The United States published an article analyzing the drawbacks of cleaning up space debris

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In November, the Dutch Elsevier Publishing Group's Space Policy journal published an article "Debris Deterrence: The Drawbacks of Clearing Space", which pointed out that in view of the threat posed by debris to space activities, the government, the military, private companies and the scientific community continue to raise the voice to eliminate orbital debris, and academic journals have also published articles on the importance and methods of removing orbital debris, and NASA called orbital debris "the first major threat to spacecraft, satellites and astronauts" in 2016. But this paper argues that before the international community or startups rush to eliminate the threat of debris, the "second-order effect" of fragment disappearance must be considered. This paper focuses on the cascading effect after debris removal, arguing that the presence of debris can deter hostile countries from malicious space activities to a certain extent, and countries should also study how to avoid weakening debris deterrence while studying debris removal technology.

First, the dual role of debris technology

Space debris is mainly derived from conventional space activities and accidental collisions. In 1985, the United States conducted anti-satellite tests, which produced thousands of pieces of debris in space, and India and Russia conducted anti-satellite tests in March 2019 and April 2020, respectively, creating varying degrees of debris threat. In addition to the threat to space security interests posed by countries with anti-satellite capabilities and the risk of escalating the space arms race, the debris itself threatens international scientific and commercial platforms.

In response to the debris threat, major governments and private companies have developed a variety of clearance techniques, including flynet capture, harpoon capture, tow sail off orbit, high-energy laser burns, and "space fence" tracking. While these innovations have contributed valuable solutions to the debris problem, the technology itself can also be used as an anti-space weapon, such as technology that captures and tows debris can also perform the same behavior on a functioning spacecraft. At present, it is not yet possible to determine the true intention behind commercial space debris removal technology, and governments are racing to achieve technological breakthroughs in this field to get ahead of their opponents, which could trigger an arms race based on space debris removal technology; in addition, debris removal will also have a negative impact on stopping offensive activities against space and weakening the deterrent power of debris to malicious space behavior. This paper argues that before developing solutions to address the weakening deterrent of debris, it is important to understand the theory of deterrence and the link between space debris and deterrence.

Second, the theory of deterrence

In international relations, the theory of deterrence refers to a threat from one state (the sender) to another (the target party) that if the target party takes an action that the sender wants to prevent, it will be punished in some form and at a cost far greater than the benefits of continuing the action. The sender thus deters the target party from continuing to carry out the action. Successful deterrence theory encompasses three elements: commitment, capacity and credibility (3Cs). Among them, the commitment means that the target party should know what actions to avoid; the ability refers to the ability of the sender to only cause sufficient damage to the target without destroying the target, so that the target can bear the cost more than the proceeds of continuing the action; credibility, is to convince the target party of the probability that the sender will implement the deterrence. According to the punishment of the sending party to the target party, the types of deterrence mainly include two types: refusal of deterrence and punishment deterrence, and refusal of deterrence is a military force that threatens to destroy the target, which indicates that the attacking State does not have sufficient military capability to launch an attack, and even if it successfully invades, there is no military force to hold the occupied area. Punitive deterrence involves threatening the territorial or other strategic interests of the target State. Others have proposed other types of deterrence: normative deterrence, which emphasizes the use of norms and legal provisions to block certain types of activities; entanglement deterrence, which focuses on interdependence, i.e., interdependence between two states, as a means of curbing negative behavior (because severing relations would harm the interests of both parties). Deterrence in space refers to the effect of space debris on actions that limit or counter kinetic energy in space.

Third, fragment deterrence

Debris from satellites or other space objects deters or deters violations of international norms and attacks on space objects, increasing costs for space invaders. Removing debris would weaken that constraint, making anti-satellite tests and space hostilities more likely. The article summarizes the following factors that can prevent a country from launching kinetic energy tests or striking an adversary's space interests. First, if a country's adversaries have the capability to destroy space objects, deterrence against adversaries can avoid escalation. The advantage of debris deterrence is that it does not depend on the need to implement norms such as international space law and outer space treaties, nor does it have to consider the credibility of deterrence; Second, a country does not need a specific space capability to punish those who violate space norms or commit acts of aggression, and can use cyberattacks or even conventional military forces to deal with space aggression, even if it does not have a space launch capability, it can deter debris generation.

One of the challenges in applying deterrence theory is how to determine that deterrence can really affect behavior. Some actors will not care about debris or actions that produce fragmentation if they have no significant interest in space. At present, only a few space-launching countries have tested kinetic anti-satellite weapons, and other countries may not consider such tests to be necessary, such tests violate international norms, and debris that may be generated will threaten their own space interests. In most cases, debris deterrence enables kinetic space interception, which provides an opportunity for other countries to pursue other non-kinetic anti-satellite capabilities, such as the launch of non-kinetic anti-satellite weapons with electronic warfare and cyber capabilities. Such anti-satellite weapons not only avoid fragmentation, but also make attribution more difficult and help malicious actors define their activities below the threshold of armed conflict.

Other deterrence options

The key to effective debris deterrence is to maintain an optimal amount of debris, depending on the altitude of the orbit and the actors that need to be stopped, so as to deter hostilities and pose the least threat to a functioning spacecraft.

Currently, about 55 percent of spacecraft in orbit are in low Earth orbit, and most of the space debris also exists in the region. About 35% of the spacecraft in geostationary orbit, medium Earth orbit is mainly used by navigation satellites, and the number of spacecraft is much lower than that in low Earth orbit and geostationary orbit. Debris from higher orbits takes longer to run, but because of the small number of spacecraft, there is less probability of an accident and poses less of a threat. The number and debris of spacecraft operating in low-Earth orbit are relatively large, and the possibility of collision is also greater. In addition, due to the low probability of a secondary collision in the middle Earth orbit, more countries are seeking to conduct satellite weapons tests in the orbital area. Therefore, even if debris acts as a deterrent, States should consider restricting anti-satellite tests in low and medium Earth orbit.

The article suggests that in addition to debris deterrence, the following measures should be taken to curb hostile activities in space. (1) Accountability of the international community. The international community must take steps to strengthen accountability for acts of aggression in space, particularly the deliberate creation of space debris. The Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention already hold States engaged in space activities responsible for the consequences of their space activities and the resulting destruction of orbiting objects, but not all sovereign States are parties to those agreements, and even for signatories, implementation of the agreements depends to some extent on the will of other States to fulfil their provisions. This suggests that international space law requires stronger powers to punish states that produce debris from unauthorized space activities. (2) Definition of space behavior. States could regard the destruction of objects by any fragment as an act of aggression, and if a State's unlawful act in space resulted in a collision, that State would be held legally responsible for its conduct, and the injured State would have the right to take measures or act in accordance with the principle of necessity. Depending on the scale and impact of the harm caused, the unlawful perpetrator may be considered to have committed an "armed attack" and the Directly Attacked State has the right to use force for defence. (3) Alliance Commitments. NATO, under its space policy, can view any hostile space activity that threatens the interests of alliance members as an armed attack on the alliance as a whole. NATO can respond in conjunction with the Alliance using space, cyber or conventional measures. Such an approach would at least discourage some countries from deliberately causing fragmentation, and even a public debate on the subject would have some deterrent effect. (4) Establishment of regulatory bodies. By authorizing a WTO-like body to punish those who violate space-related policies, countries could provide a conduit for potential attacked states to apply for compensation and avoid resorting to military responses escalating into hostilities.

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Source | Dutch Space Policy

Image | internet

Author | Zhang Mingyue

Note: The original source network, the views in the text do not represent the position of this public account, and the relevant suggestions are for reference only.

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