Lingyun
Abstract: In the early days of World War II, the German army was invincible in Europe, and the iron hooves of blitzkrieg ravaged most of Europe, basically without encountering opponents. But on the vast plains of Russia, it was met with stubborn resistance from the Soviets. So when did the German officers and men, who had always been on their toes, begin to feel unable to defeat the Soviet army in the bloodiest and cruel Soviet battlefield?
In the early days of World War II, the German army was invincible in Europe, and the iron hooves of blitzkriegs ravaged most of Europe, basically encountering no opponents. But on the vast plains of Russia, it was met with stubborn resistance from the Soviets. So when did the German officers and men, who had always been on their toes, begin to feel unable to defeat the Soviet army in the bloodiest and cruel Soviet battlefield?
The answer to this question, very clearly, is definitely after the Battle of Kursk in 1943!
The first setback for the Germans in the Soviet Union was under the city of Moscow. In this battle, the Soviets are actually still very meaty, and the defensive strategy is that there is no strategy, just like the kindergarten children playing the war, desperately drawing troops, organizing the people, and encircling Moscow with a circle of defensive lines. The average deployment of troops, completely unfocused, to the beginning of the war, I also feel that this is not OK, I have to predict the most likely direction of attack of the Germans to focus on the layout, the tragedy is that the Soviets misjudged! It was finally resisted by the Germans breaking through to the core of the defensive circle - and here a topic of debate in the circle of military fans in later generations was born: Hitler believed that it was time to grit his teeth and break through at any cost.
But Guderian believed that the German soldiers should not be so depleted, should retire to reorganize, and the battlefield disobedience bar troops withdrew, so he was subsequently dismissed and transferred back to the country. This is the contradiction between Hitler's political perspective and Guderian's military perspective, and here we will not discuss who is right and who is wrong, but from this argument, Germany at this time still retains the right to actively choose the time and place of attack, and choosing right and wrong is another matter.
The next setback was the Battle of Stalingrad, a battle that Germany really lost, but could make Paulus back, and every German fan could say that Paulus couldn't do it, not Germany. Of course, the summary of military experience, strategic and tactical research, can be discussed with german rigor at this time, the peak expansion of German troops has reached the limit, should be closed, should be shortened and shortened, this is a pure military point of view. Unlike the political and propaganda needs of the Battle of Stalingrad, we can admit that paulus's 6th Army knew that it would be surrounded, and he had the opportunity to choose to retreat, but he chose to obey Hitler's orders, did not retreat, and eventually fell under soviet encirclement.
Then Hitler promised that his logistical supplies would not be delivered, and the reinforcements could not break the siege, so Paulus did not fight to the death according to Hitler's requirements, but according to Western tradition, he chose to surrender when he ran out of ammunition. This military fan circle also has the 6th Army can still fight? Is there a need to fight? Will they, with their own misery, give the Soviets an even more tragic victory when there is no doubt of defeat? Thus increasing the psychological burden on the Soviets in future battles? We are not arguing about this here, but it shows that Paulus did have a chance to break through at that time.
By the time of the Battle of Kursk, the pre-war stage of material accumulation between the two sides, the Germans already knew that the longer the time dragged on, the more favorable it would be for the Soviets, but the top level had a weak heart, knowing that it was not good for themselves, or preferred to delay a little time to try to accumulate a little more equipment and materials. After the campaign began, the various units repeatedly played textbook classic examples of warfare, relying on the excellent military quality of the troops, and in the case of inferior troops, they had a variety of tricks to win more with less. Helplessly, the Number of Soviet T-34 tanks was too large, like a torrent of steel, endlessly knocking down layer after layer, Manstein used the same stick of Kharkiv to hit the Soviets twice... Kill three thousand enemies, lose eight hundred, and those who can't survive are actually losing eight hundred of themselves?!
The Germans lost more than two hundred and thirty tanks and destroyed more than two thousand Soviet tanks. The Soviets reported the loss of more than 6,000 tanks and the destruction of 700 German tanks, but after the Battle of Kursk, Germany could no longer organize armored groups that could carry out blitzkrieg warfare, and the Soviets, who had suffered greater losses, had more than a thousand tanks left at that time, which could form armored groups and counterattack on the spot. The key is that among the officers and men lost by the German army this time, there are 30,000 non-commissioned officers and veterans who have fought on the battlefield since the beginning of the war, and the German army without this backbone is less of this backbone, and the soldiers' military quality has been quickly flattened and surpassed by the Soviet Union, and the German army after that seems to have lost its soul.
Before the Battle of Kursk, the German army could fight with only fifteen tanks left in a tank division, and it could also take the initiative to attack, look for the weak points of the enemy, or break through on their own, or build fighters for the brother troops. The Germans after the Battle of Kursk, the SS Panzer Division, which had previously been known for its die-hard fanaticism, would actually be short of twenty-five tanks, and after the exchange of fire, they would desperately go around for help.
What does this mean? It shows that in the Battle of Kursk, although the Soviet losses were greater and the Germans had the advantage tactically, because of this, the Germans thought that they had tried their best, but they had no effect. Or was it heaped up by the Soviet army in the most clumsy way, that is, the Soviets did not need to have more brains, they could continue to push it so flat, and they not only had no other means, but even the means that could be used were less and less... Surrounded by old comrades-in-arms who were originally optimistic and positive and full of spirit, now they are all tired veterans, panicked raw melon eggs, how can this battle continue?
Therefore, after the Battle of Kursk, the German army completely lost the initiative in the Soviet-German battlefield, and the Battle of Kursk was the real inflection point of the Soviet-German battlefield.
(The picture of this article is from the network)