In September 1861, Chen Yucheng symbolically launched a charge, then sighed at tianchang, and then led his army to leave Jixian Pass and move to the northern Anhui region. Then, Zeng Guoquan's "Jizi Battalion" Xiang army conquered Anqing, and then on the pretext of issuing road fares, 16,000 Taiping Army officers were executed, and the defenders Ye Yunlai and Wu Dingcai were killed in battle. For the fall of Anqing, many descendants attributed the reason to Li Xiucheng, and if Li Xiucheng threw himself into battle, the Taiping Army was sure to hold Anqing and defeat the Xiang army.
Hong Renjie, the King of Gan, criticized Li Xiucheng: "Abandoning and ignoring it, in vain as a prosperous place in Suzhou and Hangzhou, once it is frustrated, it will not last long." "So, is this really the case? In fact, even if Li Xiucheng threw himself into battle and supported Chen Yucheng in the Battle of Anqing, the Taiping Army would also lose and suffer more heavy losses.
In the Battle of Anqing, Li Xiucheng did not directly rescue Anqing, and there were three main performances. First, Chen Yucheng returned to Anqing from the Jiangsu and Zhejiang battlefields, and Li Xiucheng did not support the Xiang army in the Battle of the Trailer River. In October 1860, the Xiang army began to attack Anqing, and Chen Yucheng invited Li Xiucheng to act together and go upstream to fight the Xiang army. The result? Li Xiucheng refused Chen Yucheng's request on the grounds that Suzhou and Changzhou were not yet stable.
Second, Hong Xiuquan decided to attack Wuchang in the west and attack the rear of the Xiang army, forcing Zeng Guofan to return to help. According to the regulations, Chen Yucheng led his army to the north road, Li Xiucheng led his troops to take the south road, and then attacked Wuchang. The result? Li Xiucheng recruited troops along the way, but progress was slow, and Chen Yucheng first arrived on the outskirts of Wuchang, but did not carry out siege battles.
Finally, Li Xiucheng arrived near Wuchang, did not see Chen Yucheng, and followed him back. At this time, Li Xiucheng did not go to rescue Anqing, but directly returned to Suzhou and prepared to march east to Jiangsu and Zhejiang. These three points are the basis for posterity to blame Li Xiucheng for not rescuing Anqing. However, even if Li Xiucheng threw himself into battle, the result was still the same.
Can Li Xiucheng's throwing himself into battle change the outcome of the Battle of Anqing? The answer is no, whether Li Xiucheng participated in the Battle of Anqing or not, it will have no impact on the outcome, it will only cause the Taiping Army to die more. The reason is very simple, Li Xiucheng's elite soldiers are not many, there are only a bunch of "miscellaneous cards", and it still needs time to train. Li Xiucheng once said in the "Self-Statement": "At that time, the British king was famous, but my name was not successful, and I calculated everywhere."
In September 1856, the Tianjing Incident broke out, and the elite of the Taiping Army was lost. In May 1857, Shi Dakai went out alone without a word, taking away more than 100,000 people, and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was "no one in the dprk and no general in the country", and the situation was very critical. After the "Five Kings of Shouyi", Chen Yucheng had the most soldiers and horses under his command, and Li Xiucheng did not have many people, and could only assist Chen Yucheng in playing as a substitute.
Before capturing Jiangsu and Zhejiang, Li Xiucheng's strength was very average, far inferior to Chen Yucheng. Therefore, once Li Xiucheng encountered an attack by the Qing army, he could not handle it himself and could only wait for Chen Yucheng to arrive. In July 1860, 200,000 "miscellaneous troops" left Shi Dakai and went north, halfway into the Zhongwang Army, and Li Xiucheng had the corresponding strength.
Soldiers from the north of Guangxi, Li Xiucheng had not yet had time to train, the combat effectiveness was too general, even if he went to Anqing to engage the Xiang army, he would also hit the stone with a pebble and kill himself. The Xiang army adopted the tactic of "encircling points to fight for assistance", digging long trenches, building fences, and building fortresses under Anqing City, and confronting the Taiping Army in the city for a long time. At this time, the Xiang Army, relying on the strength of the powerful marine division, blockaded the Yangtze River and cut off the grain transportation line of the Taiping Army, occupying an advantage.
Under the tactic of "encircling points and attacking for reinforcements", the Taiping Army could not defeat the Xiang Army, and no matter how many people there were, they were in vain. The reason was simple: the Taiping Army lacked heavy weapons and could not destroy the Xiang Army's fortified barracks. Moreover, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had no water division, the control of the Yangtze River fell into the hands of the Xiang Army, the logistics supply of the Taiping Army was not good, and the grain transportation line was cut off by the Xiang Army, which could not support the war of attrition and tug-of-war.
In October 1862, the Battle of Yuhuatai broke out, and Li Xiucheng led an army of 200,000 to fight a decisive battle with 20,000 Xiang troops, which lasted for 44 days. The result? The Xiang army hid in the camp, the Taiping army could not conquer, the logistics could not keep up, can only lead the troops to retreat, Zeng Guoquan laughed to the end.
Without heavy weapons and the assistance of powerful sailors, how could the Taiping Army win the Battle of Anqing? Even if Li Xiucheng led 200,000 "miscellaneous troops" to support Chen Yucheng in the past, the result would only increase casualties and would have no effect at all. Moreover, during the Battle of Anqing, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had already invested a lot of troops, and Chen Yucheng, Yang Fuqing, Huang Wenjin, Liu Guanfang, Lin Shaozhang, Hong Renjiu, Jin Ai, wu Dingcai, and so on all participated in the battle.
Inside and outside Anqing City, the total number of the Taiping Army was close to 200,000, and the Xiang Army was about 60,000. The result? Chen Yucheng commanded all the soldiers and horses and launched a continuous attack, but even Li Xuyi and Duo Long'a could not handle it. For several months, the Xiang army's outer defense line was solid, and the Taiping Army reinforcements were blocked outside Anqing, failing to contact the defenders inside the city.
Chen Yucheng played in such a way, except for his own need to guard the base, no one was willing to continue to fight, to fight a battle with no hope of victory. For this reason, Chen Yucheng and various generals often quarreled, and the contradictions between them were very sharp. Later, Chen Yucheng was trapped in Luzhou, and no one was willing to go to the rescue, and this was the reason.
Backward weapons, lack of water divisions, poor logistics supplies, the Battle of Anqing was doomed to failure, and it had little to do with whether Li Xiucheng came to reinforcements or not. If Li Xiucheng came to reinforcements and attacked the Xiang army with Chen Yucheng, it would only increase the number of casualties and would have no practical significance. Li Xiucheng's army was crippled again, the Taiping Army could not capture the Jiangsu and Zhejiang regions, and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom may not survive in 1864 and perish two years ahead of schedule.
Fighting in the Jiangnan region, where the rivers crisscross the river crisscrosses, the Taiping Army did not have a strong water division, it was innately insufficient, and it was very difficult to win the victory. If the Taiping Army wanted to win victory, it first solved the problem of water divisions; if it wanted to establish a water division, it must seize the Jiangsu and Zhejiang regions, enhance economic strength, and get in touch with the great powers.
Bibliography: History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom