(Continued from the previous issue https://www.toutiao.com/i6708875923225051660/ )
Arriving in northern Shaanxi, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Red Army, which had been replenished by the Eastern Crusade, did not completely relax, and there was also a heavy heart disease in their hearts, that is, as the most vital force of the Red Army at that time, the Red Fourth Front, including Zhu De, the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, was still wandering away under the hostage of Zhang Guotao and did not obey the command of the CPC Central Committee. Not only that, Zhang Guotao even set up a separate "central government".
Zhang Guotao
In January 1936, Zhang Hao (Lin Yuying), a representative of the Comintern, communicated with him by telegram and conveyed the instructions of the Comintern, but Zhang Guotao was still in a period of hesitation, and the Red Fourth Front, in its continuous misjudgment of the situation, blindly commanded, carried out a long-term continuous long-distance operation, which was very attrition.
Zhang Hao (Lin Yuying)
According to the situation in the northwest region, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided to find another base area to open up, form a Western Field Army, with Peng Dehuai as commander and political commissar, to carry out a western expedition, attack Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin, open up a new foothold, and plan for the Red Second and Sixth Armies and the Red Fourth Front to go north (note that the Western Route Army will not be soon).
Before the departure of the Red Army's western expedition
On May 19, 1936, the Western Field Army dispatched and completed its scheduled mission at the end of July. A total of 7 battalions of the Kuomintang army were annihilated, 3 regiments and 5 battalions were destroyed, more than 2,000 people were captured, more than 2,000 guns of various kinds were captured, more than 500 war horses were captured, more than 10 towns were occupied, and new areas of more than 200 kilometers were opened on the border of the three provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia.
From the beginning of the Western Expedition to October 22, when the three main divisions of the Red Army met, the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission issued nearly 100 enemy information circulars and reports to ensure the operation of the Western Field Army.
After the end of the Western Expedition, in order to coordinate the Red Second and Red Fourth Fronts to move north, achieve greater capture of Ningxia, open up the Soviet Union, and cooperate with the strategic vision of the Northeast Army to establish a northwest defense government (this is the purpose of the formation of the Western Route Army in the future), Mao Zedong ordered the Western Field Army to assemble in Yuwangbao, Hongde, and other places east of the Qingshui River in Ningxia to be put to rest and prepare for war.
In 1936, the Red Second and Fourth Red Fronts successively arrived in Gannan. Cao Xiangren of the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission led a capable forward task force of the Second Bureau to the headquarters of the Western Field Army to provide intelligence for the three main divisions and the Ningxia operation.
Group photo of the leaders of the Red Second and Sixth Armies
On the Kuomintang side, the "Two Cantons Incident" ended, the Kuomintang army pulled out again, and the southern huzongnan, who was transferred south, began to return to Gansu from Hunan in an attempt to prevent the Red Army from joining the division.
Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Zongnan
In early September 1936, the main force of the Red Army began to advance westward, while the Red Second and Red Fourth Fronts marched northeast, forming a corresponding trend on the north and south sides of the Sealand Avenue.
Because Pan Hannian finally arrived in northern Shaanxi, handed over the secret code of the Comintern written in his head, finally reopened the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which was in communication with Moscow, and immediately reported to the Comintern the next deployment and development direction of the Red Army.
On September 11, 1936, the Comintern replied: "Agree to your plan to occupy the Ningxia region and western Gansu." At the same time, it was resolutely pointed out that the Red Army could not be allowed to advance further towards Xinjiang, lest the Red Army break away from the main areas of China. After occupying the Ningxia region, we will help you. ”
On September 14, 1936, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China telegraphed the above situation to Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, and Ren Bi, it made a plan to seize Ningxia: instructed the main force of the Red Fourth Front to immediately move north, control the Sealand Avenue, prevent Hu Zong's southern advance to the west, and prepare to join forces with the Red Army to seize Ningxia; and demanded that the Red Second Front Army undertake the task of clamping down south of the Sealand Avenue; "The three fronts must use the greatest efforts and the closest unity to go there."
Mao Bingwen
At this point, Zhang Guotao was still hesitant about whether to move west or north, and the Kuomintang army, the vanguard of the southern Huzong army, which was advancing west from Baoji, had already moved closer to Wang Junbu of the Kuomintang Third Army.
On the morning of September 24, 1936, the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission urgently reported that the Divisions of Mao Bingwen and Wang Junbu Zeng Wanzhong of the Kuomintang Army had successively captured Tongwei, Maying, Huajialing, Huining and other places, and Huzong had entered Jingning in the south. The southern part of Huzong, which was constantly "pursuing and advancing backwards" to the north, exerted pressure on the Shaanxi-Gansu region and also posed a serious threat to the Red Fourth Front, which crossed the Yellow River and advanced westward.
At this time, although according to the instructions of the Comintern telegram, Zhang Guotao had abolished the "Second Central Committee" and established the Northwest Bureau headed by him. But Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China still did not have authority over the Red Fourth Front. Mao Zedong sensed: "Guotao has the intention of going out of Liangzhou and not going out of Ningxia."
The three main forces of the Red Army will meet the divisions
On September 28, 1936, the headquarters of the Western Field Army was changed to the General Headquarters of the Former Enemy under the order of the central authorities, with Peng Dehuai as the commander-in-chief and political commissar of the former enemy, and Liu Bocheng as the chief of staff, commanding the three fronts of the army in a unified manner.
The Forward Task Force of the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission was renamed the former General Second Section, with Cao Xiangren as the section chief, and its members included Tang Daode (Tang Ming), Zhao Binyu, and Ye Gen. On the same day, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission sent a telegram to the heads of the armies of all sides: "At present, we are at a critical juncture of change, and it is advantageous for the three fronts to close to combat, and it is advantageous to disperse the operations [then], and there is a risk of being cut off by the enemy and broken through each one.", and ordered the three fronts to "immediately assemble in favorable positions, resolutely make a surprise attack within a few days, eliminate the first division or two divisions of the Hu enemy, and resist Jingyuan Mao and Wang with small units."
Cao Xiangren
On September 30, 1936, Peng Dehuai informed the various departments according to the intelligence of the former Second Section: the enemies Hu, Wang, and Mao, who were advancing northward, advanced in three ways in an attempt to take advantage of our half-crossing and seek a decisive battle. After the enemy had seized the sea, dry, fighting, jing, and avenues, they pressed north in unison.
Peng Dehuai was ready to concentrate his forces in the valley between Haiyuan and Dalachi to seek out and chase the 43rd and 97th Divisions of the Red Second Front, and to combat the arrogance of Hu Zong's southern army advancing northward.
History proves that short-sighted people are ultimately short-sighted! At this time, Zhang Guotao once again "drew salaries from the bottom of the cauldron" and ordered the Fifth Red Army to cross the Yellow River in the west at a regiment near Jingyuan, and the Fourth Army and the Thirty-first Army of the Red Fourth Front withdrew to Xingrenbao and Tongxincheng behind the flank of the Red Front, causing Peng Dehuai to abandon the plan for a naval campaign. The Red Army was forced to move eastward, causing the Red First and Fourth Fronts to join forces to attack Hu Zongnan and abort the plan to seize Ningxia.
In the autumn and winter of 1936, a total of 260 regiments of the Kuomintang army surrounded the northern Shaanxi regiment, and only by stopping the attack of the Nationalist army could the Ccp reverse its passivity and seize the conditions for survival.
In the Kuomintang area, directly under the instructions of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Pan Hannian contacted the brothers Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu in Nanjing, saying that as long as the offensive stopped, the Red Army was willing to accept the reorganization and cooperate in resisting Japan. However, Pan Hannian reported to the Central Committee that Chiang was trying to "drive the entire Red Army to Outer Mongolia and give it to the Soviet Union to resolve this contradiction." The harshness of the conditions is unacceptable to the CCP.
On November 10, 1936, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram ordering the Red Army crossing the Yellow River to form the "Western Route Army", with commander-in-chief Xu Xiangqian, political commissar Chen Changhao, deputy commander-in-chief Wang Shusheng, chief of staff Li Te, director of the Political Department Li Zhuoran, and director of the Political Protection Bureau Zeng Chuanliu. The most tragic expedition in the history of the Chinese Communist army's expedition began.
In mid-November 1936, the Suiyuan War of Resistance broke out again, the Sino-Japanese negotiations reached a stalemate, and the wave of anti-Japanese resistance in the whole country rose, but Chiang Kai-shek still mobilized 20 divisions to attack north from Huining, Jingning, and Guyuan, Ningxia, Gansu. Mao Bing's ministry of culture prepared to cross the Yellow River in the west to pursue the Red Army's Western Route Army.
Peng Dehuai, who was in the former enemy, relied on the uninterrupted reconnaissance of the enemy by the former General Second Section and constantly reported to the Central Military Commission the enemy situation on the front line: The Zhou and Kong divisions entered and occupied Guanqiao Fort, Ding Delong's troops entered luojiashan and Wangjiawan, Hu Shili brigade entered and occupied Machun Fort and Guxian Prefecture, and three infantry regiments and a cavalry regiment of the Ma Division may enter Shangxia Longchi Bay and Hejiabao tomorrow. The Kuomintang army was fierce, and the plan originally planned to ambush and annihilate Hu Zongnan's troops on the front line of Guanqiao Fort was also difficult to realize because the Nationalist army was fierce.
The question of whether the CHINESE Communists and the Red Army can survive in northern Shaanxi has once again become apparent. The Party Central Committee is already considering implementing a "new operational plan" of abandoning northern Shaanxi and moving south.
At midnight on November 12, 1936, the former Second Section of the General Headquarters and the Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission once again made a miracle, and through technical investigation, successively reported that Hu zong's lone army in the south was advancing deep and was advancing to Yuwang Fort to the east. The turning point of the Red Army suddenly appeared.
On November 13, 1936, the Red Army began to assemble at Yuwang fort.
At 12:00 on November 14, 1936, Peng Dehuai issued a combat order to attack Hu Zong's southern flank and back, and informed the enemy according to the report of the Second Section: "The four divisions of the enemy Hu Zongnan yesterday entered tongxin city, Wangjia Tuanzhuang, and the line of nine hundred households..."
On November 15, 1936, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order: "At present, the center is to break the enemy's offensive,...... Otherwise, the enemy will regard us as a deception, and not only will the situation not be able to unfold, but it will also be impossible to unite with the united front in Nanjing." "If you don't break through, you can't go south, because the enemy will continue to pursue it." In order to ensure that Zhang Guotao's interference was eliminated, the Central Military Commission stressed that the heads of all corps must absolutely obey the orders of Peng Dehuai, the commander-in-chief of the former enemy, and that the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the Headquarters of the Red Army did not directly command the corps.
With limited strength, the former Second Section of the General Headquarters closely monitored the movements of various units of the surrounding Kuomintang troops.
At 1:00 and 3:00 a.m. on November 18, 1936, Peng Dehuai sent telegrams to He Long, Ren Bishi, and others, as well as to Mao Zedong, to report the enemy's situation again: The First Brigade of Hu Enemy attempted to advance toward Mengcheng and Sweetwater Fort, and Ding's division attacked the mountain castle. ...... The Zhou and Kong divisions did not seem to move near Yuwang County. On the same day, Zhou Enlai, who had arrived from northern Shaanxi to greet Zhu De and Zhang Guotao, arrived at the general headquarters of the former enemy in Helianwan, Hongde County, and worked out with Peng Dehuai a battle plan for the battle of the mountain castle.
At 19:00 on November 20, 1936, the former commander-in-chief issued a combat deployment for the 21st, informing the enemy's movements: the enemy Ding and Kong divisions entered the Zhanshan Castle and its east on a daily basis, and one of them confronted our Twenty-eighth Army yesterday (nineteenth). Hu's 1st Division was its reserve of two roads. Zeng Shi had the possibility of entering Wangjia Tuanzhuang and Yuwang County. Judging ding and Kong liangshiming (twenty-one) riyou eight mile paving to the Yu family Wanzi is fully likely .... "Our army is expected to encounter the annihilation of ding and Kong divisions and the purpose of each breaking Hu Zongnan's main force..."
On the afternoon of November 21, 1936, the main force of the Red First Army and the Red Fourth and Red Thirty-first Armies each joined forces to launch a centripetal assault on the mountain castle from the north, east and south.
At noon on November 22, 1936, the battle ended with the victory of the Red Army. Hu Zongnan's 1 brigade of the 78th Division of the First Army (Ding Delong Division) was annihilated, and the army retreated in its entirety, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to suspend the large-scale offensive against the Red Army. Mao Bing's ministry also stopped pursuing the Western Route Army, relieving the pressure behind the Western Route Army. (To be continued)