of 15% of the equity, the transfer of the actual control of the actual control of the shares held by Xu Wei, the actual controller of Tencent shares, is completed step by step within 12 months after the lifting of the ban, including but not limited to the transfer of agreements and the entrusted voting rights. Subsequently, Liu Xun from Qingdao Haoji was elected as the chairman of the third board of directors of Tencent in December 2018, and the term of office was from the date of deliberation and approval of the board of directors to the expiration of the third term of the board of directors. Next, Tengxin shares, which had been deteriorating in operation, ushered in a major rebound in performance in 2019: during the reporting period, the company achieved operating income of 1.481 billion yuan, an increase of 11.15% year-on-year; and achieved a net profit attributable to shareholders of listed companies of 34.2629 million yuan, an increase of 116.62% year-on-year.

However, the change in the board of directors of Tencent in March 2020 caught Qingdao Haoji off guard. The reporter noted that the day before the release of the 2019 performance express report (February 26, 2020), Tencent announced the announcement of the election of the board of directors, and Liu Xun, Xu Zhuohui and Zhang Shaohua on this list all served in Qingdao Haoji. After the completion of the change on March 12, 2020, Liu Xun and Xu Zhuohui were unexpectedly defeated, and only Zhang Shaohua was left with the directors nominated by Qingdao Haoji. In January 2021, after Yu Yangli resigned, The Dang Guojun nominated by Qingdao Haoji was gradually increased to a non-independent director of the fourth board of directors of Tencent Shares.

"Liu Xun was not elected, which is indeed not normal. But we don't know what the internal situation is, because we are not a party. A person from Qingdao Fortune told the "Daily Economic News" reporter.

"This is the election result of the shareholders' meeting." On the morning of January 19, 2022, in an exchange with the "Daily Economic News" reporter, a person from the securities department of Tencent Shares said.

Strange: 16 of the 31 suppliers in Tianjin

Abstaining from voting on Tencent's regular report should be a direct way for the second largest shareholder to express its dissatisfaction, and there is something deeper behind it.

"As the most valuable asset of a listed company, the cash flow of Tencent shares is not used to carry out real business, but after a large amount of funds are paid out, it is structured into a closed loop of funds, which is obviously only a matter of the surface, and there are some things under the face, which may be the core and essence of the matter (of Tencent shares)." A person familiar with Tencent shares told the "Daily Economic News" reporter.

The "under-the-face matter" referred to by this financial person is related to the large advance payment of Tencent shares. Financial data show that in the past two years, the amount of prepaid accounts at the end of the period of Tencent shares has increased sharply.

According to the announcement issued by Tencent Shares, in 2020, it had a number of large capital transactions with 19 units such as Tianjin Jiuzhou Hongbo International Trade Co., Ltd. and Tianjin Port Transport Zhongxing Trading Co., Ltd., and the payment was paid in advance of the contract and returned by the termination of the contract, with a cumulative payment and refund of 1.928 billion yuan. At the same time, The advance payment of Tencent Shares in the first three quarters of 2021 increased by 350 million yuan, and the ending balance was 545 million yuan, and the company's directors Dang Guojun and Zhang Shaohua said that it was impossible to judge whether the large advance payment had commercial substance. According to the latest reply, in the first three quarters of 2021, There were a total of 12 new prepayment corresponding to Tencent shares.

The reporter's research found that these advance payments and corresponding collection units are more strange.

One of the mysteries, Tencent shares in the 2021 semi-annual report introduced, the company is in the industry for Internet marketing and data services related business, the company's main business is to provide customers on the Internet advertising, public relations and technical services, business involves the entire Internet marketing industry chain links, through the analysis of relevant data, so that advertising and public relations services are more accurate, better service effect. According to conventional business logic, as an Internet marketing enterprise, the main supplier of Tencent shares should also be a unit related to Internet marketing.

This is also true until 2020. In the previous year, the reporter's inquiry found that the annual large suppliers disclosed by Tencent Shares included Beijing Tencent Culture Media Co., Ltd., Baidu Times Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd., Beijing Sina Advertising Co., Ltd., Beijing Sohu Donglin Advertising Co., Ltd., shanghai iQIYI Culture Media Co., Ltd., etc., all of which were closely related to the main business of Tencent Shares. However, in 2020 and the first three quarters of 2021, nearly half of the 31 prepayment units of Tencent co., Ltd. were trading companies and international trade companies. For example, Tianjin Bomei Hongfu Trading Co., Ltd., Tianjin Jiuzhou Hongbo International Trade Co., Ltd. and so on.

Of course, according to Tencent's explanation in the reply to the inquiry letter of the 2020 annual report, it has prepaid a large amount of procurement money for a large number of commercial and trade enterprises, because the company has formulated a new strategic plan for 2020 and added the content of "building a new media e-commerce ecology", so it has participated in and prepared the "Haopin China" national independent brand action plan, and the advance payment for commercial and trade enterprises is to purchase beauty, electronic products and other supply chains.

It should be noted that before the disclosure in March 2021 and the signing of a strategic cooperation agreement with Zhongshang Beidou Supply Chain Management Group Co., Ltd., the sole implementing unit of "Haopin China", Tencent did not publicly disclose the company's strategic arrangements, nor did it state that the company had plans and arrangements to develop e-commerce and supply chain business. Moreover, according to public information, the official release time of the "Haopin China" plan was in May 2020, and Tencent said that it had decided to participate in the plan since the end of 2019, but although a large amount of preparations and large purchases were made in 2020, until March 2021, the strategic cooperation agreement signed by the two sides was actually only a "framework" and "intention" agreement.

Second, more than half of these prepayment units with trade and international trade as the main business are mainly located in Tianjin.

In the reply to the inquiry letter of the 2020 annual report, Tencent shares disclosed 19 advance payment enterprises and contract details, 19 companies, 7 of which are located in Tianjin; In the reply to the inquiry letter of the 2021 third quarter report released recently, Tencent shares also disclosed the new advance payment units in the first three quarters of 2021 as required by the exchange, and the reporter's statistics found that 9 of the 12 companies were located in Tianjin. Therefore, according to the statistics of the companies disclosed above two times, 16 of the total 31 companies are located in Tianjin.

It should be noted that it is uncertain whether There are a large number of suppliers located in Tianjin in recent years. The advance payment units and supplier units disclosed in The 2016 Annual Report, 2015 Annual Report and the 2014 Prospectus of Tencent Co., Ltd. are mainly located in Beijing; the reply to the inquiry letter of The 2017 Annual Report of Tencent Co., Ltd. discloses some of the prepayment suppliers, including Beijing Shuoweisi Public Relations Consulting Co., Ltd. and Baidu Times Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd., which are mainly located in Beijing. After 2017, Tencent rarely disclosed the names of specific suppliers, advance payments and payable units, mainly replacing them with unnamed forms such as "supplier one" and "first place".

Coincidence: The backgrounds of the prepayment units overlap

Specifically analyzing the advance payment unit of Tencent shares in Tianjin, more coincidences and doubts contrary to normal business logic were also displayed in front of reporters.

Coincidentally, the ownership structure and management allocation of these suppliers are extremely uniform. Most of the equity structure is a two-person investment model with an equity ratio of "90%+ 10%", and the management personnel allocation is that the shareholders holding 90% of the shares are also executive directors, managers (or general managers), and the natural persons holding 10% of the shares serve as supervisors; even if there is an enterprise with an individual equity ratio that is not "90%+ 10%" model, its management personnel are still "executive directors, managers (or general managers) + supervisors" allocation.

Coincidentally, among the 7 prepayment units of Tencent in Tianjin in 2020, 5 of them do not overlap with the place of registration, shareholders, senior executives, etc., but the email address contacted is the same: 2761436**qq.com. The five enterprises are Tianjin Anxingda Import and Export Trading Co., Ltd., Tianjin Jiuzhou Hongbo International Trade Co., Ltd., Tianjin Mingyuan Technology Co., Ltd., Tianjin Gangyun Zhongxing Trading Co., Ltd. and Tianjin Yuntaihe Trading Co., Ltd. In addition, the historical or current registered contact numbers of these five enterprises have also coincided or appeared to be "022-235370**".

Coincidentally, the reporter's statistics found that in the first three quarters of 2021, 9 new prepayment enterprises in Tianjin, 6 of which are registered in the Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone (Airport Economic Zone), are hosted by Tianjin Xinzhishang Commercial Secretary Co., Ltd. or Tianjin Xinzhijia Business Secretary Co., Ltd. Because the registered addresses are the same industrial and commercial trusteeship unit, the contact information and mailbox of many industrial and commercial registrations in these 6 enterprises are naturally consistent. These 6 companies also conform to the equity and management allocation model mentioned in "Coincidence 1", and 5 companies have the same name shareholders.

The six enterprises are Tianjin Cinda Rongzhong Trade Co., Ltd., Tianjin Minyue Ruilin Cultural Communication Co., Ltd., Tianjin Oriental Rongxin Technology Co., Ltd., Tianjin Tengda Guanrong Trade Co., Ltd., Tianjin Huizhong Juxin Cultural Communication Co., Ltd., and Tianjin Ruixin Hengxin Technology Co., Ltd. Among them, the shareholders of Tianjin Cinda Rongzhong Trading Co., Ltd. and Tianjin Tengda Guanrong Trade Co., Ltd. are Su Meiyu and Zhang Baozhu. The difference is that the shareholding structure of Tianjin Cinda Rongzhong Trading Co., Ltd. is 90% owned by Su Meiyu and 10% by Zhang Baozhu, the former as an executive director and manager, and the latter as a supervisor; in Tianjin Tengda Guanrong Trading Co., Ltd., the shareholding ratio and position of the two are just opposite. In addition, Tianjin Minyue Ruilin Cultural Communication Co., Ltd., Tianjin Oriental Rongxin Technology Co., Ltd., and Tianjin Huizhong Juxin Cultural Communication Co., Ltd. are related to Guan Yumin and Qi Weihua. Tianjin Minyue Ruilin Cultural Communication Co., Ltd. is a 100% shareholding enterprise of Guan Yumin, which is also an executive director and manager, and Qi Weihua is a supervisor; Tianjin Oriental Rongxin Technology Co., Ltd. is 90% owned by Guan Yumin, and at the same time as an executive director and manager, Qi Weihua holds 10% of the shares and serves as a supervisor; the equity and management personnel allocation of Tianjin Huizhong Juxin Cultural Communication Co., Ltd. are just the opposite.

The shareholders and senior management of Tianjin Ruixin Hengxin Technology Co., Ltd. are 90% owned by Zhang Jinlin, who serves as executive director and manager, and Li Qiaolan holds 10% of the shares as a supervisor. Around the same name Li Qiaolan, there is another "coincidence". Li Qiaolan also holds 100% of the equity of Tianjin Wanxin Hengxing Trading Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Tianjin Wanxin"), and Zhang Jinlin is a supervisor of the enterprise, which is addressed as 902-B, Building 5, No. 158 West Third Road, Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone (Airport Economic Zone) (Tianjin Xinzhijia Business Secretary Co., Ltd. Trusteeship No. 694).

Weird: Rush out and rush back to form a closed loop of funds

From 2018 to 2020, the ending balance of Tencent's prepayment was 135 million yuan, 241 million yuan and 140 million yuan respectively, and the proportion of the company's prepaid account ending balance to operating costs was as high as 9.79%, 16.75% and 13.66% respectively, which was much higher than that of other companies in the same industry by several percentage points or even more than a dozen percentage points.

Cash as the most liquid asset, many companies will try to hold it firmly in their hands, but Tencent shares seem to be a little different.

First of all, the time for the return of prepayments is relatively concentrated, generally at the end of the quarter or the end of the year. Among them, 300 million yuan was refunded at the end of the first quarter of 2020, 500 million yuan at the end of the half year, 640 million yuan at the end of the third quarter, and 460 million yuan at the end of the year. The corresponding monetary funds at the end of each quarter of 2020 were 399 million yuan, 470 million yuan, 410 million yuan and 352 million yuan. Obviously, if the above-mentioned advance payments are not refunded in a timely manner, the company may be in a cashless situation.

The reporter sorted according to the size of the advance payment amount, and found that the pace of funds involving 14 contracts and a total advance amount of up to 1.705 billion yuan was unusually consistent, and then these contracts were sorted according to the advance payment time, and a surprising scene appeared: just after the deadline for the regular reporting of A-share listed companies (December 31, 2019, March 31, 2020, June 30, 2020, September 30, 2020), the funds rushed to "flee". Then hurry back to your place quickly before the next periodic reporting deadline. In a 3-month cycle, funds go in and out of 4 rounds. If you look at the regular report of Tencent shares, shareholders will think that these funds have been obediently staying in the company's account, where to think of avoiding the scrutiny of the eyes, Tencent shares' account actually played the "empty city plan".

Secondly, analyzing the signing time of these contracts and the time when the advance payment began to be paid, it will be found that after the contract is signed, Tencent shares prepay the other party's funds in a very timely manner. Among the 39 contracts, 4 contracts began to advance money to the other party on the day of signing, two of which were paid on the same day, and two were prepaid within one week; 5 contracts began to be prepaid in 2 to 7 days; 11 began to prepay in 8 to 14 days; and 7 began to prepay in 15 to 21 days. In other words, the total number of contracts that began to pay advances within 21 days after the signing of the contract was 27, accounting for 69%. There are only 3 contracts that start prepaid after 90 days.

Again, when the project cannot move forward, these advance payments can be returned quickly and without loss. According to statistics, of the above 39 contracts, the advance payment for 22 (accounting for 56%) contracts was returned to the listed company within 10 days (inclusive) after signing the termination agreement.

What's more, there are unsatisfactory exceptions – before the termination agreement is signed, the money has fled home. The "Network Image Endorsement Cooperation Agreement" signed by Tencent co., Ltd. and Tianjin Jiuzhou Hongbo International Trade Co., Ltd. prepaid 157.185 million yuan, and the contract termination agreement was signed on October 9, 2020, but the money was refunded on September 28 to 30, that is to say, 11 days before the signing of the termination agreement between the two parties, the refund has embarked on the road back. If you notice the deadline for the three quarterly reports of A-share listed companies on September 30, it is not difficult to understand the above behavior.

In addition, Tencent shares did not disclose any loss of advance payment due to the termination of the prepayment project, and the supplier returned the payment in full and in a timely manner.

Finally, the reporter noted that the 19 prepaid supplier contracts disclosed in the company's reply to the inquiry letter of the 2020 annual report actually included two semiconductor equipment import contracts and two game development contracts. In September 2020, the company signed a "Technology Import Contract" with Tianjin Anxingda Import and Export Trading Co., Ltd. to import semiconductor-related equipment, and intends to resell the chip manufacturer after procurement, but this transaction was not successful. Game development also failed due to uneven staffing of the counterparty.

"Channel": 300 million cash but not repaid

Tianjin Wanxin Hengxing Trading Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Tianjin Wanxin) is not the advance payer of Tencent shares, but it can be regarded as a "capital channel party".

The reporter noted that Tianjin Wanxin was established on December 4, 2020, and less than a month after its establishment, the company signed the "Entrusted Payment Agreement" with Tencent on December 29, 2020. The agreement stipulates that Tencent shares entrust Tianjin Wanxin to collect the principal amount of the loan of 300 million yuan returned by the company to Qingdao Haoji before December 31, 2020. After tianjin wanxin receives the above payment, it shall pay 300 million yuan to Qingdao Haoji, and upon completion, it will be deemed that Tencent has fulfilled the repayment obligation of the principal of the 300 million yuan loan.

In the reply to the inquiry letter, Tencent said that the company paid a total of 300 million yuan to Tianjin Wanxin on December 30 and 31, 2020, but Tianjin Wanxin did not pay the above amount in a timely manner in accordance with the agreement due to its own capital turnover problems.

The strange thing is that although there is a debt relationship with Qingdao Haoji, when repaying the loan, Tencent shares did not directly pay 300 million yuan to Qingdao Haoji, but "happily" paid the money to the Tianjin Wanxin account that was not yet full moon.

As for why it signed the "Entrusted Payment Agreement" with Tianjin Wanxin instead of directly paying 300 million yuan to Qingdao Haoji, on January 19, 2022, Tencent shares told the "Daily Economic News" reporter: "I understand your confusion, but we can't say, (can't) give you a detailed interpretation, can only say what is on the announcement." ”

Compared with the happiness of Tengxin shares when paying money, Tianjin Wanxin, as the "capital channel party", played the "dragging word trick" when returning money to Qingdao Haoji. For the reason, the explanation given by Tianjin Wanxin is: the company's own capital turnover problem.

That is to say, less than a month after its establishment, Tianjin Wanxin had a capital turnover problem. A year later, Tianjin Wanxin still failed to complete the payment of 300 million yuan.

According to the information disclosed by Tencent Shares, after repeated urging and issuing the "Lawyer's Letter", Tianjin Wanxin returned 50 million yuan of loans to Qingdao Haoji (Tencent Shares) in March 2021 and returned 20 million yuan to Tencent shares in June 2021. In October 2021, Tianjin Wanxin issued a "Commitment Letter" to Tencent Shares, promising to repay the arrears of RMB230 million by December 31, 2021.

The payment of this amount was also questioned by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. On January 7, 2022, in response to the inquiry letter of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Tencent said that as of the date of this reply, Tianjin Wanxin had returned 70 million yuan in December 2021, and the remaining 160 million yuan had not been returned, and the company would maintain close communication with it and urge it to return the remaining amount.

It is worth noting that the lending relationship between Tencent shares and Qingdao Haoji has become complicated by the emergence of Tianjin Wanxin.

On January 11, 2022, Qingdao Haoji told the "Daily Economic News" reporter: "I don't think it (Tencent shares) is through a newly established third party to pay back that money." (Qingdao Haoji) did not receive the money, and the announcement also disclosed that it did not receive the money. ”

For the reason why Tencent shares do not pay Qingdao Haoji directly, the reporter tried to ask Qingdao Haoji for verification, but did not get a positive answer. As for whether Tianjin Wanxin has the ability to repay, the Daily Economic News reporter asked Tengxin shares, and the company's personnel did not make an evaluation on the grounds of inconvenience. A person close to Qingdao Haoji said: "The real background of this company is not clear to Qingdao, but Qingdao Haoji really did not receive the rest of the money." ”

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