In 1941, the Snow in Moscow was so heavy that the Germans outside the city felt unwilling and miserable in the snow, the Winter in Moscow was so cold that they could only wear single clothes and curl up in the trenches to barely maintain their body temperature, some unlucky eggs had been frozen in the trenches, and many more were suffering from frostbite and had basically lost their combat effectiveness. As for the tanks and cannons that once looked impregnable? They are not what they used to be now, and they have become the winter landscape of Moscow in the low temperature and snowfall, and when they retreat to the rear, they will probably have to leave their things to the Soviets as booty.
There is no doubt that the German army ushered in a tragic defeat in Moscow, which directly disgraced the German army that once threatened Europe. Countless German sticks in later generations looked back on the defeat of the German army, and they all lamented that the failure of the German army was because they wanted to help Mussolini clean up the mess in Greece, otherwise why delay the attack by one month? In short, the Germans believe that all faults are Mussolini's fault, as long as they do not help Mussolini, they will be fine.
In that case, we might as well go back to the german offensive and see if the Germans can recapture the lost January for themselves.
Is it okay not to save Mussolini?
The Best Way for the Germans to spend an extra month was not to help Mussolini, or at least to keep the bald man from attacking Greece. To be honest, the difficulty of getting Mussolini not to attack Greece is estimated to be more difficult than getting Mussolini's bald head to grow hair. After all, the main reason for Mussolini's attack on Greece was to fight Hitler, and he saw that Germany had put its hand into the Balkans and hooked up with Greece, and the anger in his heart came up. In order to prove that the Balkans and other southern European regions were Italy's sphere of influence, Mussolini directly ordered the Italian army to attack Greece.
Obviously, it was too difficult to expect Mussolini not to attack Greece, so we had to consider whether to save Mussolini. If you don't save Mussolini, will it work? To be honest, I really can't ignore this Mussolini. Frankly speaking, Hitler was really angry at that time, thinking that this Mussolini would add to his confusion, and told his advisers that Mussolini was looking for his own death. In the end, as Hitler had thought, the Italian army had lost so much in Greece that it had been counter-attacked by the Greeks to Albania, and what was worse was that the British had sent an expeditionary force to Greece.
Now what? Regardless of Mussolini? Allowing Mussolini to be driven out of the Balkans by the Italians? If the British were to win the victory over the Italians in the Balkans, the British would be able to gain a foothold in southern Europe, and the British would be able to unite with Yugoslavia and completely form a bridgehead in southern Europe that threatened the German flank.
In this way, not to mention the possibility of Hungary and Romania falling to the British, the British could take off bombers in Greece or Yugoslavia and attack the Romanian oil fields was enough to drive Hitler crazy. After all, the Germans mostly relied on Romania for oil supply, and if it was captured, the German armored forces were expected to stop cooking due to the lack of fuel.
Moreover, if Germany does not save Italy, it is estimated that Mussolini will have to step down if he is not in good health, and the main reason for Mussolini's ouster in history is that he lost a feather on the battlefield, and Italy directly ousted him from power. If such a thing happened, it would be that the German rear was unstable, and it is estimated that Hitler would not have to consider attacking the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is not possible not to assist Mussolini, and not to assist Mussolini is equivalent to letting the British pick up the bargain. So in the end, we still had to send troops to help Mussolini. Otherwise, Hitler would not have wanted to attack the Soviet Union, and it is estimated that he would have committed suicide in 1943.
How can it be an extra month?
Strictly speaking, it is a little difficult to attack Moscow a month earlier under the condition that Mussolini must be rescued, but it is not impossible. The jumping Yugoslavia was easy to deal with, with a focus on how to win the battle against the Greek and British expeditionary forces.
Historically, the ground advance strategy was certainly not good, because the progress was too slow, and the biggest problem for the German army in the Greek campaign was not how to defeat the Greek army and the British expeditionary force, but how to quickly annihilate the other side. Greece was a mountainous terrain, which gave the Greek army and the British Expeditionary Force a home field advantage, at least not in terms of defense and retreat.
Historically, the Germans began to attack Greece and Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, and although Yugoslavia announced its surrender on April 17, the Greek and British Expeditionary Forces resisted fiercely, and most of the battle was spent by the Germans pondering how to break through the defensive line and pursuing the fleeing Greek army and the British Expeditionary Force. Historically, the main pursuit method of the German army in the Greek campaign was ground pursuit, which was a tactic of F2 selecting troops and then dividing the troops into combined attacks to try to encircle, which was good in France and Poland, but it was not very good in Greece, a mountainous country.
In reality, the Germans missed out on their warplanes because of the slow movement of ground forces, causing the Greek and British troops to flee south and miss the fighters. If you want to break this stalemate, the best way is to invest a large number of air forces to completely seize air supremacy and repeatedly bomb British troops. As long as the Germans were able to completely control the air superiority, the retreat of the Greek army and the British Expeditionary Force would be greatly slowed down, and if the roads, bridges and crossings along the way were blown up by the Germans, the Greek army and the British Expeditionary Force would be a pipe dream if they wanted to flee south.
The most crucial step in the whole campaign was to send airborne troops as soon as possible to occupy the Corinth Canal Bridge, the only way for the British Expeditionary Force to retreat, as long as the German airborne troops could hold this position to the death, it would be impossible for the British Expeditionary Force to escape.
If sufficient air support could be provided to the airborne troops, the probability of the British Expeditionary Force breaking through here was almost zero, and coupled with the repeated bombardment of the Germans along the way, there was really no reason to think that they would be able to escape. In this way, the Germans were able to completely end the Greek campaign at the end of April, thus giving the Germans enough time to move their troops to the Soviet-German border, and even if the time for the troops to rest was removed, the Germans could still attack the Soviet Union at the end of May.
epilogue
Logically, the Germans could have had an extra month. However, because of the large number of aviation forces, it is questionable whether the air forces participating in the Greek campaign can fill their war with fighters to participate in the war against the Soviet Union. Of course, we can say that the Luftwaffe ground maintenance personnel are more powerful and can quickly repair the aircraft to a good condition, but the bombs thrown down are not so easy to recover. Considering that Germany did not enter the full mobilization of the wartime system at this time, it would take another month to replenish the materials, so it was really difficult not to postpone the offensive.
Reference: Fight and Resistance
World War II
Italy in the War, 1940-1943