Basic Concepts
Basic concepts
(Chinese Phenomenology Library, Phenomenological Classics Translation Series, Heidegger Series)
[de] Heidegger
Translated by Zhang Ke
Introduction:
Basic Concepts is a lecture given by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg in the summer semester of 1941 and is now volume 51 of Heidegger's Complete Works. In this book, Heidegger understands the "basic concept" (Grundbegriffe) as "Grund-Begriffe" [according to the concept], and he thinks of concepts that provide a basis for everything and need to use the person in its essence, such as: "existence", "basis", "beginning", "existence and man", and so on. The central theme of the book is thus the fundamental problem of Heidegger's thought: the question of the existence of a human connection. In addition, the core expression of Heidegger's later thought, "The Mandate of Existence", has been formally raised in this book as a strict ideological wording, and this book is thus an important text for the study of Heidegger's idea of "The Mandate of Existence".
About the Author:
Martin Heidegger (26.09.1889 – 26 May 1976) was a famous German philosopher, one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, the founder of existential philosophy, and one of the main representatives of phenomenology.
Translator's Bio:
Zhang Ke, born in April 1977, doctor of philosophy from Nanjing University, professor of the Department of Philosophy of Guizhou University. He has been engaged in the teaching and research of German philosophy for a long time, and has published a monograph "Thoughts on the Road: Heidegger's Existential Thoughts on Differences" (Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 2012), and published more than ten papers in CSSCI journals such as Fudan Journal, Journal of Sun Yat-sen University, and Confucius Studies. He has been engaged in the translation of Heidegger's works for a long time, and has been the translator of the first volume of the complete collection "Early Works" (main translation), volume 1 "According to the Law" (solo translation), and volume 16 "Speech and Biographical Testimony" (co-translation) in the "Heidegger Collection" series of the Commercial Press. In addition, he independently translated the Correspondence between Heidegger and Ernst Jung (Nanjing University Press).
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If we say that existence is the most understandable thing, the most spoken thing, the most forgotten thing, then isn't this what is named here — it should simply be attributed to existence, as long as it is in an after-the-fact connection with our understanding, our words, our forgetting? Isn't all this thing that belongs to us such a thing - it belongs to the human apparatus, to the apparatus of the human subject, and therefore everything which is connected with it immediately fades into a "subjective thing"? But we supposedly should think about existence itself (selbst), that is, thinking about existence "an sich", that is, thinking about existence "objectively".
But isn't everything that is related to man and prescribed from this association in fact already immediately "subjective"? If so, why did "subjective things" immediately become suspicious again? In any case, subjective things exist only where a "subject" exists. But the question has always been whether man is fundamentally a subject and only a "subject", and whether man's essence is limited to being a subject. Perhaps only the modern and "most modern" man is a "subject", and perhaps there is a basis for this, but these bases are not sufficient to guarantee that the historical man, whose history we are ourselves, must be, and always be, a "subject". For all of this, it may be necessary to clarify what it means for man to be a "subject." What if this is precisely for the kind of person who is the subject and can provide the being as an objective thing? What if, in the most modern modern times, a kind of "objectivity", an objectivity that has never been known in history before, has been attained? This situation arises only because man becomes the subject. Subjectivity does not already mean the exclusion of truth.
Whatever we want to ask and answer these questions, what the rules of existence (according to these rules, existence is the most understandable, the most spoken, the most forgotten) mean the things that are always explicitly concerning man and man's way of acting (understanding, speaking, forgetting), and existence is therefore thought out of its relation to man, understood in human form, and therefore seen as "human-like." (anthropomorph) and thus anthropomorphized. We do not enter into the connection with existence itself, but at best we move toward the kind of existence that we humans imagine.
We have in fact not even noticed this difficulty, and we have allowed the danger to persist, namely that we are not thinking about existence itself everywhere but merely "anthropomorphizing" existence. While this anthropomorphism of existence can always give us an overview of existence itself (albeit a vague overview), we are faced with a greater doubt that threatens to destroy all the contemplation of existence that is now being attempted.
We say that existence is "the most empty thing," "the most intimate thing," "the most understandable thing," and "the richest." Existence is "ist"—Well, in this kind of discourse, isn't existence (since we speak of it as something "existing"[ist]) irretrievably become a being, and thus precisely the kind of thing it is supposed to be fundamentally different from it? We can pile these assertions of existence endlessly, but they are in fact invalid in the first step, for for us the assertions in the form of "existence is..." have destroyed in advance what we are trying to grasp, namely, existence distinct from the being. But if existence immediately appears to us as something, the kind of thing that different things "are", can existence, without taking into account whether we have given human characteristics to it when we make appearances to it, be able to appear here fundamentally as existence? Wherever, whenever existence is mentioned, it is meant that it is immediately and only the being.
From this point of view, the "natural" way of thinking wins its complete justification defense. The habitual opinion is everywhere stubborn in the existence of beings, and interprets the so-called existence as an "abstraction", as an unrealistic empty word, which it is this empty word that makes all thinkers who trace existence into fools. Thus it becomes clear that the neglect of existence and the forgetting of the questionability of existence may follow the typical view that, in the case of existence, there is nothing serious to ask everywhere. The conventional wisdom thus adheres to the fact that only those who exist are "yes/exist" (ist).
True – there is only a Being, but what "is" with it? It, the being, ist. So what does it mean: it is/exists (ist)? Where does it exist? When we subscribe to the aforementioned doubts, disregard or even remove existence as an abstraction and thus accept only the being, what is the phrase "the being is/exists" (Das Seiende ist)? Then only the "beings" remain. But what does it mean to be "bleibt" (existential)? Is what this sentence means different from the following sentence: Beings and only "Beings" and "beings" and "beings"? When we want to just insist on the Being and avoid the "abstraction" of existence, very strongly only to stay in the Being, and thus say, "The Being is the Being," then we still say "yes/exist" and therefore still think from existence. Existence strikes us again and again, and it strikes us as something we cannot think of.
Thus we are between two equally inescapable boundaries: on the one hand, when we think about existence and say "existence is/exist", we immediately make existence a kind of being and thus deny the original cause of existence (Werk): Existence is abandoned by us (DasSein wird von uns verworfen). But on the other hand, no matter where we experience a being, we still cannot deny "being" and "being." For, if we do not experience a being as a being, that is, experience it with an eye to existence, how can it be a being for us?
Existence has thrown and thrown itself at us. Existence: Throwing oneself at us and being abandoned by us may seem like a "contradiction." However, we do not want to intercept what is opened here into a formal pattern of formal thought. If this were the case, everything would simply become thin in nature and devoid of essence under the appearance of a "paradoxen" wording. On the contrary, we must try to experience that we, placed between these two boundaries, are placed in a unique aufenthalt from which there is no way out. But when we find ourselves placed in this state of no way out, we will notice that even this greatest state of no way out may arise from existence itself. Those dominant sentences all in fact all indicate a peculiar duality of existence.
When the activity of questioning encounters many seemingly insurmountable difficulties in the manner just pointed out, when the mind finds itself placed in a situation where there is no way out, then the thought can still help itself out of the predicament in the way it used to think. Although we have rejected the most relevant approach, namely, to identify a contradiction and to play it as if by a "paradox"—for [this practice implies the abandonment of thought, and] the abandonment of thought is perhaps the saddest way for the mind to solve its task—one can have other ideas, in the same way of thinking which has been used in the usually popular philosophical questions, with a view to the state of no way out which it has now arrived, Rather, in view of this situation where there is no way out (on the one hand, existence can become inescapable, but on the other hand, when one discusses existence, existence is immediately made into a kind of "being", thus depriving existence of its essence), people simply abandon the question of existence and declare it to be a pseudo-problem. But perhaps people also decide to acknowledge this now revealed state of no way out (dilemma). One must then somehow come to an understanding of this state of no way out. In these cases, the popular practice — aus der Not eine Tugend macht — has saved. Correspondingly, we can say in view of our state of no way out: existence is precisely forced into this thing that has no way out and has taken the thing itself. Thus existence itself shows that it is such a thing, that it is at the same time two cases: it is inevitably manifested and still unattainable. Existence in this way shows itself to be this kind of thing, this state of no way out, and this is precisely the essence of existence. This state of no way out, as if brought about by existence, is a characteristic sign of existence. Thus we regard this state of no way out as a predicate, and with the help of this predicate we win the decisive assertion of existence. That is, in every attempt to think about existence, existence is subverted into a being and thus destroyed in essence; nevertheless existence does not deny that it is different from all beings. Existence itself has precisely the nature that it brings man's mind into this state of no way out. If we know this, we already have an essential understanding of existence.
But do we really "know something" about existence, or do we simply find out how existence is about us and our thoughts in that attempt to grasp existence? In fact, all we gain is the insight that we are incapable of grasping existence itself. As long as we are content to merely propose this state of no-way, we have identified an "embarrassment". But with this assiduousness, which seems like an important insight, we close our eyes to the realm of stay, the one in which we have always been, though completely ignored. For we need to be present in all our dealings with beings. But we can still think of the alternative possibility of our position, namely, that we neither turn our eyes closed to this state of no way out, nor do we impersonate this state of no way out itself and its identification as wise conclusions, but we prefer and first look around in this situation of no way out, and exclude all hasty intentions of detachment from it.
When we speak of existence, existence is made "being" by us and is thus abandoned (verworfen). But existence has always been thrown at us (zugeworfen). Throw it away and throw it at the same time, no matter which direction you look at, there is no way out. What if any lack of direction of way out no longer allows us to think of a way out, that is, if we first set foot in a place where there is no way out imaginary and become familiar with it, rather than pursuing the usual "way out"? What if the "way out" of our needs (beanspruchen) stems from the demands of Ansprüchen, which are always incompatible with the essence of existence and which arise only from the desire for beings? What if the thing that has no way out (which, when we want to grasp existence, puts us in this thing that has no way out) must first be taken as a hint that we have been placed in what way we have been fundamentally placed (we are dealing here with beings) as a hint?
This kind of "no way out" does not mean a situation, and we cannot equate it with some kind of everyday "situation" of common behavior, or even if it is just a comparison. Such a place implies a still hidden realm of sojourn, to which the origin of the essence of our history is attributed. As long as we try to make this realm of dwelling known through those historical descriptions—the historical descriptions of the many processes that can be known in the historical sense—we have not cut to this realm of dwelling. For this realm of stay is such a thing that it is related to our essence. Whether we know this or whether we simply move into a kind of contemplation is not decisive.
So what if we may not know where we are and who we are? What if so far many of the answers to that question (who are we) have been based solely on a random application of an answer that has already been given, and that this answer is not at all commensurate with what might be asked in the question which is now touched upon (who are we)? For now we do not question us as "human beings" at all, assuming that we understand the name human in the traditional sense. In the traditional sense, man is a kind of "animal" (ζῷον [animal]), only one of the creatures on earth and in the universe in which it inhabits. We know this creature, especially since we ourselves belong to its type. There is a great deal of "science" that gives knowledge about this creature, which is called "man," which is collectively referred to as "anthropology." Some books are titled with arrogant headlines like "Man," and they pretend to know who man is. It is as if the view of American pseudo-philosophy, which today German science is embracing too ardently, has expressed truth about man.
We can also arbitrarily identify the creature "man" in a most different, narrower, or wider region, for example in a narrower or wider range of its daily activities, or in a region as vast as the Earth, which is only one of hundreds of millions of stars in the vast universe. Nietzsche begins his treatise On Truth and Lies in the Immoral Sense: "In some remote corner of the universe, which has shimmered with countless solar systems, there was once a star on which intelligent animals invented cognition. It was the proudest and most deceptive moment of 'world history' (Weltgeschichte): but only a moment. After a few breaths of nature, the star will solidify, and the intelligent animals will have to die. Man: An animal that appears in "nature" with intelligence (reason), i.e., animal rationale.
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By the german master [de] Ludiger Safransky
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Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness [de] by Edward Fon Hartmann
The Phenomenon of the Heart [Switzerland] by Geng Ning
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Memories of Edmund Husserl Ni Liang Kang, ed
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